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ABSTRACT	  
	  
The	  Life	  and	  Death	  of	  Mass	  Media	  
Natan	  Dotan	  
	  
There is a paradox in our understanding of the media today. Popular accounts often 
proclaim that mass media is dead while newspapers routinely report that new Hollywood 
box-office records have been smashed. In this dissertation I aim to resolve this paradox 
and to determine whether or not mass media is in fact in terminal decline. I propose two 
new concepts – the principle of cheap publicity and the mass media tendency – and I use 
a computer simulation to demonstrate that these provide a parsimonious explanation of 
the paradoxical structure of today’s dominant media. This leads me to the conclusion that 
mass media is not in terminal decline; rather, there has been a shift in the social locus of 
mass media. Throughout most of the American 20th century, massification played a 
central role in the guiding logic of media firms. Beginning in the 1970s though, these 
firms began adopting strategies of audience segmentation. In the decades since this 
rupture mass media has lived on as the emergent outcome of audience behavior rather 
than as an innate characteristic of media technologies or institutions. I discuss the 
implications of this finding for the structure of the contemporary American public sphere 
and for the experience of publicity today.	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CHAPTER	  1	  
THE	  NEW	  PUBLIC	  SPHERE	  
	  
At	  some	  point	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  we,	  the	  public,	  became	  a	  mass	  public.	  We	  had	  been	  
a	  public	  by	  virtue	  of	  our	  participation	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  –	  that	  sphere	  of	  social	  life	  
where	  things	  were	  said	  and	  done	  in	  view	  of	  anyone	  who	  wanted	  to	  watch	  –	  but	  we	  
became	  a	  mass	  public	  when	  we	  started	  to	  share	  the	  public	  sphere	  with	  others.	  A	  
central	  factor	  in	  our	  massification	  as	  a	  public	  was	  the	  proliferation	  of	  mass	  media.	  
But	  by	  the	  start	  of	  the	  new	  millennium	  the	  mass	  media	  that	  dominated	  the	  20th	  
century	  had	  undergone	  a	  series	  of	  radical	  changes.	  And	  just	  as	  the	  rise	  of	  mass	  
media	  reshaped	  public	  life	  early	  in	  the	  last	  century,	  the	  newest	  media	  have	  radically	  
reshaped	  the	  structure	  of	  public	  life	  today.	  
According	  to	  one	  set	  of	  popular	  narratives	  the	  media	  that	  dominate	  the	  
present	  represent	  the	  latest	  stage	  in	  a	  decline	  of	  mass	  media	  that	  has	  been	  taking	  
place	  since	  the	  1970s.	  According	  to	  this	  account	  the	  mass	  character	  that	  defined	  
mid-­‐20th	  century	  media	  fell	  victim	  to	  a	  wave	  of	  technological	  innovations	  that	  
caused	  large-­‐scale	  audience	  fragmentation.	  Whereas	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  mid-­‐century	  
television	  audiences	  simultaneously	  watched	  the	  most	  popular	  TV	  shows,	  today’s	  
audiences	  have	  become	  scattered	  across	  hundreds	  of	  channels.	  Whereas	  the	  
dominant	  daily	  newspapers	  of	  mid-­‐century	  offered	  millions	  of	  readers	  a	  
homogeneous	  sampling	  of	  world	  events,	  today’s	  readers	  are	  scattering	  across	  a	  
nearly	  unlimited	  menu	  of	  online	  news	  sources.	  And,	  the	  story	  goes,	  as	  the	  large-­‐
scale,	  homogeneous	  media	  that	  dominated	  mid-­‐century	  American	  society	  began	  to	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break	  apart	  American	  society	  began	  losing	  its	  mass	  character.	  I	  call	  this	  the	  death-­‐of-­‐
mass-­‐media	  narrative.	  
According	  to	  another	  dominant	  narrative	  though,	  these	  same	  new	  media	  
technologies	  are	  strengthening	  the	  media’s	  mass	  character	  by	  promoting	  audience	  
engagement.	  Although	  the	  Internet	  offers	  seemingly-­‐unlimited	  varieties	  of	  
entertainment	  it	  also	  allows	  movie	  studios	  to	  deepen	  their	  engagement	  with	  
blockbuster	  audiences,	  which	  reliably	  show	  up	  to	  watch	  the	  latest	  summer	  movies.	  
Although	  new	  platforms	  for	  content	  delivery	  threaten	  to	  compete	  with	  television,	  
mega-­‐audiences	  continue	  to	  tune-­‐in	  to	  national	  broadcasts	  like	  the	  Super-­‐Bowl,	  
often	  using	  new	  technologies	  to	  enhance	  their	  television-­‐watching.	  According	  to	  this	  
account	  new	  technologies	  have	  a	  complex	  and	  evolving	  relationship	  to	  traditional	  
media,	  which	  nonetheless	  retain	  their	  mass	  character.	  I	  call	  this	  the	  life-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐
media	  narrative.	  
Both	  of	  these	  narratives	  find	  empirical	  support	  in	  recent	  trends.	  While	  some	  
measures	  indicate	  that	  mass	  media	  is	  thriving	  others	  indicate	  a	  clear	  decline.	  This	  
has	  left	  a	  paradox	  at	  the	  center	  of	  contemporary	  American	  public	  life,	  and	  the	  stakes	  
of	  this	  paradox	  are	  huge.	  
American	  mass	  society	  and	  the	  American	  mass	  media	  came	  to	  prominence	  in	  
the	  years	  when	  the	  United	  States	  was	  emerging	  as	  the	  world’s	  dominant	  super-­‐
power.	  In	  many	  respects	  the	  mass	  society	  and	  mass	  media	  that	  dominated	  that	  era	  
are	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  world-­‐view	  that	  orients	  contemporary	  American	  identity.	  The	  
heroism	  of	  the	  American	  victory	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  platonic	  
home-­‐owning	  American	  family,	  the	  United	  States	  as	  the	  center	  of	  the	  “free	  world,”	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and	  the	  high	  quality	  of	  life	  enjoyed	  by	  American	  consumers	  –	  these	  were	  all	  
developed,	  popularized,	  and	  ingrained	  in	  the	  American	  psyche	  in	  the	  years	  of	  mass	  
media	  and	  mass	  society.	  And	  so	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  supposed	  end	  of	  mass	  
media	  and	  mass	  society	  has	  been	  felt	  by	  many	  people	  as	  a	  national	  identity	  crisis	  in	  
which	  mid-­‐century	  American	  self-­‐assuredness	  has	  given	  way	  to	  culture	  wars	  and	  
vicious	  battles	  about	  the	  essence	  of	  American	  identity.	  
This	  question	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  –	  whether	  we	  are	  witnessing	  
the	  life-­‐	  or	  death-­‐	  of	  mass	  media	  –	  is	  also	  a	  question	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  
contemporary	  American	  public	  life.	  As	  such	  it	  has	  great	  bearing	  on	  the	  processes	  of	  
social	  integration	  and	  personal	  identity-­‐formation	  that	  define	  the	  current	  state	  and	  
future	  trajectory	  of	  American	  society.	  As	  human	  communication	  has	  become	  
increasingly	  mediated	  over	  the	  five	  centuries	  since	  the	  invention	  of	  printing	  in	  
Europe,	  our	  experience	  of	  publicity	  (i.e.,	  our	  experience	  of	  seeing	  others	  and	  of	  
being	  seen)	  has	  become	  increasingly	  shaped	  by	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  through	  
which	  we	  communicate.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  media	  are	  constitutive	  of	  many	  basic	  
processes	  of	  social	  integration	  as	  well	  as	  many	  aspects	  of	  individual	  experience.	  
Many	  influential	  scholars	  have	  examined	  these	  effects	  of	  publicity	  on	  the	  
individual	  and	  society.	  The	  space	  of	  publicity,	  the	  public	  sphere,	  is	  where	  we	  
individuals	  become	  subjects,	  it	  is	  where	  we	  are	  interpellated	  into	  social	  roles	  
(Althusser),	  where	  our	  experiences	  of	  reality	  are	  validated	  by	  others	  (Arendt),	  
where	  we	  learn	  the	  rules	  governing	  social	  interactions	  (Goffman),	  where	  we	  learn	  to	  
sublimate	  instinctual	  desires	  into	  socially	  sanctioned	  behavior	  (Freud),	  and	  where	  
we	  learn	  to	  classify	  others	  according	  to	  their	  tastes	  and	  to	  develop	  our	  own	  tastes	  in	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line	  with	  our	  station	  in	  life	  (Bourdieu).	  Media	  determine	  the	  form	  that	  these	  
processes	  take	  insofar	  as	  media	  dominate	  the	  form	  and	  experience	  of	  publicity.	  To	  
understand	  the	  contemporary	  social	  order	  we	  must	  therefore	  understand	  the	  
structure	  of	  contemporary	  publicity.	  To	  understand	  the	  structure	  of	  publicity	  we	  
must	  understand	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  through	  which	  publicity	  is	  enacted.	  And	  
so	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  life-­‐	  and	  death-­‐	  of	  mass	  media	  in	  the	  
millennial	  United	  States	  is	  about	  much	  more	  than	  nostalgia	  for	  the	  forms	  of	  
communication	  that	  dominated	  the	  salad	  days	  of	  the	  American	  empire.	  It	  is	  a	  debate	  
about	  personhood,	  social	  cohesion,	  community,	  meaning,	  and	  the	  future	  of	  all	  of	  
these	  in	  the	  millennial	  United	  States.	  
	  
I	  have	  two	  goals	  in	  this	  project.	  First,	  I	  aim	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  
contemporary	  publicity,	  and	  this	  means	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
contemporary	  media,	  which	  in	  turn	  means	  resolving	  the	  apparent	  contradiction	  
between	  the	  life-­‐	  and	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media	  narratives.	  Second	  I	  aim	  to	  clarify	  the	  
structural	  link	  between	  the	  media	  and	  the	  public	  sphere.	  
My	  attempt	  to	  resolve	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  contemporary	  public	  sphere	  and	  
to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  apparent	  contradiction	  between	  the	  life-­‐	  and	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐
media	  narratives	  hinges	  on	  what	  I	  see	  as	  a	  basic	  contradiction	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  mass	  
publicity.	  The	  contradiction	  of	  mass	  publicity	  is	  that	  it	  simultaneously	  promises:	  1)	  a	  
mass	  audience	  for	  public	  displays,	  which	  means	  that	  public	  appearances	  are	  
witnessed	  by	  large	  numbers	  of	  people,	  and	  2)	  publicity	  that	  is	  accessible	  to	  the	  
masses,	  which	  means	  that	  according	  to	  its	  inclusive	  ideal	  every	  member	  of	  the	  mass	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can	  make	  a	  public	  appearance	  that	  will	  be	  seen	  by	  a	  mass	  audience.	  But	  there	  are	  
only	  so	  many	  hours	  in	  the	  day	  and	  as	  the	  number	  of	  people	  with	  whom	  we	  share	  the	  
public	  sphere	  grows	  –	  i.e.,	  as	  it	  massifies	  to	  include	  people	  dissimilar	  from	  ourselves	  
–	  we	  are	  faced	  with	  the	  inevitability	  of	  being	  unable	  to	  witness	  the	  public	  displays	  of	  
everyone	  seeking	  publicity.	  Large	  scale	  publicity	  therefore	  implies	  inequality.	  Some	  
people	  will	  attract	  far	  more	  than	  their	  fair	  share	  of	  the	  public’s	  attention,	  others	  will	  
attract	  far	  less.	  In	  practice	  the	  structure	  of	  this	  inequality	  within	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  
often	  linked	  to	  differential	  access	  to	  the	  means	  of	  publicity.	  Some	  people,	  
corporations,	  or	  interest	  groups	  have	  control	  over	  the	  media,	  which	  have	  become	  
the	  dominant	  means	  of	  publicity,	  while	  others	  do	  not.	  This	  inequality	  does	  not	  
preclude	  massification	  of	  the	  audience,	  but	  by	  aggregating	  dissimilar	  people	  into	  the	  
same	  sphere	  of	  publicity	  massification	  inevitably	  leads	  marginalized	  groups	  to	  
recognize	  their	  marginality.	  This	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  demands	  among	  these	  groups	  for	  
more	  inclusive	  access	  to	  the	  means	  of	  publicity.	  Because	  the	  ability	  of	  people	  to	  act	  
as	  spectators	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  length	  of	  the	  day	  these	  demands	  can	  only	  be	  met	  in	  
one	  of	  two	  ways:	  1)	  they	  can	  be	  ignored	  and	  repressed,	  which,	  if	  the	  public	  sphere	  
remains	  a	  mass	  public	  sphere,	  will	  not	  go	  unnoticed,	  or	  2)	  the	  public	  sphere	  can	  be	  
fragmented,	  granting	  publicity	  to	  these	  marginal	  groups	  but	  only	  within	  certain	  
circles.	  The	  basic	  implication	  of	  the	  contradiction	  of	  mass	  publicity	  though,	  is	  that	  a	  
mass	  public	  sphere	  cannot	  simultaneously	  accommodate	  all	  of	  its	  members’	  desire	  
for	  mass	  publicity.	  
This	  contradiction	  became	  a	  prominent	  feature	  of	  the	  American	  public	  
sphere	  beginning	  in	  the	  1970s.	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  mid-­‐century	  massification	  of	  the	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public	  sphere,	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement,	  and	  the	  increasing	  recognition	  and	  
acceptance	  of	  various	  subcultures,	  previously-­‐marginalized	  groups	  began	  calling	  for	  
increased	  access	  to	  publicity	  within	  the	  American	  mainstream.	  Meanwhile	  
advertisers	  discovered	  the	  power	  of	  targeting	  their	  efforts	  to	  particular	  segments	  of	  
the	  population.	  And	  so	  in	  the	  1970s	  the	  mass	  public	  sphere	  appeared	  to	  be	  taking	  
the	  second	  of	  the	  two	  solutions	  to	  the	  problem	  outlined	  above	  –	  the	  mass	  public	  
sphere	  seemed	  to	  be	  fragmenting.	  
Real	  fragmentation	  is	  economically	  problematic	  though.	  The	  mass	  public	  
sphere	  was	  constituted,	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  by	  commercial	  media,	  which	  had	  
become	  powerful	  economic	  entities,	  and	  fragmentation	  is	  contradictory	  with	  
respect	  to	  the	  commercial	  logic	  of	  industrial	  capitalism.	  Mass	  media,	  which	  
constitute	  mass	  publicity,	  enact	  a	  form	  of	  mass	  production,	  and	  as	  such	  they	  enjoy	  
economies	  of	  scale.	  Fragmentation	  disrupts	  these	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  
contradicts	  the	  profit-­‐maximizing	  logic	  of	  commercial	  media	  firms.	  And	  so	  by	  the	  
1970s	  the	  American	  public	  sphere	  was	  faced	  with	  a	  structural	  problem	  –	  how	  to	  
maintain	  the	  logic	  of	  mass	  production	  while	  satisfying	  increasing	  calls	  for	  access	  to	  
publicity?	  
The	  solution	  that	  emerged	  has	  defined	  contemporary	  American	  publicity	  and	  
the	  structure	  of	  the	  dominant	  media.	  It	  has	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  a	  great	  bait-­‐and-­‐
switch.	  Without	  disrupting	  the	  profit	  maximizing	  logic	  of	  mass	  production	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  contemporary	  media	  satisfies	  calls	  for	  increased	  access	  to	  publicity	  
by	  giving	  each	  individual	  a	  disproportionate	  sense	  of	  their	  own	  publicity.	  Each	  
individual	  is	  given	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  public	  sphere	  revolves	  around	  his-­‐	  or	  her	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self.	  In	  this	  way	  demands	  for	  greater	  representation	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  were	  
satisfied	  not	  by	  the	  impossible	  task	  of	  actually	  granting	  each	  group	  the	  share	  it	  
demanded	  in	  the	  collective	  experience	  of	  American	  public	  life	  but	  by	  offering	  each	  
group	  its	  own	  narcissistic	  vision	  of	  American	  public	  life.	  For	  an	  increasingly	  low	  cost	  
people	  could	  cast	  themselves	  as	  stars	  in	  their	  own	  universes	  –	  in	  print,	  on	  television,	  
and	  on	  the	  Internet,	  there	  are	  now	  representations	  of	  the	  world	  from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  every	  identity.	  These	  have	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  specialty	  television	  
channels	  such	  as	  the	  Oxygen	  and	  Lifetime	  networks,	  which	  are	  geared	  towards	  
women,	  and	  the	  BET	  network,	  which	  is	  geared	  towards	  African-­‐American	  audiences,	  
but	  also	  on	  a	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  level	  this	  has	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  new	  technologies	  
such	  as	  internet-­‐based	  news	  aggregators	  that	  offer	  a	  daily	  selection	  of	  world	  news	  
tailored	  to	  each	  consumer’s	  particular	  interests.	  No	  social	  group	  occupies	  a	  
peripheral	  place	  in	  this	  new	  public	  sphere,	  because	  the	  new	  public	  sphere	  conceals	  
the	  fact	  that	  a	  periphery	  exists.	  
A	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  powerful	  media	  outlets	  continue	  to	  control	  and	  
profit	  from	  the	  facilitation	  of	  publicity	  on	  an	  industrial	  scale.	  Seemingly	  bespoke	  
recombination	  of	  news	  stories	  and	  custom-­‐tailored	  menus	  of	  TV	  shows	  give	  the	  
impression	  that	  mass	  products	  have	  been	  designed	  to	  cater	  to	  the	  idiosyncratic	  
interests	  of	  the	  individual.	  Meanwhile	  the	  hyper-­‐profitability	  of	  economies	  of	  scale	  
in	  the	  media	  continue	  to	  thrive.	  Increasingly	  sophisticated	  audience-­‐distributor	  
feedback	  mechanisms	  create	  swarming	  effects	  that	  allow	  media	  firms	  to	  devote	  
resources	  to	  self-­‐evidently	  popular	  products,	  which	  snowball	  towards	  even	  greater	  
popularity.	  And	  the	  low-­‐popularity,	  hyper-­‐specific	  bits	  of	  information,	  commentary,	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and	  entertainment	  (often	  made	  by	  uncompensated	  citizen-­‐journalists	  or	  citizen-­‐
producers)	  are	  used	  as	  high-­‐efficiency	  vehicles	  for	  delivering	  advertisements	  that	  
promote	  high-­‐profit	  mass	  audience	  products.	  The	  complex	  process	  through	  which	  
this	  takes	  place	  explains	  the	  simultaneous	  and	  apparently	  contradictory	  appearance	  
of	  the	  death-­‐	  and	  life-­‐of-­‐mass	  media.	  It	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  contemporary	  publicity.	  
	  
The	  second	  goal	  of	  this	  project	  is	  to	  illustrate	  both	  the	  deep	  structural	  
connection	  between	  media	  and	  publicity	  and	  their	  joint	  transformations	  throughout	  
modern	  history.	  Media	  have	  shaped	  the	  structure	  of	  public	  life	  since	  the	  early	  days	  
of	  print-­‐capitalism.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  early	  16th	  century	  people	  and	  events	  that	  
appeared	  in	  print	  became	  known	  to	  much	  broader	  audiences	  over	  much	  longer	  
periods	  of	  time.	  And	  with	  the	  development	  of	  new	  media	  technologies	  and	  
institutions	  access	  to	  new	  forms	  of	  publicity	  spread.	  This	  broadening	  of	  the	  public	  
experience	  becomes	  particularly	  evident	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  each	  major	  
innovation	  –	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  rotary	  press	  in	  the	  1840s,	  the	  rise	  of	  movies	  in	  
the	  1910s,	  the	  emergence	  of	  radio	  in	  the	  1920s,	  the	  popularization	  of	  television	  in	  
the	  1950s,	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Internet	  in	  the	  1990s.	  With	  each	  development	  public	  
life	  was	  increasingly	  enacted	  through	  the	  media.	  And	  these	  developments	  did	  more	  
than	  simply	  extend	  the	  reach	  of	  public	  life.	  In	  the	  centuries	  since	  the	  publication	  of	  
Gutenberg’s	  bible	  the	  structure	  of	  media,	  as	  a	  complex	  of	  technologies,	  institutions,	  
and	  social	  practices,	  has	  also	  left	  its	  imprint	  on	  what	  it	  means	  to	  take	  part	  in	  public	  
life.	  Access	  to	  the	  public	  sphere,	  both	  as	  spectator	  and	  as	  performer,	  became	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increasingly	  dependent	  on	  access	  to	  the	  media.	  In	  other	  words,	  media	  became	  the	  
means	  of	  publicity	  and	  public	  life	  became	  mediated	  life.	  
Transformations	  in	  media-­‐publicity	  are	  also	  linked	  to	  broader	  
transformations	  in	  society,	  in	  part	  because	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  the	  site	  of	  our	  
integration	  into	  society.	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  where	  we	  as	  individuals	  
are	  articulated	  into	  what	  Jürgen	  Habermas	  described	  as	  the	  dominant	  mode	  of	  
social	  coordination	  –	  the	  overarching	  logic	  that	  organizes	  social	  life	  at	  a	  particular	  
place	  and	  time.	  In	  our	  experience	  of	  public	  life	  we	  learn	  to	  act,	  think,	  and	  feel	  
according	  to	  that	  logic.	  And	  so	  just	  as	  transformations	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  are	  
linked	  to	  structural	  transformations	  in	  the	  media	  these	  transformations	  are	  also	  
linked	  to	  transformations	  in	  the	  dominant	  mode	  of	  social	  coordination	  (I	  briefly	  
discuss	  this	  issue	  in	  Appendix	  2,	  emphasizing	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Habermas).	  
	  
The	  pragmatic	  subtext	  of	  this	  entire	  project	  is	  an	  interrogation	  of	  what	  has	  
been	  gained	  or	  lost	  by	  the	  shift	  to	  the	  most	  recent	  form	  of	  publicity	  in	  the	  United	  
States.	  If	  we	  are	  in	  fact	  confronted	  with	  two	  alternative	  trajectories	  for	  the	  future	  of	  
mass	  media	  –	  i.e.,	  its	  life	  or	  death	  –	  which	  should	  we	  choose?	  I	  do	  not	  expect	  that	  
such	  a	  choice	  will	  ever	  exist	  in	  simple	  terms.	  Nonetheless	  decisions	  on	  the	  level	  of	  
government	  policy,	  corporate	  policy,	  and	  personal	  consumer	  choice	  are	  best	  made	  
with	  an	  awareness	  of	  their	  stakes	  and	  so	  throughout	  this	  project	  I	  often	  note	  the	  
gains	  and	  losses	  that	  have	  come	  with	  transformations	  in	  the	  media.	  Many	  of	  these	  
are	  somewhat	  obvious	  and	  have	  to	  do	  with	  barriers	  to	  accessing	  the	  public	  sphere,	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but	  one	  of	  them,	  the	  progressive	  potential	  of	  mass	  publicity,	  is	  worth	  noting	  in	  
advance.	  
The	  progressive	  potential	  of	  mass	  publicity	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  mass	  publicity	  
is	  a	  form	  of	  mass	  consumption.	  During	  much	  of	  the	  American	  20th	  century	  the	  
majority	  of	  individuals	  experienced	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  their	  public	  lives	  through	  
the	  consumption	  of	  the	  same	  relatively-­‐homogenous	  media.	  This	  kind	  of	  mass	  
consumption	  is	  progressive	  insofar	  as	  it	  makes	  social	  problems	  visible	  across	  lines	  
of	  class,	  race,	  and	  other	  social	  divisions,	  notwithstanding	  the	  fact	  that	  mass	  
consumption	  often	  excludes	  diversity	  and	  freedom	  of	  expression;	  I	  discuss	  this	  in	  
more	  detail	  in	  the	  concluding	  chapter.	  
Paradoxically,	  one	  of	  the	  social	  problems	  that	  mid-­‐20th	  century	  mass	  
publicity	  made	  visible	  was	  unequal	  access	  to	  mass	  publicity.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  
factors	  that	  have	  lead	  to	  the	  apparent	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  and	  this	  
specter	  of	  fragmentation	  threatens	  to	  undermine	  the	  progressive	  potential	  of	  mass	  
media.	  If	  for	  no	  other	  reason	  than	  this,	  it	  seems	  worthwhile	  to	  look	  closely	  at	  the	  
dramatic	  and	  recent	  transformations	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  we	  present	  ourselves	  to	  
others	  and	  allow	  others	  to	  present	  themselves	  to	  us,	  and	  to	  determine	  whether	  we	  
have,	  over	  the	  past	  three	  decades,	  been	  witnessing	  the	  life	  or	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  
media.	  
	  
Data,	  Methods,	  and	  Organization	  
I	  use	  three	  kinds	  of	  “data”	  in	  this	  project:	  prior	  theoretical	  scholarship,	  historical	  
accounts,	  and	  quantitative	  data	  on	  media,	  society,	  and	  the	  economy	  culled	  from	  a	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variety	  of	  sources.	  I	  begin	  by	  engaging	  with	  prior	  scholarship	  on	  mass	  media,	  mass	  
society,	  and	  publicity.	  While	  not	  “data”	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense,	  my	  engagement	  with	  
this	  scholarship	  serves	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  a	  novel	  mode	  of	  analyzing	  the	  link	  
between	  media	  and	  publicity,	  a	  link	  which,	  I	  argue,	  is	  critical	  for	  both	  making	  sense	  
of	  the	  changing	  character	  of	  public	  life	  and	  for	  understanding	  the	  implications	  of	  
structural	  changes	  in	  the	  media	  that	  dominate	  much	  of	  the	  world	  today.	  Two	  bodies	  
of	  literature	  are	  particularly	  important	  here:	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  
publicity,	  which	  I	  review	  in	  chapter	  2,	  and	  the	  literature	  on	  mass	  media	  and	  mass	  
society,	  which	  I	  review	  in	  chapter	  3.	  	  
	   In	  chapter	  4	  I	  review	  the	  modern	  history	  of	  mass	  media	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
in	  order	  to	  illustrate	  a	  historic	  rupture	  that	  began	  in	  the	  1970s.	  This	  rupture	  was	  a	  
fundamental	  shift	  in	  the	  logic	  guiding	  dominant	  media	  firms	  and	  is	  largely	  
responsible	  for	  the	  paradoxical	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  today.	  In	  chapter	  4	  I	  also	  
introduce	  an	  operational	  definition	  of	  mass	  media	  and	  emphasize	  its	  links	  to	  the	  
theories	  of	  publicity	  and	  mass	  society	  outlined	  in	  chapters	  2	  and	  3.	  Chapter	  5	  
reviews	  the	  present,	  covering	  the	  contemporary	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  both	  the	  
death-­‐	  and	  life-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media	  narratives.	  
Media	  consumption	  involves	  large	  audiences	  made	  up	  of	  interacting	  
individuals	  each	  governed	  by	  similar	  basic	  rules;	  as	  such	  media	  markets	  are	  
complex	  systems.	  This	  means	  that	  particular	  methods	  are	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  
understand	  the	  implications	  of	  changes	  in	  these	  systems,	  namely	  the	  use	  of	  
computer	  simulations.	  I	  introduce	  two	  key	  insights	  in	  chapters	  2-­‐5,	  the	  mass	  media	  
tendency	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  cheap	  publicity,	  and	  in	  chapter	  6	  I	  use	  a	  series	  of	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simulations	  to	  examine	  their	  ramifications;	  the	  main	  finding	  here	  is	  that	  the	  mass	  
media	  tendency	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  cheap	  publicity	  provide	  a	  parsimonious	  
explanation	  for	  the	  paradoxical	  structure	  of	  the	  dominant	  media	  today.	  
	  
Emergence	  and	  Complexity	  
The	  concepts	  of	  emergence	  and	  complexity	  play	  a	  central	  roll	  in	  this	  project	  and	  
motivate	  my	  use	  of	  simulations	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  questions	  introduced	  above.	  
These	  concepts	  have	  their	  roots	  in	  the	  field	  of	  complexity	  science.1	  While	  a	  detailed	  
discussion	  of	  this	  fascinating	  field	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  project	  it	  is	  worth	  
summarizing	  some	  of	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	  complexity	  science:	  1)	  A	  complex	  
system	  is	  comprised	  of	  many	  interacting	  parts	  each	  of	  which	  can	  affect	  one	  or	  more	  
other	  parts;	  2)	  These	  systems	  can	  exhibit	  great	  complexity	  despite	  the	  simplicity	  of	  
rules	  guiding	  individual	  interactions	  of	  parts	  –	  this	  complex	  behavior	  produced	  by	  
simple	  rules	  is	  called	  emergence;	  3)	  Complex	  systems	  often	  show	  extreme	  
sensitivity	  to	  initial	  conditions	  –	  which	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  path	  
dependence;	  4)	  Complex	  systems	  can	  exhibit	  chaos	  –	  extremely	  unpredictable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  field	  is	  often	  considered	  to	  have	  started	  with	  Henri	  Poincaré’s	  work	  on	  the	  n-­‐body	  
problem	  in	  astronomy.	  Poincaré’s	  work	  on	  the	  movement	  of	  heavenly	  bodies	  led	  him	  to	  
discover	  that	  systems	  can	  be	  simultaneously	  deterministic	  and	  chaotic	  –	  they	  can	  be	  guided	  
by	  a	  simple	  set	  of	  deterministic	  rules	  that	  nonetheless	  yield	  highly	  complex	  aggregate	  
behavior.	  Modern	  work	  in	  complexity	  science	  began	  in	  the	  1940s	  and	  1950s	  with	  the	  
convergence	  of	  three	  veins	  of	  research.	  These	  were	  Norbert	  Weiner’s	  work	  on	  Cybernetics,	  
Ludwig	  von	  Bertalanffy’s	  General	  Systems	  Theory,	  and	  John	  von	  Neumann’s	  development	  of	  
the	  cellular	  automaton.	  By	  the	  early	  1980s	  these	  became	  organized	  into	  the	  semi-­‐coherent	  
discipline	  of	  complex	  systems	  analysis.	  In	  a	  comprehensive	  work	  synthesizing	  
developments	  in	  this	  field	  Stephen	  Wolfram	  showed	  that	  a	  great	  variety	  of	  systems	  can	  
exhibit	  complex	  behaviors	  (Wolfram	  2002).	  Insights	  from	  this	  field	  have	  also	  found	  their	  
way	  into	  popular	  works,	  perhaps	  most	  famously	  James	  Gleik’s	  Chaos	  and	  Malcolm	  
Gladwell’s	  The	  Tipping	  Point.	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outcomes	  based	  on	  known	  initial	  conditions;	  5)	  Complex	  systems	  can	  exhibit	  self-­‐
organization	  or	  the	  emergence	  of	  order	  from	  complexity;	  and,	  6)	  Complex	  systems	  
often	  exhibit	  non-­‐linear	  dynamics.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  such	  non-­‐linearities	  is	  
the	  occurrence	  of	  tipping	  points	  –	  points	  where	  a	  triggering	  event	  causes	  a	  sudden	  
gross	  change	  in	  the	  system.2	  Considering	  social	  systems	  in	  light	  of	  these	  insights	  
implies	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  understand	  systemic	  behavior	  by	  disaggregating	  the	  
parts	  of	  the	  system.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  
implications	  of	  the	  central	  ideas	  proposed	  in	  this	  dissertation	  (the	  mass	  media	  
tendency	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  cheap	  publicity)	  I	  implement	  them	  into	  a	  simulation	  of	  
media	  consumption.	   	  
The	  concepts	  of	  complexity	  and	  emergence	  have	  been	  part	  of	  sociology	  in	  
various	  forms	  since	  the	  discipline’s	  inception.	  Emile	  Durkheim’s	  work,	  for	  instance,	  
generally	  emphasized	  the	  synergistic	  aspects	  of	  collective	  behavior	  –	  the	  emergence	  
of	  collective	  phenomena	  greater	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  their	  parts.	  He	  argued,	  for	  example,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  In	  1972	  Philip	  Merilees	  presented	  a	  talk	  at	  the	  American	  Association	  for	  the	  Advancement	  
of	  Science	  titled	  “Does	  the	  flap	  of	  a	  butterfly’s	  wings	  in	  Brazil	  set	  off	  a	  tornado	  in	  Texas?”	  
Merilees’s	  talk	  helped	  to	  popularize	  the	  term	  butterfly	  effect,	  which	  encapsulates	  sensitivity	  
to	  initial	  conditions.	  The	  term	  butterfly	  effect	  is	  usually	  attributed	  to	  E.	  N.	  Lorenz.	  In	  his	  
early	  writing	  Lorenz	  used	  a	  sea	  gull	  metaphor:	  "When	  the	  instability	  of	  uniform	  flow	  with	  
respect	  to	  infinitesimal	  perturbations	  was	  first	  suggested	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  presence	  
of	  cyclones	  and	  anticyclones	  in	  the	  atmosphere,	  the	  idea	  was	  not	  universally	  accepted.	  One	  
meteorologist	  remarked	  that	  if	  the	  theory	  were	  correct,	  one	  flap	  of	  a	  sea	  gull's	  wings	  would	  
be	  enough	  to	  alter	  the	  course	  of	  the	  weather	  forever.	  The	  controversy	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  
settled,	  but	  the	  most	  recent	  evidence	  seems	  to	  favor	  the	  gulls”	  Edward	  N.	  Lorenz	  “The	  
predictability	  of	  hydrodynamic	  flow”	  Transactions	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Academy	  of	  Sciences.	  Vol	  
25,	  p409	  1963.	  See	  also:	  Robert	  C.	  Hilborn	  “Sea	  gulls,	  butterflies,	  and	  grasshoppers:	  A	  brief	  




that	  religion	  was	  an	  emergent	  product	  of	  collective	  life	  (É.	  Durkheim	  1912).3	  Around	  
the	  same	  time	  Georg	  Simmel	  offered	  a	  concise	  description	  of	  emergence	  in	  sociology	  
in	  addressing	  the	  question	  of	  how	  society	  is	  “possible.”4	  In	  order	  for	  society	  to	  
emerge,	  Simmel	  believed,	  all	  that	  was	  needed	  was	  a	  large	  number	  of	  interacting	  
individuals	  each	  possessing	  rules	  to	  govern	  his	  or	  her	  own	  behavior;	  this	  is	  identical	  
to	  the	  basic	  specification	  of	  cellular	  automata,	  which	  play	  an	  important	  roll	  in	  
modern	  complexity	  science.	  Later	  in	  the	  century	  Bourdieu’s	  theory	  of	  habitus	  
offered	  a	  more	  elaborate	  model	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  individual	  action	  and	  
emergent	  social	  structure	  based	  on	  iterative	  interactions	  between	  rules	  of	  behavior	  
and	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  they	  are	  implemented.5	  Anthony	  Giddens	  offered	  a	  
similar	  model	  of	  the	  reciprocal	  interaction	  of	  emergent	  social	  structures	  and	  
individual	  behaviors	  in	  his	  concept	  of	  structuration	  (Giddens	  1986).	  
The	  concepts	  of	  complexity	  and	  emergence	  have	  also	  played	  an	  important	  
role	  in	  several	  subfields	  of	  sociology.	  In	  organizational	  sociology,	  for	  instance,	  
Charles	  Perrow’s	  model	  of	  normal	  accidents	  describes	  the	  emergence	  of	  failures	  
more	  severe	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  individual	  failing	  components	  (Perrow	  1984).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In	  the	  emergent	  product	  of	  collective	  behavior,	  Durkheim	  believed,	  “man	  does	  not	  
recognize	  himself”	  (É.	  Durkheim	  1912,	  424).	  His	  occupation	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  
collectivity	  from	  its	  interacting	  components	  could	  be	  seen	  even	  in	  his	  earliest	  work	  through	  
his	  explanations	  of	  mechanical	  and	  organic	  solidarity	  (Durkheim	  1893).	  
	  
4	  Simmel	  concluded	  that	  the	  conditions	  of	  society’s	  possibility	  “reside	  a	  priori	  in	  the	  
elements	  themselves,	  through	  which	  they	  combine,	  in	  reality,	  into	  the	  synthesis,	  society”	  
(Simmel	  1910,	  376).	  
	  
5	  “Practices	  cannot	  be	  deduced	  either	  from	  the	  present	  conditions	  which	  may	  seem	  to	  have	  
provoked	  them	  or	  from	  the	  past	  conditions	  which	  have	  produced	  the	  habitus,	  the	  durable	  
principle	  of	  their	  production.	  They	  can	  therefore	  only	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  relating	  the	  social	  
conditions	  in	  which	  the	  habitus	  that	  generated	  them	  was	  constituted,	  to	  the	  social	  
conditions	  in	  which	  it	  is	  implemented”	  (Bourdieu	  1990,	  56).	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Complexity	  also	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  studies	  of	  urban	  segregation,	  most	  
notably	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Grodzins’s	  use	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  tipping	  point	  to	  explain	  white	  
flight	  from	  inner	  cities	  to	  suburbs	  (Grodzins	  1957).	  
The	  debate	  between	  Jürgen	  Habermas	  and	  Niklas	  Luhmann	  highlights	  the	  
significance	  of	  paying	  special	  attention	  to	  complexity	  when	  analyzing	  the	  structure	  
of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  In	  the	  following	  chapter	  I	  discuss	  Habermas	  and	  his	  analysis	  of	  
structural	  changes	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  
emancipatory	  potential	  of	  rational-­‐critical	  debate.	  Luhmann,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
whose	  work	  was	  rooted	  in	  analyzing	  the	  communicative	  dynamics	  of	  complex	  
systems,	  argued	  that	  society	  was	  too	  complex	  for	  rational	  debate	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  
effective	  solution	  to	  large-­‐scale	  social	  problems.	  According	  to	  Luhmann,	  the	  various	  
systems	  that	  made	  up	  society	  –	  law,	  economy,	  media,	  etc.	  –	  each	  operated	  according	  
to	  their	  own	  internal	  logic,	  a	  specific	  language	  that	  constituted	  each	  system’s	  mode	  
of	  communication.	  Besides	  the	  complexity	  of	  society	  the	  incommensurability	  of	  
these	  “systems”	  posed	  a	  fundamental	  challenge	  to	  Habermas’s	  master	  narrative	  
based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  rational-­‐critical	  debate.6	  
These	  analyses	  all	  point	  to	  the	  impossibility	  of	  understanding	  the	  behavior	  of	  
individuals	  or	  of	  societies	  without	  analyzing	  both	  macro-­‐	  and	  micro-­‐level	  processes.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  In	  a	  forthcoming	  review	  of	  this	  debate	  Shamus	  Khan	  clarifies	  Luhmann’s	  epistemology	  
with	  a	  quote	  from	  Spinoza:	  “That	  which	  cannot	  be	  conceived	  through	  anything	  else	  must	  be	  
conceived	  through	  itself”	  (Khan).	  For	  Luhmann	  systems	  could	  only	  be	  understood	  on	  their	  
own	  terms,	  and	  from	  this	  perspective	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  no	  transcendental	  mode	  of	  
communication	  –	  particularly	  not	  Habermas’s	  rational-­‐critical	  debate	  –	  that	  cuts	  across	  all	  
social	  systems	  providing	  a	  functional	  means	  of	  resolving	  conflicts	  in	  society.	  I	  do	  not	  have	  
the	  necessary	  familiarity	  with	  Luhmann’s	  work	  –	  much	  of	  which	  has	  not	  been	  translated	  
into	  English	  –	  to	  offer	  a	  deep	  engagement	  with	  his	  concepts	  of	  complexity	  and	  (social)	  
systems.	  His	  debate	  with	  Habermas	  though	  signals	  the	  tension	  between	  understandings	  of	  
complexity	  and	  monolithic	  master-­‐narratives	  about	  the	  public	  sphere.	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While	  a	  detailed	  engagement	  with	  methodological	  theories	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  
this	  project	  I	  do	  take	  the	  insights	  sketched	  above	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  my	  dual	  focus	  
on	  both	  the	  macro-­‐scale	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  media	  and	  publicity	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  micro-­‐scale	  characteristics	  of	  individual	  behavior.	  In	  chapter	  4,	  for	  instance,	  
where	  I	  review	  the	  history	  of	  modern	  mass	  media,	  I	  examine	  both	  the	  influence	  of	  
individual	  actors	  and	  larger-­‐scale	  processes	  and	  structures.	  I	  take	  it	  for	  granted	  that	  
a	  full	  account	  of	  social	  change	  cannot	  emphasize	  one	  without	  the	  other.	  
	  
Hermeneutics	  
In	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  media,	  particularly	  in	  the	  historical	  survey	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  media	  and	  the	  character	  of	  public	  life	  (chapter	  4),	  I	  avoid	  
using	  the	  “mass	  media”	  per	  se	  as	  the	  guiding	  hermeneutic	  instrument,	  using	  instead	  
two	  dimensions	  of	  popular	  media	  –	  their	  scale	  and	  barriers	  –	  in	  order	  to	  uncover	  the	  
historical	  rupture	  that	  began	  in	  the	  1970s.	  This	  approach	  was	  informed	  by	  
methodological	  considerations	  outlined	  in	  Saskia	  Sassen’s	  work	  on	  globalization.	  
Beginning	  with	  The	  Global	  City	  (1991)	  Sassen	  revealed	  that	  changes	  in	  the	  
world	  economy	  since	  the	  late	  1970s	  –	  often	  coded	  as	  “globalization”	  –	  had	  produced	  
a	  wide	  range	  of	  novel	  formations	  including	  the	  new	  urban	  configurations	  that	  she	  
called	  global	  cities.	  An	  important	  aspect	  of	  her	  analysis	  was	  the	  recognition	  that	  
apparently	  non-­‐global	  processes	  –	  including,	  for	  instance,	  the	  migrations	  of	  low-­‐
wage	  workers	  –	  were	  articulations	  of	  the	  same	  set	  of	  broader	  transformations	  that	  
had	  produced	  high-­‐powered	  financial	  centers	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  world’s	  leading	  
cities.	  This	  unexpected	  insight	  was	  made	  possible,	  Sassen	  suggests,	  by	  her	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methodological	  approach,	  namely	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  did	  not	  limit	  her	  object	  of	  
analysis	  to	  self-­‐evidently	  global	  processes.7	  Likewise,	  I	  assume	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  
to	  fully	  understand	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  its	  evolving	  
structure	  by	  confining	  my	  study	  to	  self-­‐evidently	  mass	  media.	  Instead	  I	  have	  chosen	  
two	  transhistorical	  characteristics	  of	  publicity	  –	  scale	  and	  barriers	  –	  and	  have	  used	  
these	  a	  lens	  through	  which	  to	  examine	  historical	  transformations	  in	  the	  media.	  
This	  approach	  is	  fruitful	  in	  several	  respects:	  1)	  it	  reveals	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  
era	  of	  mass	  media	  in	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  century,	  2)	  it	  reveals	  the	  path	  dependent	  
processes	  that	  led	  to	  that	  mid-­‐century	  conjuncture,	  and	  3)	  it	  reveals	  the	  social	  
ramifications	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  dominant	  Western	  media,	  which	  
have	  been	  understood	  by	  others	  as	  the	  “decline”	  of	  mass	  media	  but	  which	  in	  fact	  
constitute	  a	  more	  complex	  reconfiguration	  of	  both	  media	  and	  publicity.	  
	  
The	  Importance	  of	  the	  American	  Media	  
Above	  I	  have	  briefly	  discussed	  the	  embeddedness	  of	  the	  media	  and	  the	  public	  
sphere	  in	  society.	  This	  implies	  that	  these	  must	  be	  analyzed	  in	  particular	  historical	  
and	  national	  contexts	  rather	  than	  in	  abstract	  terms.8	  In	  most	  of	  the	  chapters	  that	  
follow	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  media	  and	  its	  influence	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  “A	  key	  proposition	  that	  has	  long	  guided	  my	  research	  is	  that	  we	  cannot	  understand	  the	  x—
in	  this	  case	  globalization—by	  confining	  our	  study	  to	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  x—i.e.,	  global	  
processes	  and	  institutions.	  This	  type	  of	  confinement	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  endogeneity	  trap,	  one	  all	  
too	  common	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  spectacularly	  so	  in	  the	  globalization	  literature”	  
(Sassen	  2008,	  4).	  
	  
8	  The	  specificity	  of	  sub-­‐national	  contexts	  is	  also	  important.	  For	  instance	  low	  literacy	  rates	  in	  
the	  southern	  states	  of	  the	  early	  American	  republic	  shaped	  the	  character	  of	  southern	  media	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  was	  distinct	  from	  the	  media	  that	  dominated	  the	  more	  literate	  northern	  states.	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public	  sphere	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  I	  chose	  the	  United	  States	  because	  this	  is	  the	  case	  
with	  which	  I	  am	  most	  familiar	  but	  also	  because	  the	  United	  States	  has	  largely	  been	  
the	  model	  for	  the	  development	  of	  communications	  around	  the	  world.	  Paul	  Starr	  has	  
made	  a	  compelling	  case	  for	  focusing	  on	  the	  United	  States	  when	  studying	  the	  modern	  
media.	  
No	  single	  country	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  making	  of	  modern	  communications,	  but	  the	  
United	  States	  has	  played	  a	  singular	  role	  for	  the	  past	  two	  centuries	  in	  such	  
developments	  as	  the	  constitutional	  protection	  of	  rights	  to	  free	  expression,	  the	  
opening	  up	  of	  government	  to	  public	  scrutiny,	  the	  development	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  
postal	  system,	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  popular	  press,	  the	  spread	  of	  literacy	  and	  primary	  
education,	  the	  development	  and	  diffusion	  of	  the	  telephone,	  the	  invention	  of	  
broadcasting,	  the	  development	  of	  satellite	  communications,	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Internet,	  
e-­‐mail,	  and	  other	  recent	  changes	  too	  numerous	  to	  mention.	  (Starr	  2005,	  19)	  
Modern	  American	  media	  have	  both	  defined	  the	  character	  of	  the	  global	  media	  and	  
can	  serve	  as	  a	  template	  for	  analyzing	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  in	  other	  countries	  
and	  regions.	  It	  is	  my	  hope	  that	  the	  mode	  of	  analysis	  that	  I	  apply	  here	  will	  be	  useful	  
for	  others’	  efforts	  to	  analyze	  the	  relationship	  between	  media	  and	  the	  public	  sphere	  
in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	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CHAPTER	  2	  
MEDIA	  AND	  THE	  PUBLIC	  SPHERE	  
	  
The	  presence	  of	  others	  who	  see	  what	  we	  see	  and	  hear	  what	  we	  hear	  assures	  us	  of	  the	  reality	  
of	  the	  world	  and	  ourselves.	  (Arendt	  1998,	  50)	  
	  
The	  public	  sphere	  is	  that	  sphere	  of	  human	  life	  where	  everything	  is	  seen	  and	  heard	  
by	  others.	  This	  concept	  has	  been	  fundamental	  to	  much	  of	  20th	  century	  political	  
theory.	  As	  a	  discursive	  space	  of	  interactions	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  where	  ‘public	  
opinion’	  emerges	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  a	  sine	  qua	  non	  of	  democratic	  society.9	  From	  the	  
perspective	  of	  sociology	  though,	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  much	  more.10	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  I	  will	  not	  engage	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  in	  political	  theory	  in	  any	  depth	  here,	  
because	  my	  usage	  of	  the	  concept	  differs	  from	  its	  usage	  in	  that	  literature,	  but	  a	  few	  
comments	  are	  worthwhile.	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  was	  most	  influentially	  
theorized	  in	  modern	  political	  theory	  by	  Hannah	  Arendt	  and	  Jürgen	  Habermas.	  Arendt	  
theorized	  the	  public	  sphere	  in	  phenomenological	  terms	  –	  the	  public	  sphere	  was	  a	  sphere	  of	  
appearances,	  particularly	  the	  sphere	  were	  people	  could	  form	  a	  shared	  consensus,	  which	  
constituted	  a	  “world”	  appearing	  before	  them.	  For	  Habermas	  the	  public	  sphere	  was	  also	  a	  
sphere	  of	  consensus,	  but	  the	  consensus	  was	  based	  in	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  free,	  rational	  
communication,	  rather	  than	  in	  its	  coherent	  appearance.	  For	  both	  though,	  the	  public	  sphere	  
provided	  a	  non-­‐transcendental	  basis	  for	  legitimizing	  political	  action	  (Arendt	  1998;	  
Habermas	  1991).	  I	  do	  borrow	  from	  Arendt’s	  conception	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  because	  of	  the	  
sociological	  relevance	  of	  the	  phenomenological	  “work”	  that	  goes	  on	  there;	  but	  I	  do	  not	  
adopt	  her	  understanding	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  for	  collective	  political	  action.	  
	  
10	  Several	  important	  postmodern/poststructuralist	  critiques	  have	  undermined	  the	  earlier	  
model	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  as	  a	  coherent,	  legitimizing,	  and	  political	  space.	  In	  so	  doing	  they	  
have	  opened	  the	  concept	  to	  broader	  sociological	  considerations.	  Dana	  R.	  Villa	  outlined	  three	  
classes	  of	  such	  criticism.	  1)	  Foucault’s	  work	  on	  the	  microdynamics	  of	  power	  suggested	  that	  
these	  theories	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  were	  based	  on	  an	  obsolete	  model	  of	  power,	  which	  
overemphasized	  the	  question	  of	  legitimacy.	  Foucault’s	  model	  of	  power	  suggested	  that	  
individuals	  were	  constituted	  as	  subjects	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Their	  constitution	  as	  subjects	  
embedded	  them	  in	  networks	  of	  power-­‐relationships.	  The	  public	  sphere	  could	  not	  therefore	  
be	  a	  site	  of	  free	  communication	  among	  a	  plurality	  of	  previously-­‐free	  subjects	  with	  their	  own	  
opinions.	  2)	  Lyotard’s	  work	  on	  the	  principles	  of	  performativity	  suggested	  that	  various	  
discourses,	  which	  he	  calls	  “language	  games,”	  are	  irreducible	  to	  one	  another.	  The	  meta-­‐
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Publicity	  plays	  several	  fundamental	  roles	  in	  the	  life	  of	  the	  individual.	  The	  
public	  sphere	  is	  where	  individuals	  become	  subjects	  within	  networks	  of	  social	  
control	  (Foucault);	  it	  is	  where	  we	  are	  interpellated	  into	  social	  roles	  (Althusser);	  it	  is	  
where	  our	  experiences	  of	  reality	  are	  validated	  by	  others	  (Arendt);	  it	  is	  where	  we	  
learn	  the	  rules	  governing	  social	  interactions	  (Goffman);	  it	  is	  where	  we	  learn	  to	  
sublimate	  instinctual	  desires	  into	  socially	  sanctioned	  behavior	  (Freud);	  and,	  it	  is	  
where	  we	  learn	  to	  classify	  others	  according	  to	  their	  tastes	  and	  to	  develop	  our	  own	  
tastes	  in	  line	  with	  our	  station	  in	  life	  (Bourdieu).	  In	  sum,	  we	  are	  integrated	  into	  
society	  through	  our	  participation	  in	  the	  public	  sphere;	  and	  just	  as	  social	  roles	  are	  
varied,	  so	  too	  are	  people’s	  experiences	  of	  publicity.	  
Various	  factors	  –	  both	  structural	  and	  contingent	  –	  shape	  the	  particular	  ways	  
that	  individuals	  participate	  in	  public	  life;	  and	  the	  particular	  way	  that	  an	  individual	  
participates	  in	  public	  life	  shapes	  that	  individual’s	  self-­‐perception	  and	  his	  perception	  
by	  others.	  And	  so	  an	  individual’s	  experience	  of	  publicity	  shapes	  his	  life-­‐chances,	  to	  
borrow	  a	  phrase	  from	  Weber,	  by	  shaping	  what	  he	  can	  do,	  what	  he	  can	  imagine	  
doing,	  and	  what	  others	  will	  allow	  him	  to	  do.11	  As	  I	  have	  noted	  in	  the	  introduction,	  
one	  of	  this	  project’s	  guiding	  concepts	  is	  that	  throughout	  history	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
narrative	  of	  consensus	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  undermines	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  these	  
discourses,	  their	  participants,	  and	  their	  views,	  by	  imposing	  an	  artificial	  imperative	  to	  
cohere.	  3)	  From	  an	  ontological	  perspective,	  Deleuze	  and	  Baudrillard,	  have	  suggested	  the	  
disappearance	  of	  a	  common,	  collective	  “real”	  as	  a	  constitutive	  aspect	  of	  postmodernity.	  
Symbols	  with	  no	  real	  referents	  constitute	  worlds	  in	  themselves.	  In	  this	  light,	  Arendt’s	  search	  
for	  a	  common	  phenomenological	  basis	  for	  experience	  –	  consensus	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  –	  is	  
nothing	  more	  than	  “nostalgia	  for	  a	  common	  referent,”	  which	  “power	  is	  able	  to	  exploit	  for	  its	  
own	  ends”	  (Villa	  1992,	  717).	  
	  
11	  Weber	  imagined	  life-­‐chances	  in	  specifically	  economic	  terms	  (Weber	  1991,	  181).	  I	  am	  
describing	  something	  broader,	  which	  encompasses	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  symbolic	  capital	  as	  
well	  (c.f.	  Bourdieu	  1989,	  17).	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media	  shapes	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  and	  so	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  contemporary	  media	  is	  vital	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  
contemporary	  public	  life	  and	  everything	  that	  implies.	  But	  if	  each	  individual	  
experiences	  publicity	  in	  various	  forms	  and	  in	  various	  contexts	  then	  in	  what	  sense	  
can	  we	  describe	  structural	  changes	  in	  “the”	  public	  sphere?	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  monolithic	  public	  sphere	  that	  covers	  the	  whole	  of	  society.	  Each	  
individual	  enacts	  his	  publicity	  –	  as	  both	  performer	  and	  spectator	  –	  in	  various	  
contexts	  and	  at	  various	  times.	  The	  same	  individual	  may	  experience	  and	  enact	  
publicity	  differently	  in	  church,	  at	  work,	  or	  during	  a	  weekend	  visit	  to	  the	  park.	  Each	  
individual	  life	  is	  lived	  in	  an	  overlapping	  set	  of	  public	  spheres	  –	  some	  are	  shared	  with	  
friends,	  others	  with	  neighbors,	  others	  with	  like-­‐minded	  people	  on	  opposite	  sides	  of	  
the	  globe.	  But	  insofar	  as	  these	  various	  spheres	  of	  publicity	  are	  constituted	  within	  a	  
broader	  social	  framework	  –	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  broader	  social	  
structures	  of	  culture,	  economy	  and	  society	  –	  these	  various	  spheres	  of	  publicity	  are	  
subject	  to	  a	  more-­‐or-­‐less-­‐shared	  set	  of	  structuring	  rules.	  Taken	  as	  a	  whole	  these	  
various	  public	  spheres	  constitute	  the	  overall	  experience	  of	  publicity	  in	  a	  given	  
society.	  
Considering	  these	  public	  spheres	  as	  an	  aggregate	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  convenient	  
conceptual	  maneuver.	  Individuals	  move	  from	  one	  sphere	  to	  another	  knitting	  these	  
various	  spaces	  of	  publicity	  into	  an	  overlapping	  network.	  This	  network	  has	  structure:	  
some	  spheres	  have	  more	  weight	  than	  others,	  some	  have	  higher	  bars	  to	  participation	  
than	  others.	  It	  is	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  aggregate	  experience	  of	  publicity	  in	  society	  is	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made	  up	  of	  various	  and	  unequal	  parts	  that	  we	  can	  describe	  this	  aggregation	  of	  
public	  spheres	  –	  i.e.,	  the	  public	  sphere	  –	  as	  having	  structure.	  And	  it	  is	  to	  the	  extent	  
that	  opportunities	  for	  publicity	  are	  shaped	  by	  broader	  social	  structures	  such	  as	  
economy,	  culture,	  and	  politics	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  linked	  to	  
structural	  transformations	  in	  society.	  
This	  implies	  many	  practical	  questions	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  public	  
sphere:	  to	  what	  extent	  do	  men	  and	  women	  occupy	  the	  same	  public	  sphere?	  To	  what	  
extent	  do	  blacks,	  whites,	  Jews,	  and	  Catholics	  occupy	  the	  same	  public	  sphere?	  To	  
what	  extent	  do	  different	  economic	  classes	  occupy	  the	  same	  public	  sphere?	  Where	  
and	  when	  do	  these	  various	  groups	  experience	  publicity?	  Does	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  
public	  sphere	  extend	  into	  the	  home?	  Into	  the	  bedroom?	  
In	  modern	  societies	  the	  experience	  of	  publicity	  –	  the	  experience	  of	  seeing	  and	  
being	  seen,	  of	  spectatorship	  and	  performance	  –	  is	  increasingly	  constituted	  by	  
various	  media.	  An	  important	  consequence	  of	  this	  fact	  is	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
media	  imprints	  itself	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  This	  is	  why	  
understanding	  the	  links	  between	  the	  media	  and	  the	  public	  sphere	  matters.	  
Understanding	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  dominant	  media	  will	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  public	  sphere;	  and	  it	  will	  help	  us	  understand	  the	  consequences	  of	  
decisions	  we	  make	  about	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  media.	  The	  public	  sphere	  is	  a	  
charged	  space,	  filled	  with	  potential.	  Understanding	  its	  structural	  relationship	  to	  the	  
media	  will	  help	  us	  to	  navigate	  that	  space.	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The	  way	  in	  which	  I	  discuss	  publicity	  and	  the	  public	  sphere	  in	  this	  project	  
differs	  from	  classical	  accounts	  such	  as	  those	  of	  Arendt	  or	  Habermas.	  In	  classical	  
political	  theory	  publicity	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  publics	  were	  largely	  conceived	  of	  in	  
terms	  of	  physical	  co-­‐presence	  –	  visibility	  meant	  physical	  visibility	  and	  publics	  were	  
groups	  of	  people	  that	  enacted	  their	  publicity	  in	  the	  same	  physical	  space.	  
Communications	  media,	  particularly	  modern	  media	  such	  as	  the	  Internet,	  have	  
broken	  this	  link	  between	  publicity	  and	  real-­‐world	  spatiality.	  Publics	  continue	  to	  
exist	  though,	  and	  they	  are	  subject	  to	  many	  of	  the	  same	  dynamics	  as	  the	  publics	  
theorized	  in	  classical	  social	  thought.	  The	  key	  difference	  is	  that	  a	  means	  other	  than	  
physical	  space	  becomes	  necessary	  for	  aggregating	  individual-­‐scale	  performance	  and	  
spectatorship.	  In	  today’s	  world	  of	  mediated	  publicity	  two	  entities	  fill	  this	  roll	  –	  
media	  institutions	  and	  media	  events.	  Here	  “media	  institutions”	  refers	  to	  institutions	  
such	  as	  particular	  newspapers,	  television	  stations	  and	  broadcasts,	  or	  even	  certain	  
websites	  that	  bring	  together	  audiences	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  share	  a	  space	  of	  
seeing	  and	  being	  seen,	  even	  if	  they	  share	  that	  space	  with	  each	  other	  on	  unequal	  
footing.	  With	  the	  phrase	  “media	  events”	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  one-­‐off	  broadcasts	  and	  
publications	  –	  the	  Apollo	  moon	  landings	  or	  the	  Super	  Bowl,	  for	  example	  –	  that	  fulfill	  
the	  same	  role.12	  As	  media	  constitute	  more	  and	  more	  of	  the	  contemporary	  
experience	  of	  publicity	  the	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  the	  media	  define	  the	  
structural	  characteristics	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  The	  deep	  consequences	  of	  changes	  in	  
the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  should	  therefore	  be	  interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  effects	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  will	  treat	  these	  two	  mechanisms	  of	  public	  formation	  as	  
interchangeable,	  although	  there	  are	  some	  difference.	  The	  principle	  difference	  is	  in	  the	  
duration	  over	  which	  these	  publics	  survive	  –	  media	  institutions	  tend	  to	  create	  longer-­‐lasting	  
publics	  while	  media	  events	  tend	  to	  create	  publics	  that	  may	  survive	  only	  briefly.	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on	  the	  structure	  of	  contemporary	  publicity;	  and	  so	  to	  understand	  what	  the	  media	  do	  
we	  must	  first	  understand	  what	  publicity	  and	  the	  public	  sphere	  do.	  
In	  the	  following	  pages	  I	  review	  the	  concept	  of	  publicity	  and	  its	  effects.	  This	  is	  
not	  a	  sweeping	  review	  of	  sociological	  theories	  of	  publicity,	  publics,	  and	  public	  space.	  
Instead	  I	  mostly	  review	  these	  concepts	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  mediated	  publicity;	  I	  
examine	  publicity	  as	  it	  is	  experienced	  through-­‐	  and	  enacted	  by-­‐	  the	  media,	  namely	  
print,	  radio,	  television,	  movies,	  and	  internet-­‐based	  new	  media	  technologies.	  The	  
purpose	  of	  this	  review	  is	  to	  clarify	  the	  social	  importance	  of	  publicity.	  It	  is	  also	  an	  
attempt	  to	  illustrate	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  publicity	  is	  enacted	  through	  the	  media,	  
particularly	  the	  mass	  media.	  
I	  emphasize	  the	  character	  of	  publicity	  as	  enacted	  by	  the	  mass	  media	  in	  
particular,	  because	  this	  project	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  two	  conflicting	  
accounts	  about	  the	  present.	  I	  have	  described	  these	  as	  the	  life-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media	  and	  the	  
death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media	  narratives.	  Clarifying	  the	  links	  between	  mass	  media	  and	  
publicity	  reveals	  what	  is	  exactly	  at	  stake	  in	  these	  two	  narratives;	  it	  reveals	  what	  
exactly	  would	  be	  gained	  or	  lost	  by	  the	  alleged	  death	  of	  mass	  media.	  
	  
Functions	  of	  Mediated	  Publicity	  
Three	  of	  the	  most	  fundamental	  processes	  that	  take	  place	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  are	  
community-­‐making,	  reality-­‐making,	  and	  meaning-­‐making.	  The	  mediation	  of	  




By	  its	  very	  nature	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  a	  space	  of	  community-­‐making	  in	  the	  most	  
basic	  sense.	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  phenomenological	  description	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  –	  
as	  a	  space	  of	  common	  appearance	  –	  links	  her	  model	  to	  a	  strand	  of	  phenomenological	  
sociology.	  I	  am	  referring	  in	  particular	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Alfred	  Schutz,	  who	  offered	  a	  
phenomenological	  explanation	  for	  the	  basis	  of	  community	  with	  his	  concept	  of	  the	  
“we	  relation.”	  
According	  to	  Schutz,	  the	  possibility	  of	  community-­‐formation	  depended	  on	  
the	  ability	  of	  individuals	  to	  imagine	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  relationship	  to	  others	  –	  the	  
ability	  to	  imagine	  a	  we,	  rather	  than	  just	  an	  I	  and	  a	  you.	  This	  we	  refers	  to	  the	  
experience	  of	  intersubjectivity	  and	  is	  a	  sine	  qua	  non	  of	  social	  life.	  This	  ability	  to	  
imagine	  a	  we,	  wrote	  Schutz,	  emerges	  from	  a	  particular	  sense	  of	  temporality	  –	  a	  
sense	  of	  shared	  temporality.	  In	  order	  to	  imagine	  a	  “we”	  individuals	  need	  to	  realize	  
that	  they	  have	  a	  shared	  experience	  of	  the	  passage	  of	  time.	  And	  this	  realization,	  
wrote	  Schutz,	  true	  to	  his	  phenomenological	  orientation,	  occurred	  when	  multiple	  
people	  simultaneously	  observed	  a	  mediating	  object	  changing	  over	  time.	  Schutz	  used	  
the	  example	  of	  a	  bird	  in	  flight.	  
Since	  we	  are	  growing	  older	  together	  during	  the	  flight	  of	  the	  bird,	  and	  since	  I	  have	  
evidence,	  in	  my	  own	  observations,	  that	  you	  were	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  same	  event,	  
I	  may	  say	  that	  we	  saw	  a	  bird	  in	  flight	  (Schutz	  1964,	  25).	  
Shared	  perception	  of	  a	  mediating	  object	  is	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	  for	  imagining	  a	  
community;	  and	  the	  public	  sphere,	  at	  least	  in	  Arendt’s	  phenomenological	  model,	  
which	  I	  largely	  adopt	  here,	  is	  the	  space	  of	  shared	  perceptions.	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   As	  communications	  media	  –	  print,	  television,	  etc.	  –	  increasingly	  constitute	  
the	  space	  of	  perceptions	  and	  publicity	  they	  structure	  the	  appearance	  of	  mediating	  
objects	  by	  affecting	  who	  sees	  what	  and	  when.	  Karin	  Knorr	  Cetina,	  for	  instance,	  has	  
written	  about	  stock	  traders,	  whose	  sense	  of	  community	  is	  largely	  shaped	  by	  their	  
simultaneous	  attention	  to	  the	  patterns	  of	  the	  stock	  market	  (Cetina	  and	  Bruegger	  
2002).	  The	  stock	  market	  is	  the	  mediating	  object	  –	  Schutz’s	  bird	  in	  flight	  –	  that	  acts	  as	  
the	  basis	  for	  the	  shared	  sense	  of	  temporality	  that	  enables	  this	  community	  to	  exist,	  
and	  although	  they	  are	  spread	  across	  the	  globe,	  the	  traders	  are	  all	  able	  to	  watch	  the	  
movements	  of	  the	  market	  thanks	  to	  television	  and	  computer	  networks.	  
Performances	  and	  events	  of	  all	  kinds,	  from	  soap	  operas	  to	  televised	  protests	  
and	  national	  wars,	  make	  up	  the	  phenomenological	  content	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  
when	  they	  are	  delivered	  simultaneously	  by	  the	  media.	  And	  insofar	  as	  access	  to	  the	  
media	  is	  structured	  –	  insofar	  as	  certain	  people	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  watch	  certain	  
media	  outlets	  at	  certain	  times	  –	  both	  the	  spaces	  of	  publicity,	  and	  the	  communities	  
that	  they	  facilitate	  bear	  the	  imprint	  of	  the	  media’s	  structure.	  
	   	  
Communications	  media	  deliver	  the	  mediating	  objects	  that	  act	  as	  the	  
phenomenological	  basis	  for	  community	  formation;	  but	  media	  themselves,	  
particularly	  mass	  media,	  can	  also	  act	  as	  these	  mediating	  objects.	  People	  consume	  
mass	  media	  with	  the	  knowledge	  that	  many	  other	  people	  are	  consuming	  the	  same	  
media	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  simultaneously;	  this	  creates	  a	  shared	  temporality	  and	  an	  
imagined	  community	  among	  audience	  members	  on	  a	  large	  scale.	  Benedict	  Anderson	  
described	  this	  phenomenon	  on	  the	  national	  scale,	  with	  the	  newspaper	  serving	  as	  the	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mediating	  object	  that	  enables	  the	  formation	  of	  “imagined”	  national	  communities.	  
The	  newspaper,	  Anderson	  wrote,	  is	  what	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  imagine	  a	  we	  on	  a	  
national	  scale	  –	  e.g.	  the	  “we”	  in	  the	  preamble	  to	  the	  United	  States	  Constitution,	  we	  
the	  people	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America…	  
The	  obsolescence	  of	  the	  newspaper	  on	  the	  morrow	  of	  its	  printing…	  creates	  this	  
extraordinary	  mass	  ceremony...	  We	  know	  that	  particular	  morning	  and	  evening	  
editions	  will	  overwhelmingly	  be	  consumed	  between	  this	  hour	  and	  that,	  only	  on	  this	  
day,	  not	  on	  that…	  Each	  communicant	  is	  well	  aware	  that	  the	  ceremony	  he	  performs	  is	  
being	  replicated	  simultaneously	  by	  thousands	  (or	  millions)	  of	  others	  of	  whose	  
existence	  he	  is	  confident,	  yet	  of	  whose	  identity	  he	  has	  not	  the	  slightest	  notion…	  At	  
the	  same	  time,	  the	  newspaper	  reader,	  observing	  exact	  replicas	  of	  his	  own	  paper	  
being	  consumed	  by	  his	  subway,	  barbershop,	  or	  residential	  neighbours,	  is	  
continually	  reassured	  that	  the	  imagined	  world	  is	  visibly	  rooted	  in	  everyday	  life…	  
Fiction	  seeps	  quietly	  and	  continuously	  into	  reality,	  creating	  that	  remarkable	  
confidence	  of	  community	  in	  anonymity	  which	  is	  the	  hallmark	  of	  modern	  nations.	  (B.	  
R.	  O.	  Anderson	  1991,	  35)	  
The	  consumption	  of	  mass	  media	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  simultaneously	  creates	  what	  
Anderson	  beautifully	  articulates	  as	  “that	  remarkable	  confidence	  of	  community	  in	  
anonymity”	  (Anderson	  1983:	  36).	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville	  had	  similar	  thoughts	  
regarding	  the	  role	  of	  the	  newspaper	  in	  democracy:	  “Only	  a	  newspaper	  can	  put	  the	  
same	  thought	  at	  the	  same	  time	  before	  a	  thousand	  readers…	  So	  hardly	  any	  
democratic	  association	  can	  carry	  on	  without	  a	  newspaper”	  (Tocqueville	  1835,	  289).	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  I	  use	  the	  word	  community	  here	  in	  the	  most	  
general	  sense.	  Community	  has	  been	  extensively	  theorized	  over	  the	  past	  century	  and	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has	  various	  meanings	  for	  the	  character	  of	  interpersonal	  interaction	  and	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  collective.	  Here	  though,	  I	  simply	  mean	  that	  a	  shared	  experience	  
creates	  something	  in	  common	  among	  audience	  members.	  And	  this	  something-­‐in-­‐
common	  can	  bring	  them	  together	  in	  various	  ways.	  The	  kind	  of	  shared	  perception	  
characteristic	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  necessary,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient,	  for	  the	  
formation	  of	  community.	  It	  is	  one	  of	  the	  practical	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  structure	  of	  
publicity,	  and	  therefore	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media,	  matter.	  
	  
Reality-­‐Making	  
In	  phenomenological	  accounts,	  such	  as	  Arendt’s,	  appearance	  is	  the	  only	  arbiter	  of	  
reality;	  and	  since	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  the	  sphere	  of	  common	  appearances,	  the	  public	  
sphere	  constitutes	  the	  world	  of	  shared	  reality.	  This	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  Arendt’s	  claim	  
that	  “for	  us,	  appearance	  –	  something	  that	  is	  being	  seen	  and	  heard	  by	  others	  as	  well	  
as	  ourselves	  –	  constitutes	  reality”	  (Arendt	  1998,	  50).	  The	  corollary	  to	  this	  is	  that	  our	  
experiences	  are	  only	  half-­‐real	  until	  they	  are	  made	  public.	  	  
Even	  the	  greatest	  forces	  of	  intimate	  [i.e.	  private]	  life	  –	  the	  passions	  of	  the	  heart,	  the	  
thoughts	  of	  the	  mind,	  the	  delights	  of	  the	  senses	  –	  lead	  an	  uncertain,	  shadowy	  kind	  of	  
existence	  unless	  and	  until	  they	  are	  transformed,	  deprivatized	  and	  deinidividualized,	  
as	  it	  were,	  into	  a	  shape	  to	  fit	  them	  for	  public	  appearance.	  (Arendt	  1998,	  50)	  
Even	  on	  a	  mundane	  level	  we	  constantly	  seek	  reassurance	  that	  our	  experiences	  are	  
real	  –	  “is	  it	  just	  me	  or	  is	  it	  cold	  in	  here?”	  Our	  daily	  lives	  are	  filled	  with	  such	  reality-­‐
validating	  exchanges	  –	  and	  their	  defining	  characteristic	  is	  that	  they	  involve	  sharing	  
experiences	  with	  other	  people.	  Sharing	  our	  experiences	  with	  other	  people	  helps	  to	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validate	  our	  sense	  of	  reality	  and	  constitutes	  the	  shared	  reality	  within	  which	  social	  
life	  takes	  place.	  This	  is	  the	  second	  key	  consequence	  of	  publicity	  –	  and	  is,	  today,	  
largely	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media.13	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  this	  reality-­‐making	  
function	  of	  publicity.	  Mass	  media,	  for	  instance,	  increase	  the	  reality-­‐making	  power	  of	  
the	  public	  sphere	  by	  increasing	  its	  size,	  but	  it	  also	  threatens	  to	  decrease	  its	  reality-­‐
making	  power	  by	  making	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  people	  to	  share	  their	  experiences	  –	  its	  
one-­‐to-­‐many	  character	  makes	  it	  far	  easier	  to	  hear	  stories	  in	  public	  than	  to	  tell	  them.	  
As	  the	  size	  of	  the	  audience	  grows	  its	  members	  do	  not	  have	  enough	  time	  to	  hear	  
every	  other	  member’s	  unique	  stories.	  This	  problem	  is	  easily	  dealt	  with	  though	  –	  and	  
its	  solution	  shapes	  the	  character	  of	  reality	  as	  we	  experience	  it.	  An	  experience	  does	  
not	  need	  to	  be	  directly	  shared	  through	  the	  mass	  media	  to	  be	  validated.	  As	  long	  as	  
that	  experience	  is	  experienced	  in	  the	  same	  terms	  as	  experiences	  that	  have	  been	  
shared	  through	  the	  media	  it	  indirectly	  benefits	  from	  validation	  by	  the	  masses.	  This	  
is	  the	  meaning	  of	  increasingly	  common	  statements	  about	  experiences	  that	  were	  
“just	  like	  on	  TV.”	  Experiences	  that	  are	  framed	  and	  felt	  in	  the	  same	  terms	  as	  those	  
that	  appear	  in	  the	  mass	  media	  have	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  hyper-­‐real.14	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  This	  reality-­‐making	  function	  of	  publicity	  explains	  people’s	  storytelling	  impulse.	  
Each	  time	  we	  talk	  about	  things	  that	  can	  be	  experienced	  only	  in	  privacy	  or	  intimacy,	  we	  bring	  
them	  out	  into	  a	  sphere	  where	  they	  will	  assume	  a	  kind	  of	  reality	  which,	  their	  intensity	  
notwithstanding,	  they	  never	  could	  have	  had	  before.	  The	  presence	  of	  others	  who	  see	  what	  we	  
see	  and	  hear	  what	  we	  hear	  assures	  us	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  world	  and	  ourselves.	  (Arendt	  
1998,	  50)	  
In	  Arendt’s	  terms,	  storytelling	  allows	  our	  experiences	  to	  make	  a	  “public	  appearance”	  
(Arendt	  1998,	  50).	  
	  
14	  This	  is	  an	  inversion	  of	  Baudrillard’s	  formula.	  For	  Baudrillard	  hyperreality	  is	  the	  reality	  of	  
symbols	  with	  no	  real	  referents	  (Baudrillard	  1994).	  Here	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  hyper-­‐reality	  as	  




Appearance	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  validates	  not	  only	  the	  reality	  of	  experiences,	  but	  
their	  meaning	  as	  well.	  Meaning-­‐making	  is	  not	  an	  innate	  function	  of	  publicity	  per	  se.	  
But	  the	  meaning-­‐making	  function	  of	  narratives	  and	  the	  centrality	  of	  narrative	  in	  
mass	  media,	  coupled	  with	  the	  validation	  that	  comes	  with	  large-­‐scale	  publicity	  and	  
the	  dominance	  of	  mass	  media	  over	  the	  public	  sphere,	  means	  that	  the	  public	  sphere	  
increasingly	  is	  the	  site	  of	  meaning-­‐making.	  Social	  (and	  public)	  processes	  of	  
meaning-­‐making	  have	  been	  theorized	  in	  sociology	  in	  the	  contexts	  of	  both	  symbolic	  
interactionism	  and	  in	  studies	  of	  culture.	  
The	  concept	  of	  symbolic	  interactionism	  was	  formalized	  by	  Herbert	  Blumer,	  
who	  described	  it	  as	  having	  three	  basic	  premises:	  1)	  people	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
meaning	  that	  other	  things	  and	  people	  have	  for	  them,	  2)	  the	  meaning	  of	  things	  and	  
people	  is	  the	  product	  of	  social	  interactions	  between	  people,	  3)	  these	  meanings	  are	  
handled	  and	  modified	  through	  interpretive	  processes.	  Blumer’s	  concept	  was	  an	  
attempt	  to	  correct	  an	  oversight	  in	  theories	  that	  accounted	  for	  human	  behavior	  on	  
the	  sole	  basis	  of	  external	  factors,	  such	  as	  class,	  politics,	  or	  economic	  interest.	  These	  
theories,	  Blumer	  argued,	  neglected	  a	  fundamental	  dimension	  of	  human	  action	  –	  i.e.,	  
meaning	  (Blumer	  1986,	  1–4).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
symbolic	  representation	  of	  that	  experience.	  My	  experience	  of	  scoring	  a	  football	  touchdown	  
might	  never	  appear	  on	  television,	  might	  never	  be	  disseminated	  in	  symbolic	  form;	  but	  I	  can	  
imagine	  my	  touchdown	  in	  the	  same	  symbolic	  terms	  as	  the	  televised	  touchdowns	  that	  I	  have	  
witnessed.	  And	  imagining	  this	  sympathy	  between	  my	  touchdown	  and	  the	  televised	  
touchdowns	  that	  I	  know	  were	  witnessed	  by	  countless	  others,	  gives	  my	  own	  touchdown	  the	  
hyper-­‐validation	  of	  countless	  audiences	  made	  up	  of	  countless	  people	  witnessing	  countless	  
touchdowns.	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Blumer’s	  model	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  understandings	  of	  the	  public	  
sphere	  on	  the	  level	  of	  meaning-­‐making,	  but	  also	  in	  its	  implications	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  
public	  opinion.	  In	  Blumer’s	  account	  public	  opinion	  is	  not	  monolithic.	  Instead	  public	  
opinion	  is	  constituted	  through	  interaction	  and	  produces	  various	  and	  often	  
contradictory	  forms	  of	  consensus	  among	  different	  groups.	  And	  public	  opinion	  is	  not	  
a	  “mere	  display”	  or	  “terminal”	  in	  its	  expression	  –	  public	  opinion	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  
action	  by	  legislators,	  executives,	  administrators,	  and	  policy	  makers	  (Blumer	  1986,	  
201).	  All	  of	  these	  people	  respond	  to	  public	  opinion	  according	  to	  their	  own	  processes	  
of	  meaning-­‐making,	  which	  are	  themselves	  constituted	  through	  interactions	  and	  
which	  are	  themselves	  largely	  constituted	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  
Other	  scholars	  had	  similarly	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  meaning-­‐making,	  
generally	  agreeing	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  meanings	  produced	  through	  social	  
interactions	  constitute	  much	  of	  culture.	  Erving	  Goffman,	  for	  instance,	  noted	  the	  role	  
of	  culture	  in	  disseminating	  what	  he	  called	  “frameworks	  of	  understanding”	  (Goffman	  
1974).	  These	  frameworks	  of	  understanding	  allow	  people	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  
events	  that	  they	  experience	  –	  without	  these	  frameworks	  of	  understanding	  events	  in	  
themselves	  would	  be	  otherwise	  meaningless.15	  Ann	  Swidler	  extended	  this	  type	  of	  
analysis	  in	  modeling	  culture	  as	  a	  “tool	  kit”	  for	  action.	  (Swidler	  1986;	  Swidler	  2000).	  
Swidler	  pointed	  out	  that	  while	  culture	  is	  full	  of	  contradictions	  people	  tend	  to	  
selectively	  and	  strategically	  apply	  cultural	  frameworks	  according	  to	  their	  context.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Goffman	  here	  is	  echoing	  Schutz’s	  existentialist	  position:	  “it	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  our	  
experience	  and	  not	  the	  ontological	  structure	  of	  the	  objects	  which	  constitute	  reality”	  
(Goffman	  1974).	  Much	  of	  this	  literature	  is	  rooted	  in	  existentialist	  thought	  and	  its	  
sociological	  ramification	  constructivism.	  For	  instance,	  Berger	  and	  Luckman’s	  foundational	  
The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Reality	  also	  draws	  on	  Schutz	  (Berger	  and	  Luckmann	  1967).	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People	  use	  these	  frameworks	  to	  orient	  themselves	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  to	  act,	  but	  also,	  
importantly,	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  to	  feel.	  Cultural	  frames,	  Swidler	  explained,	  help	  us	  “to	  
be	  guilt-­‐ridden	  about	  wrongdoing,	  passive	  before	  authority,	  or	  infuriated	  by	  
insubordination”	  (Swidler	  2000,	  73).16	  
	  
The	  sociologists	  analyzing	  both	  the	  emergence	  of	  meaning	  from	  social	  
interactions	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  frameworks	  of	  meaning	  in	  facilitating	  social	  
interactions	  constituted	  what	  Margaret	  Somers	  describes	  as	  a	  “narrative	  turn”	  in	  
sociology.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  turn	  was	  a	  shift	  from	  conceiving	  of	  narrative	  in	  
representational	  terms	  –	  i.e.,	  narrative	  simply	  recounts	  reality	  –	  to	  conceiving	  of	  
narrative	  in	  ontological	  terms	  –	  i.e.,	  narrative	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  constituting	  reality.17	  
Narrative,	  in	  Somers’s	  account,	  is	  constitutive	  of	  individuals’	  life	  experiences.18	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  The	  importance	  of	  meaning-­‐making	  had	  been	  recognized	  decades	  earlier	  in	  psychology,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Viktor	  Frankl	  who	  argued	  that	  “man’s	  search	  for	  meaning	  is	  the	  
primary	  motivation	  in	  his	  life”	  (Frankl	  1985,	  121).	  Frankl	  built	  a	  school	  of	  psychoanalysis	  
based	  on	  this	  insight	  and	  developed	  a	  therapeutic	  technique	  that	  he	  called	  logotherapy	  –	  the	  
name	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  Greek	  logos	  (meaning).	  His	  most	  popular	  book,	  Man’s	  Search	  for	  
Meaning,	  has	  sold	  10	  million	  copies	  and	  was	  ranked	  9th	  on	  a	  Library	  of	  Congress/Book-­‐of-­‐
the-­‐Month	  club	  survey	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  books	  among	  Americans;	  #1	  was	  the	  Bible.	  
	  
17	  “Scholars	  are	  postulating	  something	  much	  more	  substantive	  about	  narrative	  [than	  a	  
representational	  role]:	  namely,	  that	  social	  life	  is	  itself	  storied	  and	  that	  narrative	  is	  an	  
ontological	  condition	  of	  social	  life.	  Their	  research	  is	  showing	  us	  that	  stories	  guide	  action;	  
that	  people	  construct	  identities	  (however	  multiple	  and	  changing)	  by	  locating	  themselves	  or	  
being	  located	  within	  a	  repertoire	  of	  emplotted	  stories;	  that	  “experience”	  is	  constituted	  
through	  narratives;	  that	  people	  make	  sense	  of	  what	  has	  happened	  and	  is	  happening	  to	  them	  
by	  attempting	  to	  assemble	  or	  in	  some	  way	  to	  integrate	  these	  happenings	  within	  one	  or	  
more	  narratives;	  and	  that	  people	  are	  guided	  to	  act	  in	  certain	  ways,	  and	  not	  others,	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  the	  projections,	  expectations,	  and	  memories	  derived	  from	  a	  multiplicity	  but	  
ultimately	  limited	  repertoire	  of	  available	  social,	  public,	  and	  cultural	  narratives”	  (Somers	  
1994,	  613).	  
	  
18	  E.M.	  Forster	  offered	  a	  succinct	  definition	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  chronological	  series	  
of	  events	  and	  a	  meaningful	  plot	  or	  narrative	  –	  “the	  king	  died	  and	  then	  the	  queen	  died”	  lacks	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The	  dominance	  of	  narrative	  in	  the	  mass	  media	  that	  increasingly	  constitute	  
the	  public	  sphere	  point	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  these	  media	  in	  processes	  of	  meaning-­‐
making.	  Narrative	  television,	  radio	  broadcasts,	  and	  narrative	  forms	  of	  journalism	  
point	  to	  the	  power	  of	  these	  media	  as	  mechanisms	  for	  producing,	  transmitting,	  and	  
diffusing	  meaning-­‐making	  narratives.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  
affects	  the	  structure	  of	  meaning-­‐making	  in	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  
media	  affects	  which	  groups	  will	  be	  more	  or	  less	  likely	  to	  share	  frameworks	  of	  
meaning	  and	  how	  coherent	  frameworks	  of	  meaning	  will	  be	  throughout	  society.	  
From	  Somers’s	  ontological	  perspective	  this	  implies	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  
constitutes,	  or	  at	  least	  shapes,	  the	  reality	  of	  society.	   	  
Culturally-­‐derived	  narratives	  can	  bring	  meaning	  to	  people’s	  most	  intimate	  
life	  experiences.	  For	  instance,	  in	  Talk	  of	  Love,	  Swidler	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  how	  
culture	  shaped	  one	  respondent’s	  personal	  understanding	  of	  love:	  
When	  Ted	  Oster,	  the	  philosophically	  inclined	  lawyer	  of	  chapter	  2,	  says	  “I	  had	  always	  
heard,	  and	  I	  wanted	  to	  believe,	  that	  when	  you	  find	  that	  special	  someone,	  you’ll	  know	  
she’s	  right,”	  he	  is	  appropriating	  and	  personalizing	  a	  cultural	  formula…	  he	  is	  using	  
terms	  provided	  by	  the	  larger	  culture	  to	  name	  his	  own	  experience…	  (Swidler	  2000,	  
44)	  
The	  narrative	  frameworks	  that	  shaped	  Ted	  Oster’s	  understanding	  of	  love	  derive	  
from	  a	  lifetime	  of	  media	  consumption.	  And	  Oster	  has	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  
there	  is	  at	  least	  one	  other	  person	  out	  there	  that	  feels	  the	  way	  that	  he	  does	  about	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
meaning,	  but	  the	  sentence	  becomes	  a	  meaningful	  narrative	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  two	  words:	  
“the	  king	  died,	  and	  then	  the	  queen	  died	  of	  grief”	  (Forster	  1985,	  86).	  By	  showing	  how	  lived	  
moments	  come	  together	  in	  meaningful	  chains	  of	  connected	  events,	  narratives	  are	  both	  tools	  
and	  models	  for	  people	  struggling	  to	  make	  meaning	  in	  their	  own	  lives.	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finding	  “that	  someone	  special”	  –	  after	  all	  it	  was	  the	  mass	  media,	  with	  their	  mass	  
audience,	  that	  gave	  us	  The	  Platter’s	  hit	  song	  “Only	  You”,	  or	  Norman	  Jewison’s	  
romantic	  movie	  of	  the	  same	  name.	  
In	  attempting	  to	  explain	  the	  immense	  popularity	  of	  certain	  mass	  media	  
broadcasts	  several	  scholars	  have	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  broadcasts’	  
meaning-­‐making	  functions.	  For	  instance,	  in	  trying	  to	  explain	  the	  immense	  
popularity	  of	  the	  TV	  show	  Dallas	  –	  which	  was	  watched	  by	  350	  million	  people	  
around	  the	  world	  during	  the	  famous	  “Who	  Shot	  J.R.?”	  broadcast19	  –	  Ien	  Ang	  argued	  
that	  soap	  operas	  like	  Dallas	  are	  so	  popular	  because	  they	  make	  normal	  interactions	  
seem	  meaningful.	  Soap	  operas	  can	  make	  the	  mundane	  interactions	  of	  our	  own	  daily	  
lives	  seem	  like	  part	  of	  a	  momentous	  tragic	  narrative.	  Ang	  bases	  her	  conclusions	  on	  
Peter	  Brooks’s	  description	  of	  the	  “melodramatic	  imagination”	  (c.f.	  Brooks	  1976).	  
The	  melodramatic	  imagination	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  psychological	  strategy	  to	  
overcome	  the	  material	  meaninglessness	  of	  everyday	  existence,	  in	  which	  routine	  and	  
habit	  prevail...	  The	  melodramatic	  imagination	  is	  therefore	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  
refusal,	  or	  inability,	  to	  accept	  insignificant	  everyday	  life	  as	  banal	  and	  meaningless,	  
and	  is	  born	  of	  a	  vague,	  inarticulate	  dissatisfaction	  with	  existence	  here	  and	  now…	  
There	  are	  no	  words	  for	  the	  ordinary	  pain	  of	  living	  of	  ordinary	  people	  in	  the	  modern	  
welfare	  state,	  for	  the	  vague	  sense	  of	  loss…	  By	  making	  that	  ordinariness	  something	  
special	  and	  meaningful	  in	  the	  imagination,	  that	  sense	  of	  loss	  can	  –	  at	  least	  for	  a	  time	  
–	  be	  removed…	  Dallas	  offers	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  melodramatic	  imagination,	  
nourishes	  it,	  makes	  it	  concrete.	  (Ang	  1985,	  79)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  On	  Nov.	  21,	  1980	  Dallas	  fans	  finally	  found	  out	  who	  shot	  the	  nefarious	  J.R.	  Ewing	  
character.	  In	  the	  US	  the	  episode	  was	  watched	  by	  53.3%	  of	  TV	  households,	  and	  76%	  of	  
households	  watching	  during	  the	  broadcast.	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It	  is	  not	  only	  their	  narrative	  form	  that	  makes	  mass	  media	  broadcasts	  such	  powerful	  
instruments	  of	  meaning-­‐making;	  their	  publicity	  gives	  these	  narratives	  added	  
significance.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  Reality-­‐Making	  section	  above,	  presence	  in	  the	  
public	  sphere	  heightens,	  and	  even	  constitutes,	  our	  sense	  of	  reality.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  
meaning-­‐making	  power	  of	  mass	  media	  narratives	  is	  heightened	  by	  the	  audience’s	  
sense	  of	  their	  “reality”	  which	  comes	  from	  those	  narratives’	  publicity.	  The	  heroic	  
meaning	  of	  Luke	  Skywalker’s	  exploits	  in	  the	  Star	  Wars	  movie	  franchise,	  for	  instance,	  
is	  all	  the	  more	  heroic	  because	  it	  is	  on	  display	  for	  a	  massive	  public	  audience	  –	  an	  
audience	  that	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  size	  reifies	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  stories	  it	  consumes.	  This	  
may	  help	  to	  explain	  why	  audiences	  continue	  to	  flock	  to	  certain	  mass-­‐media	  stories	  
even	  when	  presented	  with	  more	  personally-­‐relevant	  alternatives.	  
	  
Other	  Functions	  
Publicity	  is	  linked	  to	  many	  other	  social	  processes,	  besides	  the	  three	  listed	  above.	  
Social	  capital,	  for	  instance,	  is	  particularly	  linked	  to	  publicity.	  In	  an	  analysis	  of	  mid-­‐
century	  American	  life	  Lazarsfeld	  and	  Merton	  noted	  that	  the	  mass	  media	  exercise	  a	  
status-­‐conferral	  function.	  Merely	  appearing	  in	  the	  media	  enhances	  the	  status	  of	  
issues,	  people,	  and	  organizations.	  Publicity	  in	  the	  media	  indicates	  that	  “one	  is	  
important	  enough	  to	  have	  been	  singled	  out	  from	  the	  large	  anonymous	  masses,	  that	  
one’s	  behavior	  and	  opinions	  are	  significant	  enough	  to	  require	  public	  notice”	  (Paul	  F.	  
Lazarsfeld	  and	  Merton	  1971,	  20).	  
	  
The	  Mass	  Media	  Tendency	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Our	  demand	  for	  mass	  media	  is	  rooted	  in	  three	  basic	  needs:	  a	  need	  to	  share	  a	  
sense	  of	  reality	  with	  other	  people,	  a	  need	  to	  find	  meaning	  in	  our	  daily	  lives,	  and	  a	  
need	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  community	  –	  reality-­‐making,	  meaning-­‐making,	  and	  community-­‐
making.	  I	  have	  reviewed	  each	  of	  these	  above.	  Whether	  these	  represent	  
transhistorical	  tendencies,	  or	  whether	  they	  have	  emerged	  as	  the	  result	  of	  national	  
conditioning	  during	  the	  years	  in	  which	  mass	  media	  were	  the	  only	  available	  media,	  
we	  have	  come	  to	  satisfy	  these	  needs	  through	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  engagement	  with	  
the	  media.	  This	  form	  of	  engagement	  seems	  to	  be	  persisting,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
media	  themselves	  have	  changed.	  
The	  mode	  in	  which	  we	  have	  become	  accustomed	  to	  satisfying	  these	  basic	  
human	  impulses	  to	  reality-­‐making,	  meaning-­‐making,	  and	  community-­‐making	  
creates	  a	  demand	  for	  mass	  media.	  This	  demand	  is	  what	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  mass	  media	  
tendency,	  and	  it	  explains	  why	  technologies	  are	  not	  necessarily	  being	  used	  according	  
to	  the	  audience-­‐fragmenting	  logic	  of	  their	  engineers	  –	  why	  people	  still	  come	  
together	  to	  watch	  tragedies	  in	  Africa	  rather	  than	  focusing	  only	  on	  their	  own	  back	  
yards,	  why	  111	  million	  people	  watched	  the	  Super	  Bowl	  in	  2010,	  and	  why	  26	  million	  
people	  went	  to	  see	  The	  Avengers	  in	  its	  first	  72	  hours.20	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Recognizing	  this	  tendency	  amounts	  to	  introducing	  a	  new	  variable	  into	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  new	  media	  and	  older	  mass	  media	  –	  a	  variable	  that	  must	  be	  added	  to	  
widely-­‐discussed	  technical	  variables	  such	  as	  the	  number	  of	  simultaneous	  media	  channels	  
available	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  time-­‐shifting.	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CHAPTER	  3	  
AGGREGATION	  and	  FRAGMENTATION	  
	  
“A	  specter	  is	  haunting	  sociologists.	  It	  is	  the	  specter	  of	  ‘mass	  society’”	  
(Shils	  1962,	  35).	  
	  
In	  the	  years	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  American	  society	  underwent	  a	  major	  shift,	  
from	  the	  highly	  competitive,	  volatile,	  and	  market-­‐oriented	  days	  of	  the	  early	  1900s	  to	  
an	  era	  of	  “mass	  society,”	  in	  which	  large,	  formerly-­‐excluded	  segments	  of	  the	  
population	  played	  an	  increasingly	  visible	  role	  in	  the	  life	  of	  the	  nation;	  and	  one	  of	  the	  
most	  visible	  features	  of	  the	  ascendant	  mass	  society	  was	  its	  system	  of	  
communications,	  the	  “mass	  media.”	  It	  is	  this	  era	  of	  mass	  society	  and	  mass	  media	  
that	  has	  supposedly	  been	  waning	  since	  the	  last	  decades	  of	  the	  last	  millennium.	  The	  
era	  of	  mass	  society	  was	  the	  era	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  formed	  its	  identity	  as	  a	  
global	  superpower,	  the	  world’s	  strongest	  economy,	  and	  the	  standard-­‐bearer	  of	  
personal	  political	  freedom;	  and	  so	  the	  supposed	  end	  of	  this	  era	  amidst	  a	  flurry	  of	  
domestic	  “culture	  wars”	  has	  been	  met	  with	  no	  small	  amount	  of	  nail-­‐biting.	  In	  order	  
to	  understand	  whether	  the	  United	  States	  has,	  in	  fact,	  been	  losing	  its	  character	  as	  a	  
mass	  society	  organized	  by	  mass	  media,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  character	  of	  
American	  society	  today,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  the	  social	  order	  that	  these	  
terms	  signified	  –	  a	  social	  order	  that	  was	  as	  feared	  on	  its	  way	  in	  as	  it	  has	  been	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mourned	  on	  its	  supposed	  way	  out.21	  That	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter.	  I	  begin	  by	  
reviewing	  theories	  of	  mass	  society	  and	  mass	  media,	  then	  I	  propose	  a	  set	  of	  
questions	  for	  examining	  whether	  the	  effects	  of	  today’s	  media	  on	  the	  contemporary	  
social	  order	  differ	  from	  the	  relationship	  that	  characterized	  mass	  media	  and	  mass	  
society.	  
	  
Mid-­‐century	  theorists	  of	  mass	  society	  sought	  to	  give	  a	  coherent	  theoretical	  
articulation	  to	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  empirical	  changes:	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  American	  
people	  had	  become	  more	  educated,	  wealthier,	  and	  more	  informed	  than	  they	  had	  
ever	  been;	  while	  they	  had	  not	  joined	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  elites,	  the	  formerly-­‐peripheral	  
mass	  of	  society	  had	  moved	  closer	  to	  the	  center	  than	  ever	  before,	  and	  the	  center	  
increasingly	  catered	  to	  their	  tastes,	  if	  not	  their	  interests;	  in	  rapidly-­‐growing	  cities	  
the	  masses	  were	  more	  visible	  than	  ever	  before;	  and,	  as	  their	  wealth,	  culture,	  and	  
level	  of	  political	  participation	  grew	  the	  masses	  played	  an	  increasingly	  important	  
role	  in	  public	  life.	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly	  though,	  the	  Fordist/Keynesian	  
economic	  strategy	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  years	  meant	  that	  for	  the	  nation	  to	  thrive	  the	  
masses	  had	  to	  thrive,	  creating	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  elites	  needed	  the	  masses	  like	  never	  
before.	  The	  elites	  that	  had	  formerly	  controlled	  publicity	  and	  power	  were	  now	  forced	  
to	  share	  the	  former,	  if	  not	  the	  latter,	  with	  the	  hoi	  polloi.	  In	  short,	  the	  American	  
population	  was	  becoming	  aggregated	  around	  an	  increasingly	  accessible	  
mainstream;	  this	  was	  in	  large	  part	  accomplished	  by	  the	  mass	  media	  whose	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Mid-­‐century	  fears	  of	  the	  rising	  “mass	  society”	  were	  also	  tied	  to	  the	  international	  political	  
climate	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  “We	  have	  moved	  a	  considerable	  distance	  along	  the	  road	  to	  the	  mass	  
society,”	  wrote	  C.	  Wright	  Mills.	  “At	  the	  end	  of	  that	  road	  there	  is	  totalitarianism,	  as	  in	  Nazi	  
Germany	  or	  in	  Communist	  Russia”	  (Mills	  1956,	  304).	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dominant	  effect	  during	  the	  years	  of	  mass	  society	  was	  to	  aggregate	  a	  population	  
formerly	  fragmented	  by	  class,	  culture,	  region,	  political	  identity,	  etc.22	  This	  
aggregating	  function	  was	  the	  mass	  media’s	  salient	  feature	  and	  understanding	  its	  
effects	  on	  society	  is	  vital	  if	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  the	  social	  ramifications	  of	  recent	  
transformations	  in	  the	  media	  –	  particularly	  their	  shift	  to	  a	  guiding	  logic	  of	  audience	  
fragmentation.	  
	  	  
Theories	  of	  mass	  society	  and	  mass	  media	  can	  generally	  be	  organized	  
according	  to	  their	  provenance,	  which	  is	  often	  correlated	  with	  their	  outlook.	  Scholars	  
working	  in	  a	  Marxist	  tradition,	  for	  instance	  –	  including	  Max	  Horkheimer,	  Theodor	  
Adorno,	  Jurgen	  Habermas,	  and	  cultural	  critics	  Clement	  Greenberg	  and	  Dwight	  
MacDonald	  –	  tended	  to	  view	  mass	  media	  and	  mass	  society	  as	  pernicious	  
phenomena,	  deluding	  the	  American	  public	  into	  aligning	  themselves	  with	  the	  
interests	  of	  capital,	  corrupting	  “high	  culture,”	  and	  reinforcing	  unequal	  power	  
relations.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  scholars	  drawing	  on	  functionalist	  modes	  of	  analysis	  
tended	  to	  describe	  the	  mass	  media	  as	  generally	  positive,	  giving	  large	  swaths	  of	  the	  
formerly-­‐excluded	  access	  to	  the	  mainstream,	  providing	  valuable	  information	  and	  
entertainment,	  and	  finding	  that	  where	  the	  media	  had	  negative	  side-­‐effects	  these	  
were	  generally	  outweighed	  by	  the	  positive	  functions	  of	  entire	  system	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Since	  mid-­‐century	  the	  media	  have	  accounted	  for	  an	  increasingly	  large	  share	  of	  national	  
GDP.	  In	  1947	  the	  information	  industries	  –	  including	  publishing,	  motion	  pictures,	  sound	  
recording,	  and	  broadcasting	  –	  accounted	  for	  2.8	  percent	  of	  GDP,	  or	  $28.6	  billion;	  by	  1997	  
the	  share	  of	  GDP	  accounted	  for	  by	  these	  industries	  had	  jumped	  50	  percent	  to	  4.2	  percent	  of	  
GDP,	  while	  their	  value	  had	  jumped	  over	  ten-­‐fold	  to	  $331	  billion.22	  The	  state	  of	  “the	  media”	  
became	  an	  increasingly	  important	  national	  concern,	  but	  the	  dominant	  theoretical	  framing	  
through	  which	  these	  media	  were	  understood	  was	  the	  “mass	  media”	  framework	  that	  had	  
developed	  during	  the	  mid-­‐century	  massification	  of	  American	  society.	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communications.	  Other	  scholars	  working	  in	  a	  functionalist-­‐inspired	  tradition	  of	  
cultural	  sociology	  –	  notably	  Edward	  Shils	  –	  offered	  explanations	  for	  the	  costs	  and	  
benefits	  of	  mass	  media	  and	  mass	  society	  with	  reference	  to	  mass	  culture,	  landing	  
somewhere	  between	  the	  terminal	  pessimism	  of	  the	  Frankfurt-­‐School	  Marxists,	  and	  
the	  patriotic	  ebullience	  of	  the	  structural-­‐functionalists.	  And	  non-­‐functionalist	  
Weberians	  –	  most	  notably	  the	  inimitable	  C.	  Wright	  Mills	  –	  focused	  their	  analyses	  on	  
the	  implications	  of	  the	  new	  social	  order	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  in	  society.	  
Many	  other	  theories	  were	  offered	  by	  pundits,	  religious	  leaders,	  politicians,	  and	  arm-­‐
chair	  commentators,	  but	  these	  generally	  fall	  somewhere	  within	  the	  spectrum	  
outlined	  by	  the	  more	  rigorously-­‐theorized	  work	  of	  the	  authors	  listed	  above.	  
It	  is	  not	  my	  intention	  to	  adjudicate	  between	  these	  theories	  here.	  Rather,	  
because	  they	  have	  constituted	  the	  dominant	  way	  in	  which	  the	  media	  have	  been	  
understood	  for	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  they	  provide	  a	  useful	  starting	  point	  
for	  determining	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  contemporary	  media	  and	  society	  have	  been	  
reconfigured	  and	  whether	  these	  reconfigurations	  have,	  as	  alleged,	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  
a	  decline	  in	  mass	  society	  and	  mass	  media.	  
	  
Difference	  clarifies	  identity,	  and	  several	  of	  the	  most	  generative	  efforts	  to	  
understand	  mass	  society	  began	  by	  comparing	  the	  democratic	  society	  of	  the	  mid-­‐
century	  United	  States	  to	  its	  imagined	  predecessor	  and	  opposite,	  the	  public	  of	  
classical	  democratic	  theory.23	  This	  ideal	  public	  was	  characterized	  by	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  C.f.	  Habermas	  The	  Structural	  Transformations	  of	  the	  Public	  Sphere;	  C.W.	  Mills	  “The	  Mass	  
Society”	  in	  The	  Power	  Elite.	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ideas	  and	  the	  active,	  critical	  engagement	  of	  its	  members.	  Individual	  citizens	  
participated	  in	  various	  associations	  and	  peer	  groups	  in	  which	  they	  reached	  
consensus	  through	  dialogue.	  A	  congress	  or	  parliament	  tied	  these	  smaller	  groupings	  
together	  and	  acted	  as	  a	  platform	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  aggregate	  public	  opinion,	  
which	  was	  the	  ultimate	  seat	  of	  all	  legitimate	  power.24	  This	  was	  the	  legitimating	  
formula	  of	  American	  politics	  through	  the	  mid-­‐1900s.	  Ideologically,	  the	  distribution	  
of	  power	  in	  society	  was	  premised	  on	  the	  dominance	  of	  public	  opinion	  –	  “no	  force	  is	  
held	  to	  be	  as	  important	  as	  The	  Great	  American	  Public,”	  wrote	  Mills	  –	  and	  the	  organic	  
emergence	  of	  public	  opinion	  assumed	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  social	  interaction:	  
engaged,	  rational,	  and	  free	  (Mills	  1946,	  298).25	  But	  the	  massification	  of	  American	  
society	  had	  changed	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  body	  politic	  and	  commentators	  worried	  
about	  its	  effects	  on	  the	  presumed	  integrity	  of	  public	  opinion	  as	  the	  ultimate	  seat	  of	  
legitimacy.	  For	  active,	  critical	  engagement	  by	  its	  members	  to	  be	  possible	  a	  society	  
has	  to	  respect	  and	  preserve	  their	  differences	  –	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  some	  scholars	  though	  
this	  difference	  is	  precisely	  what	  the	  mass	  media’s	  aggregating	  influence	  put	  at	  risk.	  
Meanwhile,	  for	  discourse	  to	  be	  possible	  the	  members	  of	  a	  society	  had	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
engage	  with	  one	  another	  and	  by	  aggregating	  the	  American	  public	  around	  a	  
mainstream,	  its	  boosters	  claimed,	  mass	  media	  was	  expanding	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  
democratic	  process	  to	  include	  formerly	  fragmented	  and	  excluded	  segments	  of	  
society.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Habermas,	  for	  instance,	  traces	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  rational,	  dialogical	  public	  
opinion	  from	  Hobbes,	  through	  Locke,	  Rousseau,	  Burke,	  and	  Friedrich	  Georg	  Forster,	  to	  Kant	  
(Habermas	  1991,	  89–117).	  	  
	  
25	  Habermas	  has	  famously	  theorized	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  rational-­‐critical	  debate	  among	  the	  
bourgeois.	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   It	  was	  in	  this	  context	  that	  many	  theories	  of	  “mass	  society”	  emerged;	  and	  
because	  the	  formation	  of	  public	  opinion	  presumed	  the	  dominance	  of	  certain	  kinds	  of	  
discourse	  the	  character	  of	  communications	  in	  mass	  society	  became	  a	  central	  part	  of	  
these	  theories.	  Mass	  society	  and	  mass	  media	  were	  –	  rightfully	  –	  theorized	  together.	  
	   	  
Theories	  of	  Mass	  Media	  and	  Mass	  Society	  
	  
Functionalist	  Theories	  
After	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  mainstream	  American	  sociology	  was	  largely	  dominated	  
by	  a	  functionalist	  analytic	  approach	  and	  this	  influenced	  many	  dominant	  theories	  
about	  mass	  society	  and	  mass	  media.	  Functionalism	  was	  a	  mode	  of	  analyzing	  society	  
that	  modeled	  itself	  on	  the	  theory	  of	  natural	  selection.	  First	  popularized	  by	  Herbert	  
Spencer,	  functionalism	  took	  for	  granted	  that	  social	  structures	  functionally	  adapted	  
to	  the	  “fittest”	  form.26	  Practically	  this	  meant	  that	  social	  formations	  could	  be	  
analyzed	  by	  determining	  what	  “function”	  they	  served.	  Despite	  a	  common	  
misconception,	  functionalism	  did	  not	  assume	  that	  all	  aspects	  of	  society	  were	  stable	  
and	  positive	  –	  only	  that	  instability	  would	  resolve	  itself	  into	  new	  “fitter”	  structures.	  
Nonetheless	  functionalist	  analyses	  were	  often	  conducted	  with	  an	  eye	  towards	  
understanding	  the	  utility	  of	  social	  formations,	  rather	  than	  agnostically	  examining	  
whether	  or	  not	  they	  were	  pathological	  –	  and	  in	  this	  functionalists	  differed	  
significantly	  from	  the	  Marxist	  authors	  discussed	  below.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Spencer	  had	  described	  this	  as	  Super-­‐Organic	  Evolution	  (Spencer	  1906,	  3).	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   In	  the	  United	  States	  functionalism	  became	  increasingly	  popular	  after	  the	  
Second	  World	  War.	  The	  United	  States	  had	  emerged	  as	  a	  global	  superpower	  and	  so	  it	  
seemed	  reasonable	  to	  many	  scholars	  that	  the	  American	  social	  order	  was	  the	  “fittest”	  
of	  all.	  This	  approach	  took	  a	  particularly	  acute,	  and	  contentious,	  form	  in	  the	  work	  of	  
Kingsley	  Davis	  and	  Wilbert	  E.	  Moore	  who	  argued	  that	  social	  stratification	  –	  the	  
structure	  of	  social	  inequality	  –	  was	  a	  “functional	  necessity”	  and	  that	  stratification	  
serves	  both	  stability	  and	  prosperity	  (K.	  Davis	  and	  Moore	  1945).	  
	   With	  respect	  to	  mass	  society	  and	  the	  mass	  media,	  scholars	  with	  a	  
functionalist	  perspective	  sought	  to	  understand	  what	  about	  these	  formations	  was	  
“eufunctional”	  –	  i.e.,	  what	  made	  a	  positive	  contribution	  to	  the	  fitness	  of	  the	  system.	  
Any	  dysfunctional	  aspects	  of	  the	  system	  were	  assumed	  to	  be	  more	  than	  
counterbalanced	  by	  the	  eufunctional	  aspects,	  otherwise	  the	  social	  order	  would	  be	  
unstable	  and	  change	  would	  occur.	  The	  United	  States	  was	  the	  world’s	  dominant	  
superpower	  and	  so	  from	  a	  functionalist	  perspective	  its	  mass	  society	  and	  mass	  media	  
must	  have	  served	  a	  functional	  purpose.	  
	   Sociologist	  Edward	  Shils,	  for	  example,	  touted	  the	  benefits	  of	  both	  mass	  
society	  and	  mass	  media.	  These	  had	  brought	  large	  portions	  of	  the	  population	  closer	  
to	  the	  “center”	  of	  society;	  they	  had	  created	  a	  “greater	  sense	  of	  attachment”	  among	  
Americans;	  they	  had	  led	  to	  the	  wide	  dispersion	  of	  “civility”	  among	  the	  masses;	  by	  
bringing	  the	  masses	  into	  the	  sphere	  of	  culture	  they	  had	  “liberated”	  their	  “cognitive,	  
appreciative,	  and	  moral	  capacities”;	  and	  even	  if	  the	  content	  distributed	  by	  the	  mass	  
media	  was	  not	  of	  the	  same	  caliber	  as	  high	  art,	  it	  was	  often	  “very	  good	  fun,”	  and	  
“earnestly,	  if	  simply,	  moral”	  (Shils	  1960,	  288–294).	  The	  sense	  of	  cultural	  decline	  felt	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by	  some	  postwar	  intellectuals	  who	  railed	  against	  the	  mass	  media	  was,	  according	  to	  
Shils,	  merely	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  historic	  tension	  between	  the	  advocates	  of	  high-­‐
culture	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  society.27	  The	  change	  that	  had	  occurred	  in	  the	  twentieth	  
century,	  Shils	  suggested,	  was	  not	  that	  the	  quality	  of	  culture	  as	  a	  whole	  was	  in	  
decline.	  Rather,	  the	  elevation	  of	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  masses	  and	  its	  increasingly	  
dominant	  role	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  in	  society	  had	  made	  formerly-­‐insulated	  
intellectuals	  more	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  masses.	  Nonetheless,	  Shils	  
argued,	  the	  growth	  of	  mass	  culture	  should	  not	  and	  had	  not	  affected	  the	  elites’	  ability	  
to	  discriminate	  between	  high-­‐	  and	  low-­‐	  culture.	  The	  quality	  of	  literary	  criticism	  in	  
elite	  publications	  was,	  he	  argued,	  as	  high	  in	  the	  mid-­‐century	  United	  States	  as	  it	  had	  
been	  half	  a	  century	  earlier	  before	  the	  massification	  of	  society.28	  
	   Shils	  did	  acknowledge	  that	  much	  was	  “wrong”	  with	  the	  quality	  of	  American	  
culture,	  but	  he	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  not	  the	  fault	  of	  the	  massification	  of	  society	  or	  
the	  media.	  Instead	  it	  was	  the	  legacy	  of	  American	  cultural	  traditions	  that	  were	  
responsible	  for	  the	  poor	  quality	  of	  mass	  culture,	  particularly	  “the	  dour	  Puritanism	  
that	  looked	  on	  aesthetic	  expression	  as	  self-­‐indulgent”	  (Shils	  1960,	  309).	  The	  
American	  educational	  system	  was	  also	  to	  blame,	  since	  it	  emphasized	  technical	  
training	  and	  specialization,	  particularly	  at	  the	  university	  level.	  This	  had	  created	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Shils	  links	  this	  to	  the	  Romantic	  ethos	  in	  particular.	  “It	  is	  a	  cardinal	  tenet	  of	  romanticism	  
that	  the	  creative	  person	  is	  cut	  off	  from	  his	  own	  society	  and	  especially	  from	  its	  rulers.	  The	  
contemporary	  romantic	  intellectual	  has	  in	  addition	  an	  acute	  sense	  of	  being	  cut	  off	  from	  the	  
people”	  (Shils	  1960,	  304).	  
	  
28	  It	  is	  particularly	  noteworthy	  that	  Shils	  cites	  The	  New	  Yorker	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  integrity	  
of	  high-­‐culture	  (Shils	  1960,	  306).	  Marxist	  critic	  Dwight	  MacDonald,	  discussed	  below,	  had	  
listed	  the	  magazine	  as	  an	  example	  of	  Midcult	  –	  high-­‐culture	  adulterated	  by	  Masscult.	  This	  
highlights	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  practical	  distinctions	  between	  high-­‐quality	  and	  low-­‐quality	  
culture.	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technically	  competent	  elite	  but	  no	  coherent	  intellectual	  community.	  High	  culture	  
was	  in	  decline,	  Shils	  argued,	  because	  specialization	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  had	  both	  
fragmented	  the	  elite	  and	  neglected	  the	  masses,	  creating	  a	  space	  in	  which	  popular-­‐
but-­‐mediocre	  culture	  could	  flourish.29	  In	  Shils	  account	  though,	  mass	  society	  offered	  
the	  potential	  to	  counteract	  the	  decline	  of	  American	  culture,	  by	  bringing	  large	  parts	  
of	  the	  population	  into	  the	  cultural	  sphere.30	  
	   Other	  sociologists	  examined	  the	  functional	  implications	  of	  mass	  media	  and	  
mass	  society	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  social	  action.	  Paul	  Lazarsfeld	  and	  Robert	  
Merton,	  for	  instance,	  examined	  several	  such	  functions,	  distinguishing	  between	  
positive	  and	  negative.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  mass	  media	  had	  the	  positive	  effect	  of	  
closing	  the	  gap	  between	  private	  and	  public	  morality.	  The	  total	  visibility	  of	  the	  mass	  
media	  forced	  individuals	  to	  confront	  social	  norms	  and	  to	  either	  accept	  them	  or	  
recognize	  their	  obsolescence.	  In	  general	  though,	  the	  mass	  media	  tended	  to	  reaffirm	  
social	  norms,	  by	  exposing	  deviations	  between	  personal	  ideals	  and	  reality,	  thereby	  
prompting	  moral	  social	  action	  (Paul	  F.	  Lazarsfeld	  and	  Merton	  1971,	  238–239).	  On	  
the	  other	  hand	  Lazarsfeld	  and	  Merton	  also	  pointed	  to	  the	  potential	  “narcotizing	  
dysfunction”	  of	  the	  mass	  media.	  By	  offering	  the	  audience	  a	  vicarious	  sense	  of	  social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  “Specialization	  has	  lessened	  the	  coherence	  of	  the	  intellectual	  community,	  comprising	  
creators,	  reproducers	  and	  consumers;	  it	  has	  dispersed	  its	  focus	  of	  attention,	  and	  thus	  left	  
ungratified	  cultural	  needs	  which	  the	  mediocre	  and	  brutal	  culture	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  and	  of	  
private	  life	  have	  been	  called	  in	  to	  satisfy”	  (Shils	  1960,	  311).	  
	  
30	  “As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  the	  vitality,	  the	  individuality,	  which	  may	  rehabilitate	  our	  intellectual	  
public	  will	  probably	  be	  the	  fruits	  of	  the	  liberation	  of	  powers	  and	  possibilities	  inherent	  in	  
mass	  societies”	  (Shils	  1960,	  311).	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engagement	  the	  media	  could	  reduce	  real	  political	  involvement.31	  The	  commercial	  
imperatives	  of	  mass	  media	  also	  lead	  it	  to	  shy	  away	  controversial	  topics,	  promoting	  
social	  conformism	  and	  survival	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  –	  i.e.	  the	  continued	  dominance	  of	  
large	  commercial	  interests.	  Overall	  though,	  in	  Lazarsfeld	  and	  Merton’s	  account,	  the	  
mass	  media	  served	  to	  maintain	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  social	  order	  and	  did	  not	  warrant	  
the	  popular	  fears	  that	  massification	  of	  the	  media	  had	  made	  the	  population	  
vulnerable	  to	  nefarious	  manipulation	  by	  corporate	  interests.	  
	   Sociologist	  Charles	  R.	  Wright	  similarly	  took	  a	  functional	  “inventory”	  of	  mass	  
media	  methodically	  distinguishing	  between	  its	  positive	  and	  negative	  aspects.	  His	  
analysis	  was	  informed	  by	  the	  functionalist	  principle	  of	  equilibrium	  and	  he	  
concluded	  that	  many	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  served	  as	  mechanisms	  for	  
“minimizing	  or	  counteracting	  the	  dysfunctions	  produced	  by	  another	  activity,	  in	  
order	  to	  keep	  the	  system	  from	  breaking	  down”	  (Wright	  1960,	  619–620).	  For	  
instance	  the	  mass	  media	  offered	  a	  powerful	  mechanism	  for	  warning	  the	  population	  
of	  dangers,	  and	  informing	  them	  of	  unfolding	  events.	  Too	  much	  information	  about	  
dangers,	  crises,	  and	  wars	  though,	  could	  create	  a	  dysfunctional	  degree	  of	  anxiety.	  
This	  dysfunction	  was	  balanced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  same	  media	  also	  served	  as	  a	  
powerful	  means	  of	  entertainment,	  alleviating	  the	  anxiety	  that	  they	  caused.32	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  They	  categorize	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  as	  dysfunctional,	  “on	  the	  assumption	  that	  it	  
is	  not	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  modern	  complex	  society	  to	  have	  large	  masses	  of	  the	  population	  
politically	  apathetic	  and	  inert”	  (Paul	  F.	  Lazarsfeld	  and	  Merton	  1971,	  239).	  
32	  “One	  function	  of	  mass-­‐communicated	  entertainment,	  then,	  is	  to	  provide	  respite	  for	  the	  
individual	  which,	  perhaps,	  permits	  him	  to	  continue	  to	  be	  exposed	  to	  the	  mass-­‐
communicated	  news,	  interpretation,	  and	  prescriptions	  so	  necessary	  for	  his	  survival	  in	  the	  
modern	  world”	  (Wright	  1960,	  620).	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   Discovering	  the	  eufunctional	  role	  of	  apparently	  pathological	  aspects	  of	  
society	  became	  characteristic	  of	  many	  functionalist	  analyses	  (c.f.	  Davis	  and	  Moore’s	  
analysis	  of	  stratification).	  Elihu	  Katz	  and	  David	  Foulkes,	  for	  instance,	  examined	  the	  
“escapist”	  tendencies	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  in	  this	  manner.	  They	  argued	  that	  although	  
people	  might	  seek	  out	  mass	  media	  entertainment	  as	  an	  escape	  from	  the	  stresses	  of	  
their	  daily	  lives,	  such	  an	  escape	  might	  have	  the	  beneficial	  effect	  of	  allowing	  them	  to	  
continue	  engaging	  with	  these	  stresses	  at	  work	  and	  elsewhere.33	  Furthermore	  the	  
escape	  offered	  by	  the	  mass	  media	  was	  preferable	  to	  more	  destructive	  forms	  of	  
stress	  alleviation	  such	  as	  alcohol	  consumption,	  drug	  use,	  spiritualism,	  or	  even	  
suicide.	  
	   At	  the	  extreme,	  some	  functionalist	  scholars	  even	  attributed	  concerns	  about	  
mass	  society	  and	  mass	  media	  to	  the	  prejudices	  of	  their	  opponents.	  Bauer	  and	  Bauer	  
for	  instance,	  concluded	  that	  many	  social	  theorists	  were	  above	  all	  disturbed	  by	  the	  
egalitarianism	  of	  the	  mass	  media.	  They	  call	  these	  scholars	  –	  including	  Mills,	  Merton,	  
and	  Lazarsfeld	  –	  “elitists”	  and	  “intellectuals”	  driven	  by	  a	  bias	  against	  their	  own	  
distorted	  vision	  of	  the	  Protestant	  ethic	  that	  governs	  industrial	  society	  (Bauer	  and	  
Bauer	  1960,	  59–60).34	   	  
	  
Psychological	  Theories	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  “The	  same	  behavior	  that	  causes	  an	  individual	  to	  withdraw	  from	  social	  and	  political	  
participation	  may	  contribute	  to	  the	  success	  of	  his	  performance	  at	  work	  the	  next	  day”	  (Katz	  
and	  Foulkes	  1962,	  385).	  
34	  Bauer	  and	  Bauer	  justify	  their	  admittedly	  ad	  hominem	  attacks	  as	  a	  “sociology	  of	  
knowledge”	  (Bauer	  and	  Bauer	  1960,	  65).	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Although	  academic	  critiques	  of	  mass	  society	  and	  mass	  media	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  
have	  generally	  been	  associated	  with	  sociology	  a	  body	  literature	  has	  also	  emerged	  in	  
psychology	  to	  explain	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  mass	  media,	  implicitly	  building	  on	  
the	  functionalist	  tradition.	  Elkin,	  for	  instance,	  argued	  that	  the	  evolution	  of	  certain	  
popular	  formulas	  in	  the	  motion	  picture	  industry	  was	  a	  response	  to	  the	  psychological	  
needs	  of	  audiences.	  Focusing	  on	  Hollywood	  Westerns,	  Elkin	  suggested	  that	  these	  
films	  offered	  psychological	  satisfaction	  by	  presenting	  audiences	  with	  an	  easy-­‐to-­‐
understand	  world.	  In	  the	  world	  of	  Hollywood	  Westerns,	  unlike	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  
good	  and	  evil	  were	  always	  clearly	  defined	  and	  the	  hero	  won	  the	  day	  through	  his	  
own	  hard-­‐work	  and	  integrity	  (Elkin	  1950,	  80).	  Much	  of	  the	  psychology	  literature	  
also	  emphasized	  the	  ability	  of	  mass	  media	  entertainments	  to	  facilitate	  people’s	  
engagement	  with	  their	  own	  psychological	  issues	  at	  a	  safe	  distance.	  The	  fictional	  
nature	  of	  mass	  entertainments	  gave	  viewers	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  were	  not	  actually	  
engaging	  with	  their	  personal	  histories,	  but	  the	  structure	  of	  mass	  media	  narratives	  –	  
parent-­‐child	  relationships,	  heroes	  dealing	  with	  seemingly	  overwhelming	  obstacles	  –	  
often	  mirrored	  the	  structure	  of	  common	  psychological	  conflicts.	  Emery,	  for	  instance,	  
also	  analyzing	  Hollywood	  Westerns,	  found	  that	  their	  “irreality”	  created	  a	  safe	  
opportunity	  for	  viewers	  to	  confront	  Oedipal	  conflicts	  (Emery	  1959,	  207).35	  Scholars	  
had	  also	  noted	  that	  mass	  media	  entertainments	  might	  have	  a	  secondary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  “Though	  attracted	  by	  the	  similarity	  of	  the	  latent	  theme	  he	  [the	  viewer]	  must	  be	  able	  to	  
insist	  to	  himself	  that	  it	  is	  obviously	  not	  his	  problem	  in	  real	  life.	  (The	  same	  defensive	  
mechanism	  has	  been	  consistently	  noted	  in	  the	  study	  of	  dreams,	  play,	  and	  other	  phantasy.)	  
The	  primary	  defense	  is	  that	  all	  this	  must	  take	  place	  on	  the	  level	  of	  irreality;	  the	  individual	  
must	  be	  constantly	  made	  aware	  that	  the	  hero,	  his	  setting,	  and	  his	  deeds	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  
real	  world	  to	  which	  he,	  the	  viewer,	  must	  return”	  (Emery	  1959,	  207).	  
	  
	  49	  
psychological	  importance	  in	  offering	  viewers	  cathartic	  opportunities	  for	  wish-­‐
fulfillment	  through	  the	  vicarious	  experience	  of	  violence,	  heroism,	  and	  sexual	  
promiscuity	  thereby	  reducing	  the	  viewers’	  own	  “anti-­‐social”	  impulses	  (Emery	  1959,	  
209).	  These	  psychological	  benefits	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  would	  later	  find	  practical	  
applications	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  “cinematherapy.”36	  
	   The	  understanding	  among	  psychologists	  that	  mass	  media	  could	  actually	  
enable	  greater	  self-­‐reflection,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  traumatic	  and	  
psychologically	  challenging	  experiences,	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  view	  of	  many	  critics	  of	  
mass	  media.	  Mills,	  for	  instance,	  had	  argued	  that	  the	  viewer	  of	  mass	  media	  
entertainments	  “cannot	  detach	  himself	  in	  order	  to	  observe,	  much	  less	  to	  evaluate,	  
what	  he	  is	  experiencing”	  (Mills	  2000,	  322).	  But	  psychologists	  claimed	  that	  in	  certain	  
situations	  the	  mass	  media	  enabled	  precisely	  this	  kind	  of	  detachment.	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36	  Cinematherapy	  is	  a	  more	  recent	  analog	  of	  bibliotherapy,	  which	  uses	  novels	  in	  order	  to	  
facilitate	  a	  patient’s	  engagement	  with	  challenging	  issues.	  In	  the	  past	  decade	  several	  studies	  
have	  sought	  to	  establish	  the	  empirical	  effectiveness	  of	  cinematherapy.	  Powell	  and	  Newgent	  
for	  instance	  report	  a	  case	  study	  in	  which	  treatment	  involving	  screenings	  of	  The	  Lord	  of	  the	  
Rings:	  The	  Fellowship	  of	  the	  Ring	  reduced	  a	  patient’s	  level	  of	  hopelessness	  by	  48%	  (Powell	  
and	  Newgent	  2010).	  Priester	  described	  a	  case	  study	  in	  which	  the	  film	  Interview	  With	  the	  
Vampire	  was	  used	  in	  treating	  a	  13-­‐year	  old	  girl,	  noting	  that	  “the	  power	  differential	  evident	  
in	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  vampire	  and	  the	  victim	  are	  a	  striking	  analogy	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  
may	  relationships	  in	  an	  adolescent’s	  life”	  (Priester	  2008,	  76).	  And	  Schlozman	  similarly	  
described	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  using	  the	  teen-­‐oriented	  TV	  show	  Buffy	  the	  Vampire	  Slayer	  
(Schlozman	  2000).	  Bierman,	  Krieger,	  and	  Leifer	  described	  an	  effective	  use	  of	  various	  films	  
with	  teenaged	  girls	  in	  group	  therapy	  settings	  (Bierman,	  Krieger,	  and	  Leifer	  2003).	  Sharp,	  
Smith,	  and	  Cole	  have	  outlined	  principles	  of	  cinematherapy,	  emphasizing	  the	  centrality	  of	  
metaphor,	  and	  described	  a	  case	  in	  which	  the	  film	  For	  Keeps	  was	  used	  to	  promote	  
communication	  between	  a	  mother	  and	  her	  teenaged	  daughter	  (Sharp,	  Smith,	  and	  Cole	  
2002).	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Marxist	  critiques	  of	  mass	  society	  and	  the	  mass	  media	  emphasized	  their	  tendency	  to	  
promote	  acceptance	  of	  the	  capitalist	  social	  order	  while	  diminishing	  the	  population’s	  
capacity	  for	  critical	  social	  or	  aesthetic	  engagement.	  
In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  essays	  of	  post-­‐war	  Marxist	  cultural	  analysis	  
Theodor	  Adorno	  and	  Max	  Horkheimer	  argued	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  was	  
to	  lull	  the	  masses	  into	  passive	  acceptance	  of	  consumerist	  values	  (Horkheimer	  and	  
Adorno	  2002,	  94–136).	  In	  their	  understanding	  popular	  culture	  was	  not	  “mass	  
culture”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  was	  not	  the	  organic	  product	  of	  a	  mass	  audience.	  Rather	  
it	  was	  a	  capitalist	  mechanism	  for	  imposing	  norms,	  rules,	  and	  tastes	  on	  the	  popular	  
audience	  –	  and	  it	  was	  this	  homogenization	  of	  sensibilities	  that	  made	  the	  people	  into	  
a	  mass.37	  This	  approach	  to	  understanding	  mass	  media	  and	  mass	  society	  emphasized	  
the	  exploitation	  of	  the	  masses	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  capitalists.38	  
Meanwhile	  other	  commentators	  emphasized	  the	  qualitative	  effect	  that	  
massification	  had	  on	  culture	  itself,	  rooting	  their	  analyses	  in	  the	  changing	  character	  
of	  the	  population.	  For	  instance	  the	  influential	  art	  critic	  Clement	  Greenberg	  wrote	  
about	  the	  rise	  of	  kitsch	  –	  the	  mass	  produced	  sentimental	  art	  that	  started	  to	  emerge	  
in	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  and	  became	  characteristic	  of	  mid-­‐century	  American	  culture.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  “The	  culture	  industry	  intentionally	  integrates	  its	  consumers	  from	  above”	  (Adorno	  and	  
Rabinbach	  1975,	  12).	  
	  
38	  Adorno	  and	  Horkheimer	  referred	  to	  the	  “culture	  industry”	  rather	  than	  “mass	  culture,”	  in	  
order	  to	  distinguish	  their	  concept	  from	  the	  populist	  connotations	  of	  the	  term	  mass	  culture.	  
“The	  conformity	  to	  the	  consumer…	  which	  likes	  to	  masquerade	  as	  humanitarianism,	  is	  
nothing	  but	  the	  economic	  technique	  of	  consumer	  exploitation…	  The	  consumers	  are	  made	  to	  
remain	  what	  they	  are:	  consumers.	  That	  is	  why	  the	  culture	  industry	  is	  not	  the	  art	  of	  the	  
consumer	  but	  rather	  the	  projection	  of	  the	  will	  of	  those	  in	  control	  onto	  their	  victims.	  The	  
automatic	  self-­‐reproduction	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  in	  its	  established	  forms	  is	  itself	  an	  expression	  
of	  domination”	  (Adorno	  and	  Levin	  1981,	  205).	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As	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  became	  literate	  and	  had	  more	  leisure	  time	  they	  began	  to	  
consume	  more	  culture.	  But	  the	  culture	  that	  they	  consumed	  had	  a	  specific	  character	  
–	  it	  was	  not	  the	  high	  art	  of	  the	  avant-­‐garde,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  folk-­‐art.	  Instead	  it	  was	  
mechanically	  reproduced,	  easily	  digestible	  culture	  appearing	  in	  movies,	  magazines,	  
newspapers,	  billboards,	  radio	  plays.	  The	  character	  of	  this	  mass	  culture	  was	  the	  
result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  a)	  kitsch	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  profit-­‐maximizing	  logic	  of	  the	  market,	  
and	  b)	  the	  market	  for	  culture	  was	  increasingly	  made	  up	  of	  laborers	  whose	  hard	  
daily	  work	  made	  them	  seek	  out	  easy	  entertainment	  in	  their	  leisure-­‐time.39	  Although	  
it	  emerged	  to	  satisfy	  the	  tastes	  of	  laborers,	  the	  pre-­‐digested	  amusements	  of	  kitsch	  
had	  broad	  appeal	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  society.	  In	  Greenberg’s	  account	  elite	  magazines	  like	  
The	  New	  Yorker,	  for	  instance,	  were	  no	  more	  than	  “high-­‐class	  kitsch	  for	  the	  luxury	  
trade,”	  watering-­‐down	  avant-­‐garde	  material	  in	  order	  to	  sell	  more	  magazines	  
(Greenberg	  1961,	  11).	  
Greenberg	  was	  particularly	  concerned	  about	  the	  pernicious	  effects	  of	  kitsch	  
on	  high-­‐culture	  and	  the	  avant-­‐garde.	  Kitsch	  was	  highly	  profitable	  and,	  in	  
Greenberg’s	  view,	  would	  draw	  artists	  away	  from	  production	  of	  avant-­‐garde	  works	  
as	  it	  drew	  audience	  interest	  away	  from	  critical	  engagement.	  But	  it	  was	  only	  the	  
avant-­‐garde	  –	  art	  that	  engaged	  with	  the	  form	  of	  art	  itself	  –	  that	  could	  drive	  culture	  
forward;	  without	  the	  avant-­‐garde	  culture	  would	  stagnate	  and	  die.40	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  “The	  peasant	  soon	  finds	  that	  the	  necessity	  of	  working	  hard	  all	  day	  for	  his	  living	  and	  the	  
rude,	  uncomfortable	  circumstances	  in	  which	  he	  lives	  do	  not	  allow	  him	  enough	  leisure,	  
energy	  and	  comfort	  to	  train	  for	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  Picasso.	  This	  needs,	  after	  all,	  a	  
considerable	  amount	  of	  ‘conditioning’”	  (Greenberg	  1961,	  18).	  
40	  Kitsch	  not	  only	  distracts	  from	  the	  avant-­‐garde	  –	  it	  is	  a	  parasite	  on	  the	  latter,	  stealing	  its	  
techniques	  in	  order	  to	  offer	  the	  mass	  market	  a	  sense	  of	  newness	  in	  their	  pre-­‐digested	  
culture,	  and	  spreading	  parasitically,	  across	  regional	  and	  national	  boundaries.	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Greenberg	  defined	  Kitsch	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  values	  of	  “genuine	  art”	  and	  the	  
avant-­‐garde.	  In	  an	  encounter	  with	  genuine	  art,	  the	  viewer	  reflects	  on	  the	  immediate	  
impression	  made	  by	  the	  work	  itself	  –	  and	  only	  after	  reflection	  does	  the	  true	  meaning	  
of	  the	  work	  appear	  (Greenberg	  1961,	  15).	  Kitsch	  shortcuts	  this	  process,	  creating	  all	  
of	  its	  effects	  without	  requiring	  any	  reflection;	  in	  other	  words,	  kitsch	  collapsed	  the	  
distance	  between	  the	  experience	  of	  art,	  which	  required	  active	  audience	  
participation,	  and	  the	  immanence	  of	  experiencing	  the	  real	  world.	  The	  paintings	  of	  
Normal	  Rockwell	  for	  instance,	  tell	  an	  immediately	  moving	  story	  in	  a	  hyper-­‐realist	  
visual	  language	  –	  there	  is	  nothing	  beyond	  the	  initial	  impression	  and	  so	  the	  work	  
does	  not	  demand	  that	  the	  viewer	  reflect	  on	  his	  experience	  of	  the	  painting;	  he	  can	  
simply	  enjoy	  it	  while	  he	  enjoys	  it	  simply.	  
Greenberg’s	  reflections	  on	  Kitsch,	  like	  much	  critical	  theory	  of	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  
century	  –	  though	  he	  wrote	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  American	  entry	  into	  World	  War	  II	  –	  
were	  written	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Western	  fears	  of	  the	  growing	  influence	  of	  repressive	  
totalitarianism.	  The	  rise	  of	  Kitsch,	  Greenberg	  feared,	  signaled	  a	  society’s	  totalitarian	  
tendency:	  when	  people	  become	  disaffected	  with	  the	  social	  order	  they	  begin	  to	  rail	  
against	  all	  institutions	  of	  the	  elites,	  including	  culture,	  and	  totalitarian	  leaders,	  
seeking	  to	  piggy-­‐back	  on	  popular	  discontent,	  begin	  to	  encourage	  kitsch	  as	  a	  form	  of	  
anti-­‐elitist	  culture	  (Greenberg	  1961,	  19).41	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Another	  mass	  product	  of	  Western	  industrialism,	  it	  has	  gone	  on	  a	  triumphal	  tour	  of	  the	  world,	  
crowding	  out	  and	  defacing	  native	  cultures	  in	  one	  colonial	  country	  after	  another,	  so	  that	  it	  is	  
now	  by	  way	  of	  becoming	  a	  universal	  culture,	  the	  first	  universal	  culture	  ever	  beheld.	  Today	  
the	  native	  of	  China,	  no	  less	  than	  the	  South	  American	  Indian,	  the	  Hindu,	  no	  less	  than	  the	  
Polynesian,	  have	  come	  to	  prefer	  to	  the	  products	  of	  their	  native	  art,	  magazine	  covers,	  
rotogravure	  sections	  and	  calendar	  girls.	  (Greenberg	  1961,	  12)	  
41	  “Here	  revolvers	  and	  torches	  begin	  to	  be	  mentioned	  in	  the	  same	  breath	  as	  culture…	  the	  
statue-­‐smashing	  commences”	  (Greenberg	  1961,	  17).	  Totalitarian	  regimes,	  even	  more	  than	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Greenberg’s	  fellow	  left-­‐leaning	  critic	  Dwight	  MacDonald	  extended	  this	  
analysis	  of	  kitsch,	  introducing	  the	  terms	  “masscult”	  and	  “midcult.”42	  Greenberg	  was	  
particularly	  concerned	  about	  the	  depersonalized	  character	  of	  Masscult	  –	  his	  term	  
for	  Greenberg’s	  kitsch.	  The	  true	  artist,	  argued	  MacDonald	  was,	  borrowing	  a	  phrase	  
from	  Wordsworth,	  “a	  man	  speaking	  to	  men”	  (Macdonald	  1983,	  7).	  The	  personality,	  
distinct	  voice,	  and	  personal	  concerns	  of	  an	  author	  like	  Edgar	  Allan	  Poe,	  was	  imbued	  
in	  his	  works.	  But	  Masscult,	  produced	  as	  commodity	  for	  the	  market	  place,	  was	  
concerned	  only	  with	  the	  spectator	  –	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  author	  and	  the	  sense	  of	  
personal	  connection	  between	  performer	  and	  spectator	  was	  lost	  to	  an	  industrial	  
impersonality.	  In	  MacDonald’s	  account,	  this	  is	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  Masscult	  made	  
audiences	  into	  masses	  –	  it	  squashed	  any	  prerogative	  for	  inter-­‐personal	  connection	  
in	  favor	  of	  profit.	  This	  is	  why,	  MacDonald	  argues,	  American	  society	  had	  become	  
what	  David	  Riesman	  later	  described	  as	  a	  “lonely	  crowd”	  (Macdonald	  1983,	  8;	  
Riesman,	  Glazer,	  and	  Denney	  2001).	  The	  dominance	  of	  Masscult	  had	  caused	  the	  
American	  people	  to	  cohere	  in	  a	  “purely	  mechanical	  way,	  as	  iron	  filings	  of	  different	  
shapes	  and	  sizes	  are	  pulled	  toward	  a	  magnet	  working	  on	  the	  one	  quality	  they	  have	  
in	  common”	  (Macdonald	  1983,	  9).43	  The	  Masscult	  disseminated	  by	  the	  mass	  media	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
democracies,	  must	  promote	  “on	  a	  much	  more	  grandiose	  style…	  the	  illusion	  that	  the	  masses	  
actually	  rule”	  (Greenberg	  1961,	  20).	  This,	  suggests	  Greenberg,	  is	  why	  in	  Nazi	  Germany,	  the	  
totalitarian	  imperative	  of	  national	  cohesion	  overruled	  Hitler’s	  own	  aesthete	  inclinations.	  
	  
42	  There	  was	  no	  “mass	  culture”	  MacDonald	  argued,	  opting	  for	  the	  term	  Masscult,	  because	  
mass	  culture	  was	  not	  culture	  at	  all,	  but	  a	  mere	  “parody”	  of	  culture	  (Macdonald	  1983,	  3).	  
43	  The	  reference	  to	  a	  “mechanically”	  cohesive	  society	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  allusion	  –	  though	  
MacDonald	  does	  not	  specify	  it	  as	  such	  –	  to	  Emile	  Durkheim’s	  twin	  concepts	  of	  mechanical	  
and	  organic	  solidarity.	  Only	  the	  latter	  is	  a	  true	  community	  in	  which	  individuals	  are	  linked	  by	  
the	  complementarity	  of	  their	  varied	  and	  individual	  interests	  (E.	  Durkheim	  1893).	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was	  the	  magnet,	  tugging	  at	  the	  least	  common	  denominator	  among	  the	  American	  
people.	  Masscult	  had	  depersonalized	  the	  American	  population	  driving	  each	  
individual	  towards	  the	  limit	  of	  becoming	  a	  “mass	  man,”	  with	  “no	  private	  life,	  no	  
personal	  desires,	  hobbies,	  aspirations,	  or	  aversions	  that	  are	  not	  shared	  by	  
everybody	  else”	  (Macdonald	  1983,	  11).44,45	  
	   One	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  MacDonald’s	  analysis	  was	  that	  the	  
depersonalization	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  had	  created	  a	  hunger	  for	  personality	  among	  
members	  of	  mass	  society.	  And	  so	  the	  charisma	  of	  the	  artist	  –	  an	  expression	  of	  his	  
personality	  –	  became	  a	  precious	  commodity.46	  MacDonald	  recounts	  the	  tragic	  last	  
years	  of	  the	  great	  thespian	  John	  Barrymore	  whose	  audiences	  came	  to	  see	  him	  drunk	  
and	  tired	  on	  stage,	  forgetting	  his	  lines	  –	  audiences	  were	  thrilled	  by	  a	  taste	  of	  
personality	  in	  an	  impersonal	  society	  (Macdonald	  1983,	  25).	  Depersonalized	  
members	  of	  the	  mass	  bought	  their	  quota	  of	  personality	  in	  the	  form	  of	  tickets;	  and	  
the	  short-­‐circuiting	  of	  critical	  engagement	  that	  Greenberg	  described	  meant	  that	  
Masscult	  could	  even	  do	  their	  feeling	  for	  them.47	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  MacDonald	  held	  special	  contempt	  for	  sociologists	  –	  singling	  out	  Edward	  Shils	  –	  whose	  
mid-­‐century	  enthusiasm	  for	  survey	  research	  had,	  in	  his	  view,	  promoted	  the	  tendency	  
towards	  a	  flattening	  of	  individual	  difference	  in	  service	  of	  discovering	  the	  average	  American	  
(Macdonald	  1983,	  13;	  see	  also	  Igo	  2009).	  
	  
45	  Like	  Greenberg,	  MacDonald	  was	  implicitly	  criticizing	  totalitarian	  aesthetics.	  “Nazism	  and	  
Soviet	  Communism…	  show	  us	  how	  far	  things	  can	  go	  in	  politics,	  as	  Masscult	  does	  in	  art”	  
(Macdonald	  1983,	  11).	  
	  
46	  Sennett	  has	  explored	  this	  with	  great	  depth	  –	  and	  less	  vitriol	  –	  in	  The	  Fall	  of	  Public	  Man	  
(Sennett	  1992).	  
47	  This	  was	  a	  motif	  of	  Marxist	  critiques.	  Adorno	  had	  written	  that	  in	  popular	  music	  “the	  
composition	  hears	  for	  the	  listener”	  (Adorno	  2002,	  442).	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   If	  Masscult	  was	  bankrupt,	  in	  MacDonald’s	  analysis,	  Midcult	  was	  pernicious.	  
Midcult	  was	  Masscult	  masquerading	  as	  high	  culture.	  It	  vulgarized	  high	  culture	  and	  
was	  able	  to	  pass	  as	  “the	  real	  thing”	  (Macdonald	  1983,	  38).	  Midcult	  incorporated	  the	  
avant-­‐garde	  and	  was	  produced	  by	  “lapsed	  avant-­‐gardists”	  using	  modern	  idioms	  “in	  
the	  service	  of	  the	  banal”	  (Macdonald	  1983,	  51).	  This	  “tepid	  ooze”	  of	  Midcult	  was	  
especially	  dangerous	  in	  MacDonald’s	  account	  because	  it	  robbed	  high	  culture	  of	  its	  
raison-­‐d’être,	  cannibalizing	  the	  would-­‐be	  audience	  for	  high	  culture.	  MacDonald’s	  
recommendation	  –	  very	  much	  “against	  the	  American	  grain”	  –	  was	  to	  keep	  audiences	  
segregated,	  since	  it	  was	  the	  porousness	  of	  American	  class	  distinctions	  that	  was	  to	  
blame	  for	  Masscult’s	  penetration	  into	  high	  culture.	  
So	  let	  the	  masses	  have	  their	  Masscult,	  let	  the	  few	  who	  care	  about	  good	  writing,	  
painting,	  music,	  architecture,	  philosophy,	  etc.,	  have	  their	  High	  Culture,	  and	  don’t	  
fuzz	  up	  the	  distinction	  with	  Midcult.	  (Macdonald	  1983,	  73)	  
	  
Both	  MacDonald	  and	  Greenberg	  are	  gifted	  polemicists,	  and	  their	  analyses	  valuably	  
explore	  the	  qualitative	  implications	  of	  structural	  changes	  in	  the	  media.	  But	  the	  
distinction	  between	  high-­‐	  and	  low-­‐	  culture	  in	  these	  accounts	  is	  ambiguous	  at	  best.	  
Greenberg	  offers	  a	  conceptually	  compelling	  argument	  –	  that	  high	  culture	  engages	  
with	  the	  nature	  of	  art	  itself	  and	  is	  therefore	  unique	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  drive	  culture	  
forward.	  And	  the	  importance	  of	  audience	  reflection	  similarly	  seems	  to	  offer	  a	  
rigorous	  criterion.48	  In	  practice	  though,	  the	  selection	  of	  high-­‐	  and	  low-­‐	  is	  largely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  It	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  project	  to	  engage	  the	  issue	  deeply	  here	  but	  I	  would	  suggest	  
that	  despite	  rhetoric	  of	  compositions	  “hearing”	  for	  themselves,	  and	  artworks	  “feeling”	  for	  
themselves,	  reflection	  is	  a	  property	  of	  the	  spectator,	  not	  the	  spectacle,	  no	  matter	  how	  “pre-­‐
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subjective.	  There	  is	  a	  hint	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  stance	  on	  pornography	  here	  –	  “I	  
know	  it	  when	  I	  see	  it”	  (Jacobellis	  V.	  Ohio	  1964).	  MacDonald	  himself	  acknowledges	  
that	  both	  Masscult	  and	  high	  culture	  can	  co-­‐exist	  in	  the	  work	  of	  an	  artist,	  and	  can	  
even	  co-­‐exist	  in	  the	  same	  work.	  This	  ambiguity	  makes	  it	  difficult	  –	  if	  not	  impossible	  
–	  to	  operationalize	  this	  definition	  in	  any	  sort	  of	  rigorous	  analysis	  of	  the	  changing	  
structure	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  And	  this	  ambiguity	  lends	  itself	  to	  a	  nostalgic	  fetishism	  
of	  the	  past,	  which	  can	  itself	  be	  antithetical	  to	  cultural	  progress.49	  The	  history	  of	  20th	  




Among	  mid-­‐century	  theorists	  of	  mass	  society	  C.	  Wright	  Mills	  was	  perhaps	  the	  most	  
eloquent,	  rigorous,	  and	  insightful.	  I	  do	  not	  necessarily	  agree	  with	  the	  implications	  of	  
his	  analysis	  in	  toto,	  but	  his	  work	  serves	  as	  a	  valuable	  foundation	  for	  analyzing	  the	  
present	  because	  in	  classic	  Weberian	  style	  Mills	  is	  methodical	  in	  creating	  a	  typology	  
of	  characteristics	  that	  distinguish	  mass	  society	  and	  in	  examining	  their	  ramifications.	  
The	  result	  is	  a	  valuable	  rubric	  for	  examining	  how	  the	  present	  differs	  from	  the	  mass	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
digested.”	  An	  operational	  distinction	  between	  high-­‐	  and	  low-­‐	  culture	  on	  the	  terms	  
Greenberg	  and	  MacDonald	  have	  outlined	  might	  be	  found	  in	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  mode	  in	  
which	  a	  work	  is	  engaged	  rather	  than	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  work	  itself.	  The	  recent	  literature	  
and	  artworks	  dealing	  with	  “relational	  aesthetics”	  have	  engaged	  this	  issue	  productively	  (C.f.	  
Bourriaud	  2002).	  Abstraction	  may	  demand	  more	  reflection	  than	  realism	  –	  but	  do	  
Strindberg’s	  plays	  merit	  less	  reflection	  than	  Brecht’s?	  Is	  a	  work	  that	  allows	  its	  spectator	  to	  
choose	  his	  level	  of	  engagement	  less	  worthy	  than	  one	  that	  offers	  nothing	  without	  aggressive	  
and	  immediate	  reflection?	  
	  
49	  If	  nostalgia	  is	  itself	  a	  fetishism	  of	  the	  past,	  then	  “nostalgic	  fetishism	  of	  the	  past”	  is	  
redundant.	  But	  then	  again	  so	  is	  much	  of	  the	  cultural	  criticism	  that	  pines	  for	  the	  days	  when	  
culture	  was	  good.	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society	  that	  Mills	  described.	  In	  chapter	  7	  I	  apply	  this	  rubric	  to	  contemporary	  
American	  society,	  first,	  by	  asking	  whether	  the	  characteristics	  that	  Mills	  described	  
still	  hold;	  second,	  by	  asking	  whether	  their	  consequences	  hold,	  particularly	  in	  light	  of	  
an	  additional	  half-­‐century	  of	  empirical	  evidence;	  and	  third,	  by	  considering	  recent	  
structural	  changes	  in	  the	  media	  and	  their	  implications	  for	  Mills’s	  model.	  For	  this	  
reason	  I	  examine	  Mills’	  theory	  of	  mass	  society	  at	  some	  length	  in	  the	  following	  pages	  
and	  will	  refer	  back	  to	  it	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  
	  
The	  Public	  and	  The	  Mass	  
If	  the	  mainstream	  rhetoric	  in	  the	  mid-­‐century	  United	  States	  imagined	  that	  ultimate	  
power	  lay	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  “The	  Great	  American	  Public,”	  this	  was,	  Mills	  wrote,	  a	  “fairy	  
tale”	  (Mills	  1956,	  300).50	  The	  salient	  characteristic	  of	  modern	  American	  life,	  Mills	  
argued,	  was	  precisely	  that	  “the	  public	  of	  public	  opinion”	  –	  the	  critically	  engaged,	  
politically	  active	  population	  that	  debated	  issues	  of	  popular	  relevance	  –	  had	  become	  
“something	  less	  than	  it	  once	  was”	  (Mills	  1956,	  300).	  It	  was	  because	  of	  the	  hollowing	  
out	  of	  the	  public’s	  critical,	  dialogical	  capacity	  that	  the	  entry	  of	  the	  masses	  into	  public	  
life	  represented	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  classic	  community	  of	  public	  opinion	  into	  a	  
society	  of	  masses.	  This	  transformation,	  Mills	  wrote,	  was	  “one	  of	  the	  keys	  to	  the	  
social	  and	  psychological	  meaning	  of	  modern	  life	  in	  America”	  (Mills	  1956,	  300).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  The	  two	  types	  –	  public	  and	  mass	  –	  are	  Weberian	  ideal-­‐types.	  They	  are	  limits	  which	  a	  real	  
society	  never	  reaches	  but	  towards	  which	  it	  tends.	  “The	  United	  States	  today	  is	  not	  altogether	  
a	  mass	  society,	  and	  it	  has	  never	  been	  altogether	  a	  community	  of	  publics.	  These	  phrases	  are	  
names	  for	  extreme	  types;	  they	  point	  to	  certain	  features	  of	  reality,	  but	  they	  are	  themselves	  
constructions;	  social	  reality	  is	  always	  some	  sort	  of	  mixture	  of	  the	  two”	  (Mills	  1956,	  302).	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   Several	  factors	  account	  for	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  fantasy	  of	  liberal	  mass	  
democracy	  in	  Mills’s	  account.	  First,	  the	  hope	  that	  coherent	  and	  effective	  public	  
opinion	  could	  emerge	  from	  an	  enlarge	  public	  seemed	  increasingly	  untenable.	  This	  
hope	  had	  presumed	  a	  “natural	  harmony	  of	  interests”	  among	  the	  population;	  when	  
this	  harmony	  of	  interests	  was	  present	  rational	  discourse	  would	  invariably	  lead	  to	  
coherent	  public	  opinion.	  But	  as	  the	  peripheral	  masses	  moved	  into	  public	  life	  the	  
enlarged	  public	  began	  to	  include	  contradictory	  interests.51	  A	  natural	  harmony	  of	  
interests	  in	  an	  inclusive	  society	  seemed	  unlikely,	  particularly	  in	  light	  of	  Marx’s	  
recognition	  of	  the	  class	  contradictions	  of	  capitalism.	  
	   Second,	  classical	  democratic	  theory	  had	  presumed	  that	  public	  discourse	  
would	  be	  rational.	  While	  this	  may	  have	  been	  possible	  when	  the	  public	  was	  the	  
exclusive	  purview	  of	  the	  educated	  elites	  it	  was	  increasingly	  unlikely	  in	  the	  mass	  
society	  for	  three	  reasons:	  1)	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  would	  not	  have	  the	  necessary	  
knowledge	  or	  skill	  to	  rationally	  discuss	  many	  relevant	  issues,	  particularly	  technical	  
issues	  of	  governance,	  economics,	  etc.,	  2)	  humans	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  irrationality	  of	  
their	  psyches,	  an	  insight	  popularized	  by	  Freud,	  and	  3)	  individual	  thought	  is	  shaped	  
by	  social	  context	  so	  members	  of	  the	  public	  are	  not	  so	  free	  in	  their	  discourse	  as	  was	  
imagined.52	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  This	  is	  a	  central	  moment	  in	  Habermas’s	  account	  of	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  rational-­‐critical	  
bourgeois	  public	  sphere	  and	  this	  accounts	  for	  John	  Stuart	  Mill	  and	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville’s	  
“resignation	  before	  the	  inability	  to	  resolve	  rationally	  the	  competition	  of	  interests	  in	  the	  
public	  sphere”	  (Habermas	  1991,	  135).	  
52	  This	  insight	  –	  that	  social	  context	  determines	  thought	  –	  was	  one	  of	  Marx’s	  basic	  insights	  
and	  has	  become	  the	  foundation	  for	  much	  of	  sociology.	  It	  is	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  Mills’s	  
canonical	  The	  Sociological	  Imagination.	  Mills	  also	  offered	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  rational-­‐
critical	  mass	  democracy	  was	  an	  un-­‐reflexive	  projection	  by	  Enlightenment	  theorists	  of	  their	  
own	  values	  onto	  society	  at	  large,	  “a	  projection	  upon	  the	  community	  at	  large	  of	  the	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The	  dominant	  mode	  of	  communication	  at	  a	  given	  historical	  moment	  shapes	  
the	  structure	  of	  dialogue	  in	  society	  at	  large	  –	  which	  is	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  
emergence	  of	  public	  opinion	  –	  and	  this	  is	  why	  the	  media,	  specifically	  the	  mass	  
media,	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  publics.	  Three	  of	  the	  four	  key	  
structural	  differences	  that	  Mills	  identified	  between	  the	  society	  of	  publics	  and	  the	  
society	  of	  masses	  are	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  the	  media;	  the	  fourth	  refers	  to	  the	  
social	  power	  structure.53	  	  
	  
1)	  Ratio	  of	  performers	  to	  spectators.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  publicity	  is	  
constituted	  by	  both	  performance	  and	  spectatorship.	  The	  balance	  between	  
performers	  and	  spectators	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  –	  or,	  as	  Mills	  puts	  it,	  givers	  and	  
receivers	  of	  opinion	  –	  is	  central	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  media	  in	  society.	  At	  one	  extreme	  
dialogue	  and	  publicity	  are	  entirely	  experienced	  in	  dyadic	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  interactions;	  at	  
the	  other,	  a	  single	  voice	  is	  broadcast	  to	  a	  nation	  of	  spectators.	  
	  
2)	  Answering	  back.	  In	  reality,	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  are	  both	  performers	  and	  
spectators,	  though	  the	  scale	  on	  which	  they	  perform	  and	  view	  performances	  varies	  
enormously.	  An	  individual	  might	  be	  a	  spectator	  on	  a	  national	  scale,	  watching	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
intellectual’s	  ideal	  of	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  intellect”	  (Mills	  1956,	  301).	  This	  line	  of	  thought	  –	  
that	  massification	  necessarily	  undermines	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  rational	  public	  sphere	  –	  
became	  the	  basis	  of	  Jurgen	  Habermas’s	  account	  of	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  bourgeois	  public	  
sphere,	  published	  six	  years	  after	  Mills’s	  The	  Power	  Elite	  (Habermas	  1991).	  
	  
53	  “The	  public	  and	  the	  mass	  may	  be	  most	  readily	  distinguished	  by	  their	  dominant	  modes	  of	  
communication”	  (Mills	  1956,	  304).	  Mills	  works	  here	  in	  a	  classic	  Weberian	  style	  –	  he	  creates	  
a	  rubric	  of	  structural	  variables	  and	  then	  specifies	  two	  ideal-­‐typical	  configurations.	  C.f.	  
Weber’s	  discussion	  of	  bureaucracy	  in	  Economy	  and	  Society	  (Weber	  1978).	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presidential	  addresses	  and	  nationally-­‐televised	  sporting	  events,	  while	  performing	  
only	  in	  the	  limited	  sphere	  of	  family	  and	  work-­‐place	  interactions.	  This	  possibility	  of	  
“answering	  back”	  is	  structured	  by	  the	  technical	  and	  social	  organization	  of	  the	  media	  
–	  it	  is	  shaped	  by	  censorship	  laws,	  access	  to	  the	  means	  of	  publicity,	  and	  social	  norms	  
of	  propriety.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  public	  opinion	  the	  possibility	  of	  
“answering	  back”	  shapes	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  public	  opinion	  formation	  is	  
symmetrical	  –	  at	  one	  extreme	  public	  opinion	  is	  passively	  received,	  at	  the	  other	  it	  is	  
produced	  through	  symmetrical	  dialogue.	  
	  
3)	  Penetration	  of	  institutional	  authority.	  The	  first	  two	  dimensions	  along	  which	  the	  
media	  is	  structured	  are	  agnostic	  to	  the	  prior	  distribution	  of	  power	  in	  society	  –	  they	  
are	  structural	  characteristics,	  which	  may	  certainly	  amplify	  or	  subdue	  power	  
dynamics,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  explicitly	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  power.	  The	  third	  difference	  
between	  a	  society	  of	  masses	  and	  a	  society	  of	  publics	  that	  Mills	  describes	  is	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  the	  institutions	  of	  power	  in	  society	  penetrate	  the	  sphere	  of	  
publicity.	  Where	  institutionalized	  power	  dominates	  communication	  in	  public	  –	  
through	  policing,	  formal	  mechanisms	  of	  propaganda,	  etc.	  –	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  
in	  public	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  public	  opinion	  is	  not	  free;	  where	  institutionalized	  
power	  is	  entirely	  absent	  from	  the	  public	  sphere,	  publicity	  develops	  organically.	  The	  
dominance	  of	  institutional	  authority	  may	  be	  more	  or	  less	  visible	  but	  at	  the	  extreme	  
it	  constitutes	  a	  totalizing	  hegemony.54	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Marx	  had	  famously	  stated	  the	  basic	  premise	  of	  hegemony	  –	  “The	  ideas	  of	  the	  ruling	  class	  
are	  in	  every	  epoch	  the	  ruling	  ideas,	  i.e.	  the	  class	  which	  is	  the	  ruling	  material	  force	  of	  society,	  
is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  its	  ruling	  intellectual	  force.”	  It	  was	  Antonio	  Gramsci	  though,	  who	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4)	  Ability	  to	  act	  collectively.	  Finally,	  Mills	  noted	  that	  variation	  in	  the	  “ability	  of	  people	  
to	  act	  collectively”	  distinguishes	  mass	  societies	  from	  societies	  of	  publics.	  The	  social	  
order	  can	  either	  facilitate	  the	  conversion	  of	  public	  opinion	  into	  social	  action	  –	  
through	  legal	  reform	  or	  popular	  uprisings	  –	  or	  it	  can	  stifle	  the	  translation	  of	  opinion	  
into	  action;	  and	  this	  capacity	  varies	  according	  to	  position	  in	  the	  social	  structure.	  
Unlike	  the	  preceding	  three	  differences	  Mills	  identified,	  this	  is	  less	  a	  structural	  
characteristic	  of	  the	  media	  or	  the	  social	  order	  than	  an	  effect.	  It	  is	  therefore	  most	  
useful	  as	  a	  question:	  to	  what	  extent	  do	  structural	  transformations	  in	  the	  media	  and	  
in	  society	  affect	  people’s	  ability	  to	  translate	  opinion	  into	  collective	  action?	  
	  
Using	  the	  four	  dimensions	  listed	  above	  Mills	  offers	  two	  ideal-­‐typical	  societies,	  one	  
representing	  a	  mass	  society,	  the	  other	  a	  society	  of	  publics.	  In	  a	  society	  of	  publics,	  1)	  
there	  is	  a	  balance	  between	  spectatorship	  and	  performance,	  2)	  there	  are	  frequent	  
opportunities	  for	  “answering	  back”,	  3)	  institutional	  authority	  does	  not	  penetrate	  the	  
public	  sphere,	  and	  4)	  opinion	  can	  readily	  be	  converted	  into	  collective	  social	  action.	  
Meanwhile	  in	  mass	  society,	  1)	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  are	  spectators,	  receiving	  
opinions	  rather	  than	  offering	  them,	  2)	  there	  are	  few	  opportunities	  for	  individuals	  to	  
“answer	  back”	  to	  the	  mass	  media,	  3)	  institutional	  authority	  permeates	  the	  public	  
sphere,	  and	  4)	  collective	  social	  action	  is	  rare	  and	  difficult.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
expanded	  this	  concept	  into	  the	  theory	  of	  cultural	  hegemony	  according	  to	  which	  the	  ruling	  
class	  can	  only	  maintain	  its	  dominance	  by	  dominating	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  order	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  material	  (c.f.	  Bates	  1975).	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In	  Mills’s	  account,	  the	  shift	  towards	  a	  mass	  society	  represented	  a	  dangerous	  
loss	  of	  freedom	  and	  agency	  for	  the	  American	  public.	  The	  public	  had	  become	  a	  
“collective	  of	  individuals”	  rather	  than	  a	  reasoning	  body	  politic.	  Individuals	  had	  
become	  helpless	  consumers	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  mass	  media’s	  manipulations.	  And	  
rather	  than	  giving	  the	  masses	  a	  new	  degree	  of	  freedom,	  the	  massification	  of	  
American	  society	  had	  made	  them	  vulnerable	  to	  exploitation	  and	  manipulation	  by	  
elites.	  Mills	  identified	  four	  general	  consequences	  of	  the	  shift	  to	  mass	  society	  and	  
each	  of	  these	  suggests	  important	  questions	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  media	  and	  
the	  public	  sphere	  today.	  
	  
1)	  Leaders	  and	  followers.	  In	  mass	  society	  individual	  political	  action	  is	  mediated	  
through	  mass	  associations,	  including	  large-­‐scale	  political,	  religious,	  and	  civic	  groups.	  
Unlike	  the	  earlier	  publics,	  mass	  associations	  are	  complex	  organizations	  and	  as	  the	  
power	  of	  mass	  associations	  grows	  so	  does	  the	  power	  of	  their	  leaders.	  These	  leaders	  
soon	  stop	  acting	  as	  representatives	  of	  the	  associations’	  members;	  they	  become	  
members	  of	  the	  elite	  and	  their	  primary	  concern	  becomes	  maintaining	  their	  position.	  
In	  a	  society	  of	  mass	  organizations	  decisions	  are	  debated	  among	  the	  elites	  and	  are	  
then	  “sold”	  to	  the	  organizations’	  memberships.	  Associations	  become	  mechanisms	  
for	  convincing	  the	  masses	  rather	  than	  mechanisms	  for	  the	  organic	  development	  of	  
public	  opinion	  –	  the	  flow	  of	  opinion	  has	  become	  inverted.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  
massification	  of	  organizations	  mirrors	  the	  massification	  of	  the	  media	  –	  earlier	  forms	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of	  participatory	  dialogue	  give	  way	  to	  mass	  persuasion.55	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  the	  proper	  
way	  to	  understand	  mass	  organizations	  is	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  “publics	  acting	  
autonomously,”	  but	  as	  “masses	  manipulated	  at	  focal	  points	  into	  crowds	  of	  
demonstrators”	  (Mills	  1956,	  309).56	  
This	  understanding	  of	  mass	  organizations	  implies	  the	  following	  question	  for	  
studies	  of	  the	  contemporary	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  and	  the	  public	  sphere:	  how	  do	  
changes	  in	  the	  dominant	  media	  affect	  the	  scale	  and	  structure	  of	  mass	  organizations	  
and	  how,	  in	  turn,	  does	  this	  affect	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  masses	  and	  the	  
machinery	  of	  governance?	  
	  
2)	  Manipulation.	  The	  shift	  towards	  mass	  society	  was	  not	  the	  result	  of	  any	  intentional	  
program	  of	  mass	  manipulation.	  But	  the	  system	  that	  emerged	  created	  new	  
opportunities	  for	  intentional	  manipulation	  of	  the	  masses.57	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  
opinion-­‐making	  became	  an	  accepted	  and	  effective	  technique	  of	  gaining	  and	  holding	  
power,	  because	  it	  was	  legitimated	  by	  the	  supposed	  infallibility	  of	  “The	  Great	  
American	  Public.”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  “The	  older	  world	  of	  voluntary	  organization	  was	  as	  different	  from	  the	  world	  of	  the	  mass	  
organization,	  as	  was	  Tom	  Paine’s	  world	  of	  pamphleteering	  from	  the	  world	  of	  the	  mass	  
media”	  (Mills	  1956,	  309).	  
	  
56	  This	  is	  the	  product	  of	  the	  growing	  scale	  of	  mass	  associations	  –	  “the	  primary	  publics	  are	  
now	  either	  so	  small	  as	  to	  be	  swamped,	  and	  hence	  give	  up;	  or	  so	  large	  as	  to	  be	  merely	  
another	  feature	  of	  the	  generally	  distant	  structure	  of	  power,	  and	  hence	  inaccessible”	  (Mills	  
1956,	  310).	  
	  
57	  “The	  public	  of	  public	  opinion	  has	  become	  the	  object	  of	  intensive	  efforts	  to	  control,	  
manage,	  manipulate,	  and	  increasingly	  intimidate”	  (Mills	  1956,	  310).	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Mills	  distinguished	  between	  two	  forms	  of	  opinion	  making:	  authoritative	  and	  
manipulative.	  In	  the	  first	  case	  opinion-­‐makers	  exercise	  their	  power	  openly	  –	  they	  
have	  both	  power	  and	  authority	  and	  the	  masses	  obey	  willingly.	  This	  may	  be	  the	  case	  
with	  moral	  authorities,	  such	  as	  a	  church	  hierarchy,	  or	  with	  charismatic	  leaders,	  such	  
as	  certain	  popular	  celebrities.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  manipulation	  takes	  place	  when	  the	  
masses	  unwittingly	  obey	  the	  will	  of	  those	  who	  hold	  power	  but	  not	  authority;	  this	  is	  
the	  dominant	  way	  that	  power	  is	  exercised	  in	  a	  society	  where	  power	  and	  authority	  
do	  not	  reside	  in	  the	  same	  place.	  
In	  classical	  democratic	  theory	  manipulation	  does	  not	  take	  place	  because	  
public	  opinion	  is	  the	  source	  of	  both	  authority	  and	  power.	  But	  in	  mid-­‐century	  
American	  mass	  society	  power	  was	  concentrated	  among	  elites	  while	  authority	  was	  
rooted	  in	  public	  opinion,	  and	  so,	  for	  Mills,	  manipulation	  became	  the	  “prime	  way”	  in	  
which	  power	  was	  exercised	  in	  mid-­‐century	  American	  mass	  society.	  It	  consisted	  of	  
powerful,	  but	  authority-­‐less	  elites	  manipulating	  the	  masses	  “into	  willing	  acceptance	  
or	  cheerful	  support	  of	  their	  decisions	  or	  opinions”	  (Mills	  1956,	  317).	  
	   This	  theory	  of	  manipulation	  is	  especially	  useful	  when	  analyzing	  the	  effects	  of	  
structural	  changes	  in	  the	  media	  because	  it	  is	  specified	  in	  structural	  terms	  –	  namely,	  
in	  terms	  of	  the	  divorce	  between	  power	  and	  authority	  in	  society.	  But	  the	  concept	  can	  
also	  be	  fruitfully	  extended	  beyond	  Mills’s	  specification	  –	  manipulation	  can,	  but	  need	  
not	  be,	  intentional	  or	  “willful”	  (Mills	  1956,	  317).	  Accounts	  of	  class-­‐conflict	  often	  
devolve	  into	  paranoia	  and	  conspiracy	  when	  they	  assume	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  
omnipotent	  elite	  with	  the	  conscious	  capacity	  to	  manipulate	  the	  masses.	  But	  the	  
exercise	  of	  power	  by	  elites	  can	  be	  manipulative	  without	  these	  elites	  recognizing	  its	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deceptive	  character	  –	  manipulation	  can	  be	  a	  structural	  consequence	  of	  the	  
organization	  of	  society.	  The	  concept	  of	  manipulation	  becomes	  an	  even	  more	  
powerful	  tool	  for	  analyzing	  the	  distribution	  and	  exercise	  of	  power	  in	  society	  when	  it	  
is	  not	  contingent	  on	  intentionally	  deceptive	  schemes.	  I	  would	  specify	  a	  broader	  
concept	  of	  manipulation,	  “structural	  manipulation,”	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  
a)	  Power	  is	  “the	  probability	  that	  one	  actor	  within	  a	  social	  relationship	  will	  be	  
in	  a	  position	  to	  carry	  out	  his	  own	  will	  despite	  resistance,	  regardless	  of	  the	  basis	  on	  
which	  this	  probability	  rests”	  (Weber	  1978,	  53).	  
b)	  The	  exercise	  of	  power	  is	  manipulative	  when	  it	  is	  exercised	  without	  
authority	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  its	  outcome	  appears	  to	  be	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  social	  locus	  
of	  authority,	  
c)	  Structural	  manipulation	  occurs	  where	  the	  organization	  of	  society	  gives	  
certain	  members	  of	  society	  a	  disproportionate	  ability	  to	  exercise	  their	  will	  without	  
formally	  acknowledging	  their	  power	  and	  while	  increasing	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  
outcome	  –	  rather	  than	  the	  exercise	  –	  of	  their	  will	  appears	  to	  be	  in	  accordance	  with	  
the	  will	  of	  the	  locus	  of	  authority.	  
	   The	  manipulative	  exercise	  of	  power	  can	  therefore	  take	  place	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  
series	  of	  micro-­‐level	  decisions.	  Consider	  a	  hypothetical	  manufacturer	  of	  beverages.	  
The	  manufacturer	  can	  market	  a	  new	  product	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  appeals	  to	  the	  
greatest	  number	  of	  people,	  using	  the	  disproportionate	  means	  of	  publicity	  at	  his	  
disposal.	  The	  new	  product	  might	  then	  become	  popular	  among	  the	  masses	  and	  
profitable	  for	  the	  manufacturer,	  while	  causing	  negative	  health	  effects	  among	  
consumers.	  Even	  when	  the	  harmful	  nature	  of	  the	  product	  is	  acknowledged,	  its	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popularity	  might	  be	  attributed	  to	  consumer	  demand	  –	  which	  bears	  the	  authority	  of	  
“public	  opinion”	  –	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  manufacturer’s	  power	  derived	  from	  his	  access	  
to	  the	  means	  of	  publicity.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  source	  of	  the	  manipulation	  is	  not	  
intentional	  deception	  by	  the	  manufacturer	  –	  it	  is	  no	  secret	  that	  he	  spends	  millions	  
on	  advertisements;	  instead	  manipulation	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  logics	  of	  the	  
consumer	  market	  and	  the	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  the	  means	  of	  publicity	  in	  society.58	  
In	  this	  way	  manipulation	  can	  be	  read	  as	  an	  articulation	  of	  social	  contradictions	  
rather	  than	  a	  consciously	  and	  intentionally	  deceptive	  practice	  of	  elites.	  
Members	  of	  the	  elite	  themselves	  may	  be	  unaware	  of	  the	  manipulative	  
character	  of	  their	  actions	  where	  it	  is	  promoted	  by	  the	  organization	  of	  society.	  It	  was	  
Mills	  himself,	  articulating	  the	  blindness	  of	  most	  people	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
social	  order	  in	  shaping	  their	  lives,	  who	  wrote	  the	  following.	  	  
Seldom	  aware	  of	  the	  intricate	  connection	  between	  the	  patterns	  of	  their	  own	  lives	  
and	  the	  course	  of	  world	  history,	  ordinary	  men	  do	  not	  usually	  know	  what	  this	  
connection	  means	  for	  the	  kinds	  of	  men	  they	  are	  becoming	  and	  for	  the	  kinds	  of	  
history-­‐making	  in	  which	  they	  might	  take	  part.	  (Mills	  2000,	  3–4)	  
Elites	  are,	  in	  this	  regard,	  made	  of	  “ordinary	  men”	  and	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  
that	  their	  power	  implies	  a	  refined	  “sociological	  imagination.”	  Today’s	  elites	  –	  in	  
finance,	  computer	  science,	  and	  business	  administration	  –	  are	  more	  technocrats	  than	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  There	  are	  certainly	  those	  that	  recognize	  the	  deceptive	  nature	  of	  advertising	  practices,	  as	  
demonstrated	  by	  the	  1970	  Public	  Health	  Cigarette	  Smoking	  Act,	  which	  banned	  the	  
advertising	  of	  cigarettes	  on	  television.	  But	  the	  recent	  debate	  over	  a	  proposed	  ban	  of	  large-­‐
sized	  sugared	  soft-­‐drinks	  in	  New	  York	  City	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point	  –	  the	  products	  are	  obviously	  
harmful	  to	  the	  public,	  profitable	  for	  manufacturers,	  and	  were	  popularized	  through	  ad	  
campaigns	  such	  as	  7-­‐Eleven’s	  Big	  Gulp	  beverage	  cups	  in	  sizes	  of	  up	  to	  1.9	  liters.	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social	  thinkers,	  guessing	  at	  the	  riddles	  of	  the	  market.	  Their	  exercise	  of	  power	  may	  
nonetheless	  be	  manipulative.	  
	   It	  is	  not	  my	  intention	  to	  offer	  an	  apologetics	  for	  the	  marketing	  practices	  of	  
big	  businesses.	  It	  is	  certainly	  possible	  –	  and	  probable	  –	  that	  manufacturers	  make	  
intentional	  efforts	  to	  deceive	  the	  public;	  but	  complex	  bureaucracies	  involve	  large	  
numbers	  of	  people	  and	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  mass	  deception	  of	  the	  public	  would	  be	  an	  
effective	  strategy	  for	  the	  internal	  coordination	  of	  business	  organizations,	  especially	  
in	  an	  age	  of	  whistle-­‐blowers	  and	  class-­‐action	  law	  suits.	  A	  more	  compelling	  concept	  
than	  intentional	  deception	  would	  be	  Sartre’s	  notion	  of	  bad-­‐faith	  –	  the	  self-­‐deceptive	  
renunciation	  of	  free	  will	  according	  to	  which	  elites	  may	  convince	  themselves	  that	  
they	  are	  not	  enacting	  a	  deception	  (Sartre	  1956,	  59).	  In	  such	  a	  case	  the	  manipulation	  
is	  nonetheless	  structural	  because	  the	  organization	  of	  society	  is	  such	  that	  it	  facilitates	  
the	  elite’s	  double	  deception	  –	  i.e.,	  their	  self-­‐deception	  and	  their	  deception	  of	  the	  
public.59	  
The	  concept	  of	  structural	  manipulation	  as	  I	  have	  sketched	  it	  above	  implies	  a	  
concrete	  question	  for	  analyses	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  media	  and	  public	  sphere:	  do	  these	  
changes	  make	  the	  relationship	  between	  power	  and	  authority	  more	  or	  less	  obvious?	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  I	  would	  take	  pains	  here	  to	  distinguish	  my	  description	  of	  structural	  manipulation	  from	  
Marx’s	  idea	  of	  false-­‐consciousness.	  Structural	  manipulation	  describes	  a	  mechanism	  through	  
which	  harmful	  outcomes	  can	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  product	  of	  the	  popular	  will;	  but	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  
to	  imply	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  universal	  will	  or	  universal	  interest	  that	  is	  masked	  by	  this	  
manipulation.	  Asserting	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  true,	  shared	  interest	  was	  the	  essence	  of	  false-­‐
consciousness	  –	  which	  could	  only	  be	  “false”	  insofar	  as	  it	  replaced	  something	  “true”.	  
Wholesale	  atrocities	  –	  killings,	  forced	  reeducations	  –	  have	  been	  committed	  in	  the	  name	  of	  
promoting	  “true”	  class	  consciousness.	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3)	  Experience	  and	  Thought.	  In	  Mills’s	  account	  of	  mass	  society,	  the	  media	  shape	  more	  
than	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  –	  they	  provide	  the	  templates	  through	  which	  individuals	  
experience	  and	  see	  the	  world.60	  Mills	  frames	  the	  existential	  impact	  of	  mass	  media	  in	  
terms	  of	  “stereotypes	  of	  loyalty”	  which	  influence	  what	  people	  are	  likely	  to	  believe,	  
not	  by	  their	  rationally-­‐compelling	  logic,	  but	  by	  their	  “emotional	  affinity.”	  Accepting	  
the	  world	  in	  accordance	  with	  these	  “stereotypes	  of	  loyalty”	  gives	  people	  “the	  good	  
solid	  feeling	  of	  being	  correct	  without	  having	  to	  think”	  (Mills	  312).	  	  
Individuals	  are	  generally	  unaware	  of	  the	  impact	  that	  these	  stereotypes	  have	  
on	  their	  lives.61	  These	  “stereotypes”	  appear	  to	  be	  common	  sense	  taking	  the	  place	  of	  
rational	  thought,	  and,	  Mills	  writes,	  “common	  sense	  is	  more	  often	  common	  than	  
sense”	  (Mills	  313).	  These	  stereotypes,	  transmitted	  to	  the	  people	  through	  the	  mass	  
media	  condition	  the	  population	  to	  live	  in	  line	  with	  the	  dominant	  mode	  of	  social	  
coordination	  –	  “they	  set	  men’s	  ordination	  towards	  prevailing	  authorities”	  (Mills	  
313).	  And	  insofar	  as	  it	  aligns	  the	  population	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  state,	  the	  mass	  
media	  constitutes	  what	  Louis	  Althusser	  called	  an	  “ideological	  state	  apparatus,”	  an	  
instrument	  of	  Gramscian	  hegemony	  (Althusser	  2006,	  127–188).	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  shaping	  individuals’	  relationship	  to	  the	  world,	  in	  mass	  society	  
the	  media	  shape	  individuals’	  understandings	  of	  their	  selves.	  The	  mass	  media,	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  “The	  media	  not	  only	  give	  us	  information;	  they	  guide	  our	  very	  experiences…	  Our	  
standards	  of	  reality	  tend	  to	  be	  set	  by	  these	  media	  rather	  than	  by	  our	  own	  fragmentary	  
experience”	  (Mills	  1956,	  311).	  In	  this	  regard	  Mills’s	  analysis	  of	  mass	  society	  resonates	  with	  
the	  theories	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  For	  instance	  Mills’s	  claim	  
that	  “the	  individual	  does	  not	  trust	  his	  own	  experience…	  until	  it	  is	  confirmed	  by	  others	  or	  by	  
the	  media”	  echoes	  Arendt’s	  existential	  account	  of	  publicity	  (Mills	  1956,	  312).	  
	  
61	  This	  mirrors	  Althusser’s	  concept	  of	  ideology,	  also	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  In	  
Althusser’s	  account,	  ideology	  is	  invisible	  to	  those	  within	  it.	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Mills’s	  account,	  “tell”	  the	  individual	  in	  the	  mass	  a)	  “who	  he	  is,”	  b)	  “what	  he	  wants	  to	  
be,”	  c)	  “how	  to	  get	  that	  way,”	  and	  d)	  “how	  to	  feel	  that	  he	  is	  that	  way	  even	  when	  he	  is	  
not”	  (Mills	  1956,	  314).	  But	  this	  identity-­‐making	  function	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  comes	  at	  
a	  high	  cost.	  In	  mass	  society	  the	  mass	  media	  often	  replace	  small-­‐scale	  interpersonal	  
discussion	  in	  which	  personal	  identity	  could	  have	  been	  organically	  formed	  and	  in	  
which	  the	  specific	  conflicts	  and	  contradictions	  of	  an	  individual’s	  identity	  could	  have	  
been	  productively	  engaged.	  Instead	  of	  offering	  a	  dialogical	  space	  for	  engaging	  with	  
issues	  of	  identity,	  the	  mass	  media	  generally	  offer	  a	  distraction	  from	  these	  issues	  by	  
showing	  fictional	  characters	  struggling	  against	  artificial	  obstacles	  usually	  aligned	  
with	  the	  logic	  of	  consumer	  demand.62	  In	  Mills’s	  account	  of	  mass	  society	  the	  media	  
tends	  to	  homogenize	  the	  population	  by	  promoting	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  identities,	  desires,	  
and	  modes	  of	  living,	  turning	  a	  potentially-­‐diverse	  public	  into	  a	  mass	  of	  increasingly-­‐
similar	  individuals.	  
The	  only	  resistance	  an	  individual	  can	  muster	  against	  the	  homogenizing	  
power	  of	  mass	  media	  ideology	  comes	  from	  competition	  among	  media	  outlets	  –	  “so	  
long	  as	  the	  media	  are	  not	  entirely	  monopolized,	  the	  individual	  can	  play	  one	  medium	  
off	  against	  another;	  he	  can	  compare	  them”	  (Mills	  313).	  In	  mass	  society	  though	  two	  
patterns	  undermine	  this	  potential:	  a)	  people	  tend	  to	  select	  media	  with	  which	  they	  
already	  agree,	  and,	  b)	  media	  are	  generally	  not	  in	  genuine	  competition,	  offering	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  “The	  chief	  distracting	  tension	  of	  the	  media	  is	  between	  the	  wanting	  and	  the	  not	  having	  of	  
commodities	  or	  of	  women	  held	  to	  be	  good	  looking”	  (Mills	  314).	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“variations	  on	  a	  few	  standardized	  themes”	  rather	  than	  truly	  alternative	  ways	  of	  
seeing	  the	  world	  (Mills	  1956,	  313).63	  
With	  respect	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  contemporary	  media	  and	  
public	  sphere	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  begs	  several	  questions:	  a)	  to	  what	  extent	  does	  
media	  confirm	  what	  its	  audience	  already	  believes,	  b)	  to	  what	  extent	  do	  alternative	  
media	  substantively	  compete	  with	  each	  other	  and	  offer	  alternative	  ways	  of	  seeing	  
the	  world,	  and	  c)	  to	  what	  extent	  do	  the	  media	  constrain	  the	  individual’s	  freedom	  to	  
form	  his	  own	  specific	  identity?	  
	  
4)	  Homogeneous	  Pseudo-­‐Worlds.	  The	  fourth	  key	  difference	  that	  Mills	  identifies	  
between	  a	  society	  of	  publics	  and	  a	  society	  of	  masses	  is	  the	  tendency	  for	  members	  of	  
mass	  society	  to	  sequester	  themselves	  within	  “homogeneous	  pseudo-­‐worlds.”	  This	  is	  
in	  part	  a	  consequence	  of	  large-­‐scale	  urbanization,	  which	  is	  an	  essential	  feature	  of	  
mass	  society.	  In	  order	  to	  insulate	  themselves	  from	  the	  overwhelming	  chaos	  and	  
complexity	  of	  a	  diverse	  metropolitan	  environment	  individuals	  adopt	  a	  blasé	  outlook	  
on	  the	  world,	  relating	  to	  people	  in	  the	  city	  according	  to	  their	  functional	  roles	  –	  
lawyer,	  grocer,	  bus-­‐driver	  –	  rather	  than	  relating	  to	  them	  as	  whole	  individuals.64	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Jameson	  has	  formalized	  this	  idea	  as	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  postmodernism.	  The	  logic	  of	  
capitalism	  demands	  the	  continuous	  consumption	  of	  new	  products	  and	  so	  aesthetic	  becomes	  
increasingly	  important	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  substantive	  newness.	  	  
What	  has	  happened	  is	  that	  aesthetic	  production	  today	  has	  become	  integrated	  into	  
commodity	  production	  generally:	  the	  frantic	  economic	  urgency	  of	  producing	  fresh	  waves	  of	  
ever	  more	  novel-­‐seeming	  goods	  (from	  clothing	  to	  aeroplanes),	  at	  ever	  greater	  rates	  of	  
turnover,	  now	  assigns	  an	  increasingly	  essential	  structural	  function	  and	  position	  to	  aesthetic	  
innovation	  and	  experimentation.	  (Jameson	  1991,	  4)	  
	  
64	  Early	  urban	  sociologists,	  particularly	  those	  of	  the	  Chicago	  School,	  described	  the	  effects	  of	  
metropolitan	  life	  on	  the	  individual.	  Wirth,	  for	  instance	  described	  it	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  
“The	  reserve,	  the	  indifference,	  and	  the	  blasé	  outlook	  which	  urbanites	  manifest	  in	  their	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consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that	  members	  of	  mass	  society	  fail	  to	  see	  the	  overarching	  
social	  order	  that	  integrates	  diverse	  people;	  and	  the	  only	  people	  to	  whom	  they	  relate	  
as	  more	  than	  functional	  stereotypes	  are	  those	  that	  are	  similar	  to	  themselves.65	  
Robbed	  of	  the	  full	  experience	  of	  reality	  in	  all	  its	  complexity	  these	  individuals	  
increasingly	  inhabit	  what	  Mills	  described	  as	  “pseudo-­‐worlds,”	  well-­‐ordered,	  
relatively	  homogeneous	  fictions	  offered	  by	  the	  mass	  media.	  
Rather	  than	  offering	  the	  opportunity	  for	  individuals	  to	  transcend	  the	  narrow	  
view	  of	  the	  world	  offered	  by	  their	  daily	  routines,	  the	  mass	  media’s	  pseudo-­‐worlds	  
offer	  the	  false	  comfort	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  imaginary;	  rather	  than	  showing	  individuals	  
the	  cosmopolitan	  difference	  in	  which	  they	  live,	  the	  mass	  media	  offer	  a	  homogeneous	  
view	  of	  the	  world,	  reconfirming	  the	  mass	  society’s	  consumer	  values;	  and	  trapped	  
between	  their	  own	  narrow	  millieux	  and	  the	  pseudo-­‐world	  of	  mass	  media	  these	  
individuals	  lose	  the	  awareness	  of	  their	  surroundings	  that	  would	  be	  essential	  for	  
meaningful	  social	  action.	  But	  individuals	  in	  mass	  society	  do	  not	  feel	  that	  they	  have	  
lost	  something	  by	  trading	  reality	  for	  an	  imagined	  pseudo-­‐world	  –	  their	  lives	  are	  
lived	  within	  these	  fictions	  and	  they	  cannot	  see	  beyond	  them.66	  Living	  in	  these	  
pseudo-­‐worlds	  robs	  individuals	  of	  the	  hope	  for	  something	  better,	  blocks	  their	  ability	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
relationships	  may	  thus	  be	  regarded	  as	  devices	  for	  immunizing	  themselves	  against	  the	  
personal	  claims	  and	  expectations	  of	  others”	  (Wirth	  1938,	  12).	  
	  
65	  “They	  do	  not	  transcend,	  even	  by	  discussion,	  much	  less	  by	  action,	  their	  more	  or	  less	  
narrow	  lives.	  They	  do	  not	  gain	  a	  view	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  their	  society	  and	  of	  their	  role	  as	  a	  
public	  within	  it”	  (Mills	  1956,	  320).	  
	  
66	  “It	  is	  not	  that	  he	  likes	  or	  does	  not	  like	  this	  life;	  it	  is	  that	  the	  question	  does	  not	  come	  up…	  
He	  thinks	  he	  wants	  merely	  to	  get	  his	  share	  of	  what	  is	  around	  with	  as	  little	  trouble	  as	  he	  can	  
and	  with	  as	  much	  fun	  as	  possible”	  (Mills	  1956,	  323).	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to	  conceive	  of	  social	  change,	  and	  makes	  them	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  manipulations	  of	  the	  
mass	  media.	  
And	  so	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  changing	  structure	  of	  media	  and	  society	  we	  can	  
ask:	  to	  what	  extent	  does	  the	  world	  represented	  by	  the	  mass	  media	  reflect	  the	  
complexity	  and	  diversity	  of	  the	  real	  world?	  
	  
Mills	  assumptions	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  metropolis	  and	  the	  mass	  media	  
with	  regard	  to	  social	  action	  merit	  some	  discussion	  here,	  because	  they	  have	  special	  
bearing	  on	  the	  ramifications	  of	  a	  would-­‐be	  shift	  away	  from	  mass	  media.	  If	  the	  effects	  
of	  mass	  media	  are	  as	  harmful	  as	  he	  claims	  that	  they	  are	  –	  if	  they	  do	  indeed	  trap	  
individuals	  in	  false	  pseudo-­‐worlds	  that	  mask	  diversity,	  lull	  individuals	  into	  
avoidance	  of	  real	  issues,	  and	  prevent	  meaningful	  social	  action	  –	  then	  the	  purported	  
decline	  of	  mass	  media	  in	  the	  past	  decades	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  worth	  meeting	  with	  
optimism.	  But	  if,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  is	  something	  valuable	  about	  having	  the	  
larger	  part	  of	  society	  share	  an	  experience	  of	  the	  world	  offered	  by	  the	  mass	  media	  
then	  perhaps	  we	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  losing	  something	  in	  the	  supposed	  fragmentation	  of	  
the	  mass.	  
	  
Can	  Mass	  Society	  be	  Progressive?	  
Mills	  had	  linked	  his	  assumptions	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  mass	  media	  to	  assumptions	  
about	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  late-­‐industrial	  urban	  experience	  –	  the	  latter	  promoted	  
isolation,	  which	  was	  alleviated	  by	  the	  former’s	  homogeneous	  pseudo-­‐worlds.	  By	  the	  
early	  1970s	  though,	  this	  view	  increasingly	  seemed	  at	  odds	  with	  reality.	  Widespread	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urban	  unrest	  and	  urban	  social	  movements	  revealed	  that	  cities	  were	  something	  more	  
than	  a	  collection	  of	  narrow-­‐minded	  individualistic	  consumers.	  Something	  about	  the	  
urban	  experience	  had	  made	  cities	  into	  platforms	  for	  social	  movements	  and	  this	  had	  
become	  increasingly	  evident	  with	  the	  1968	  uprisings.	  From	  a	  structural	  perspective	  
this	  something	  was	  collective	  consumption.	  
Visibility	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  public	  life,	  and	  a	  public	  sphere	  that	  is	  
simultaneously	  shared	  by	  a	  large	  and	  diverse	  population	  makes	  social	  problems	  
visible	  to	  everyone.	  Collective	  consumption	  –	  of	  roads,	  parks,	  and	  the	  mass	  media	  –
brings	  diverse	  members	  of	  society	  into	  the	  same	  sphere;	  and	  because	  collective	  
consumption	  is	  fundamental	  to	  urban	  life,	  it	  was	  in	  cities	  that	  inequalities	  had	  
become	  so	  acutely	  evident	  in	  the	  1970s.67	  The	  progressive	  potential	  of	  collective	  
consumption	  in	  cities	  was	  first	  recognized	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s	  by	  a	  
new	  generation	  of	  Marxist	  urban	  sociologists.	  Their	  conclusions,	  grafted	  onto	  an	  
analysis	  of	  mass	  media,	  suggest	  that	  mass	  media,	  like	  urban	  collective	  consumption,	  
might	  have	  a	  progressive	  tendency.	  Mass	  media	  might	  be	  far	  better,	  in	  terms	  of	  
making	  social	  complexity	  visible,	  than	  the	  alternative	  –	  a	  fragmented,	  bespoke	  
media	  that	  structurally	  mirrors	  the	  narrow-­‐minded	  individualism	  that	  Wirth	  had	  
perceived	  in	  cities	  and	  that	  Mills	  had	  perceived	  as	  the	  salient	  feature	  of	  mass	  
society.	  
	  
Castells,	  Collective	  Consumption,	  and	  1968	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  collective	  consumption	  brings	  people	  into	  the	  same	  sphere	  on	  
equal	  terms.	  It	  is	  precisely	  the	  ability	  of	  collective	  consumption	  to	  bring	  unequal	  people	  into	  
the	  same	  sphere	  that	  makes	  the	  fact	  of	  inequality	  –	  and	  other	  contradictions	  –	  visible.	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By	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s	  urban	  sociology	  was	  faced	  with	  the	  
challenge	  of	  explaining	  a	  wave	  of	  urban	  unrest	  and	  urban	  social	  movements	  that	  
had	  broken	  out	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic.	  These	  seemed	  like	  essentially	  urban	  
phenomena	  but	  mainstream	  urban	  sociologists,	  mostly	  using	  conceptual	  tools	  
developed	  to	  describe	  1920s	  Chicago,	  had	  both	  failed	  to	  predict	  and	  seemed	  
unequipped	  to	  explain	  the	  latest	  wave	  of	  urban	  struggles.	  It	  was	  in	  this	  context	  that	  
Manuel	  Castells	  –	  who	  had	  lost	  his	  fist	  university	  job	  because	  of	  his	  participation	  in	  
the	  1968	  student	  uprisings	  –	  proposed	  an	  urban	  sociology	  founded	  in	  class	  analysis	  
and	  oriented	  towards	  consumption,	  particularly	  collective	  consumption,	  the	  kind	  of	  
consumption	  that	  is	  prevalent	  in	  cities.	  
With	  this	  approach	  Castells	  was	  also	  seeking	  to	  answer	  a	  fundamental	  and	  
lingering	  question	  in	  Marxist	  thought	  –	  how	  do	  members	  of	  a	  class	  become	  aware	  of	  
their	  shared	  interests	  and	  begin	  to	  demand	  social	  change?68	  Marx	  had	  provided	  no	  
solution	  to	  this	  problem	  of	  connecting	  contradictions	  in	  social	  structure	  to	  
progressive	  social	  movements	  in	  the	  real	  world.	  Lenin	  and	  the	  Third	  International	  
proposed	  that	  the	  revolutionary	  party	  could	  act	  as	  this	  link,	  but	  this	  answer	  was	  
ultimately	  unsatisfactory;	  generations	  of	  social	  movements	  had	  sprung	  up	  around	  
cities	  without	  the	  involvement	  of	  revolutionary	  parties	  –	  the	  revolutions	  of	  1848,	  
the	  Paris	  commune	  of	  1871,	  the	  Shanghai	  Commune	  in	  1927,	  the	  1968	  student	  
uprisings.	  It	  was	  in	  the	  urban	  character	  of	  such	  uprisings	  that	  Castells	  found	  an	  
answer	  to	  the	  dilemma	  left	  by	  Marx,	  and	  this	  is	  where	  he	  identified	  the	  progressive	  
power	  of	  collective	  consumption.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  “A	  class	  in	  itself	  becomes	  a	  class	  for	  itself.	  But	  how	  does	  this	  occur?”	  (Castells	  1999,	  8).	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In	  essence	  urban	  space	  had	  acted	  the	  platform	  for	  so	  many	  class-­‐based	  social	  
movements	  because	  urban	  space	  is	  the	  site	  of	  collective	  consumption.	  When	  
different	  segments	  of	  society	  consume	  together	  –	  by	  sharing	  public	  transportation,	  
roads,	  or	  public	  spaces	  –	  they	  all	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  broader	  contradictions	  in	  the	  
social	  order.69	  Castells	  used	  the	  example	  of	  characteristically	  urban	  problems	  like	  
pollution	  and	  traffic:	  
Certainly	  one	  can	  escape	  from	  pollution	  and	  the	  noise	  of	  urban	  traffic	  if	  one	  is	  above	  
a	  certain	  income	  level,	  but	  one	  is	  no	  less	  aware	  of	  the	  difficulties;	  that	  is,	  it	  is	  at	  the	  
level	  of	  urban	  problems	  that	  one	  can	  see	  most	  easily	  how	  the	  logic	  of	  capital	  
oppresses	  not	  only	  the	  working	  class	  but	  all	  the	  possibilities	  for	  human	  
development.	  (Castells	  1978,	  124)	  
Collective	  consumption	  therefore	  creates	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  kind	  of	  cross-­‐class	  
solidarity.	  This	  solidarity	  is	  what	  Castells	  saw	  in	  the	  urban	  social	  movements	  that	  
swept	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s.70	  
I	  am	  suggesting	  here	  that	  the	  same	  progressive	  potential	  that	  Castells	  saw	  in	  
urban	  collective	  consumption	  applies	  to	  collective	  experiences	  of	  the	  mass	  public	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  In	  more	  general	  terms	  Castells	  was	  identifying	  a	  contradiction	  between	  collective	  
consumption	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  which	  had	  become	  fundamental	  to	  the	  organization	  of	  
industrial	  capitalism,	  and	  unequal	  relations	  of	  production,	  which	  were	  equally	  fundamental.	  
Unequal	  relations	  of	  production	  entails	  a	  separation	  among	  classes,	  whose	  relationship	  is	  
fundamentally	  antagonistic.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  collective	  consumption	  in	  urban	  space	  
generally	  entails	  bringing	  these	  classes	  together	  to	  varying	  degrees.	  
In	  ‘urban	  problems,’	  social	  inequality	  articulates	  a	  question	  of	  more	  general	  scope:	  structural	  
contradiction	  between	  the	  model	  of	  collective	  consumption	  and	  the	  model	  of	  relationships	  of	  
production	  which	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  class	  system,	  for	  the	  collective	  character,	  objectively	  
socialized	  by	  this	  process	  of	  consumption,	  makes	  the	  crises	  and	  difficulties	  more	  solidified,	  
less	  dissociable	  among	  the	  agents.	  (Castells,	  1978:	  124)	  
	  
70	  Collective	  consumption,	  Castells	  proposed,	  could	  “permit	  the	  progressive	  formation	  of	  an	  
anti-­‐capitalist	  alliance	  upon	  a	  much	  broader	  objective	  basis	  than	  the	  specific	  interests	  of	  the	  
proletariat	  or	  than	  the	  contingent	  political	  alliances”	  (Castells	  1978,	  124).	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sphere	  as	  constructed	  by	  the	  mass	  media.	  Certainly	  the	  mass	  media	  of	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  
century	  offered	  a	  generally	  monolithic	  view	  of	  American	  life,	  but	  by	  offering	  the	  
same	  vision	  to	  vast	  segments	  of	  society	  the	  mass	  public	  sphere	  made	  many	  people	  
sharply	  aware	  of	  inequalities.	  When	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  collective,	  inclusive,	  and	  
offers	  everyone	  the	  same	  representation	  of	  public	  life	  it	  becomes	  impossible	  to	  hide	  
social	  conflicts.	  This	  is	  the	  progressive	  potential	  of	  mass	  publicity.	  The	  decline	  of	  the	  
mass	  public	  sphere	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  order	  of	  publicity	  in	  recent	  decades	  
beg	  the	  question	  –	  has	  this	  progressive	  potential	  been	  lost?	  
	  
The	  Contradictions	  of	  Mass	  Publicity	  
While	  the	  mass	  public	  sphere	  encouraged	  new	  claims	  to	  inclusion	  and	  
representation	  –	  particularly	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  –	  the	  particular	  form	  that	  
these	  claims	  took	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  contradictory	  with	  respect	  to	  mass	  consumption	  
itself	  in	  two	  respects	  –	  they	  threatened	  its	  progressive	  potential	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  
and	  its	  economic	  logic	  on	  the	  other.	  
First,	  the	  salient	  social	  problem	  that	  collective	  consumption	  in	  the	  mass	  
public	  sphere	  of	  the	  1960s	  highlighted	  was	  the	  mass	  character	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  
itself.	  The	  one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all	  model	  of	  public	  life	  no	  longer	  worked	  and	  various	  social	  
groups	  began	  demanding	  publicity	  for	  themselves.	  The	  popular	  magazine	  Ebony,	  for	  
instance,	  marketed	  to	  African-­‐American	  readers	  began	  publication	  in	  1945.	  The	  
magazine	  was	  influential	  in	  shaping	  a	  sphere	  of	  African-­‐American	  public	  life	  as	  
distinct	  from	  the	  mass	  culture	  of	  white	  America.	  By	  undermining	  the	  collective	  
nature	  of	  American	  public	  identity,	  the	  rise	  of	  identity	  politics	  threatened	  the	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structure	  of	  collective	  consumption	  that	  had	  led	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  systematically	  
unequal	  access	  to	  publicity	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
The	  second	  contradiction	  in	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  mass	  public	  sphere	  had	  to	  do	  
with	  the	  logic	  of	  capitalism.	  The	  reaction	  against	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  mass	  public	  
sphere	  was	  also	  an	  implicit	  reaction	  against	  the	  mass	  consumption	  of	  media.	  But	  
mass	  consumption	  is	  the	  corollary	  of	  mass	  production,	  which	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  
profit-­‐maximizing	  logic	  of	  industrial	  capitalism.	  And	  so	  by	  challenging	  the	  mass	  
production	  of	  publicity	  the	  reaction	  against	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  
threatened	  the	  economic	  logic	  of	  the	  capitalist	  media	  itself	  –	  the	  media	  that	  had	  
constituted	  this	  public	  sphere	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
The	  decline	  of	  the	  mass	  public	  sphere	  therefore	  would	  represent	  the	  loss	  of	  
progressive	  potential	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  a	  blow	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  capital	  
accumulation	  on	  the	  other	  –	  strange	  bedfellows	  from	  a	  Marxist	  perspective.	  But	  the	  
solution	  to	  both	  of	  these	  problems	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  historical	  rupture	  in	  the	  
logic	  guiding	  dominant	  media	  institutions.	  
The	  solution	  to	  the	  contradictions	  of	  mass	  publicity	  emerged	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
new	  regime	  that	  offered	  each	  individual	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  public	  sphere	  
revolved	  around	  himself.71	  Mid-­‐century	  demands	  for	  greater	  representation	  in	  the	  
public	  sphere	  were	  now	  satisfied,	  not	  by	  the	  impossible	  task	  of	  actually	  granting	  
each	  group	  the	  share	  it	  demanded	  in	  the	  collective	  experience	  of	  American	  public	  
life,	  but	  by	  offering	  each	  group	  its	  own	  narcissistic	  vision	  of	  American	  public	  life.	  For	  
an	  increasingly	  low	  cost	  people	  could	  cast	  themselves	  as	  stars	  in	  their	  own	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  I	  describe	  this	  as	  the	  cheapening	  of	  publicity	  and	  argue	  in	  chapters	  4-­‐6	  that	  it	  has,	  since	  
the	  1970s,	  increasingly	  defined	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  American	  public	  sphere.	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universes	  –	  in	  print,	  on	  television,	  and	  on	  the	  Internet,	  there	  are	  now	  
representations	  of	  the	  world	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  every	  identity.	  These	  have	  
taken	  the	  form	  of	  specialty	  television	  channels	  such	  as	  the	  Oxygen	  and	  Lifetime	  
networks,	  which	  are	  geared	  towards	  women,	  and	  the	  BET	  network,	  which	  is	  geared	  
towards	  African-­‐American	  audiences,	  but	  also	  on	  a	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  level	  this	  has	  
taken	  the	  form	  of	  new	  technologies	  such	  as	  internet-­‐based	  news	  aggregators	  that	  
offer	  a	  daily	  selection	  of	  world	  news	  tailored	  to	  each	  consumer’s	  particular	  
interests.	  No	  social	  group	  occupies	  a	  peripheral	  place	  in	  this	  new	  public	  sphere,	  
because	  the	  new	  public	  sphere	  conceals	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  periphery	  exists.	  
The	  new	  public	  sphere	  hides	  the	  fact	  that	  collective	  consumption	  involves	  
sharing	  public	  life	  with	  people	  different	  from	  oneself;	  it	  hides	  the	  collective	  nature	  
of	  mass	  public	  life	  while	  leaving	  the	  economic	  logic	  of	  mass	  production	  untouched.	  
The	  contemporary	  public	  sphere	  therefore	  has	  a	  dual	  character	  –	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  it	  
satisfies	  the	  mass’s	  need	  for	  publicity,	  on	  the	  other	  it	  increasingly	  offers	  each	  
individual	  a	  disproportionate	  sense	  of	  his	  own	  publicity.	  	  
	   	  
	  79	  
CHAPTER	  4	  
MASS	  MEDIA	  INSTITUTIONS	  
	  
	   The	  purpose	  of	  this	  extended	  chapter	  is	  to	  highlight	  a	  historical	  rupture	  that	  
began	  in	  the	  1970s	  –	  a	  break	  from	  the	  media	  regime	  whose	  dominant	  tendency	  was	  
towards	  aggregating	  audiences	  into	  semi-­‐cohesive	  publics	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  regime	  
based	  on	  audience	  segmentation.	  This	  rupture	  is	  widely	  interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
“death”	  of	  mass	  media.	  
I	  begin	  this	  chapter	  by	  providing	  an	  operational	  definition	  of	  mass	  media.	  I	  
then	  trace	  the	  histories	  of	  four	  key	  mass	  media	  institutions	  –	  telegraph	  news,	  radio,	  
movies,	  and	  television.	  These	  histories	  reveal	  a	  tendency	  for	  dominant	  media	  to	  act	  
as	  increasingly	  powerful	  mechanisms	  for	  aggregating	  audiences	  into	  mass	  publics.	  
Next	  I	  discuss	  the	  rupture	  that	  began	  in	  the	  1970s,	  discussing	  the	  new	  media	  that	  
emerged	  in	  the	  latter	  decades	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  whose	  salient	  characteristic	  has	  
been	  their	  apparent	  tendency	  to	  fragment	  audiences.	  
	   A	  key	  characteristic	  of	  this	  rupture	  was	  the	  cheapening	  of	  publicity.	  The	  
media	  institutions	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  late	  twentieth-­‐century	  made	  it	  far	  easier	  for	  
people	  to	  access	  the	  means	  of	  publicity.	  The	  result	  of	  this	  cheapening	  has	  been	  a	  
huge	  increase	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  content	  in	  the	  media	  ecosystem.	  In	  chapter	  6	  I	  show	  
that	  this	  cheapening,	  together	  with	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency	  (discussed	  in	  chapter	  
2),	  accounts	  for	  the	  paradoxical	  situation	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  today.	  I	  also	  suggest	  
that	  this	  cheapening	  of	  publicity	  partly	  emerged	  as	  a	  way	  to	  stabilize	  what	  I	  describe	  
as	  the	  contradiction	  of	  mass	  publicity	  (see	  Chapter	  2).	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I.	  What	  is	  Mass	  Media?	  
While	  the	  term	  mass	  media	  is	  ubiquitous	  it	  is	  also	  somewhat	  ambiguous	  in	  common	  
usage.	  The	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media	  scenario	  predicts	  the	  large-­‐scale	  fragmentation	  of	  
audiences	  in	  the	  coming	  decades.	  But	  what	  exactly	  is	  it	  about	  the	  mode	  of	  
production/consumption	  that	  “mass	  media”	  describes?	  Is	  it	  the	  social	  norms	  
involved	  in	  gathering	  around	  the	  television	  set?	  Is	  it	  the	  technology	  that	  makes	  TV	  
broadcasting	  possible?	  Is	  it	  something	  about	  the	  broadcasts	  themselves?	  
The	  phrase	  mass	  media	  entered	  common	  usage	  in	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  period	  and	  
by	  the	  late	  1960s	  it	  was	  roughly	  as	  common	  as	  it	  is	  today	  (Michel	  et	  al.	  2011).	  The	  
phrase	  was	  popularized	  at	  a	  time	  when	  certain	  media	  were	  thriving	  and	  is	  closely	  
associated	  with	  these	  media	  –	  magazines,	  film,	  radio,	  television,	  and	  newspapers.	  
The	  first	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  “mass	  media”	  in	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  appeared	  in	  1940	  in	  
reference	  to	  a	  series	  of	  magazine	  advertisements	  (“Advertising	  News	  and	  Notes”	  
1940).	  The	  phrase	  appeared	  in	  the	  Times	  only	  twice	  more	  over	  the	  next	  five	  years,	  
but	  during	  the	  following	  decade	  (1951-­‐1960)	  the	  phrase	  appeared	  in	  474	  articles.	  
About	  half	  of	  the	  articles	  that	  mentioned	  mass	  media	  also	  mentioned	  television	  
(51%),	  roughly	  half	  mentioned	  radio	  (48%),	  a	  third	  mentioned	  magazines	  (31%),	  
slightly	  fewer	  mentioned	  movies	  and	  newspapers	  (28%).	  In	  total,	  75%	  of	  New	  York	  
Times	  articles	  that	  mentioned	  mass	  media	  also	  mentioned	  TV,	  radio,	  magazines,	  
and/or	  movies.	  Many	  of	  the	  remaining	  articles	  do	  not	  mention	  any	  particular	  
medium	  and	  simply	  refer	  to	  “mass	  media”	  taking	  for	  granted	  that	  readers	  will	  be	  
familiar	  with	  the	  term.	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Over	  the	  next	  half-­‐century	  between	  64%	  and	  86%	  of	  New	  York	  Times	  articles	  that	  
mentioned	  “mass	  media”	  also	  mentioned	  TV,	  radio,	  magazines,	  newspapers	  and/or	  
movies	  (see	  Appendix	  1).	  
	  
“Mass	  media”	  clearly	  describes	  something	  about	  these	  media.	  
In	  common	  usage	  “mass	  media”	  –	  and	  its	  metonym	  “the	  media”	  –	  refer	  to	  
various	  aspects	  of	  TV,	  radio,	  magazines,	  and	  newspapers.	  For	  instance	  in	  a	  political	  
context	  the	  term	  often	  refers	  to	  media	  outlets	  and	  the	  people	  that	  run	  them.72	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  “The	  media’s	  the	  most	  powerful	  entity	  on	  earth.	  They	  have	  the	  power	  to	  make	  the	  
innocent	  guilty	  and	  to	  make	  the	  guilty	  innocent,	  and	  that’s	  power.	  Because	  they	  control	  the	  
minds	  of	  the	  masses”	  (Malcolm	  X;	  quoted	  in	  Goodman	  and	  Goodman	  2007).	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such	  accounts	  “the	  media”	  is	  usually	  imagined	  as	  a	  powerful	  (and	  often	  nefarious)	  
actor	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  manipulate	  society.	  In	  other	  contexts	  “mass	  media”	  refers	  to	  
the	  specific	  forms	  of	  communication	  that	  reach	  large	  groups	  –	  soap	  operas,	  pulp	  
fiction,	  comic	  strips,	  motion	  pictures,	  etc.73	  This	  usage	  can	  still	  include	  the	  sense	  that	  
mass	  media	  have	  an	  awesome	  power,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  imagined	  as	  power	  in	  
the	  hands	  of	  conspiring	  decision	  makers.	  In	  other	  contexts,	  “mass	  media”	  refers	  to	  a	  
particular	  kind	  of	  content,	  not	  merely	  the	  media’s	  form.	  This	  use	  often	  ends	  up	  being	  
pejorative,	  with	  “mass	  media”	  becoming	  code	  for	  “vapid	  entertainment.”74	  
In	  an	  effort	  to	  pin	  down	  a	  serviceable	  definition	  of	  this	  ambiguous	  term	  
several	  scholars	  have	  offered	  their	  own	  definitions.	  Some	  of	  these	  have	  been	  simple.	  
Marshall	  MacLuhan,	  for	  instance,	  defines	  a	  mass	  medium	  as	  one	  that	  involves	  
multiple	  people	  at	  the	  same	  time.75	  Other	  scholarly	  definitions	  of	  mass	  media	  have	  
aimed	  for	  greater	  specificity,	  bordering	  on	  the	  baroque.	  John	  B.	  Thompson,	  for	  
instance,	  offers	  a	  five-­‐part	  definition	  of	  mass	  media.	  These	  media	  must	  involve	  1)	  
“particular	  technical	  and	  institutional	  means,”	  2)	  “commodification	  of	  symbolic	  
forms,”	  3)	  a	  “structured	  break	  between	  the	  production	  of	  symbolic	  forms	  and	  their	  
reception,”	  4)	  must	  “extend	  the	  availability	  of	  symbolic	  forms	  in	  space	  and	  time,”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  “Commercial	  jazz,	  soap	  opera,	  pulp	  fiction,	  comic	  strips,	  the	  movies	  set	  the	  images,	  
mannerisms,	  standards,	  and	  aims	  of	  the	  urban	  masses.	  In	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  everyone	  is	  
equal	  before	  these	  cultural	  machines;	  like	  technology	  itself,	  the	  mass	  media	  are	  nearly	  
universal	  in	  their	  incidence	  and	  appeal”	  (C.	  Wright	  Mills,	  in	  Mills	  2002,	  333).	  
	  
74	  “What	  the	  mass	  media	  offers	  is	  not	  popular	  art,	  but	  entertainment	  which	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  
consumed	  like	  food,	  forgotten,	  and	  replaced	  by	  a	  new	  dish”	  (W.	  H.	  Auden,	  in	  Auden	  1962).	  
	  
75	  “Such	  is	  also	  the	  character	  of	  ‘mass	  media.’	  They	  are	  an	  indication,	  not	  of	  the	  size	  of	  their	  
audiences,	  but	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  everybody	  becomes	  involved	  in	  them	  at	  the	  same	  time”	  
(MacLuhan	  1999,	  349).	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and	  5)	  their	  products	  must	  be	  “available	  in	  principle	  to	  a	  plurality	  of	  recipients”	  (J.	  
B.	  Thompson	  1995,	  27–31).	  
	   Thompson’s	  criteria	  are	  a	  useful	  attempt	  at	  pinning	  down	  a	  hard-­‐to-­‐pin-­‐
down	  concept,	  but	  they	  overreach.	  Television	  for	  instance,	  is	  certainly	  a	  mass	  
medium,	  but	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1950s	  much	  of	  broadcast	  television	  failed	  to	  meet	  
Thompson’s	  five	  criteria.	  Before	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Ampex	  Quadruplex	  
videotape	  recorder	  in	  1956	  most	  television	  was	  broadcast	  live.	  Live	  broadcasts	  
were	  recorded	  on	  a	  device	  called	  a	  Kinescope	  and	  replayed	  later	  for	  other	  TV	  
markets,	  but	  the	  Kinescope	  recordings	  were	  much	  lower	  quality	  than	  the	  originals.	  
So	  while	  television	  did	  extend	  the	  availability	  of	  “symbolic	  forms”	  in	  space	  it	  did	  not	  
efficiently	  extend	  the	  availability	  of	  the	  original	  broadcasts	  in	  time,	  which	  was	  
Thompson’s	  fourth	  criterion	  for	  identifying	  a	  mass	  medium.76	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  
their	  availability	  was	  not	  extended	  temporally	  the	  live	  broadcasts	  of	  the	  golden	  age	  
of	  television	  certainly	  constituted	  mass	  media	  –	  fully	  51%	  percent	  of	  New	  York	  
Times	  articles	  that	  mentioned	  “mass	  media”	  between	  1951-­‐1960	  also	  mentioned	  
Television.	  
Thompson’s	  third	  criterion,	  commodification,	  is	  also	  problematic.	  The	  
children’s	  show	  Sesame	  Street	  for	  instance,	  has	  been	  broadcast	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
on	  non-­‐commercial	  public	  television	  since	  1969.	  A	  1996	  survey	  estimated	  that	  95%	  
of	  Americans	  had	  seen	  the	  show	  by	  the	  time	  they	  were	  3	  years	  old	  (Fisch	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Renown	  TV	  Director,	  five-­‐time	  Emmy	  Award	  winner,	  and	  one-­‐time	  president	  of	  the	  
Directors	  Guild	  of	  America	  George	  Schaefer	  recalled	  the	  time-­‐constraints	  of	  live	  television:	  
I	  remember	  a	  wonderful	  production	  on	  the	  Producers’	  Showcase	  of	  Robert	  Sherwood’s	  The	  
Petrified	  Forest.	  I	  was	  out	  here	  [on	  the	  west	  coast]	  working,	  and	  I	  had	  to	  dash	  home	  to	  see	  it	  
at	  five-­‐thirty	  because	  it	  went	  on	  the	  air	  in	  the	  east	  at	  eight-­‐thirty.	  (Skutch	  1998,	  180)	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Truglio	  2000,	  xvi).	  The	  commodification	  of	  television	  programming	  has	  been	  largely	  
achieved	  through	  the	  development	  of	  viewership	  ratings,	  which	  enable	  advertisers	  
to	  quantify	  the	  value	  of	  broadcasts.	  But	  PBS,	  the	  public	  television	  network	  that	  
carries	  Sesame	  Street,	  only	  subscribed	  to	  a	  full-­‐time	  ratings	  service	  in	  2009,	  after	  39	  
years	  of	  operations,	  while	  C-­‐SPAN	  has	  no	  commercial	  sponsorships	  and	  therefore	  
refuses	  to	  pay	  for	  ratings	  (Stelter	  2009;	  Harden	  1996).	  
Finally,	  Thompson’s	  first	  criterion	  for	  identifying	  a	  mass	  medium	  is	  that	  it	  
must	  involve	  “technical	  and	  institutional	  means.”	  It’s	  hard	  to	  imagine	  any	  medium	  
that	  does	  not.	  Both	  the	  telephone	  and	  American	  Sign	  Language	  involve	  technical	  and	  
institutional	  means	  but	  most	  people	  would	  not	  consider	  either	  to	  be	  a	  mass	  
medium.	  This	  criterion	  seems	  superfluous	  in	  determining	  what	  distinguishes	  a	  mass	  
medium.	  
	  
I	  prefer	  a	  simpler	  definition	  for	  identifying	  a	  mass	  medium.	  For	  my	  purposes	  
a	  mass	  medium	  is	  any	  medium	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  where	  one	  
message	  is	  communicated	  to	  many	  people	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  simultaneously.	  This	  definition	  
can	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  4	  parts:	  1)	  the	  medium	  must	  be	  subject	  to	  economies	  of	  
scale;	  2)	  the	  recipients	  must	  receive	  the	  same	  message;	  3)	  there	  must	  be	  more	  than	  
one	  recipient;	  and,	  4)	  the	  message	  must	  be	  received	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  simultaneously.	  	  
Part	  1	  of	  my	  definition	  of	  mass	  media,	  economies	  of	  scale,	  describes	  a	  
situation	  where	  it	  becomes	  progressively	  less	  expensive	  to	  produce	  additional	  units	  
of	  a	  product	  –	  i.e.,	  when	  the	  long-­‐run	  marginal	  cost	  is	  less	  than	  the	  long-­‐run	  average	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cost.77	  The	  cost	  of	  producing	  the	  first	  copy	  of	  a	  newspaper,	  for	  instance,	  involves	  
paying	  reporters	  and	  editors,	  maintaining	  an	  office,	  etc.	  The	  cost	  of	  producing	  the	  
second	  copy	  of	  a	  newspaper	  is	  essentially	  the	  cost	  of	  paper,	  ink,	  and	  running	  the	  
press.	  Movies	  offer	  a	  dramatic	  example	  of	  economies	  of	  scale	  because	  of	  their	  
extremely	  high	  upfront	  costs.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  $100	  million	  summer	  blockbuster	  
profits	  might	  only	  begin	  well	  after	  the	  twelve-­‐millionth	  “copy”	  of	  the	  product	  has	  
been	  made	  –	  i.e.,	  after	  the	  12	  millionth	  ticket	  has	  been	  sold.	  The	  average	  cost	  of	  
producing	  the	  first	  unit	  of	  product,	  i.e.	  selling	  the	  first	  ticket,	  is	  $100	  million.	  The	  
average	  cost	  of	  producing	  the	  1	  millionth	  unit	  of	  product,	  i.e.,	  the	  1	  millionth	  ticket,	  
is	  $100,	  and	  only	  by	  the	  time	  the	  12,610,341st	  ticket	  has	  been	  sold	  does	  the	  average	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  It	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  increasing-­‐returns-­‐to-­‐scale.	  
Some	  scholars	  have	  written	  that	  mass	  media	  are	  subject	  to	  increasing	  returns-­‐to-­‐scale	  (c.f.	  
Strömberg	  2004).	  While	  this	  is	  usually	  correct	  in	  practice	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  correct.	  
Increasing-­‐returns-­‐to-­‐scale	  describes	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  resources	  used	  in	  
production	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  product	  that	  is	  produced.	  Increasing	  returns	  to	  scale	  suggests	  
that	  increasing	  the	  resources	  used	  in	  production	  will	  have	  a	  more-­‐than-­‐proportional	  effect	  
on	  increasing	  the	  amount	  of	  product	  that	  is	  produced.	  For	  example,	  consider	  the	  following	  
scenario.	  $99	  million	  is	  spent	  producing	  a	  major	  summer	  movie	  and	  $1	  million	  is	  spent	  
making	  1,000	  film	  prints	  of	  that	  movie	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  $1,000	  each.	  The	  total	  cost	  of	  producing	  
1,000	  units	  of	  the	  product	  is	  $100	  million.	  Spending	  an	  additional	  $1	  million	  can	  increase	  
the	  number	  of	  units	  produced	  by	  100%	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  only	  an	  additional	  1%,	  which	  might	  
appear	  to	  be	  an	  increasing-­‐return-­‐to-­‐scale.	  But	  this	  would	  be	  incorrect.	  Increasing	  returns	  
to	  scale	  describes	  what	  happens	  when	  all	  factors	  of	  production	  are	  increased	  
proportionally.	  So	  a	  more	  accurate	  scenario	  would	  be	  that	  of	  the	  additional	  $1	  million,	  an	  
additional	  $990,000	  is	  spent	  producing	  the	  first	  copy	  –	  perhaps	  by	  hiring	  a	  more	  famous	  
lead	  actor	  or	  including	  another	  car	  chase	  –	  and	  only	  $10,000	  is	  used	  to	  make	  additional	  
prints.	  This	  scenario	  results	  in	  a	  1%	  increase	  in	  outputs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  1%	  increase	  in	  
inputs,	  which	  condition	  is	  known	  as	  a	  constant-­‐returns-­‐to-­‐scale.	  So,	  stating	  that	  mass	  media	  
is	  subject	  to	  increasing-­‐returns-­‐to-­‐scale	  is	  not	  necessarily	  true.	  But	  mass	  media	  is	  always	  
subject	  to	  economies	  of	  scale,	  which	  describes	  the	  cost	  of	  making	  each	  additional	  unit.	  
Economies	  of	  scale	  ask	  about	  the	  cost	  of	  producing	  an	  additional	  unit,	  not	  about	  the	  
effects	  of	  spending	  more	  on	  production.	  For	  mass	  media	  the	  second	  unit	  is	  always	  less	  
expensive	  to	  produce	  than	  the	  first	  unit.	  The	  formal	  definition	  of	  economies	  of	  scale	  is:	  long-­‐
run	  marginal	  cost	  per	  unit	  is	  lower	  than	  the	  long-­‐run	  average	  cost	  per	  unit.	  The	  formal	  
definition	  of	  increasing-­‐returns-­‐to-­‐scale	  is:	  F(αK,αL)	  >	  αF(K,L),	  where	  F	  is	  the	  production	  
function,	  K	  is	  capital,	  and	  L	  is	  labor.	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cost	  come	  to	  below	  $7.93,	  which	  was	  the	  average	  price	  of	  a	  movie	  ticket	  in	  2011.78	  
Movies	  rely	  heavily	  on	  economies	  of	  scale	  in	  order	  to	  turn	  a	  profit.	  
Parts	  2	  and	  3	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  mass	  media	  should	  be	  self-­‐explanatory	  –	  
recipients	  must	  receive	  the	  same	  message,	  and	  more	  than	  one	  recipient	  must	  
receive	  the	  message.	  
Many	  of	  the	  media	  that	  characterize	  the	  past	  century	  have	  an	  additional	  
characteristic,	  which	  is	  included	  as	  part	  4	  of	  the	  definition	  above:	  the	  audience	  
receives	  the	  communication	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  simultaneously.	  I	  hedge	  here,	  with	  the	  
qualifier	  more-­‐or-­‐less,	  because	  simultaneity	  is	  a	  slippery	  concept	  with	  respect	  to	  
mass	  media.	  This	  is	  largely	  because	  the	  time	  frame	  that	  constitutes	  simultaneity	  
varies	  from	  medium	  to	  medium.	  Stock	  market	  data,	  for	  instance,	  becomes	  irrelevant	  
within	  minutes,	  while	  a	  daily	  newspaper	  may	  be	  relevant	  for	  24	  hours.	  Movies	  may	  
have	  an	  even	  longer	  window	  of	  relevance	  –	  James	  Cameron’s	  Titanic	  (1997)	  for	  
instance,	  was	  the	  number	  one	  movie	  in	  America	  for	  15	  consecutive	  weeks	  during	  its	  
initial	  release.	  Depending	  on	  the	  context	  “more-­‐or-­‐less	  simultaneously”	  can	  mean	  in	  
the	  same	  instant,	  within	  minutes,	  within	  hours,	  or	  within	  weeks.	  
Despite	  this	  variation	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  include	  simultaneity	  as	  a	  
requirement	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  mass	  media.	  There	  is	  a	  qualitative	  difference	  
between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  television,	  radio,	  and	  newspapers,	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
the	  100	  million	  copies	  of	  the	  JRR	  Tolkien’s	  The	  Hobbit	  that	  have	  been	  printed	  over	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Movie	  tickets	  in	  the	  US	  cost	  an	  average	  of	  $7.93	  in	  2011	  (Cieply	  2012).	  To	  recoup	  a	  $100	  
million	  production	  budget	  12,610,340	  tickets	  must	  be	  sold.	  This	  is	  obviously	  a	  highly	  
schematic	  example	  and	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  marketing	  costs,	  ancillary	  markets,	  the	  
fact	  that	  only	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  theatrical	  box-­‐office	  receipts	  are	  paid	  to	  a	  film’s	  distributor,	  
financing	  costs,	  and	  may	  other	  factors.	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the	  past	  75	  years	  (BBC	  2008).	  This	  difference	  has	  to	  do	  with	  temporality	  and	  the	  
effect	  that	  certain	  media	  have	  on	  how	  consumers	  imagine	  the	  world	  around	  them.	  
Only	  when	  a	  message	  is	  consumed	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  simultaneously	  can	  it	  act	  as	  a	  
mediating	  object	  that	  makes	  the	  audience	  imagine	  themselves	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
community	  of	  shared	  experience.	  I	  have	  discussed	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  in	  chapter	  
2	  with	  reference	  to	  Benedict	  Anderson’s	  concept	  of	  imagined	  communities	  and	  
Alfred	  Schutz’s	  concept	  of	  the	  “we”	  relationship.	  
	  
The	  definition	  of	  mass	  media	  provided	  above	  encompasses	  newspapers,	  
magazines,	  radio,	  broadcast	  television,	  cable	  television,	  satellite	  radio,	  and	  many	  
other	  media.	  It	  also	  includes	  live	  TV	  broadcasts,	  which	  do	  not	  fit	  Thompson’s	  
definition.	  Other	  media	  that	  might	  fit	  Thompson’s	  definition	  do	  not	  always	  fit	  my	  
definition.	  For	  instance	  although	  a	  book	  delivers	  one	  message	  to	  multiple	  people	  
and	  printing	  is	  subject	  to	  economies	  of	  scale	  books	  may	  not	  be	  read	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  
simultaneously	  by	  their	  audience.	  There	  have	  been	  over	  100	  million	  copies	  of	  The	  
Hobbit	  sold	  worldwide	  but	  these	  have	  been	  read	  over	  a	  period	  of	  75	  years.79	  On	  the	  
other	  hand	  6.9	  million	  copies	  of	  Harry	  Potter	  and	  the	  Half-­‐Blood	  Prince	  were	  sold	  in	  
the	  first	  24	  hours	  after	  the	  book’s	  release.	  This	  suggests	  that	  quite	  a	  bit	  of	  reading	  
happened	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  simultaneously	  (Associated	  Press	  2005).	  While	  printed	  
books	  have	  existed	  since	  at	  least	  the	  mid	  fifteenth	  century,	  the	  term	  mass	  media	  
emerged	  to	  describe	  an	  early-­‐	  to	  mid-­‐	  twentieth	  century	  phenomenon.	  Categorizing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  In	  fact	  The	  Hobbit	  is	  one	  of	  only	  12	  titles	  that	  appears	  on	  Nielsen	  BookScan’s	  “evergreen”	  
list,	  which	  includes	  books	  that	  have	  appeared	  in	  the	  company’s	  top	  5,000	  chart	  every	  week	  
since	  the	  company	  started	  keeping	  track	  of	  book	  sales	  (Holden	  2008).	  
	  88	  
books	  as	  a	  mass	  medium	  together	  with	  television	  and	  radio	  obscures	  something	  
distinct	  about	  these	  twentieth-­‐century	  media.	  
The	  comparison	  of	  The	  Hobbit	  and	  Harry	  Potter	  and	  the	  Half-­‐Blood	  Prince	  
suggests	  that	  sometimes	  books	  have	  the	  element	  of	  simultaneity	  necessary	  to	  be	  
considered	  a	  mass	  medium	  and	  sometimes	  they	  do	  not.	  So	  while	  the	  printed	  novel	  is	  
not	  necessarily	  a	  mass	  medium	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  say	  that	  it	  sometimes	  behaves	  like	  a	  
mass	  medium.	  The	  same	  argument	  can	  be	  made	  for	  videocassettes,	  DVDs,	  audio	  CDs,	  
vinyl	  records,	  and	  many	  other	  media.80	  
The	  distinction	  between	  inherently	  mass	  media	  and	  media	  that	  behave	  like	  
mass	  media	  is	  particularly	  important	  when	  analyzing	  internet-­‐based	  media.	  The	  
Internet	  encompasses	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  mediums,	  from	  blogs	  and	  emails	  to	  streaming	  
video	  and	  web	  radio,	  but	  two	  of	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  Internet-­‐based	  media	  are	  
asynchronicity	  and	  recipient-­‐specificity,	  features	  that	  challenge	  two	  of	  the	  main	  
characteristics	  of	  mass	  media	  –	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  simultaneous	  consumption	  and	  
delivery	  of	  the	  same	  message	  to	  many	  users.	  To	  this	  extent	  Internet-­‐based	  media	  
generally	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  mass	  media.	  But	  just	  as	  the	  telephone	  was	  used	  as	  a	  
mass	  medium	  in	  Barack	  Obama’s	  presidential	  campaign,	  Internet-­‐based	  media	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  So	  which	  media	  are	  simply	  not	  mass	  media?	  Some	  careful	  thought	  suggests	  that	  most	  
communication	  media	  can	  behave	  like	  mass	  media.	  In	  its	  most	  popular	  form	  the	  telephone	  
has	  not	  been	  a	  mass	  medium	  because	  it	  is	  designed	  for	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  communications,	  but	  
conference	  calls	  stretch	  this	  assumption.	  For	  instance,	  during	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  2012	  
presidential	  elections	  then-­‐candidate	  Barack	  Obama	  conducted	  a	  conference	  call	  with	  9,000	  
undecided	  swing	  state	  voters	  (Stein	  2012).	  Similarly,	  a	  hand	  written	  letter	  might	  be	  a	  non-­‐
mass	  medium	  since	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  benefit	  from	  economies	  of	  scale	  or	  be	  addressed	  to	  
multiple	  people.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  direct	  mail	  marketing	  or	  magazines	  delivered	  by	  mail	  do	  
appear	  to	  be	  mass	  media.	  The	  important	  distinction	  is	  that	  while	  these	  mediums	  may	  
appear	  to	  behave	  like	  mass	  media	  they	  were	  not	  mass	  mediums	  in	  their	  initially	  
popularized	  forms.	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often	  used	  as	  mass	  media.81	  One	  of	  the	  key	  findings	  that	  emerges	  from	  the	  history	  
traced	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  that	  we	  have	  moved	  from	  a	  media	  regime	  
in	  which	  the	  dominant	  media	  were	  inherently	  mass	  media,	  to	  one	  in	  which	  the	  
dominant	  media	  are	  not	  inherently	  mass	  media	  but	  often	  behave	  like	  mass	  media.	  
Failing	  to	  recognize	  this	  distinction	  has	  led	  many	  observers	  to	  proclaim	  the	  end	  of	  
mass	  media	  when,	  in	  fact,	  we	  are	  merely	  experiencing	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  locus	  of	  mass	  
media	  –	  it	  was	  once	  embedded	  in	  the	  institutional	  logic	  of	  the	  dominant	  media	  firms	  
but	  is	  now	  located	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  audience-­‐media	  interaction.	  
	  
In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  review	  the	  histories	  of	  four	  mass	  media	  
institutions	  –	  telegraph	  news,	  radio,	  motion	  pictures,	  and	  television.	  Throughout	  
their	  histories	  these	  media	  have	  exhibited	  a	  powerful	  tendency	  towards	  
concentration	  and	  aggregation	  and	  this	  has	  had	  far	  reaching	  consequences	  for	  the	  
experience	  of	  publicity	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  This	  tendency	  culminated	  in	  the	  
appearance	  of	  “mass	  society”	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s.	  By	  the	  1970s	  though,	  a	  
rupture	  began	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  historic	  logic	  guiding	  these	  media	  –	  their	  tendency	  
towards	  audience	  aggregation	  was	  gradually	  replaced	  by	  strategic	  moves	  towards	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  For	  instance,	  in	  2007	  a	  consortium	  of	  three	  TV	  networks	  –	  NBCUniversal	  Television	  
Group,	  Fox	  Broadcasting	  Company,	  and	  Disney-­‐ABC	  Television	  Group	  –	  launched	  the	  
streaming	  video	  site	  Hulu.com.	  The	  online	  broadcasts	  offered	  through	  Hulu.com	  differ	  from	  
traditional	  TV	  broadcasts	  in	  two	  important	  ways	  –	  users	  can	  watch	  the	  program	  of	  their	  
choice	  anytime	  and	  advertisements	  can	  be	  tailored	  to	  particular	  viewers.	  This	  challenges	  
the	  simultaneity	  and	  uniformity	  of	  traditional	  TV	  broadcasts;	  and,	  simultaneity	  and	  
uniformity	  are	  criteria	  2	  and	  4	  of	  my	  definition	  of	  mass	  media.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  popular	  
shows	  on	  Hulu.com	  attract	  large	  audiences,	  which	  watch	  the	  same	  broadcasts	  soon	  after	  
they	  are	  uploaded,	  notwithstanding	  variety	  in	  targeted	  advertisements.	  So	  Hulu.com	  is	  not	  
necessarily	  a	  mass	  medium	  but	  it	  often	  behaves	  like	  one.	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audience	  segmentation.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  shift	  that	  the	  locus	  of	  mass	  media	  in	  Western	  
society	  shifted	  away	  from	  the	  institutional	  logic	  of	  dominant	  media	  institutions.	  
Contemporary	  narratives	  about	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  media	  implicitly	  equate	  
this	  rupture	  with	  the	  decline	  of	  mass	  media	  throughout	  society.	  Nonetheless	  much	  
of	  today’s	  media	  consumption	  fits	  the	  definition	  of	  mass	  media	  I	  have	  offered	  above.	  
And	  so	  while	  the	  rupture	  in	  their	  guiding	  logic	  may	  have	  led	  to	  broad	  
reconfigurations	  in	  media	  institutions,	  this	  does	  not,	  in	  my	  reading	  of	  events,	  imply	  
that	  mass	  media	  is	  in	  terminal	  decline.	  Instead,	  as	  I	  show	  in	  chapter	  6,	  the	  locus	  of	  
mass	  media	  in	  society	  has	  become	  de-­‐linked	  from	  the	  institutional	  logic	  of	  mass	  
media	  firms	  and	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  characteristic	  of	  the	  complex	  set	  of	  interactions	  
between	  today’s	  media	  distributors	  and	  consumers.	  While	  traditional	  mass	  media	  
firms	  may	  be	  declining,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  mass	  media	  is	  about	  to	  disappear.	  
	  
II.	  Telegraph	  News:	  The	  rise	  of	  monopoly	  networks	  
The	  telegraph	  was	  one	  of	  several	  network	  industries	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  19th	  
century	  including	  the	  national	  system	  of	  canals,	  railroads,	  gas	  and	  electric	  supply,	  
and	  eventually	  the	  telephone	  networks.	  These	  networks	  all	  shared	  two	  important	  
economic	  characteristics:	  the	  initial	  cost	  of	  building	  the	  network	  was	  high	  compared	  
to	  the	  cost	  of	  operation,	  and	  there	  was	  an	  added	  value	  to	  integrated	  operation.82	  As	  
a	  result	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  tendency	  in	  these	  network	  industries	  towards	  
consolidation.	  The	  telegraph	  industry	  was	  no	  exception	  and	  it	  represents	  the	  
beginnings	  of	  nation-­‐scale	  audience	  aggregation	  in	  the	  modern	  mass	  media.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  In	  economic	  terms	  these	  industries	  are	  often	  described	  as	  natural	  monopolies.	  See,	  for	  
instance,	  Sharkey’s	  The	  Theory	  of	  Natural	  Monopoly	  (Sharkey	  1982).	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In	  its	  initial	  years	  the	  telegraph	  industry	  in	  the	  United	  States	  was	  fiercely	  
competitive	  and	  by	  1952,	  six	  years	  after	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  first	  American	  
telegraph	  line,	  there	  were	  more	  than	  fifty	  different	  telegraph	  companies	  in	  
operation	  and	  23,000	  miles	  of	  telegraph	  lines	  (Starr	  2005,	  166,171;	  R.	  L.	  Thompson	  
1972).83,84	  One	  of	  the	  most	  lucrative	  uses	  of	  the	  expanding	  American	  telegraph	  
network	  was	  the	  wiring	  of	  news	  reports,	  which	  were	  then	  re-­‐printed	  in	  local	  papers	  
across	  the	  country.	  
In	  the	  early-­‐	  and	  mid-­‐1800s	  the	  newspaper	  industry	  had	  been	  highly	  
competitive.	  Editors	  took	  pride	  in	  the	  individuality	  of	  their	  papers	  and	  often	  
attacked	  rival	  publications.	  These	  editors	  saw	  themselves	  embodying	  an	  egalitarian	  
spirit,	  breaking	  the	  monopolies	  of	  knowledge	  that	  had	  been	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  
privileged	  throughout	  history	  (Blondheim	  1994,	  47).	  Around	  1848	  though,	  a	  group	  
of	  New	  York	  newspaper	  editors	  joined	  in	  a	  series	  of	  informal	  agreements	  to	  share	  
the	  cost	  of	  transmitting	  reports	  by	  telegraph.	  The	  association	  became	  known	  as	  the	  
New	  York	  Associated	  Press	  (NYAP),	  and	  later	  simply	  the	  Associated	  Press	  (AP),	  and	  
its	  formation	  triggered	  a	  wave	  of	  consolidation	  in	  the	  news	  industry.	  
The	  NYAP’s	  location	  gave	  it	  a	  strategic	  advantage	  over	  other	  would-­‐be	  wire	  
news	  services.	  New	  York	  City	  was	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  emerging	  telegraph	  network,	  
with	  links	  to	  Boston,	  Buffalo,	  Washington	  and	  beyond.	  Additionally,	  the	  NYAP’s	  
position	  near	  the	  New	  York	  Harbor	  gave	  its	  members	  a	  strategically	  important	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Starr	  cites	  Thompson	  for	  his	  figures.	  
	  
84	  Support	  from	  the	  states	  was	  crucial	  during	  this	  early	  competitive	  phase	  –	  states	  gave	  
telegraph	  operators	  rights-­‐of-­‐way	  on	  roads	  and	  canals	  at	  no	  charge,	  requiring	  only	  that	  
operators	  grant	  state	  agencies	  priority	  in	  sending	  messages	  to	  respond	  to	  public	  
emergencies	  and	  to	  catch	  fugitives	  (Starr	  2005,	  171).	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position	  in	  relaying	  arriving	  news	  from	  Europe.	  Meanwhile,	  for	  domestic	  news	  the	  
NYAP	  relied	  on	  a	  network	  of	  agents	  rewriting	  items	  from	  local	  papers	  around	  the	  
country	  and	  sending	  them	  via	  wire	  to	  the	  group’s	  headquarters	  in	  New	  York.	  There,	  
domestic	  and	  foreign	  news	  was	  consolidated	  in	  a	  single	  report	  and	  sent	  via	  wire	  to	  
member	  newspapers	  who	  shared	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  transmission.	  The	  NYAP	  made	  its	  
reports	  available	  to	  outside	  papers	  for	  a	  price,	  and	  by	  1870	  they	  were	  providing	  
news	  to	  about	  600	  newspapers	  around	  the	  country	  (Blondheim	  1994,	  6,	  172).	  
	   The	  structure	  of	  the	  NYAP	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  other	  similar	  news	  
associations	  to	  form.	  Telegraph	  operators	  charged	  the	  association	  a	  high	  rate	  for	  
raw	  news	  wired	  to	  the	  New	  York	  headquarters	  and	  a	  lower	  rate	  for	  sending	  out	  the	  
aggregated	  news	  reports	  to	  client	  papers.	  This	  meant	  that	  any	  newcomer	  to	  the	  
news-­‐via-­‐wire	  business	  would	  have	  to	  make	  a	  large	  initial	  investment	  in	  order	  to	  
build	  up	  the	  reporting	  capacity	  that	  would	  attract	  customers	  (Blondheim	  1994,	  
123).	  The	  NYAP	  had	  a	  near	  monopoly	  on	  telegraphed	  news,	  which	  meant	  that	  as	  
telegraph	  news	  grew	  in	  popularity	  Americans	  began	  receiving	  their	  news	  from	  an	  
increasingly	  limited	  number	  sources.	  
In	  the	  years	  immediately	  following	  the	  Civil	  War	  the	  AP	  made	  a	  series	  of	  
mutually	  beneficial	  agreements	  with	  Western	  Union,	  the	  nation’s	  leading	  telegraph	  
operator,	  and	  by	  1867	  the	  two	  organizations	  formed	  the	  nation’s	  first	  bilateral	  
monopoly.	  Western	  Union	  gave	  the	  AP	  preferential	  rates	  and	  refused	  to	  carry	  any	  
other	  wire-­‐news	  service	  and	  in	  exchange	  the	  AP	  agreed	  to	  exclusively	  use	  Western	  
Union	  while	  its	  member	  papers	  agreed	  to	  do	  nothing	  “to	  encourage	  or	  support”	  any	  
competing	  telegraph	  companies.	  Meanwhile	  the	  AP	  protected	  its	  dominance	  in	  the	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field	  of	  wire	  news	  by	  requiring	  that	  member	  newspapers	  agree	  to	  use	  the	  AP	  
exclusively	  for	  wire-­‐news.	  In	  exchange	  these	  papers	  were	  allowed	  to	  block	  
competing	  newspapers	  from	  receiving	  AP	  reports,	  which	  led	  to	  further	  
consolidation	  and	  homogenization	  in	  the	  news	  industry	  (Schwarzlose	  1990,	  21–22;	  
Blondheim	  1994,	  151).85	  
Aggregation	  in	  the	  news	  industry	  also	  had	  an	  important	  effect	  on	  the	  scale	  at	  
which	  the	  public	  sphere	  was	  experienced.	  Small	  town	  papers	  had	  formerly	  provided	  
readers	  with	  local	  perspectives	  on	  the	  world,	  but	  now	  many	  small	  papers	  were	  
using	  the	  AP’s	  national	  news	  machine	  for	  80	  to	  100	  percent	  of	  their	  coverage.	  The	  
national	  scale	  occupied	  an	  increasingly	  large	  role	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  while	  the	  
local	  scale	  dwindled.	  
The	  combination	  of	  Western	  Union	  and	  AP	  created	  a	  single	  channel	  through	  
which	  most	  of	  the	  nation’s	  news	  passed	  –	  a	  very	  different	  structure	  from	  the	  earlier	  
years	  of	  the	  newspaper	  industry.86	  Blondheim	  described	  this	  new	  structure	  as	  a	  
giant	  funnel.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  agreement	  between	  Western	  Union	  and	  the	  Associated	  Press	  made	  
local	  AP	  franchises	  very	  valuable	  –	  they	  were	  city-­‐specific	  monopolies	  on	  wire-­‐news.	  
According	  to	  an	  1884	  report	  by	  the	  Census	  Bureau	  the	  value	  of	  an	  AP	  franchise	  in	  New	  York	  
was	  $250,000	  (North	  1884,	  109).	  The	  publishing	  magnate	  Joseph	  Pulitzer	  made	  a	  fortune	  
buying	  up	  AP	  franchises,	  even	  when	  the	  newspapers	  that	  he	  bought	  to	  acquire	  the	  
franchises	  were	  losing	  money.	  In	  1974	  the	  up-­‐and-­‐coming	  thirty-­‐year-­‐old	  entrepreneur	  
bought	  the	  Missouri	  Staats-­‐Zeitung	  at	  a	  bankruptcy	  sale	  for	  “a	  few	  thousand	  dollars.”	  A	  day	  
later	  he	  dismantled	  the	  paper	  and	  sold	  its	  AP	  franchise	  to	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Globe	  for	  somewhere	  
between	  $27,000	  and	  $40,000.	  It	  was	  an	  early	  coup	  that	  earned	  Pulitzer	  the	  equivalent	  of	  
roughly	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  a	  million	  dollars,	  adjusted	  for	  inflation	  (Assumes	  a	  profit	  on	  the	  
order	  of	  $35,000	  in	  1874;	  adjusted	  to	  2012	  dollars	  using	  CPI;	  Schwarzlose	  1990,	  25;	  Brian	  
2002,	  23).	  
	  
86	  During	  the	  Civil	  War	  for	  instance,	  the	  White	  House	  recognized	  the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  AP	  
for	  simultaneously	  addressing	  the	  whole	  nation,	  and	  the	  AP	  became	  a	  central	  part	  of	  its	  
information-­‐management	  strategy	  (Blondheim	  1994,	  133).	  While	  this	  centralization	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The	  function	  of	  the	  AP	  in	  the	  news	  industry	  may	  be	  likened	  to	  that	  of	  a	  giant	  funnel.	  
From	  the	  vast	  network	  of	  wires	  of	  the	  nation’s	  telegraph	  monopoly	  it	  gathered	  
information	  from	  all	  over	  the	  country	  in	  its	  headquarters.	  There,	  the	  news	  was	  
consolidated	  to	  a	  single	  report	  and,	  again	  through	  WU’s	  vast	  facilities,	  distributed	  
throughout	  the	  country.	  Not	  all	  information	  that	  reached	  those	  headquarters	  went	  
out,	  and	  what	  did	  was	  necessarily	  transformed	  in	  the	  process	  (Blondheim	  1994,	  
174).	  
Those	  who	  controlled	  the	  funnel	  had	  great	  power.	  For	  instance,	  under	  orders	  from	  
Western	  Union	  the	  Alta	  California	  newspaper	  lost	  its	  AP	  franchise	  because	  the	  paper	  
supported	  the	  movement	  to	  nationalize	  the	  telegraph	  industry.	  Western	  Union	  also	  
had	  a	  more	  direct	  way	  to	  control	  the	  news	  travelling	  over	  their	  wires	  –	  when	  the	  
San	  Francisco	  Herald’s	  editorial	  policy	  opposed	  Western	  Union’s	  interests	  the	  
paper’s	  telegraph	  tolls	  were	  increased	  while	  rates	  for	  other	  California	  papers	  were	  
decreased	  from	  2.4	  to	  1.2	  cents	  per	  word	  (Schwarzlose	  1990,	  28).87	  
There	  seemed	  no	  chance	  for	  alternative	  voices	  to	  find	  their	  way	  into	  the	  print	  
public	  sphere.	  In	  1884	  the	  leader	  of	  an	  alternative	  press	  association	  testified	  before	  
the	  US	  Senate	  regarding	  Western	  Union’s	  effect	  on	  the	  news	  industry:	  “I	  cannot	  see	  
any	  future	  for	  an	  opposition	  press	  association	  unless	  there	  is	  an	  opposition	  
telegraph	  company”	  (Senate	  1884,	  168).	  But	  there	  was	  no	  alternative	  telegraph	  
company	  and	  therefore	  no	  alternative	  news	  association.	  The	  passage	  of	  the	  Sherman	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
facilitated	  the	  spread	  of	  news	  during	  war-­‐time	  it	  also	  gave	  the	  Lincoln	  administration	  a	  
degree	  of	  control	  over	  the	  nation’s	  perception	  of	  the	  war,	  which	  would	  not	  have	  been	  
possible	  before	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  NYAP.	  The	  anti-­‐administration	  Journal	  of	  Commerce	  for	  
instance,	  complained	  in	  1864	  that	  it	  had	  spent	  over	  $50,000	  on	  AP	  reports	  that	  amounted	  to	  
“gratuitous	  advertising”	  for	  the	  administration	  (Harper	  1951,	  299).	  
	  
87	  See	  note	  85	  on	  Schwarzlose	  1990,	  p.28.	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Anti-­‐trust	  act	  of	  1890	  was	  meant	  to	  address	  this	  kind	  of	  issue,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  over	  
fifty	  years	  before	  the	  act	  was	  effectively	  enforced	  against	  the	  Western-­‐
Union/Associated	  Press	  cartel	  in	  1945.88	  But	  by	  then	  the	  media,	  and	  the	  world,	  were	  
very	  different.	  
	  
	   The	  effects	  of	  telegraph	  industry	  concentration	  were	  felt	  on	  an	  international	  
scale	  as	  well.	  In	  Europe	  the	  three	  dominant	  state-­‐aligned	  wire-­‐news	  services	  –	  
French,	  German,	  and	  British	  –	  joined	  to	  form	  a	  cartel	  and	  the	  British	  service,	  
Reuters,	  was	  given	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  sell	  foreign	  news	  to	  the	  American	  market.89	  
As	  a	  result,	  European	  news	  arriving	  in	  the	  United	  States	  via	  the	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  cable	  
had	  a	  British	  tint.	  Americans	  were	  suddenly	  again	  dependent	  on	  the	  British	  for	  news	  
of	  European	  affairs,	  as	  the	  colonies	  had	  been	  over	  a	  century	  earlier.	  Now	  though,	  the	  
British	  origin	  of	  this	  news	  coverage	  was	  less	  visible,	  with	  reports	  appearing	  in	  
American	  papers	  of	  all	  kinds.	  If,	  under	  this	  new	  regime,	  the	  British	  origins	  of	  their	  
news	  made	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  view	  Americans	  had	  of	  European	  affairs	  then	  this	  
difference	  was	  subtle	  –	  it	  was	  the	  result	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  news	  industry	  rather	  
than	  the	  product	  of	  intentional	  efforts	  by	  a	  foreign	  power	  to	  manage	  Americans’	  
view	  of	  the	  world.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  The	  1945	  Supreme	  Court	  ruling	  in	  Associated	  Press	  v.	  United	  States	  effectively	  broke	  up	  
the	  Western	  Union-­‐Associated	  Press	  bilateral	  monopoly	  on	  wire	  news	  (“Associated	  Press	  V.	  
United	  States	  -­‐	  326	  U.S.	  1	  (1945)”	  2013).	  	  
	  
89	  The	  AP	  joined	  the	  cartel	  in	  1893.	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By	  aggregating	  audiences	  around	  a	  single	  source	  of	  news	  telegraphy	  had	  a	  
particularly	  important	  effect	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  American	  economy.	  Instant	  
news	  about	  prices	  across	  the	  country	  reduced	  arbitrage	  opportunities	  and	  
promoted	  the	  development	  of	  a	  single	  national	  market.	  By	  bringing	  national	  prices	  
for	  commodities	  into	  sync	  the	  telegraph	  reduced	  search	  costs	  for	  business	  –	  the	  
costs	  associated	  with	  holding	  inventory	  while	  searching	  for	  the	  best	  buyer	  (Boff	  
1980,	  477).	  The	  telegraph	  also	  made	  commodity	  futures	  markets	  possible,	  which	  
stabilized	  grain	  prices	  across	  the	  nation	  (Santos	  2002).90	  In	  1869	  US	  GNP	  was	  
$34.96bn	  in	  real	  1972	  dollars;	  by	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  it	  had	  nearly	  quadrupled	  to	  
$123.55bn	  (Balke	  and	  Gordon	  1986,	  781–782).	  
Through	  its	  effect	  on	  the	  economy	  the	  telegraph	  expanded	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  
public	  sphere	  for	  many	  Americans	  –	  suddenly	  farmers	  across	  the	  country	  were	  
affected	  by	  grain	  prices	  everywhere	  else	  in	  the	  country.	  The	  railroads	  and	  canals	  
had	  regionalized	  markets;	  a	  generation	  later	  the	  telegraph	  nationalized	  them	  (Carey	  
1983,	  315).	  The	  telegraph	  –	  and	  the	  pairing	  of	  Western	  Union	  and	  the	  Associated	  
Press	  –	  brought	  the	  experience	  of	  publicity	  to	  the	  national	  scale.	  
	  
Telegraphy	  and	  the	  Public	  Sphere	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  These	  effects	  were	  bolstered	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Western	  Union	  unabashedly	  gave	  
preferential	  treatment	  to	  businesses,	  which	  accounted	  for	  the	  bulk	  of	  telegraph	  
transmissions.	  In	  1887	  business	  messages	  accounted	  for	  87	  percent	  of	  traffic,	  press	  for	  8	  
percent,	  and	  personal	  messages	  for	  2	  percent	  (Starr	  2005,	  183).	  And	  just	  as	  the	  telegraph	  
itself	  had	  been	  shaped	  by	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  century	  market,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
century	  that	  market	  had	  steadily	  grown	  in	  strength	  partly	  because	  of	  the	  coordination	  that	  
the	  telegraph	  had	  made	  possible.	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The	  rise	  to	  dominance	  of	  a	  national	  telegraph	  monopoly	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
expanded	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  its	  scope	  –	  access	  to	  the	  
telegraph	  was	  limited	  to	  those	  newspapers	  fortunate	  enough	  to	  hold	  an	  AP	  
franchise,	  or	  those	  businesses	  and	  individuals	  wealthy	  enough	  to	  afford	  to	  send	  
telegraphs	  themselves.	  The	  public	  sphere	  had	  changed,	  but	  so	  had	  the	  cost	  of	  
publicity.	  People	  across	  the	  country	  received	  news	  almost	  simultaneously,	  but	  
increasingly	  that	  news	  was	  moderated	  by	  a	  small	  number	  of	  powerful	  organizations,	  
which	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  defining	  the	  image	  Americans	  had	  of	  their	  
surroundings.	  
	  The	  experience	  of	  colonial	  rule	  and	  the	  lessons	  of	  European	  history	  had	  
taught	  that	  freedom	  of	  information	  –	  which	  amounted	  to	  free	  expression	  in	  the	  
public	  sphere	  –	  needed	  to	  be	  protected	  from	  government.	  And	  so	  the	  world	  was	  
unprepared	  to	  contend	  with	  the	  dangers	  posed	  by	  the	  powerful	  industrialists	  born	  
of	  the	  “free”	  market.	  With	  the	  ascendance	  of	  the	  AP/Western	  Union	  monopoly	  it	  
seemed	  that	  aggregation	  in	  the	  news	  industry	  and	  the	  monopolistic	  practices	  of	  
Western	  Union	  put	  many	  Americans	  were	  at	  risk	  of	  losing	  their	  hard-­‐won	  
opportunities	  to	  claim	  a	  place	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  –	  opportunities	  that	  had	  
distinguished	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  earlier	  years	  of	  a	  more	  competitive	  free	  press.	  
Only	  in	  1910	  did	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  declare	  that	  telegraph	  companies	  were	  
“common	  carriers”	  required	  to	  accept	  messages	  from	  any	  customers	  willing	  to	  pay;	  
and	  only	  thirty-­‐five	  years	  after	  that,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  did	  the	  Court	  break	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up	  Western	  Union-­‐AP’s	  monopoly	  on	  wire	  news	  and	  on	  representing	  the	  world	  to	  
the	  American	  public.91	  
	  
III.	  Radio	  Broadcasting:	  The	  first	  modern	  mass	  medium92	  
The	  development	  of	  radio	  represented	  a	  major	  change	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  both	  the	  
American	  media	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  public	  sphere;	  and	  this	  is	  all	  the	  more	  
important	  because	  the	  structure	  of	  broadcast	  radio	  would	  serve	  as	  the	  template	  for	  
the	  structure	  of	  its	  postwar	  successor,	  television.	  Although	  radio	  was	  first	  developed	  
in	  the	  early	  1900s	  it	  took	  the	  form	  we	  know	  today	  in	  the	  1920s,	  with	  the	  emergence	  
of	  commercial	  broadcast	  radio.	  
Radio	  technology	  had	  initially	  been	  developed	  for	  use	  in	  marine	  signaling	  
and	  the	  production	  of	  radio	  equipment	  boomed	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  In	  these	  
early	  years	  radio	  had	  been	  a	  means	  of	  point-­‐to-­‐point	  communication.93	  It	  was	  the	  
rise	  of	  broadcasting	  though	  that	  caused	  radio	  to	  sweep	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  powerful	  
economic	  and	  social	  force	  and	  to	  dramatically	  reconfigure	  the	  public	  sphere.	  
On	  November	  2,	  1920,	  the	  radio	  manufacturer	  Westinghouse	  founded	  the	  
first	  commercial	  broadcasting	  station,	  KDKA	  Pittsburg,	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Regarding	  the	  court’s	  1910	  decision	  and	  its	  implications	  see	  (“Primrose	  V.	  Western	  Union	  
Tel.	  Co.	  -­‐	  154	  U.S.	  1	  (1894)”	  2013;	  Williams	  1920).	  
	  
92	  There	  was	  another	  major	  development	  in	  the	  technology	  of	  communications	  between	  the	  
rise	  of	  the	  telegraph	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  radio,	  namely	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  telephone.	  The	  
telephone	  had	  an	  undeniably	  important	  effect	  on	  American	  life.	  In	  its	  most	  common	  form	  it	  
is	  not	  a	  public	  medium	  though.	  That	  is,	  most	  telephone	  conversations	  are	  private	  –	  with	  
certain	  exceptions	  they	  are	  not	  open	  to	  anyone	  who	  wants	  to	  listen	  in.	  For	  this	  reason,	  and	  
for	  the	  sake	  of	  keeping	  this	  project	  to	  a	  reasonable	  length	  I	  will	  not	  discuss	  the	  telephone	  
here.	  Interested	  readers	  should	  see	  Starr	  2005,	  chapter	  6.	  
	  
93	  C.f.	  Baker	  1972,	  79;	  Reich	  2002,	  220–224.	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sale	  of	  radio	  receivers,	  which	  had	  previously	  only	  been	  sold	  in	  self-­‐contained	  
receiver-­‐transmitter	  sets	  (Salamon	  2010,	  7–8).	  The	  rise	  of	  broadcast	  radio	  was	  
explosive.	  In	  the	  first	  11	  months	  of	  1921	  the	  Department	  of	  Commerce	  licensed	  5	  
radio	  stations,	  in	  the	  following	  month	  it	  licensed	  23,	  the	  next	  year	  500	  stations	  went	  
on	  the	  air,	  and	  in	  March	  of	  1922	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  reported	  that	  radio	  had	  become	  
“the	  most	  popular	  amusement	  in	  America”	  (“Radio	  Telephoning”	  1922).	  From	  1922	  
to	  1924	  the	  number	  of	  radio	  receivers	  in	  the	  United	  States	  jumped	  roughly	  50-­‐fold,	  
to	  2.5	  million.	  Radio	  had	  not	  yet	  become	  universal	  but	  it	  had	  become	  a	  fixture	  in	  1	  of	  
every	  10	  American	  homes	  (Starr	  2005,	  335;	  Page	  1959).	  
	   In	  1922	  AT&T	  established	  a	  New	  York	  City	  -­‐based	  station,	  WEAF,	  to	  sell	  air-­‐
time	  to	  customers	  who	  wanted	  to	  get	  a	  message	  out	  to	  the	  public	  without	  investing	  
in	  a	  station	  of	  their	  own,	  establishing	  the	  model	  of	  advertiser-­‐supported	  radio	  that	  
would	  dominate	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  century.94	  Soon	  after	  AT&T	  began	  to	  link	  
stations	  using	  its	  telephone	  network.	  This	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  multiple	  semi-­‐
independent	  stations	  to	  simultaneously	  broadcast	  the	  same	  programs.	  By	  1924	  the	  
company	  had	  created	  a	  network	  of	  16	  stations	  reaching	  65	  percent	  of	  American	  
homes.	  By	  late	  1924	  the	  network,	  extended	  to	  26	  stations,	  broadcast	  a	  speech	  by	  
President	  Calvin	  Coolidge	  (Starr	  2005,	  337).	  Control	  of	  telephone	  wires	  gave	  AT&T	  
an	  early	  advantage	  in	  network	  radio,	  and	  seeking	  to	  leverage	  this	  advantage	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  The	  significance	  of	  AT&T’s	  toll	  broadcasting	  service	  was	  that	  it	  broke	  the	  taboo	  against	  
commercial	  sponsorship	  of	  radio	  broadcasting	  (Starr	  2005,	  337).	  Commercial	  sponsorship	  
of	  broadcasts	  would	  become	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  industry,	  but	  in	  its	  early	  years	  there	  were	  
strong	  objections.	  “The	  family	  circle	  is	  not	  a	  public	  place,”	  declared	  Printer’s	  Ink,	  a	  trade	  
magazine	  for	  advertising,	  “and	  advertising	  has	  no	  business	  intruding	  there	  unless	  it	  is	  
invited”	  (Marchand	  1985,	  89;	  Spalding	  1963,	  38;	  both	  Marchand	  and	  Spaulding	  quote	  
Printer’s	  Ink,	  April	  27,	  1922,	  though	  I	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  this	  publication).	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company	  denied	  its	  broadcast-­‐radio	  competitors	  the	  right	  to	  use	  its	  network,	  
claiming,	  “transmission	  by	  wires	  is	  ours”	  (Starr	  2005,	  337).	  By	  1924	  though,	  AT&T	  
recognized	  the	  rising	  tide	  of	  progressivism	  and	  fearing	  the	  ramifications	  of	  
establishing	  a	  dual	  monopoly	  in	  radio	  and	  telephony	  it	  entered	  into	  a	  secret	  
agreement	  with	  the	  chief	  players	  in	  the	  broadcast	  radio	  industry.	  The	  agreement,	  
which	  went	  into	  effect	  the	  following	  year,	  established	  what	  would	  become	  known	  as	  
the	  “radio	  trust.”	  
In	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  appearance	  of	  monopolizing	  broadcast	  radio,	  AT&T	  
spun	  off	  its	  broadcasting	  network	  into	  a	  new	  entity	  that	  combined	  its	  own	  stations	  
with	  those	  of	  GE,	  RCA,	  and	  Westinghouse.	  The	  new	  network	  was	  called	  the	  National	  
Broadcasting	  Company	  (NBC)	  and	  would	  be	  owned	  by	  owned	  by	  RCA	  (50%),	  GE	  
(30%),	  and	  Westinghouse	  (20%)	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  53).	  In	  exchange,	  AT&T	  would	  
earn	  revenues	  from	  NBC’s	  use	  of	  its	  long-­‐distance	  telephone	  lines	  through	  an	  initial	  
contract	  lasting	  10	  years	  and	  bringing	  in	  $1	  million	  per	  year	  (Starr	  2005,	  344).	  The	  
deal	  was	  also	  important	  in	  establishing	  that	  the	  emerging	  medium	  would	  be	  
advertiser-­‐supported	  on	  the	  model	  of	  AT&T’s	  WEAF.	  As	  NBC	  expanded	  its	  local	  
affiliates	  began	  to	  both	  carry	  national	  programs	  featuring	  national	  advertisers	  and	  
to	  seek	  their	  own	  local	  advertisers.95	  By	  1927	  roughly	  one-­‐quarter	  of	  American	  
households	  had	  radios	  (Field	  2006;	  Brower	  and	  Ruggles	  2006).	  Just	  as	  the	  
Associated	  Press	  had	  done	  over	  half	  a	  century	  earlier,	  NBC’s	  network	  brought	  news	  
and	  entertainment	  to	  a	  national	  scale	  aggregating	  massive	  audiences	  around	  a	  small	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  An	  important	  feature	  of	  both	  NBC	  and	  CBS	  was	  that	  affiliate	  stations	  were,	  for	  the	  most	  
part,	  independently	  owned	  and	  managed.	  This	  allowed	  the	  networks	  to	  expand	  their	  reach	  
without	  triggering	  concerns	  of	  monopoly,	  particularly	  important	  since	  the	  Radio	  Act	  of	  
1927	  included	  an	  explicit	  anti-­‐monopoly	  clause.	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number	  of	  broadcasts,	  pushing	  out	  the	  diversity	  of	  local	  broadcasters	  and	  
advertisers.	  
As	  NBC’s	  largest	  shareholder	  RCA	  released	  a	  full-­‐page	  newspaper	  ad	  
announcing	  formation	  of	  the	  new	  network.	  The	  ad	  prominently	  featured	  the	  
language	  of	  public	  interest,	  catering	  to	  the	  rising	  tide	  of	  wariness	  about	  
unrestrained	  markets.	  
NO	  MONOPOLY	  OF	  THE	  AIR	  –	  The	  Radio	  Corporation	  of	  America	  is	  not	  in	  any	  sense	  
seeking	  a	  monopoly	  of	  the	  air.	  That	  would	  be	  a	  liability	  rather	  than	  an	  asset.	  It	  is	  
seeking,	  however,	  to	  provide	  machinery	  which	  will	  insure	  a	  national	  distribution	  of	  
national	  programs,	  and	  a	  wider	  distribution	  of	  programs	  of	  the	  highest	  quality.	  
If	  others	  will	  engage	  in	  this	  business	  the	  Radio	  Corporation	  of	  America	  will	  welcome	  
their	  action,	  whether	  it	  be	  cooperative	  or	  competitive.	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  55)	  
This	  combination	  of	  public	  interest	  rhetoric,	  dependence	  on	  government	  licensing,	  
and	  a	  market-­‐based	  business	  structure	  would	  characterize	  broadcast	  media	  through	  
the	  millennium.	  
	   One	  upstart	  did	  take	  NBC	  up	  on	  its	  invitation	  to	  competitors.	  A	  network	  of	  
broadcasters	  financed	  by	  the	  Columbia	  Phonograph	  Company	  launched	  with	  16	  
affiliated	  stations	  and	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Columbia	  Broadcasting	  System	  (CBS).	  It	  
would	  be	  several	  years	  before	  CBS	  approached	  NBC	  in	  terms	  of	  popularity,	  but	  CBS,	  
NBC,	  and	  later	  an	  NBC	  spinoff	  called	  ABC	  would	  be	  the	  only	  major	  players	  in	  the	  




Unlike	  previous	  media	  such	  as	  print	  or	  the	  telegraph,	  radio	  relied	  on	  a	  scarce	  
resource,	  namely	  broadcast	  spectrum.	  With	  the	  technology	  available	  at	  any	  given	  
time	  only	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  broadcasters	  are	  able	  to	  transmit	  in	  a	  given	  area	  
without	  overlapping	  and	  causing	  interference	  between	  stations.	  As	  a	  result	  access	  to	  
the	  public	  sphere	  constituted	  by	  radio	  is	  necessarily	  limited;	  and	  the	  precise	  
structure	  of	  this	  limitation	  largely	  determines	  the	  character	  of	  radio	  as	  an	  
institution.	  
	   Government	  regulation	  of	  the	  airwaves	  proceeded	  in	  fits	  and	  starts	  
throughout	  most	  of	  the	  1920s.	  With	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Radio	  Act	  of	  1927	  though,	  a	  
system	  of	  regulations	  was	  put	  in	  place	  containing	  many	  of	  the	  key	  provisions	  that	  
governed	  the	  airwaves	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  century.	  The	  Act	  created	  the	  Federal	  
Radio	  Commission	  (FRC)	  and	  endowed	  it	  with	  the	  power	  to	  divide	  up	  the	  broadcast	  
spectrum.	  Recognizing	  that	  broadcast	  spectrum	  was	  a	  limited	  commodity	  the	  Radio	  
Act	  treated	  it	  as	  a	  public	  good	  –	  it	  would	  grant	  private	  interests	  the	  right	  to	  use	  the	  
airwaves,	  “but	  not	  the	  ownership	  thereof.”	  Furthermore,	  the	  act	  authorized	  the	  FRC	  
to	  grant	  a	  license	  to	  a	  broadcaster	  only	  if	  “public	  convenience,	  interest	  or	  necessity	  
will	  be	  served	  thereby”	  (“The	  Radio	  Act	  of	  1927”	  1927;	  Barnouw	  1990,	  57–60).	  But	  
the	  law	  did	  not	  specify	  how	  the	  FRC	  should	  judge	  what	  was	  in	  the	  public	  good;	  that	  
would	  be	  left	  to	  the	  commission	  itself.	  And	  although	  the	  Radio	  Act	  was	  passed	  in	  the	  
spirit	  of	  Progressivism	  the	  commission	  itself	  overwhelmingly	  favored	  granting	  
licenses	  to	  commercial,	  ad-­‐supported	  broadcasters.96	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Although	  the	  FRC	  was	  forbidden	  from	  censoring	  the	  airwaves	  the	  organization’s	  vague	  
mandate	  and	  their	  power	  over	  license	  renewal	  meant	  that	  they	  were	  able	  to	  regulate	  
content	  by	  a	  “raised	  eyebrow,”	  signaling	  that	  some	  kinds	  of	  broadcasts	  were	  inconsistent	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   In	  1928	  Congress	  required	  that	  the	  FRC	  overhaul	  its	  allocation	  of	  radio	  
spectrum	  granting	  more	  stations	  to	  the	  underrepresented	  southern	  and	  western	  
United	  States.	  This	  allocation	  of	  spectrum	  had	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  future	  
structure	  of	  the	  industry	  because	  it	  dictated	  the	  number	  of	  stations	  that	  would	  be	  
able	  to	  broadcast	  simultaneously.	  In	  addition	  to	  specifying	  which	  frequencies	  could	  
be	  licensed	  the	  FRC	  would	  specify	  the	  power	  at	  which	  those	  frequencies	  could	  be	  
broadcast.	  At	  the	  top	  end	  were	  so-­‐called	  “clear	  channels”	  with	  national	  reach.	  
Higher	  power	  meant	  that	  signals	  would	  reach	  more	  listeners,	  including	  potentially	  
under-­‐served	  rural	  listeners.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  though,	  high-­‐power	  made	  it	  
impossible	  for	  lower-­‐powered	  local	  stations	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  same	  area.	  If	  a	  given	  
frequency	  was	  occupied	  by	  a	  “clear	  channel”	  there	  could	  be	  only	  one	  broadcaster	  in	  
the	  country	  operating	  on	  that	  frequency.	  Clear	  channels	  also	  relied	  on	  expensive	  
equipment	  making	  them	  more	  suitable	  for	  commercial	  interests.	  The	  FRC’s	  
allotment	  decision	  would	  dictate	  how	  high	  the	  barrier	  to	  entry	  would	  be	  in	  the	  
public	  sphere	  constituted	  by	  radio	  –	  would	  licenses	  be	  available	  for	  local	  non-­‐profit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with	  the	  public	  “convenience,	  interest,	  or	  necessity”	  (Starr	  2005,	  364).	  As	  a	  result	  
commercial	  broadcasters	  tended	  to	  be	  highly	  conservative	  and	  to	  avoid	  controversial	  
topics,	  including	  social	  problems	  such	  as	  race	  relations.	  Loss	  of	  a	  license	  would	  be	  
financially	  devastating	  for	  commercial	  stations,	  and	  so	  as	  the	  industry	  boomed	  it	  was	  the	  
economic	  logic	  of	  minimizing	  risk	  that	  censored	  the	  airwaves,	  rather	  than	  authoritarian	  
intervention.	  Self-­‐imposed	  broadcaster	  conservatism	  reached	  levels	  that	  would	  seem	  
ridiculous	  by	  today’s	  standards.	  For	  instance	  Cole	  Porter’s	  song	  “Let’s	  Put	  Out	  the	  Lights	  
and	  Go	  to	  Bed”	  was	  retitled	  “Let’s	  Put	  Out	  the	  Lights	  and	  Go	  to	  Sleep.”	  A	  Philadelphia	  station	  
owner	  abruptly	  cut	  a	  speaker	  off	  the	  air	  when	  he	  used	  the	  word	  “hell”	  in	  describing	  a	  battle	  
in	  Haiti	  –	  the	  speaker	  was	  Major	  General	  in	  the	  US	  Marine	  Corps	  describing	  the	  battle	  in	  
which	  he	  won	  a	  Congressional	  Medal	  of	  Honor.	  And	  stations	  were	  hypersensitive	  to	  
complaints	  by	  offended	  parties.	  In	  its	  Retold	  Tales	  series	  NBC	  replaced	  references	  to	  the	  
Mormon	  Church	  with	  references	  to	  a	  “cult”	  called	  the	  “Sons	  of	  Eli”	  in	  rebroadcasting	  Sir	  
Arthur	  Conan	  Doyle’s	  world-­‐famous	  Sherlock	  Holmes	  story	  “A	  Study	  in	  Scarlet”;	  the	  
Mormon	  Church	  had	  complained	  after	  the	  first	  broadcast	  (Benjamin	  2006,	  145–6).	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groups	  or	  would	  big-­‐business	  control	  the	  image	  of	  the	  world	  streaming	  into	  people’s	  
living	  rooms	  through	  speakers	  across	  the	  country?	  
	   The	  FRC,	  advised	  largely	  by	  a	  professional	  association	  of	  engineers	  who	  had	  
worked	  for	  RCA,	  came	  down	  on	  the	  side	  of	  big	  business.	  In	  its	  1928	  decision	  the	  FRC	  
established	  40	  high-­‐powered	  clear	  channel	  stations,	  forcing	  many	  smaller	  
broadcasters	  into	  time-­‐sharing	  agreements	  on	  the	  remaining	  frequencies.	  Over	  the	  
next	  several	  years	  the	  number	  of	  radio	  stations	  operating	  in	  the	  US	  dropped	  from	  
733	  in	  1927	  to	  an	  average	  of	  600,	  with	  many	  of	  the	  smaller	  stations	  broadcasting	  for	  
a	  limited	  number	  of	  hours	  and	  sharing	  their	  frequencies	  with	  others	  (Starr	  2005,	  
351).	  
Nearly	  all	  of	  the	  licenses	  for	  high-­‐	  and	  medium-­‐powered	  stations	  went	  to	  
commercial	  broadcasters	  that	  already	  were	  or	  would	  soon	  become	  NBC	  or	  CBS	  
affiliates	  (Starr	  2005,	  351).	  In	  1927	  NBC	  had	  28	  affiliates	  and	  CBS	  had	  16,	  
accounting	  for	  6.4%	  of	  the	  nation’s	  broadcast	  stations.	  Four	  years	  after	  reallocation	  
the	  power	  and	  number	  of	  network	  affiliates	  grew	  to	  account	  for	  70%	  of	  U.S.	  
broadcasting	  (McChesney	  1990,	  33).	  And	  whereas	  commercial	  advertising	  had	  
hardly	  existed	  on	  a	  national	  scale	  before	  1928,	  six	  year	  later	  it	  brought	  in	  $72	  
million	  a	  year	  (McChesney	  1990,	  33).	  The	  FRC’s	  ideological	  position	  was	  clear	  in	  the	  
language	  it	  used	  to	  categorize	  stations.	  It	  called	  ad-­‐supported	  stations	  “general	  
public	  service”	  stations	  and	  called	  nonprofit	  stations	  “propaganda”	  stations	  –	  and	  
when	  it	  came	  to	  conflicting	  claims	  over	  airwaves	  the	  FRC	  gave	  preference	  to	  “public	  
service”	  over	  “propaganda”	  (Mcchesney	  1995,	  27).	  Ad-­‐supported	  stations,	  the	  FRC	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reasoned,	  had	  an	  interest	  in	  reaching	  the	  broadest	  possible	  audience	  while	  
nonprofits	  targeted	  narrower	  audiences	  and	  broadcast	  with	  a	  specific	  agenda.	  
Meanwhile	  non-­‐profit	  stations	  foundered	  and	  by	  1934	  they	  accounted	  for	  
only	  2	  percent	  of	  total	  U.S.	  broadcast	  time	  (McChesney	  1990,	  34).	  The	  barriers	  to	  
participation	  in	  the	  national	  public	  sphere	  constituted	  by	  radio	  had	  risen	  –	  access	  to	  
the	  American	  public	  sphere	  had	  paradoxically	  become	  more	  exclusive	  while	  
encompassing	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  people.	  Without	  buying	  up	  licenses	  NBC	  –	  and	  to	  
a	  lesser	  extent	  CBS	  –	  had	  maintained	  dominance	  of	  the	  airwaves.	  	  
	  
	   The	  rise	  of	  radio	  networks	  made	  the	  airwaves	  less	  diverse.	  Before	  networks	  
dominated	  the	  airwaves	  listeners	  could	  tune	  into	  stations	  from	  cities	  around	  the	  
country	  –	  Denver,	  Detroit,	  Boston	  –	  but	  after	  reallocation	  fewer	  stations	  remained	  
and	  even	  if	  listeners	  could	  tune	  in	  to	  another	  city’s	  station	  it	  would	  most	  likely	  be	  
airing	  the	  same	  NBC	  or	  CBS	  programs.	  Even	  stations	  within	  the	  same	  city	  often	  
broadcast	  the	  same	  content.	  In	  1928	  CBS	  had	  three	  affiliates	  in	  Chicago	  and	  NBC	  had	  
five	  (Spalding	  1963,	  34).97	  
The	  logic	  of	  broad	  reach	  and	  audience	  aggregation	  had	  become	  fundamental	  
to	  the	  structure	  of	  broadcast	  radio	  by	  the	  1930s.	  The	  industry	  would	  respond	  to	  the	  
rising	  progressivism	  of	  the	  later	  1930s	  and	  1940s,	  most	  notably	  by	  developing	  news	  
broadcasts,	  but	  the	  basic	  logic	  of	  mass	  commercialism	  would	  remain	  the	  industry’s	  
central	  organizing	  characteristic	  until	  the	  ruptures	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  Listeners	  complained	  about	  this	  “program	  duplication”	  and	  some	  law-­‐makers	  went	  so	  far	  
as	  to	  advocate	  the	  dissolution	  of	  NBC	  (Socolow	  2008,	  97).	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National	  Advertising	  
The	  exploding	  popularity	  of	  radio	  during	  the	  Depression	  years,	  coupled	  with	  
the	  new	  ease	  of	  buying	  ad	  time	  on	  a	  national	  scale	  made	  radio	  irresistible	  for	  many	  
advertisers	  who	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  powerful	  voices	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.98	  
Unlike	  newspapers,	  which	  depended	  on	  ads	  for	  only	  a	  part	  of	  their	  profits,	  radio	  
broadcasters	  sold	  no	  product	  to	  consumers	  and	  were	  entirely	  dependent	  on	  ad	  
revenues.	  This	  gave	  national	  advertisers	  power	  over	  the	  content	  of	  radio	  
broadcasts,	  further	  extending	  their	  power	  in	  shaping	  the	  character	  of	  American	  
public	  life.99	  
It	  was	  in	  this	  period	  that	  ad	  agencies	  also	  gained	  prominence.	  Initially	  
agencies	  had	  simply	  prepared	  copy	  for	  advertisers	  and	  negotiated	  sponsorship	  
deals	  on	  their	  behalf.	  By	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Depression	  though,	  ad	  agencies	  had	  taken	  
on	  the	  role	  of	  producers,	  doing	  everything	  from	  conceiving	  of	  programs,	  writing	  
scripts,	  hiring	  performers,	  finding	  sponsors,	  and	  pitching	  the	  complete	  packages	  to	  
radio	  networks.	  By	  1929	  ad	  agencies	  were	  producing	  33	  percent	  of	  radio	  programs,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  An	  important	  organizational	  innovation	  at	  CBS	  made	  national	  advertising	  much	  more	  
accessible	  to	  marketers	  than	  it	  had	  been	  in	  the	  past.	  Under	  the	  original	  network	  model	  
affiliates	  could	  chose	  among	  the	  network’s	  offerings,	  purchasing	  the	  rights	  to	  air	  some	  
programs	  while	  being	  paid	  for	  the	  service	  of	  broadcasting	  others;	  affiliates	  paid	  networks	  
for	  the	  privilege	  of	  locally	  broadcasting	  network-­‐produced	  sustaining	  programs,	  while	  
network’s	  paid	  local	  affiliates	  to	  broadcast	  programs	  featuring	  national	  ads.	  CBS	  though,	  
began	  offering	  sustaining	  programs	  to	  affiliates	  at	  no	  cost	  –	  a	  boon	  to	  smaller	  broadcasters	  
during	  the	  Great	  Depression.	  In	  return	  CBS	  received	  the	  option	  to	  place	  programming	  on	  
any	  part	  of	  its	  affiliates’	  schedules.	  This	  gave	  CBS	  an	  advantage	  with	  advertisers	  because	  
they	  could	  guarantee	  ad	  placement	  on	  as	  many	  stations	  as	  the	  advertiser	  wanted.	  By	  the	  
mid-­‐1930s	  NBC	  was	  still	  more	  popular	  but	  CBS	  had	  become	  more	  profitable	  (Starr	  2005,	  
354;	  S.	  B.	  Smith	  1991,	  62–67,	  116).	  
	  
99	  Roland	  Marchand’s	  Advertising	  the	  American	  Dream:	  Making	  Way	  for	  Modernity,	  1920-­‐
1940	  traces	  this	  history,	  uncovering	  the	  role	  of	  advertisers	  in	  shaping	  Americans’	  
conceptions	  of	  themselves	  and	  their	  surroundings	  (Marchand	  1985).	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more	  than	  individual	  sponsors,	  programming	  specialists,	  or	  even	  the	  networks	  
themselves.	  By	  1937	  agencies	  were	  in	  control	  of	  almost	  all	  sponsored	  programming	  
(MacDonald	  1979,	  32).	  Meanwhile,	  as	  ad	  revenues	  flowed	  to	  the	  networks	  many	  
formerly-­‐independent	  broadcasters	  joined	  NBC	  or	  CBS	  as	  affiliates.	  The	  financial	  
logic	  of	  affiliation	  was	  undeniable	  –	  in	  1938	  average	  net	  broadcasting	  revenues	  
were	  more	  than	  ten	  times	  as	  high	  for	  affiliated	  stations	  ($58,130)	  compared	  with	  
independents	  ($4,139)	  (Craig	  2005,	  34).	  
	   By	  1938	  Americans	  had	  accepted	  advertising	  as	  a	  standard	  feature	  of	  radio	  –
47	  percent	  of	  respondents	  to	  a	  survey	  that	  year	  said	  that	  they	  though	  the	  amount	  of	  
radio	  time	  devoted	  to	  ads	  was	  “just	  right,”	  while	  only	  36	  percent	  said	  that	  it	  was	  
“too	  much.”	  But	  even	  more	  compelling,	  79	  percent	  of	  respondents	  said	  they	  would	  
refuse	  to	  pay	  anything	  to	  listen	  without	  ads	  (Craig	  2005,	  27).	  
	   	  
The	  normalization	  of	  radio	  advertising	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  national	  networks	  had	  
important	  consequences	  for	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Networks	  aimed	  to	  
reach	  the	  broadest	  possible	  market	  sought	  by	  advertisers	  –	  and	  this	  meant	  
producing	  programming	  that	  appealed	  to	  the	  lowest	  common	  denominator,	  
homogenizing	  the	  world	  represented	  on	  the	  radio	  and	  aggregating	  audiences	  into	  a	  
more-­‐or-­‐less	  coherent	  public	  on	  a	  national	  scale.	  
One	  implication	  of	  networks’	  lowest-­‐common-­‐denominator	  approach	  was	  
that	  minority	  groups	  previously	  represented	  by	  local	  stations	  became	  marginalized	  
when	  those	  stations	  became	  network	  affiliates.	  The	  national	  radio	  networks	  
conspicuously	  excluded	  blacks	  for	  instance.	  In	  the	  mid-­‐1920s	  several	  local	  stations,	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especially	  in	  New	  York	  and	  Chicago	  broadcast	  performances	  by	  black	  musicians,	  
especially	  jazz,	  which	  was	  becoming	  a	  national	  craze.	  Network	  affiliation	  soon	  
ended	  this	  trend	  though	  –	  NBC	  and	  CBS	  were	  not	  willing	  to	  risk	  alienating	  white	  
southern	  listeners,	  and	  national	  advertisers	  were	  wary	  of	  having	  their	  products	  
associated	  with	  black	  consumers.	  As	  network	  affiliation	  and	  national	  advertising	  
grew	  to	  dominate	  radio	  in	  the	  1930s	  America’s	  airwaves	  became	  white.100	  
	   	  
Radio	  exploded	  in	  popularity	  throughout	  the	  1930s	  and	  by	  1941	  more	  
Americans	  got	  their	  news	  from	  radio	  than	  from	  newspapers	  (Paul	  Felix	  Lazarsfeld	  
1940,	  250).	  This	  shift	  from	  print	  to	  radio	  had	  deep	  implications	  for	  the	  workings	  of	  
American	  democracy.	  Print	  had	  served	  as	  the	  dominant	  medium	  for	  political	  
communication	  in	  the	  nation’s	  first	  century	  and	  a	  half.	  It	  brought	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
voices	  into	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  was	  easily	  accessible.	  The	  shift	  to	  radio	  on	  the	  
other	  hand	  changed	  the	  structure	  of	  political	  communication.	  Radio	  spectrum	  was	  
limited	  and	  so	  the	  medium	  was	  necessarily	  subject	  to	  greater	  government	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  There	  were	  a	  few	  exceptions	  to	  this	  whitening	  of	  broadcast	  radio.	  Louis	  Armstrong,	  for	  
instance	  had	  a	  show	  on	  CBS	  for	  a	  few	  months	  in	  1937,	  and	  CBS	  aired	  a	  Sunday	  morning	  
program	  of	  gospel	  music.	  In	  the	  late	  1920s	  a	  black	  journalist	  rented	  time	  on	  a	  low-­‐power	  
Chicago	  station	  for	  a	  variety	  show	  called	  The	  All-­‐Negro	  Hour.	  These	  were	  exceptions	  though	  
in	  an	  otherwise	  racially	  homogeneous	  broadcast	  spectrum.	  The	  barriers	  to	  entry	  in	  radio	  
were	  much	  higher	  than	  they	  had	  been	  in	  print	  and	  as	  the	  new	  medium	  took	  over,	  black	  
representation	  in	  the	  American	  public	  sphere	  dwindled.	  This	  marginalization	  of	  blacks	  and	  
ethnic	  minorities	  was	  as	  much	  an	  economic	  phenomenon	  as	  a	  cultural	  one.	  In	  1930	  black	  
families	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  own	  radios	  than	  white	  families.	  In	  cities,	  for	  instance,	  only	  14.4	  
percent	  of	  black	  homes	  had	  radios	  and	  in	  rural	  areas	  that	  number	  was	  only	  0.03,	  while	  45.8	  
percent	  of	  American	  households	  on	  the	  whole	  had	  radios	  (Fifteenth	  Census	  of	  the	  United	  
States,	  1930.	  1932,	  414).	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly	  pervasive	  poverty	  in	  the	  black	  
community	  limited	  its	  appeal	  to	  advertisers.	  Another	  example	  of	  such	  homogenization	  of	  
the	  airwaves	  is	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  diverse	  local	  broadcasters	  that	  had	  catered	  to	  the	  ethnic	  
and	  religious	  groups	  among	  Chicago’s	  working	  class	  during	  the	  1920s	  (L.	  Cohen	  2008a,	  
135).	  With	  the	  growing	  dominance	  of	  radio	  networks	  many	  of	  these	  stations	  vanished	  or	  
transitioned	  to	  programming	  with	  a	  broader	  appeal.	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regulation	  than	  print	  media.	  Furthermore,	  control	  of	  radio	  was	  more	  heavily	  
concentrated	  than	  control	  of	  the	  press	  had	  been.	  While	  print	  had	  created	  diverse	  
and	  fragmented	  publics	  around	  targeted	  publications,	  radio	  had	  aggregated	  and	  
homogenized	  listeners	  on	  a	  national	  scale.	  This	  was	  the	  case	  both	  in	  the	  United	  
States	  and	  in	  Europe	  –	  it	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  feature	  of	  broadcast	  radio	  itself	  (Starr	  
2005,	  370).101	  
	   An	  important	  consequence	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  radio	  as	  an	  institution	  was	  its	  
aggregating	  effect	  in	  the	  political	  sphere.	  Broadcasters	  had	  opposed	  any	  laws	  
requiring	  that	  they	  provide	  free	  airtime	  to	  candidates,	  both	  to	  ensure	  a	  profitable	  
revenue	  stream	  and	  to	  keep	  marginal	  candidates	  –	  who	  could	  potentially	  offend	  
listeners	  and	  therefore	  advertisers	  –	  off	  the	  air.	  The	  result	  was	  that	  the	  two	  major	  
parties	  dominated	  broadcast	  radio	  –	  they	  were	  the	  only	  ones	  who	  could	  afford	  air-­‐
time	  –	  and	  radicals	  were,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  successfully	  kept	  off	  the	  air	  (Craig	  2005,	  
117–118,	  132).	  
As	  political	  ad	  spending	  grew,	  so	  did	  party	  dependence	  on	  the	  networks.	  In	  
1928	  and	  1936	  both	  parties	  spent	  a	  combined	  total	  of	  over	  $1	  million	  on	  radio	  time	  
and	  were	  unable	  to	  pay	  their	  debts	  for	  several	  years	  –	  going	  into	  the	  1936	  election	  
the	  Democrats	  had	  still	  not	  paid	  their	  debts	  to	  NBC	  from	  the	  1932	  cycle	  (Craig	  2005,	  
133–135).	  Political	  parties	  needed	  the	  good	  will	  of	  broadcasters	  and	  this	  may	  have	  
played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  broadcaster-­‐friendly	  Communications	  Act	  of	  1934,	  which,	  Starr	  
suggests,	  more	  than	  paid	  back	  the	  broadcasters	  for	  the	  parties’	  unpaid	  bills	  (Starr	  
2005,	  373).	  Broadcasters	  meanwhile,	  were	  aware	  of	  their	  good	  fortune	  with	  regard	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  European	  radio	  was	  actually	  even	  less	  diverse	  than	  American	  radio	  (Starr	  2005,	  376).	  
Starr	  cites	  Hard	  1932.	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to	  political	  radio	  spending.	  The	  NBC	  executive	  in	  charge	  of	  political	  broadcasting	  
wrote	  in	  1940,	  “We	  must	  not	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  have	  been	  very	  fortunate	  
in	  radio	  in	  getting	  away	  with	  the	  selling	  of	  time	  for	  presidential	  candidates.	  We	  
might	  awaken	  some	  morning	  and	  find	  that	  we	  are	  going	  to	  have	  to	  give	  time	  to	  
national	  campaigns,	  instead	  of	  selling	  it”	  (Craig	  2005,	  137).	  This	  relationship	  
changed	  in	  the	  1940s,	  though	  only	  slightly.	  
By	  1941	  Roosevelt	  was	  in	  his	  second	  term	  and	  his	  New	  Deal	  programs	  were	  
at	  their	  height,	  and	  so	  the	  FCC	  began	  taking	  a	  more	  aggressive	  stand	  against	  the	  
networks.	  In	  1941,	  after	  a	  three-­‐year	  investigation	  into	  network	  broadcasting	  the	  
FCC	  had	  concluded	  that	  power	  had	  become	  too	  concentrated	  among	  the	  networks	  
and	  passed	  a	  series	  of	  new	  regulations:	  no	  organization	  could	  own	  more	  than	  one	  
network,	  no	  one	  network	  could	  own	  multiple	  stations	  in	  any	  given	  area,	  affiliation	  
contracts	  were	  limited	  to	  no	  more	  than	  one	  year,	  and	  affiliates	  had	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  
accept	  programs	  offered	  by	  other	  networks	  (FCC,	  Craven,	  and	  Case	  1941,	  72).	  This	  
did	  not	  fundamentally	  undermine	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  major	  networks,	  but	  it	  did	  
force	  NBC	  to	  sell	  off	  its	  NBC-­‐Blue	  network,	  which	  became	  the	  American	  
Broadcasting	  Company	  (ABC),	  the	  nation’s	  third	  major	  network.	  
	  
Network	  News	  
Meanwhile	  news	  began	  to	  find	  a	  place	  on	  the	  airwaves.	  Radio	  had	  emerged	  as	  
a	  news	  medium	  in	  the	  early	  1930s	  and	  as	  the	  depression	  deepened	  it	  became	  an	  
increasingly	  popular	  alternative	  to	  newspapers.	  Even	  the	  penny	  papers	  cost	  a	  
penny,	  but	  listening	  to	  the	  radio	  was	  free.	  By	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	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the	  majority	  of	  Americans	  preferred	  to	  get	  their	  news	  of	  the	  world	  via	  radio	  
broadcasts	  rather	  than	  newspapers.	  The	  two	  media	  were	  different	  in	  several	  basic	  
respects	  though	  and	  the	  shift	  to	  radio	  news	  brought	  with	  it	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  way	  that	  
world	  events	  were	  represented	  in	  public	  –	  news	  flashes	  made	  them	  urgent,	  and	  
broadcasts	  from	  war-­‐torn	  capitals	  made	  them	  emotionally	  compelling.	  
	   The	  movement	  of	  radio	  into	  the	  news	  business	  provoked	  a	  strong	  reaction	  
among	  newspaper	  publishers,	  fearful	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  their	  medium.	  In	  early	  1933	  
both	  the	  American	  Newspaper	  Publishers	  Association	  and	  wire	  services	  including	  
the	  Associated	  Press	  decided	  to	  stop	  selling	  news	  bulletins	  to	  broadcasters,	  setting	  
off	  the	  “press-­‐radio	  war”	  (Chester	  1949,	  256).	  CBS	  responded	  by	  founding	  a	  news	  
division.	  In	  response	  several	  city	  newspapers	  stopped	  publishing	  CBS	  program	  
listings.	  The	  two	  sides	  reached	  a	  cease-­‐fire	  in	  December	  of	  1933.	  NBC	  and	  CBS	  
agreed	  to	  provide	  only	  two	  five-­‐minute	  newscasts	  each	  day,	  early	  and	  late	  enough	  
so	  that	  neither	  would	  hurt	  sales	  of	  morning	  and	  evening	  papers.	  Furthermore	  the	  
networks	  agreed	  to	  minimize	  original	  reporting,	  to	  broadcast	  only	  news	  that	  was	  at	  
least	  24	  hours	  old,	  and	  to	  conclude	  all	  news	  broadcasts	  with	  the	  words	  “for	  further	  
details,	  consult	  your	  local	  newspaper”	  (Starr	  2005,	  377;	  Chester	  1949,	  255).	  News	  
radio	  did	  not	  disappear	  though	  –	  radio	  networks	  featured	  news	  commentators	  
rather	  than	  original	  news	  reporting	  and	  so	  as	  radio	  continued	  to	  grow	  in	  popularity	  
the	  American	  public	  sphere	  filled	  with	  more	  opinion,	  and	  less	  fact	  (Starr	  2005,	  377).	  
In	  the	  long	  run	  the	  agreement	  did	  not	  stop	  radio	  from	  eventually	  becoming	  the	  
primary	  source	  of	  news	  for	  Americans.	  But	  the	  agreement	  did	  influence	  the	  
character	  of	  radio	  broadcasts.	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   Radio	  news	  exploded	  in	  popularity	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  with	  live	  
transmissions	  from	  Europe	  giving	  Americans	  immediate	  updates	  as	  events	  
unfolded.102	  In	  1937	  CBS	  sent	  Edward	  R.	  Murrow	  to	  head	  the	  network’s	  European	  
operations.	  Murrow,	  at	  first,	  was	  supposed	  to	  simply	  arrange	  for	  European	  notables	  
and	  performers	  to	  agree	  to	  appear	  on	  CBS	  broadcasts.	  On	  March	  12,	  1938	  though,	  
less	  than	  a	  year	  after	  Murrow’s	  arrival	  in	  London,	  the	  Germans	  marched	  on	  Vienna	  –	  
Hitler	  had	  annexed	  Austria	  and	  war	  was	  looming.	  The	  next	  day	  CBS	  broadcast	  its	  
first	  World	  News	  Roundup,	  with	  dispatches	  from	  key	  European	  cities	  transmitted	  to	  
the	  US	  via	  shortwave	  radio.103	  
During	  the	  crisis	  over	  Germany’s	  annexation	  of	  Czechoslovakia	  in	  September	  
radio	  networks	  provided	  frequent	  flash	  reports,	  cutting	  into	  scheduled	  broadcasts.	  
The	  following	  month	  a	  poll	  showed	  that	  three	  out	  of	  four	  Americans	  were	  more	  
interested	  in	  radio	  news	  than	  in	  newspaper	  reports	  (Starr	  2005,	  378).	  	  
During	  the	  war	  Murrow	  became	  known	  for	  cool-­‐headed	  feats	  of	  bravery.104	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  By	  1940	  81	  percent	  of	  American	  households	  had	  radios,	  and	  new	  cars	  started	  appearing	  
equipped	  with	  radios,	  extending	  the	  reach	  of	  radio	  news	  and	  the	  public	  sphere	  that	  it	  
dominated	  (Starr	  2005,	  379).	  
	  
103	  The	  program	  was	  originally	  intended	  as	  a	  one-­‐time	  special	  broadcast;	  it	  has	  since	  
become	  the	  longest-­‐running	  news	  broadcast	  in	  history	  (A.	  Cohen	  2013).	  
	  
104	  During	  the	  Blitz,	  Germany’s	  sustained	  bombings	  of	  London	  from	  September	  1940	  to	  May	  
1941,	  Murrow	  broadcast	  from	  rooftops	  to	  let	  Americans	  hear	  the	  sounds	  of	  London	  at	  war.	  
The	  following	  is	  from	  Murrow’s	  broadcast	  on	  the	  night	  of	  September	  21,	  1940.	  
I’m	  standing	  on	  a	  rooftop	  looking	  out	  over	  London.	  At	  the	  moment	  everything	  is	  
quiet.	  For	  reasons	  of	  national	  as	  well	  as	  personal	  security,	  I’m	  unable	  to	  tell	  you	  the	  
exact	  location	  from	  which	  I’m	  speaking.	  Off	  to	  my	  left,	  far	  away	  in	  the	  distance	  I	  can	  
just	  see	  that	  faint	  angry	  red	  snap	  of	  anti-­‐aircraft	  bursts	  against	  the	  steel-­‐blue	  sky…	  
The	  lights	  are	  swinging	  over	  in	  this	  general	  direction	  now.	  You’ll	  hear	  two	  
explosions.	  There	  they	  are!	  (Cull	  1996,	  103)	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At	  a	  CBS	  banquet	  in	  New	  York	  in	  November	  1941	  the	  American	  poet	  Archibald	  
MacLeish	  eloquently	  praised	  Murrow’s	  efforts:	  
You	  made	  real	  and	  urgent	  and	  present	  to	  the	  men	  and	  women	  of	  those	  comfortable	  
[American]	  rooms,	  those	  safe	  enclosures,	  what	  the	  men	  and	  women	  had	  not	  known	  
was	  present	  there	  or	  real.	  You	  burned	  the	  city	  of	  London	  in	  our	  houses	  and	  we	  felt	  
the	  flames	  that	  burned	  it.	  You	  laid	  the	  dead	  of	  London	  at	  our	  doors	  and	  we	  knew	  the	  
dead	  were	  our	  dead	  –	  were	  all	  men’s	  dead	  –	  were	  mankind’s	  dead	  and	  ours.	  (Cull	  
1996,	  109)	  
Network	  news	  did	  more	  than	  inform.	  It	  brought	  strong	  emotional	  resonance	  to	  the	  
representations	  of	  war	  appearing	  in	  an	  increasingly	  coherent	  American	  public	  
sphere.	  	  
	  
IV.	  The	  Movies	  
The	  other	  important	  medium	  to	  emerge	  out	  of	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  was	  
cinema.	  Motion	  pictures	  started	  as	  a	  novelty	  amusement	  among	  the	  urban	  working	  
class	  but	  quickly	  developed	  into	  a	  national	  phenomenon.	  Like	  radio	  though,	  after	  an	  
early	  phase	  of	  intense	  competition	  and	  diverse	  offerings	  the	  industry	  would	  become	  
consolidated	  among	  a	  small	  number	  of	  powerful	  leaders	  aggregating	  the	  American	  
masses	  around	  their	  limited	  variety	  of	  offerings.105	  
In	  the	  United	  States	  the	  invention	  of	  motion	  pictures	  is	  closely	  associated	  
with	  Thomas	  Edison,	  who	  was	  the	  first	  to	  develop	  a	  commercially	  viable	  way	  of	  
presenting	  motion	  pictures.	  Edison’s	  set-­‐up	  consisted	  of	  a	  motion	  picture	  camera	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105	  Unlike	  print	  media,	  in	  an	  influential	  early	  ruling	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  declared	  that	  movies	  
were	  not	  protected	  under	  the	  first	  amendment.	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and	  a	  peephole	  viewing	  device	  called	  a	  “kinetoscope.”	  In	  1891	  Edison	  filed	  broad	  
patent	  claims	  on	  these	  devices,	  and	  they	  enjoyed	  a	  brief	  period	  of	  popularity.	  
Kinetoscopes	  were	  installed	  in	  “penny	  arcades”	  where	  audiences	  would	  look	  into	  
the	  device	  and	  see	  short	  films	  no	  longer	  than	  90	  seconds.	  Audiences	  delighted	  in	  the	  
illusion	  of	  motion,	  but	  the	  novelty	  of	  the	  device	  soon	  wore	  off	  giving	  way	  to	  another	  
form	  of	  exhibition	  –	  projection	  (Starr	  2005,	  300).	  
Projected	  movies	  were	  particularly	  successful	  because	  they	  were	  well	  suited	  
to	  the	  high-­‐volume,	  low	  price	  logic	  of	  working-­‐class	  entertainment	  –	  multiple	  people	  
could	  watch	  a	  projected	  movie	  at	  the	  same	  time.106	  The	  potential	  for	  large	  audiences	  
changed	  the	  logic	  of	  exhibition	  and	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  projector	  motion	  pictures	  
moved	  from	  store-­‐front	  penny	  arcades	  into	  vaudeville	  theaters.107	  
As	  their	  popularity	  rose	  motion	  pictures	  moved	  out	  of	  vaudeville	  halls	  and	  
into	  a	  new	  venue,	  the	  Nickelodeon,	  a	  cheap	  storefront	  space	  where	  admission	  cost	  a	  
nickel.	  By	  the	  beginning	  of	  1907	  there	  were	  2,500	  nickelodeons	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  
and	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  there	  were	  between	  4,000	  and	  5,000	  (Starr	  2005,	  303).	  
These	  theaters	  were	  often	  located	  in	  working	  class	  neighborhoods	  and	  the	  emerging	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  The	  projector	  had	  been	  developed	  in	  1895	  by	  French	  siblings	  Auguste	  and	  Louis	  
Lumière.	  In	  the	  United	  States	  Edison	  manufactured	  a	  projector,	  called	  “Edison’s	  Vitascope,”	  
and	  it	  was	  first	  demonstrated	  in	  April	  1896.	  
	  
107	  These	  early	  movies	  were	  typically	  a	  series	  of	  short	  segments	  ranging	  from	  filmed	  theater	  
scenes	  and	  vaudeville	  performances	  to	  “actualities,”	  scenes	  from	  everyday	  life.	  In	  most	  US	  
states	  prize	  fighting	  was	  illegal,	  but	  motion	  pictures	  of	  fights	  became	  a	  major	  attraction	  
(Starr	  2005,	  301).	  Around	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  filmmakers	  began	  to	  experiment	  with	  new	  
forms,	  first	  comedies	  and	  then	  around	  1903	  films	  that	  told	  more	  complicated	  stories.	  These	  
“story	  films”	  were	  a	  huge	  success	  with	  audiences.	  Edwin	  S.	  Porter’s	  The	  Great	  Train	  Robbery	  
(1903),	  for	  instance,	  thrilled	  audiences	  with	  a	  violent	  gang	  of	  bandits	  and	  the	  heroic	  posse	  
that	  stops	  them.	  By	  1904-­‐1905	  staged	  films	  sold	  three	  and	  a	  half	  times	  better	  than	  topical	  
films	  (Starr	  2005,	  302).	  By	  1907	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  copyrighted	  films	  were	  comedies	  or	  dramas;	  
by	  the	  following	  year	  that	  number	  had	  risen	  to	  90	  percent	  (Starr	  2005,	  305).	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medium	  had	  a	  distinctly	  working-­‐class	  orientation.108	  A	  1910	  survey	  of	  audiences	  
found	  that	  although	  people	  from	  a	  working-­‐class	  background	  made	  up	  only	  2	  
percent	  of	  attendees	  for	  live	  theater,	  they	  accounted	  for	  72	  percent	  of	  moviegoers	  
(Starr	  2005,	  304).	  These	  early	  silent	  films	  also	  had	  special	  appeal	  for	  the	  immigrants	  
that	  made	  up	  much	  of	  the	  laboring	  population	  of	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  American	  cities	  
because	  they	  could	  understand	  the	  action	  without	  knowing	  English.	  Nickelodeons	  
themselves	  were	  clustered	  in	  ethnic	  neighborhoods.	  In	  New	  York,	  for	  instance,	  they	  
were	  clustered	  in	  neighborhoods	  such	  as	  New	  York’s	  Lower	  East	  Side	  (Starr	  2005,	  
304).	  
The	  fact	  that	  nickelodeons	  found	  large	  audiences	  among	  immigrants	  played	  
an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  long-­‐term	  development	  of	  the	  film	  industry.	  Production	  and	  
ownership	  of	  motion	  pictures	  would	  be	  dominated	  by	  outsiders	  to	  the	  American	  
mainstream,	  and	  this	  led	  to	  regulatory	  and	  civic	  responses	  far	  more	  restrictive	  than	  
those	  that	  had	  been	  applied	  to	  print.	  Before	  they	  rose	  to	  dominate	  the	  film	  industry	  
on	  a	  national	  scale	  many	  immigrant	  entrepreneurs	  started	  as	  nickelodeon	  owners.	  
In	  1908	  and	  1909,	  60	  percent	  of	  the	  nickelodeon	  owners	  in	  New	  York	  were	  Jewish,	  
and	  another	  18	  percent	  were	  Italian	  (Singer	  1995,	  26).	  In	  1908	  the	  future	  heads	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	  Audiences	  watched	  and	  reacted	  to	  films	  in	  full	  view	  of	  everyone	  else.	  “Audiences	  
shouted,	  cheered,	  and	  stamped	  their	  feet.	  The	  films	  may	  have	  been	  silent,	  but	  the	  theaters	  
shook”	  (Starr	  2005,	  303).	  This	  awareness	  of	  a	  broad	  public	  of	  co-­‐consumers	  is	  a	  
fundamental	  aspect	  of	  Anderson’s	  model	  of	  imagined	  communities,	  and	  movies,	  like	  no	  
other	  medium	  (with	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  television),	  were	  constitutive	  of	  the	  public	  
American	  imaginary.	  If	  Benedict	  Anderson’s	  newspaper	  readers	  could	  imagine	  themselves	  
as	  part	  of	  a	  community,	  movie-­‐goers	  at	  the	  nickelodeon	  could	  do	  so	  even	  more	  easily	  –	  they	  
literally	  shared	  the	  viewing	  experience	  with	  a	  roomful	  of	  people.	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the	  major	  movie	  studios,	  Fox,	  Paramount,	  and	  MGM,	  all	  owned	  nickelodeons	  in	  New	  
York.109	  
	  
The	  exploding	  popularity	  of	  nickelodeons	  created	  an	  overwhelming	  demand	  
for	  new	  films	  –	  a	  demand	  that	  the	  nascent	  American	  film	  production	  industry	  could	  
not	  meet,	  and	  in	  1907	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  films	  released	  in	  the	  United	  States	  were	  
European	  imports	  (Star	  2005,	  305).	  Early	  in	  the	  life	  of	  the	  industry	  the	  principal	  
producers	  of	  motion	  picture	  equipment	  had	  been	  mired	  in	  patent	  litigation	  against	  
one	  another	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  standardization	  had	  limited	  both	  production	  and	  
distribution	  (Musser	  1994,	  303,	  336;	  Starr	  2005,	  307).	  A	  series	  of	  court	  decisions	  
had	  been	  made	  in	  favor	  of	  Edison	  and	  Biograph,	  the	  two	  industry	  leaders,	  which	  
eventually	  joined	  forces,	  forming	  the	  Motion	  Picture	  Patents	  Company,	  pooling	  their	  
patents	  and	  licensing	  those	  of	  eight	  other	  firms.	  The	  operation	  became	  known	  as	  the	  
Edison	  trust	  (it	  was	  largely	  under	  his	  control)	  and	  sought	  to	  control	  competition	  and	  
raise	  profits.	  The	  Edison	  trust	  set	  uniform	  prices	  for	  distributors,	  forbade	  exhibitors	  
from	  showing	  films	  from	  unlicensed	  firms,	  and	  made	  an	  exclusive	  deal	  for	  
purchasing	  raw	  film	  stock	  from	  Eastman	  Kodak.	  The	  trust	  also	  offered	  to	  cooperate	  
with	  the	  National	  Board	  of	  Censorship	  (NBC),	  a	  new	  association	  of	  moral	  reformers,	  
which	  became	  more	  effective	  thanks	  to	  the	  more	  centralized	  coordination	  that	  the	  
Edison	  trust	  offered	  (Starr	  2005,	  307–8).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Like	  print	  in	  the	  early	  1800s	  the	  barriers	  to	  entry	  in	  the	  movie-­‐exhibition	  business	  were	  
low	  –	  opening	  a	  theater	  cost	  as	  little	  as	  $400	  and	  since	  the	  medium	  was	  new	  it	  had	  not	  yet	  
become	  dominated	  by	  native-­‐born	  elites	  (Starr	  2005,	  304).	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This	  early	  step	  towards	  aggregation	  was	  not	  as	  decisive	  as	  the	  formation	  of	  
the	  AP	  had	  been	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  telegraph	  news.	  Not	  all	  film	  exhibitors	  and	  
distributors	  were	  included	  in	  the	  Edison	  trust	  and	  those	  that	  were	  excluded	  or	  
refused	  to	  join	  became	  known	  as	  “independents”	  –	  they	  were	  largely	  small-­‐time	  
Jewish-­‐owned	  operations.	  By	  1912	  hostility	  towards	  foreign	  films	  and	  growing	  
domestic	  production	  capacities	  had	  reduced	  foreign	  imports	  to	  less	  than	  20	  percent	  
of	  all	  movies	  shown	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (Bowser	  1994,	  2:85).	  But	  while	  the	  Edison	  
trust	  was	  showing	  conservative	  domestic	  productions	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  National	  
Board	  of	  Censorship,	  the	  independents	  circumvented	  these	  rules,	  importing	  foreign	  
productions	  that	  the	  trust	  had	  excluded	  and	  producing	  films	  of	  their	  own.	  By	  mid-­‐
1910	  the	  largest	  distributor	  of	  independents	  was	  serving	  4,000	  of	  the	  country’s	  
roughly	  10,000	  theaters	  (Starr	  2005,	  308;	  Staiger	  1984,	  51).	  In	  1912,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  
undermine	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  independents	  to	  distribute	  their	  films,	  the	  Edison	  trust	  
created	  a	  distribution	  company,	  General	  Film,	  which	  virtually	  monopolized	  
distribution	  of	  film	  from	  licensed	  sources	  (Bowser	  1994,	  2:81).	  This	  strategy	  
backfired.	  That	  same	  year	  the	  federal	  government	  charged	  both	  the	  Motion	  Picture	  
Patents	  Company	  and	  General	  Film	  with	  anti-­‐trust	  violations	  and	  the	  Edison	  trust	  
lost	  a	  key	  patent	  litigation	  case	  which	  enabled	  independents	  to	  openly	  use	  standard	  
movie	  cameras.	  Even	  with	  the	  trust’s	  anti-­‐competitive	  policies	  independent	  films	  
had	  accounted	  for	  more	  than	  half	  of	  domestic	  production	  by	  1912	  (Bowser	  1994,	  
2:85).	  
The	  Motion	  Picture	  Patents	  Company	  and	  General	  Film	  were	  found	  guilty	  of	  
antitrust	  violations	  in	  October	  of	  1915	  and	  were	  ordered	  to	  dissolve,	  but	  by	  then	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independents	  had	  already	  surpassed	  the	  former	  Edison	  trust.	  Starr	  argues	  that	  the	  
success	  of	  Jewish	  independents	  was	  not	  solely	  the	  product	  of	  their	  early	  start	  –	  the	  
Edison	  trust	  companies	  had	  an	  even	  earlier	  start.	  Rather	  the	  regulations	  that	  the	  
Motion	  Picture	  Patents	  Company	  had	  imposed	  on	  the	  Edison	  trust	  companies	  led	  to	  
a	  disparity	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  licensed	  and	  independent	  films.110	  Additionally,	  because	  
trust	  companies	  were	  forced	  to	  sell	  films	  at	  a	  uniform	  price	  they	  had	  no	  incentive	  to	  
invest	  in	  more	  elaborate	  productions.	  Initially	  the	  Edison	  trust	  had	  even	  limited	  its	  
members	  to	  short,	  one-­‐	  or	  two-­‐reel	  films.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  independents	  were	  more	  
aggressive,	  making	  larger	  high-­‐risk	  investments	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  drawing	  larger	  
audiences	  (Starr	  2005,	  310).111	  Not	  one	  of	  the	  firms	  in	  Edison’s	  trust	  survived	  to	  
become	  part	  of	  the	  modern	  movie	  industry	  and	  the	  Hollywood	  studios	  that	  
dominated	  American	  filmmaking	  from	  the	  1920s	  and	  1930s	  to	  the	  present	  –	  
Universal,	  Paramount,	  MGM,	  Warner	  Brothers	  –	  all	  emerged	  from	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  
independents.	  
	  
By	  the	  mid-­‐1910s	  the	  nickelodeon	  era	  was	  coming	  to	  an	  end	  and	  middle-­‐
class	  audiences	  began	  going	  to	  the	  movies.	  Anticipating	  this	  shift	  the	  independents	  
had	  built	  more	  luxurious	  theaters	  and	  campaigned	  to	  improve	  older	  theaters.	  This	  
represented	  both	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  movies	  and	  the	  public,	  and	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  Particularly	  important	  in	  this	  regard	  was	  the	  Edison	  Trust’s	  collaboration	  with	  National	  
Board	  of	  Censorship,	  an	  organization	  of	  religious	  leaders	  and	  social	  reformers	  dedicated	  to	  
censoring	  what	  appeared	  in	  motion	  pictures.	  
	  
111	  It	  was	  this	  long-­‐term	  vision	  that	  distinguished	  the	  independents.	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  fall	  of	  
the	  Edison	  trust	  Adolf	  Zukor	  had	  said,	  “what	  they	  were	  making	  belonged	  entirely	  to	  
technicians.	  What	  I	  was	  talking	  about	  –	  that	  was	  show	  business”	  (Gabler	  2010,	  31).	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strategic	  shift	  among	  nickelodeon	  owners	  who	  aimed	  to	  both	  appeal	  to	  a	  new	  class	  
of	  audience	  and	  to	  quiet	  calls	  for	  censorship	  by	  progressive	  reformers.112	  The	  
independents	  had	  also	  invested	  in	  longer	  multi-­‐reel	  feature	  films	  starring	  well	  
known	  European	  actors,	  which	  attracted	  more	  discerning	  audiences.113	  Stars	  both	  
provided	  an	  audience	  draw	  and	  helped	  maintain	  a	  sense	  of	  continuity	  in	  the	  new	  
longer	  and	  more	  complex	  narratives	  (Kerr	  1990).114	  These	  more	  elaborate	  
independent	  productions	  appealed	  to	  the	  higher-­‐income	  audiences	  who	  attended	  
the	  new	  upscale	  theaters	  –	  theaters	  that	  were	  owned	  by	  the	  Jewish-­‐run	  
independents,	  formerly	  the	  underdogs	  to	  Edison’s	  now-­‐defunct	  trust.	  
	   By	  the	  time	  the	  United	  States	  entered	  World	  War	  I	  the	  movies	  were	  
attracting	  10	  to	  13	  million	  people	  daily	  (Starr	  2005,	  315).	  The	  American	  obsession	  
with	  movies	  brought	  with	  it	  an	  expansion	  in	  production	  capacity	  and	  by	  the	  end	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  Those	  calls	  for	  reform	  were	  in	  part	  a	  response	  to	  the	  legitimate	  shortcomings	  of	  many	  
nickelodeons.	  In	  March	  1911,	  the	  trade	  journal	  Moving	  Picture	  World	  published	  a	  report	  on	  
New	  York	  City’s	  Lower	  East	  Side	  theaters,	  acknowledging	  the	  criticisms	  of	  reform	  
“societies”	  and	  progressive	  newspapers:	  
The	  sanitary	  condition	  of	  the	  average	  five-­‐cent	  theater	  certainly	  could	  be	  vastly	  
improved…	  Some	  of	  these	  places	  are	  perfectly	  filthy,	  with	  an	  air	  so	  foul	  and	  thick	  
that	  you	  can	  almost	  cut	  it	  with	  a	  knife.	  The	  floor	  is	  generally	  covered	  with	  peanut	  
shells,	  and	  as	  there	  is	  no	  stove	  to	  spit	  on	  everybody	  spits	  on	  the	  floor...	  No	  wonder	  
the	  societies	  and	  health	  authorities	  try	  to	  bar	  children	  from	  the	  moving	  picture	  
shows!	  (“The	  Sanitary	  Theater”	  1911)	  
New	  theaters	  were	  designed	  as	  places	  where	  the	  middle-­‐classes	  could	  feel	  comfortable.	  
Marble,	  beveled	  glass,	  polished	  oak	  and	  walnut,	  dazzling	  electric	  lights,	  lavish	  
carpeting,	  and	  huge	  mirrors	  began	  to	  appear	  in	  newly	  redecorated	  theaters.	  
Restrooms	  became	  a	  necessity	  rather	  than	  a	  luxury	  with	  longer	  programs,	  and	  these	  
were	  finer	  facilities	  than	  many	  customers	  had	  at	  home	  (Bowser	  1994,	  2:127).	  
	  
113	  For	  instance	  the	  first	  film	  released	  by	  Adolf	  Zukor’s	  Famous	  Players,	  which	  later	  became	  
Paramount,	  was	  the	  French	  production	  Les	  Amours	  de	  la	  Reine	  Elisabeth	  (1912;	  The	  Loves	  of	  
Queen	  Elizabeth),	  starring	  Sarah	  Bernhardt,	  the	  most	  famous	  actress	  of	  her	  time	  (Musser	  
2013,	  163).	  
	  
114	  Leading	  stars	  began	  commanding	  previously	  unheard	  of	  salaries	  –	  in	  1916	  Mary	  
Pickford	  was	  being	  paid	  $10,000	  a	  week	  by	  Famous	  Players-­‐Paramount.	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the	  War	  the	  United	  States	  produced	  roughly	  80	  percent	  of	  motion	  pictures	  
worldwide.	  This	  was	  also	  a	  period	  of	  consolidation	  in	  the	  film	  industry.	  In	  1912	  
there	  were	  around	  60	  production	  companies	  turning	  out	  about	  2,000	  movies	  a	  year.	  
By	  1920	  there	  were	  fewer	  firms	  producing	  around	  800	  movies	  annually.	  This	  
transformation	  reflected	  a	  shift	  in	  audience	  tastes	  and	  production	  strategies.	  
Whereas	  in	  1912	  the	  average	  cost	  of	  production	  ranged	  between	  $1,000	  and	  
$10,000,	  two	  years	  later	  films	  were	  longer	  and	  more	  elaborate	  costing	  $10,000	  to	  
$30,000	  each.	  Production	  values	  continued	  to	  rise	  and	  by	  1920	  films	  were	  costing	  
$40,000	  to	  $80,000.	  Mounting	  such	  expensive	  productions	  was	  not	  feasible	  for	  
smaller	  producers	  –	  but	  those	  producers	  that	  could	  afford	  them	  were	  well	  rewarded	  
(Balio	  1985,	  117).115	  
During	  these	  years	  the	  center	  of	  film	  production	  shifted	  from	  New	  York	  and	  
Chicago	  to	  southern	  California.	  Good	  weather	  and	  an	  anti-­‐union	  municipal	  
government	  made	  Los	  Angeles	  an	  ideal	  choice,	  but	  there	  were	  other	  reasons	  for	  this	  
move	  as	  well.	  Despite	  the	  popularity	  of	  movies	  and	  the	  size	  of	  the	  film	  industry	  
many	  Americans	  were	  still	  wary	  of	  the	  industry’s	  ethnic	  roots.	  Moving	  their	  industry	  
West	  allowed	  the	  increasingly	  prosperous	  Jewish	  filmmakers	  to	  escape	  the	  
xenophobic	  Anglo-­‐Protestant	  elites	  that	  dominated	  the	  East	  Coast.116	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  In	  1914	  W.W.	  Hodkinson	  combined	  eleven	  regional	  distributors	  to	  form	  Paramount	  
Pictures	  Corporation,	  which	  would	  help	  producers	  finance	  films	  by	  guaranteeing	  rentals	  of	  
their	  films.	  Paramount’s	  revenues	  from	  distribution	  reached	  unprecedented	  amounts	  of	  
$100,000	  to	  $125,000	  per	  film	  (Balio	  1985,	  117).	  
	  
116	  The	  importance	  of	  ethnic	  identity	  and	  the	  struggles	  associated	  with	  assimilation	  should	  
not	  be	  underestimated	  here	  –	  the	  Jewish	  aspiration	  to	  become	  assimilated	  Americans	  
defined	  the	  film	  industry	  and,	  in	  turn,	  the	  country	  itself.	  Gabler	  has	  articulated	  this	  double-­‐
movement	  nicely	  (c.f.	  Gabler	  2010,	  7).	  MacDonald,	  in	  his	  critique	  of	  Masscult,	  also	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   Agglomeration	  continued	  through	  the	  1920s	  as	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  “studio	  
system”	  began	  to	  take	  shape.	  One	  of	  its	  leading	  innovators	  was	  Adolf	  Zuker,	  who,	  in	  
an	  elaborate	  takeover,	  seized	  control	  of	  Paramount	  and	  merged	  the	  distributor	  with	  
his	  Famous	  Players	  and	  Lasky’s	  studio.	  Zukor	  then	  bought	  up	  theaters	  across	  the	  
country,	  guaranteeing	  audiences	  for	  Paramount	  pictures.	  By	  1917	  Zukor	  sat	  on	  top	  
of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  motion	  picture	  company.	  The	  following	  year	  Paramount	  
distributed	  220	  features,	  more	  than	  any	  company,	  before	  or	  since	  (Balio	  1985,	  117–
119).	  Other	  entrepreneurs	  took	  the	  same	  approach:	  in	  1915	  Carl	  Laemmle	  opened	  
Universal	  City	  Studios	  on	  a	  230-­‐acre	  farm	  adjacent	  to	  Hollywood,	  creating	  the	  
world’s	  largest	  motion-­‐picture	  production	  facility;	  in	  1918	  Harry,	  Albert,	  Sam,	  and	  
Jack	  Warner	  opened	  the	  Warner	  Bros.	  studio	  on	  Sunset	  Boulevard	  in	  Hollywood;	  
and	  in	  1924	  theater	  owner	  Marcus	  Lowe	  combined	  Metro	  Pictures,	  Goldwyn	  
Pictures	  and	  Louis	  B.	  Mayer	  Productions	  to	  create	  Metro-­‐Goldwyn-­‐Mayer,	  based	  in	  
Culver	  City.	  As	  the	  industry	  grew	  and	  movie	  palaces	  were	  built	  around	  the	  country	  
attendance	  soared.	  By	  1927	  weekly	  attendance	  reached	  100	  million	  (Starr	  2005,	  
319).	  
	   By	  the	  mid-­‐1920s	  the	  film	  industry	  was	  dominated	  by	  a	  few	  vertically	  
integrated	  giants,	  making	  it	  difficult	  for	  smaller	  companies	  to	  compete.117	  During	  the	  
second	  half	  of	  the	  1920s	  the	  introduction	  of	  “talkies”	  further	  raised	  production	  costs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  assimilationist	  impulse	  among	  the	  country’s	  eager	  
population	  of	  immigrants	  in	  promoting	  the	  spread	  of	  kitsch	  –	  which	  represented	  a	  least	  
common	  denominator	  of	  American	  culture.	  These	  immigrants	  “were	  ready-­‐made	  
consumers	  of	  Kitsch”	  (Macdonald	  1983,	  35).	  
	  
117	  The	  studios’	  practice	  of	  “block	  booking,”	  for	  instance,	  meant	  that	  theater	  owners	  had	  to	  
screen	  a	  studio’s	  lower-­‐quality	  movies	  as	  well	  as	  the	  higher-­‐production-­‐value	  hits	  with	  big-­‐
name	  stars	  (Balio	  1985,	  117).	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raising	  the	  financial	  barriers	  to	  entry	  for	  smaller	  companies.	  By	  1930	  the	  industry	  
was	  dominated	  by	  eight	  firms:	  Paramount,	  Fox,	  Warner	  Brothers,	  RKO,	  
Lowes/MGM,	  Universal,	  Columbia,	  and	  United	  Artists	  (Starr	  2005,	  320).	  The	  
industry	  would	  continue	  to	  evolve	  in	  the	  1930s,	  but	  the	  vertically	  integrated	  
structure	  of	  the	  industry	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  1920s	  would	  survive	  through	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Motion	  pictures	  had	  become	  a	  quintessential	  mass	  media	  
institution,	  aggregating	  mass	  audiences	  around	  the	  productions	  of	  a	  small	  number	  
of	  firms.	  
	  
The	  concentrated	  power	  structure	  of	  the	  industry	  had	  important	  
ramifications	  for	  what	  the	  American	  public	  saw.	  In	  the	  industry’s	  early	  years,	  the	  
1910s	  and	  early	  1920s,	  production,	  distribution,	  and	  exhibition	  were	  so	  fragmented	  
that	  effectively	  enacting	  censorship	  on	  a	  national	  scale	  was	  difficult,	  if	  not	  
impossible.	  As	  a	  result,	  many	  of	  the	  movies	  released	  during	  these	  early	  years	  were	  
socially	  relevant	  and	  offered	  a	  new	  degree	  of	  publicity	  for	  voices	  and	  ideologies	  that	  
would	  later	  be	  excluded.	  Films	  attacked	  corrupt	  businessmen	  and	  brought	  to	  the	  
screen	  fictionalized	  versions	  of	  stories	  drawn	  from	  newspapers.	  In	  1914,	  for	  
instance,	  The	  Jungle,	  Upton	  Sinclair’s	  exposé	  of	  the	  brutal	  meatpacking	  industry	  and	  
its	  immigrant	  laborers,	  was	  made	  into	  a	  movie	  (Starr	  2005,	  313).	  Unlike	  radio	  and	  
the	  press	  motion	  pictures	  were	  not	  advertiser-­‐supported,	  which	  gave	  filmmakers	  
and	  exhibitors	  the	  freedom	  to	  appeal	  directly	  to	  their	  largely	  working-­‐class	  
audiences.	  As	  a	  result	  many	  films	  from	  this	  era	  had	  a	  liberal	  slant,	  particularly	  those	  
films	  that	  Steven	  J.	  Ross	  calls	  “labor-­‐capital”	  films,	  which	  depicted	  conflicts	  between	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workers,	  business	  owners,	  and	  other	  authority	  figures	  (Ross	  1999,	  57).118	  When	  the	  
studio	  system	  was	  established	  in	  the	  mid-­‐	  and	  late-­‐	  1920s	  this	  began	  to	  change.	  
The	  lack	  of	  first	  amendment	  protections	  had	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  censorship	  of	  
motion	  pictures,	  but	  such	  censorship	  had	  not	  been	  feasible	  when	  the	  industry	  was	  
fragmented	  among	  a	  large	  number	  of	  exhibitors	  and	  producers.	  By	  the	  1920s	  
though	  the	  industry	  had	  become	  concentrated	  and	  was	  dominated	  by	  an	  oligopoly	  
of	  Jewish	  studio	  heads.119	  This	  made	  the	  industry	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  efforts	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  The	  appearance	  of	  these	  movies	  represented	  a	  new	  mode	  of	  access	  to	  the	  public	  sphere	  
for	  working-­‐class	  ideologies,	  but	  it	  also	  changed	  the	  way	  that	  audiences	  perceived	  their	  own	  
position	  in	  society.	  C.f.	  Ross:	  “Certainly	  no	  one	  movie	  was	  likely	  to	  alter	  a	  viewer’s	  vision	  of	  
the	  world.	  But	  seeing	  the	  same	  images	  and	  political	  messages	  over	  and	  over	  again	  in	  
hundreds	  of	  films	  dealing	  with	  similar	  problems	  could	  change	  the	  ways	  people	  understood	  
daily	  events.”	  (Ross	  1999,	  58).	  A	  1923	  article	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  similarly	  noted	  the	  
power	  of	  this	  effect.	  “It	  is	  not	  for	  nothing	  that	  in	  the	  first	  run	  theaters	  of	  the	  country	  a	  
million	  people	  may	  be	  gazing	  at	  the	  same	  scenes	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  What	  they	  see	  is	  party	  a	  
reflection	  of	  what	  they	  are.	  What	  they	  are	  is	  no	  less	  influenced	  by	  what	  they	  see”	  (Dickinson	  
1923,	  10).	  Because	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  early	  film	  industry	  working-­‐class	  ideologies	  found	  
a	  place	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  –	  and	  through	  their	  publicity	  they	  shaped	  the	  public	  sphere,	  and	  
its	  occupants.	  This	  understanding	  of	  the	  link	  between	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  motion	  picture	  
industry	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  subverts	  the	  claims	  of	  Frankfurt	  School	  
theorists	  and	  neo-­‐Marxian	  film	  scholars	  who	  saw	  movies	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  imposing	  a	  
single	  capitalist	  ideology	  on	  the	  public	  (Adorno	  and	  Levin	  1981;	  Adorno	  and	  Rabinbach	  
1975;	  Horkheimer	  and	  Adorno	  2002;	  Hansen	  2009).	  Certainly	  capitalist	  ideologies	  had,	  as	  
usual,	  a	  strong	  place	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  But	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  not	  monolithic	  –	  it	  reflects	  
the	  structural	  links	  between	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  media	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  publicity.	  
And	  just	  as	  the	  media	  has	  a	  complex	  structure,	  in	  which	  certain	  areas	  are	  more	  accessible	  to	  
certain	  groups,	  the	  public	  sphere	  itself	  also	  has	  a	  complex	  structure.	  Ignoring	  the	  structural	  
links	  between	  media	  and	  publicity	  flattens	  the	  public	  sphere	  into	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  single	  
dominant	  ideology.	  This	  flattening	  is	  characteristic	  of	  Frankfurt	  School	  thought	  and,	  in	  my	  
understanding,	  is	  largely	  responsible	  for	  that	  school’s	  characteristic	  pessimism	  and	  dead-­‐
ends	  –	  when	  society	  is	  a	  monolith	  there	  is	  no	  room	  for	  generative	  conflict	  and	  progressive	  
change.	  
	  
119	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  heads	  of	  the	  major	  movie	  studios	  were	  all	  Jewish	  was	  an	  important	  
factor	  in	  making	  censorship	  possible.	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  1993	  a	  Los	  Angeles	  Bishop	  sent	  A.H.	  
Giannini,	  the	  president	  of	  Bank	  of	  America,	  to	  deliver	  a	  thinly-­‐veiled	  threat	  to	  the	  studio	  
heads.	  Hitler	  had	  seized	  power	  in	  Germany	  six	  months	  earlier	  and	  Giannini	  warned	  that	  
“dirty	  motion	  pictures”	  were	  “building	  up	  an	  enormous	  case	  against	  the	  Jews	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  
the	  American	  people,”	  and	  that	  American	  Nazi	  sympathizers	  were	  “even	  now	  organizing	  
further	  to	  attack	  the	  Jew	  in	  America”	  (Starr	  2005,	  323;	  Black	  1996,	  159).	  Jewish	  film-­‐
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censors	  and	  moral	  reformers	  who	  had	  only	  to	  target	  a	  small	  number	  of	  powerful	  
immigrant	  studio	  heads	  eager	  to	  assimilate	  and	  to	  find	  acceptance	  as	  Americans.	  By	  
the	  1930s	  these	  industry	  leaders	  had	  been	  pressured	  to	  accept	  a	  strict	  moral	  
censorship	  regime	  that	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Motion	  Picture	  Production	  Code	  and	  
which	  governed	  the	  industry	  until	  the	  1960s.120,121	   	  
	  
V.	  Television	  
In	  the	  post-­‐war	  1940s	  the	  radio	  industry	  was	  a	  powerful	  force,	  flush	  with	  cash	  and	  
eager	  for	  further	  growth.	  Meanwhile	  war-­‐time	  electronic	  assembly	  lines	  were	  idle,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
industry	  entrepreneurs	  had	  longed	  to	  be	  accepted	  and	  assimilated	  into	  American	  society,	  
but	  despite	  their	  efforts	  they	  were	  once	  again	  under	  attack.	  In	  a	  history	  of	  Hollywood	  
censorship	  Gregory	  Black	  writes	  that	  after	  Giannini’s	  presentation	  Adolf	  Zukor	  “leapt	  to	  his	  
feet,	  gave	  an	  emotional	  apology	  for	  the	  ‘dirt	  and	  filth’	  that	  had	  invaded	  Paramount,	  and	  
promised	  to	  do	  all	  in	  his	  power	  to	  clean	  up	  his	  films”	  (Black	  1996,	  159–160).	  Other	  studio	  
heads	  followed	  suit.	  The	  only	  one	  to	  dissent	  was	  United	  Artists’s	  Joe	  Schenck,	  who	  accused	  
the	  other	  studio-­‐heads	  of	  being	  “cowards	  for	  submitting	  to	  the	  anti-­‐Semitic	  tirade”	  (Black	  
1996,	  160).	  Schenck	  argued	  that	  movies	  were	  not	  “immoral”	  for	  portraying	  important	  
issues	  and	  defended	  the	  release	  of	  films	  like	  A	  Farewell	  to	  Arms,	  which,	  he	  said,	  satisfied	  
Americans’	  desire	  for	  serious	  films	  (Black	  1996,	  160).	  Schenck’s	  was	  the	  minority	  opinion.	  
	  
120	  The	  code	  explicitly	  forbade	  depicting	  such	  things	  as	  theft,	  safe-­‐cracking,	  arson,	  
“excessive	  or	  lustful	  kissing,”	  sexual	  relationships	  between	  white	  and	  black	  people,	  venereal	  
disease,	  any	  and	  all	  profanity,	  “nudity	  in	  fact	  or	  in	  silhouette,”	  use	  of	  religious	  figures	  as	  
comic	  characters	  or	  villains,	  and	  depictions	  of	  “a	  woman	  selling	  her	  virtue”	  (Lewis	  2002,	  
301).	  
	  
121	  In	  1933	  a	  series	  of	  research	  reports	  were	  released	  by	  pro-­‐censorship	  organizations	  
finding	  that	  movies	  were	  particularly	  harmful	  to	  children	  and	  a	  volume	  summarizing	  these	  
findings,	  Our	  Movie	  Made	  Children,	  was	  published	  for	  a	  popular	  audience	  (Sklar	  2012,	  135).	  
The	  report	  noted	  the	  immense	  power	  of	  the	  medium,	  “only	  the	  Bible	  and	  the	  Koran	  have	  an	  
indisputably	  larger	  circulation	  than	  that	  of	  the	  latest	  film	  from	  Los	  Angeles”	  (Forman	  1933,	  
11).	  It	  was	  precisely	  their	  power	  in	  shaping	  the	  public	  sphere	  –	  and	  the	  social	  norms	  and	  
modes	  of	  self-­‐identification	  learned	  there	  –	  that	  motivated	  the	  report’s	  wariness	  of	  movies.	  
Under	  the	  heading	  “Movie-­‐Made	  Criminals,”	  for	  instance,	  the	  report	  noted	  that	  seventeen	  
percent	  of	  delinquent	  boys	  under	  the	  age	  of	  fifteen	  said	  that	  movies	  influenced	  their	  
decision	  to	  do	  something	  wrong;	  and	  under	  the	  heading	  “Sex-­‐Delinquency	  and	  Crime”	  the	  
report	  noted	  that	  41	  percent	  of	  delinquent	  girls	  admitted	  that	  “it	  was	  the	  movie-­‐made	  urge	  
that	  inclined	  them	  to	  wild	  parties,	  cabarets	  and	  roadhouses”	  (Forman	  1933,	  196–197,	  217–
218).	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waiting	  for	  a	  new	  product	  that	  could	  take	  advantage	  of	  their	  productive	  capacity.	  
Television	  was	  the	  perfect	  solution.122	  
In	  1949	  television	  sets	  made	  their	  first	  appearance	  in	  the	  popular	  Sears	  and	  
Roebuck	  catalogue,	  moderately	  priced	  at	  $149.95	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  113).	  123	  
Television	  was	  still	  in	  its	  infancy	  though.	  That	  year	  there	  were	  69	  television	  stations	  
on	  the	  air	  –	  all	  of	  them	  commercial	  –	  and	  only	  940,000	  households	  with	  television	  
sets,	  compared	  to	  39	  million	  homes	  with	  a	  radio	  (Field	  2006).	  Within	  a	  decade	  
though	  televisions	  would	  be	  in	  nearly	  44	  million	  American	  homes	  (Field	  2006).124	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  The	  rise	  of	  television	  coincided	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  “mass	  society”	  and	  both	  emerged,	  in	  
large	  part,	  as	  answers	  to	  the	  big	  economic	  question	  of	  the	  post	  war	  period.	  During	  the	  
Second	  World	  War	  the	  United	  States	  had	  built	  up	  massive	  capacity	  for	  large-­‐scale	  industrial	  
production,	  but	  after	  the	  war	  it	  remained	  unclear	  how	  exactly	  this	  productive	  capacity	  
would	  be	  integrated	  into	  a	  peacetime	  economy.	  The	  war	  had	  pulled	  the	  nation	  out	  of	  the	  
Great	  Depression,	  but	  peacetime	  threatened	  to	  plunge	  the	  country	  into	  a	  new	  depression.	  
The	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  emerged	  in	  the	  form	  of	  consumption.	  A	  central	  tenet	  of	  post-­‐
war	  Keynesian	  economics	  was	  that	  high	  aggregate	  demand	  would	  promote	  economic	  
growth.	  And	  so	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  years	  private	  consumption	  became	  more	  than	  a	  peacetime	  
luxury	  –	  it	  became	  a	  civic	  duty.	  In	  1947,	  for	  instance,	  Life	  magazine	  advised	  the	  American	  
family	  that	  “should	  buy	  more	  for	  itself	  to	  better	  the	  living	  of	  others”	  (“U.S.	  Tackles	  the	  Price	  
Problem”	  1947,	  32).	  Just	  as	  the	  nation’s	  masses	  had	  mobilized	  for	  war	  they	  would	  
“mobilize”	  for	  peacetime	  abundance	  by	  becoming	  a	  mass	  of	  consumers	  (Nathan	  1944).	  	  
Television	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  this	  transformation	  of	  the	  United	  States	  into	  what	  
Lizabeth	  Cohen	  calls	  a	  consumers’	  republic	  (L.	  Cohen	  2008b,	  123).	  Television	  sets	  were	  
high-­‐priced	  consumer	  goods	  and	  their	  widespread	  adoption	  raised	  consumer	  spending,	  but	  
perhaps	  most	  important	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  television	  broadcasts	  encouraged	  mass	  
consumption	  by	  providing	  Americans	  with	  an	  image	  of	  the	  good	  life	  –	  a	  life	  on	  sale	  in	  stores	  
everywhere.	  
	  
123	  This	  amounts	  to	  $1,467.65	  in	  CPI-­‐adjusted	  2013	  dollars,	  or	  the	  rough	  equivalent	  of	  an	  
entry-­‐level	  Apple	  computer	  today.	  
	  
124	  It	  is	  often	  claimed	  that	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  television	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  American	  
public	  at	  a	  much	  faster	  rate	  than	  radio.	  One	  widely	  repeated	  statistic	  published	  by	  the	  
investment	  bank	  Morgan	  Stanley	  suggests	  that	  it	  took	  38	  years	  for	  radio	  to	  reach	  50	  million	  
people	  while	  it	  took	  television	  only	  13	  years.	  This	  probably	  overstates	  the	  case	  –	  Hannemyr	  
suggests	  that	  adoption	  rates	  of	  radio	  and	  television	  were	  similar,	  especially	  in	  their	  early	  
years	  (Hannemyr	  2003).	  In	  either	  case	  though,	  the	  post-­‐war	  years	  the	  American	  population	  
was	  ripe	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  television.	  Even	  according	  to	  Hannemyr’s	  more	  
	  126	  
Television	  changed	  the	  character	  of	  American	  publicity	  in	  several	  ways:	  it	  
increased	  the	  importance	  of	  spectacle;	  it	  increased	  the	  power	  of	  advertising	  
agencies,	  which	  increasingly	  played	  a	  role	  in	  political	  campaigns;	  and	  it	  gave	  greater	  
emotional	  resonance	  to	  mediated	  public	  experiences.	  Above	  all	  though	  television	  
aggregated	  American	  audiences	  around	  a	  simultaneous	  and	  homogeneous	  form	  of	  
publicity.	  Its	  combination	  of	  picture	  and	  sound,	  its	  novelty,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  
broadcasts	  were	  free	  for	  those	  people	  able	  to	  receive	  them	  meant	  that	  watching	  
television	  replaced	  many	  other	  activities	  that	  had	  formerly	  constituted	  important	  
parts	  of	  American	  publicity.	  In	  1949	  for	  instance,	  restaurant	  and	  night	  club	  receipts,	  
taxicab	  incomes,	  jukebox	  receipts,	  movie	  ticket	  sales,	  library	  circulation,	  and	  even	  
radio	  listenership	  all	  dropped	  in	  cities	  that	  had	  television	  stations	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  
114).	  Newspapers,	  radio,	  and	  movies	  all	  had	  a	  mass	  character	  but	  it	  is	  television	  that	  
is	  most	  closely	  associated	  with	  post-­‐war	  American	  mass	  society.	  It	  is	  the	  
quintessential	  mass	  medium.	  
While	  the	  emergence	  of	  radio	  and	  motion	  pictures	  was	  characterized	  by	  
periods	  of	  intense	  competition	  followed	  by	  aggregation,	  television	  inherited	  the	  
industrial	  structure	  of	  radio	  and	  was	  dominated	  by	  a	  small	  number	  of	  powerful	  
networks	  from	  the	  start.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  mass	  logic	  of	  television	  became	  more	  
acute	  as	  the	  industry	  developed,	  particularly	  as	  the	  power	  of	  advertisers	  grew	  and	  
as	  the	  new	  medium	  penetrated	  more	  and	  more	  American	  homes.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conservative	  figures	  television	  reached	  142	  million	  in	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  time	  that	  it	  took	  
radio	  to	  reach	  86	  million	  people	  (Hannemyr	  2003,	  116).	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Television,	  like	  radio,	  was	  initially	  broadcast	  live.125	  Following	  the	  format	  of	  a	  
radio	  play	  a	  group	  of	  television	  performers	  would	  gather	  in	  a	  studio	  and	  put	  on	  a	  
performance,	  which	  would	  be	  immediately	  broadcast	  to	  the	  audience.	  In	  these	  early	  
years	  television	  was	  comparatively	  open	  to	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  voices.	  A	  particularly	  
effective	  format	  for	  socially-­‐relevant	  programming	  was	  the	  anthology	  series,	  in	  
which	  each	  broadcast	  told	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  story.	  Programs	  such	  as	  the	  Philco	  
Television	  Playhouse,	  the	  Goodyear	  Television	  Playhouse,	  and	  the	  Kraft	  Television	  
Theater	  represented	  a	  “carte-­‐blanche”	  to	  writers	  and	  drew	  top	  talent,	  largely	  from	  
New	  York’s	  theater	  world	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  156).	  One	  landmark	  broadcast	  in	  the	  
history	  of	  socially-­‐relevant	  television	  was	  Paddy	  Chayefsky’s	  Marty	  (1953),	  which	  
told	  the	  story	  of	  a	  young	  New	  York	  butcher’s	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  hopes	  and	  hardships.	  Marty	  
was	  not	  rich,	  charismatic,	  or	  good-­‐looking	  and	  he	  described	  himself	  as	  “a	  fat	  little	  
man.”	  Chayefsky’s	  dialogue	  was	  written	  in	  an	  unpolished	  vernacular	  style,	  and	  the	  
hardships	  he	  showed	  were	  very	  real	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  157).126	  This	  represented	  a	  
very	  different	  mode	  of	  storytelling	  from	  the	  polished,	  idealized	  and	  inevitably	  
uplifting	  world	  of	  most	  network	  radio	  and	  television	  shows.	  
	   While	  Chayefsky’s	  realism	  was	  a	  hit	  with	  audiences	  it	  rankled	  with	  
advertisers.	  Television	  advertising	  was	  premised	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  product	  would	  
make	  the	  viewer’s	  life	  better	  and	  easier	  and	  so	  the	  harsh	  realities	  of	  everyday	  life	  
were	  a	  poor	  context	  in	  which	  to	  sell	  magical	  solutions	  to	  consumers.	  This	  led	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  This	  aspect	  of	  simultaneity	  is	  an	  important	  feature	  of	  the	  operational	  definition	  of	  mass	  
media	  that	  I	  offered	  above.	  
	  
126	  Chayefsky	  would	  go	  on	  to	  become	  one	  of	  the	  most	  celebrated	  screenwriters	  in	  history,	  
winning	  three	  Academy	  Awards	  for	  screenwriting.	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struggles	  between	  socially-­‐minded	  writers	  and	  market-­‐minded	  advertisers.127	  The	  
latter	  generally	  won	  out	  and	  the	  diversity	  of	  anthology	  programs	  soon	  gave	  way	  as	  
the	  American	  masses	  became	  aggregated	  around	  a	  more	  homogenous	  slate	  of	  feel-­‐
good	  broadcasts.128	  
	   Television’s	  roots	  in	  the	  radio	  industry	  meant	  that	  many	  of	  the	  economic	  
strategies	  of	  radio	  were	  brought	  to	  television	  and	  none	  of	  these	  had	  a	  greater	  effect	  
than	  advertising.	  The	  popularity	  of	  the	  Western	  genre	  on	  TV,	  for	  instance,	  can	  be	  
traced	  in	  part	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  cigarette	  advertisers.	  Beginning	  in	  1952	  and	  1953	  a	  
series	  of	  reports	  were	  published	  linking	  cigarette	  smoking	  to	  lung	  cancer	  and	  
causing	  a	  national	  cancer	  scare.	  Cigarette	  companies	  responded	  first	  by	  denying	  the	  
claims,	  and	  then	  by	  introducing	  a	  series	  of	  new	  products	  such	  as	  longer	  cigarettes,	  
filtered	  cigarettes,	  and	  menthol	  cigarettes.	  In	  order	  to	  promote	  their	  products	  on	  
television	  though,	  they	  favored	  backing	  Westerns,	  “with	  their	  aura	  of	  fresh	  air,	  
health,	  and	  vigor”	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  199).	  	  By	  1958	  thirty	  western	  series	  were	  airing	  
on	  prime-­‐time	  television	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  214).	  Imagery	  of	  cowboys,	  Indians,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  Reginald	  Rose’s	  Thunder	  on	  Sycamore	  Street	  (1957)	  is	  a	  revealing	  case	  study.	  Rose’s	  
teleplay	  was	  based	  on	  the	  true	  story	  of	  a	  neighborhood	  organizing	  to	  force	  a	  black	  family	  
out	  of	  their	  community.	  The	  network,	  sponsor,	  and	  ad	  agency	  all	  insisted	  that	  the	  family	  
could	  not	  be	  black,	  fearing	  that	  the	  show	  would	  alienate	  Southern	  viewers.	  Rose	  reluctantly	  
replaced	  the	  black	  family	  with	  an	  ex-­‐convict;	  but	  he	  cunningly	  left	  this	  piece	  of	  information	  
out	  of	  the	  script	  until	  the	  final	  act.	  Viewers	  were	  only	  aware	  that	  the	  new	  neighbor	  was	  
unwanted.	  Some	  viewers	  assumed	  that	  the	  new	  family	  was	  Jewish,	  others	  assumed	  Catholic,	  
others	  assumed	  they	  were	  communists,	  and,	  of	  course,	  others	  assumed	  they	  were	  black.	  The	  
broadcast	  became	  what	  Barnouw	  describes	  as	  an	  extraordinary	  social	  Rorschach	  test	  
(Barnouw	  1990,	  165).	  
	  
128	  Meanwhile	  the	  Hollywood	  blacklist	  was	  becoming	  an	  increasingly	  powerful	  force	  driving	  
the	  tendency	  towards	  conservatism	  even	  further.	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the	  American	  West	  filled	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  the	  masses	  became	  aggregated	  
around	  an	  increasingly	  limited	  menu	  of	  offerings.129	  
The	  importance	  of	  sports	  in	  the	  American	  imagination	  can	  similarly	  be	  traced	  
to	  the	  commercial	  interests	  of	  broadcasters	  (Whannel	  1992,	  3).	  Beginning	  in	  the	  
1960s	  televised	  sports	  emerged	  as	  a	  highly	  lucrative	  entertainment	  for	  networks.	  
This	  was	  in	  part	  the	  result	  of	  the	  advent	  of	  instant	  replays,	  which	  allowed	  audiences	  
to	  see	  exciting	  moments	  again	  and	  again	  both	  in	  real-­‐time	  and	  in	  slow	  motion.130	  
This	  was	  particularly	  powerful	  in	  turning	  football	  into	  a	  television	  phenomenon.	  
Barnouw	  articulates	  this	  transformation	  nicely:	  “brutal	  collisions	  became	  ballets,	  
and	  end	  runs	  and	  forward	  passes	  became	  miracles	  of	  human	  coordination.	  Football,	  
once	  an	  unfathomable	  jumble	  on	  the	  small	  screen,	  acquired	  fascination	  for	  widening	  
audiences”	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  348).	  ABC-­‐TV	  began	  broadcasting	  football	  on	  Monday	  
nights	  in	  1970,	  turning	  televised	  football	  into	  prime-­‐time	  entertainment	  (Chandler	  
1991).	  Other	  sports	  found	  favor	  with	  networks	  as	  well	  and	  in	  1964	  CBS	  purchased	  
the	  New	  York	  Yankees.	  The	  growing	  dominance	  of	  sports	  in	  the	  American	  public	  
imagination	  was	  largely	  the	  product	  of	  television,	  in	  which	  it	  had	  found	  a	  symbiotic	  
partner.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Advertiser	  preferences	  did	  not	  only	  influence	  scripted	  entertainment	  on	  TV	  –	  they	  
influenced	  news	  as	  well,	  though	  in	  subtler	  ways.	  An	  NBC	  news	  series	  for	  example,	  also	  
sponsored	  by	  Camel	  cigarettes,	  was	  forbidden	  from	  showing	  any	  news	  person	  smoking	  a	  
cigar	  and	  could	  not	  show	  footage	  that	  included	  “no	  smoking”	  signs	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  170).	  
These	  distortions	  may	  have	  been	  slight	  but	  they	  reflect	  the	  power	  that	  television	  granted	  to	  
advertisers	  over	  how	  Americans	  perceived	  the	  world.	  
	  
130	  In	  1961	  the	  Congressional	  Sports	  Broadcasting	  Act	  had	  removed	  restrictions	  on	  league-­‐
wide	  sale	  of	  national	  broadcasting	  rights,	  opening	  the	  way	  for	  televising	  sports	  on	  a	  national	  
scale	  Cf.	  (Tainsky	  2010).	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In	  general	  terms,	  homogenization	  of	  the	  airwaves	  and	  the	  convergence	  of	  
broadcasts	  were	  largely	  the	  result	  of	  the	  commercial	  logics	  that	  guided	  television	  
networks	  –	  commercial	  logics	  that	  were,	  in	  this	  era,	  largely	  responsible	  for	  the	  mass	  
character	  of	  the	  dominant	  media,	  including	  television.	  As	  production	  budgets	  rose,	  
for	  instance,	  networks	  chased	  past	  successes	  rather	  than	  take	  risks	  with	  new	  shows.	  
In	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  a	  batch	  of	  spy	  shows	  appeared	  one	  after	  another:	  The	  Man	  from	  
U.N.C.L.E.	  (1964),	  Get	  Smart	  (1965),	  I	  Spy	  (1965),	  The	  Girl	  From	  U.N.C.L.E.	  (1966),	  
The	  Man	  Who	  Never	  Was	  (1966),	  Mission	  Impossible	  (1966).	  When	  Bewitched	  
became	  a	  success	  in	  1964,	  other	  shows	  about	  women	  with	  special	  powers	  appeared:	  
The	  Flying	  Nun	  (1965)	  and	  I	  Dream	  of	  Jeannie	  (1965).	  And	  with	  the	  success	  of	  
McHale’s	  Navy	  (1962)	  other	  World	  War	  II	  shows	  appeared:	  Combat	  (1962),	  Gomer	  
Pyle	  U.S.M.C.	  (1964),	  Hogan’s	  Heroes	  (1965),	  Wackiest	  Ship	  in	  the	  Army	  (1965),	  Mr.	  
Roberts	  (1965),	  Rat	  Patrol	  (1966),	  Jericho	  (1966).	  Homogenization	  of	  the	  broadcast	  
landscape	  had	  become	  a	  structural	  characteristic	  of	  television.	  
	  
In	  the	  early	  1950s	  television	  began	  to	  undergo	  an	  important	  technical	  shift	  
that	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  further	  massification	  of	  audiences,	  now	  on	  an	  international	  
scale	  –	  the	  shift	  to	  broadcasting	  pre-­‐recorded	  programs.	  Live	  broadcasts	  were	  risky,	  
with	  little	  margin	  for	  error;	  performances	  had	  to	  take	  place	  on	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  
in-­‐studio	  sets	  and	  the	  pressure	  on	  performers	  was	  enormous.	  By	  1951	  though	  
episodic	  series	  started	  pre-­‐recording	  their	  broadcasts,	  which	  allowed	  for	  editing,	  
multiple	  takes,	  and	  freed	  productions	  from	  the	  confines	  of	  indoor	  studios.	  The	  
popular	  police	  series	  Dragnet,	  for	  instance,	  included	  sequences	  filmed	  around	  the	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Los	  Angeles	  area.	  This	  move	  to	  filmed	  series	  triggered	  an	  important	  shift	  in	  the	  
spatial	  organization	  of	  television	  production.	  Television	  had	  initially	  been	  based	  in	  
New	  York,	  the	  center	  of	  the	  radio	  industry,	  but	  with	  the	  rising	  popularity	  of	  pre-­‐
recorded	  broadcasting	  the	  television	  industry	  began	  a	  shift	  towards	  Los	  Angeles,	  
where	  motion	  picture	  studios	  had	  the	  facilities	  and	  technical	  expertise	  for	  more	  
elaborate	  productions.	  Throughout	  the	  late	  1940s	  and	  early	  1950s	  the	  relationship	  
between	  television	  and	  motion	  pictures	  had	  been	  tense,	  but	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1950s	  the	  
two	  industries	  became	  increasingly	  aligned	  with	  each	  other.	  Movie	  studios	  began	  to	  
play	  an	  increasingly	  large	  role	  in	  the	  production	  of	  filmed	  television	  broadcasts	  and	  
broadcasters	  began	  buying	  feature	  films.	  
	   In	  1955,	  for	  instance,	  RKO	  decided	  to	  sell	  its	  feature-­‐film	  library	  to	  a	  
company	  called	  General	  Teleradio	  for	  $25	  million	  (or	  $213	  million	  in	  2013	  dollars).	  
General	  Teleradio	  then	  began	  offering	  individual	  TV	  stations	  the	  right	  to	  
rebroadcast	  RKO	  films	  for	  a	  fee.	  The	  arrangement	  was	  highly	  lucrative	  for	  General	  
Teleradio,	  and	  a	  money-­‐saver	  for	  individual	  stations,	  many	  of	  which	  had	  previously	  
been	  producing	  their	  own	  live	  shows.	  The	  arrangement	  was	  also	  popular	  with	  
audiences	  who	  could	  now	  watch	  movies	  in	  the	  comfort	  of	  their	  own	  homes.	  Other	  
movie	  studios	  soon	  followed	  suit,	  making	  deals	  with	  television	  distributors	  and	  
receiving	  large	  windfalls:	  Warner	  Brothers	  made	  a	  $21	  million	  deal,	  Twentieth	  
Century-­‐Fox	  made	  a	  $30	  million	  deal,	  and	  Paramount	  made	  a	  $50	  million	  deal.	  The	  
licensed	  films	  had	  all	  been	  made	  before	  1948,	  so	  broadcasting	  them	  on	  TV	  was	  not	  
threat	  to	  newer	  productions.	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With	  the	  increasing	  popularity	  of	  televised	  movies	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  
shifted	  back	  towards	  Hollywood	  –	  and	  away	  from	  live	  broadcasting.	  In	  1954	  the	  
New	  York	  station	  WOR-­‐TV,	  for	  instance,	  broadcast	  a	  live	  drama	  every	  night;	  within	  
two	  years	  it	  broadcast	  none	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  197–198).131	  The	  convergence	  of	  film	  
and	  television	  aggregated	  American	  audiences	  around	  an	  increasingly	  small	  number	  
of	  entertainments.	  
	   The	  move	  to	  filmed	  series	  was	  also	  important	  in	  establishing	  the	  dominance	  
of	  the	  American	  television	  industry	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  By	  the	  early	  1950s	  television	  
was	  already	  established	  in	  Britain	  and	  Japan,	  and	  was	  emerging	  in	  Mexico,	  Brazil,	  
Argentina	  and	  Cuba	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  134).	  As	  more	  and	  more	  programs	  were	  
recorded	  on	  film	  they	  were	  offered	  to	  foreign	  stations	  for	  far	  less	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  
production	  –	  they	  had,	  after	  all,	  already	  recouped	  their	  costs	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
and	  any	  international	  sales	  represented	  pure	  profit.	  This	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  long-­‐
term	  dominance	  of	  American	  productions	  in	  the	  international	  television	  industry,	  
particularly	  because	  cheaply	  available	  American	  hits	  inhibited	  the	  development	  of	  
domestic	  production	  capacity	  in	  many	  countries.132	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  Some	  television	  productions	  continued	  to	  film	  in	  New	  York,	  particularly	  live	  quiz	  shows,	  
which	  were	  highly	  popular	  and	  offered	  large	  prizes	  to	  contestants.	  In	  1958	  though	  it	  was	  
revealed	  that	  the	  popular	  show	  Twenty-­‐One	  had	  been	  rigged	  and	  quiz	  shows	  diminished	  in	  
popularity.	  The	  following	  season	  thirty	  new	  Hollywood	  series	  appeared	  on	  television	  
schedules,	  further	  establishing	  the	  West	  Coast’s	  dominance	  in	  TV	  entertainment	  (Barnouw	  
1990,	  240).	  
	  
132	  The	  hit	  American	  show	  Restless	  Gun	  (1957-­‐1959),	  for	  instance,	  could	  be	  bought	  by	  
Australian	  broadcasters	  for	  $1,400	  an	  episode;	  producing	  their	  own	  half-­‐hour	  films	  cost	  at	  
least	  $20,000	  per	  episode	  and	  had	  no	  guarantee	  of	  success	  with	  audiences	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  
234).	  In	  1968	  the	  Motion	  Picture	  Export	  Association	  informed	  its	  members	  that	  in	  Italy,	  
“few	  films	  are	  being	  produced	  locally	  for	  television,	  since	  American-­‐made	  TV	  films	  are	  
available	  at	  far	  below	  what	  it	  would	  cost…	  to	  produce	  similar	  films	  or	  series”	  (Barnouw	  
1990,	  408).	  Australia	  and	  Canada	  eventually	  introduced	  quotas	  to	  limit	  foreign	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With	  the	  popularization	  of	  American	  culture	  abroad,	  the	  American	  public	  
sphere	  was	  expanding	  beyond	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Increasingly	  
television	  schedules	  showed	  similarities	  in	  cities	  around	  the	  world,	  and	  prime	  time	  
television	  became	  a	  bonding	  agent	  that	  made	  audiences	  into	  increasingly	  
homogeneous	  masses.	  Television	  was	  creating	  an	  imagined	  community	  of	  prime-­‐
time	  watchers	  on	  a	  global	  scale,	  just	  as	  newspapers	  had	  done	  on	  a	  national	  scale	  two	  
centuries	  earlier.133	  
	  
Television	  had	  aggregated	  American	  audiences	  into	  a	  semi-­‐coherent	  public	  
on	  a	  national	  scale	  and	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  new	  medium	  had	  broad	  implications	  
for	  how	  Americans	  perceived	  the	  world.	  By	  the	  late	  1950s	  for	  instance,	  it	  had	  
become	  apparent	  that	  the	  logic	  of	  television	  was	  redefining	  the	  logic	  of	  political	  
performance.	  The	  power	  of	  the	  medium	  meant	  that	  certain	  television-­‐friendly	  
attributes	  had	  become	  increasingly	  important	  among	  candidates	  –	  but	  these	  were	  
not	  necessarily	  the	  same	  attributes	  that	  made	  for	  good	  elected	  officials.	  In	  1959	  
then-­‐Senator	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  expressed	  his	  concern	  over	  this	  shift	  in	  TV	  Guide:	  
Political	  success	  on	  television	  is	  not,	  unfortunately,	  limited	  only	  to	  those	  who	  
deserve	  it.	  It	  is	  a	  medium	  which	  lends	  itself	  to	  manipulation,	  exploitation	  and	  
gimmicks.	  It	  can	  be	  abused	  by	  demagogues,	  by	  appeals	  to	  emotion	  and	  prejudice	  
and	  ignorance.	  Political	  campaigns	  can	  be	  actually	  taken	  over	  by	  the	  “public	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
programming,	  but	  these	  had	  limited	  effectiveness	  –	  broadcasters	  often	  satisfied	  quotas	  with	  
lower-­‐cost	  sporting	  broadcasts	  or	  talk	  shows	  rather	  than	  expensive	  dramas	  (Barnouw	  
1990,	  235).	  
	  
133	  See	  “The	  Origins	  of	  National	  Consciousness”	  in	  Imagined	  Communities	  (B.	  Anderson	  
2006,	  37)	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relations”	  experts,	  who	  tell	  the	  candidate	  not	  only	  how	  to	  use	  TV	  but	  what	  to	  say,	  
what	  to	  stand	  for	  and	  what	  “kind	  of	  person”	  to	  be.	  (Kennedy	  1959)	  
Kennedy	  was	  himself	  an	  outstanding	  presence	  on	  television,	  but	  he	  had	  identified	  a	  
real	  shift	  in	  the	  logic	  of	  performance	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.134	  
The	  rise	  of	  advertiser-­‐supported	  radio	  had	  displaced	  some	  of	  the	  political	  
content	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  (since	  advertisers	  were	  wary	  of	  offending	  audiences)	  
and	  the	  rise	  of	  television	  pushed	  this	  displacement	  even	  further.	  It	  seems	  that	  
Americans’	  love	  for	  televised	  entertainment	  often	  trumped	  political	  concerns.	  In	  
1952	  for	  instance,	  an	  angry	  viewer	  wrote	  to	  presidential	  candidate	  Adlai	  Stevenson	  
who’s	  recent	  TV	  appearance	  had	  displaced	  an	  episode	  of	  I	  Love	  Lucy:	  “I	  Love	  Lucy,	  I	  
like	  Ike,	  drop	  dead”	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  210).	  Everywhere	  on	  television	  visual	  
showmanship	  seemed	  to	  dominate	  content.	  NBC’s	  Today	  show,	  for	  instance,	  was	  a	  
hybrid	  news	  and	  variety	  program.	  The	  show	  suffered	  from	  low	  ratings	  until	  J.	  Fred	  
Muggs	  joined	  the	  cast	  as	  a	  regular	  in	  1953	  –	  Muggs	  was	  a	  baby	  chimpanzee	  
(Barnouw	  1990,	  146).	  	  
	   By	  1960	  roughly	  half	  of	  the	  people	  in	  the	  United	  States	  relied	  on	  television	  
for	  their	  news	  –	  and	  for	  their	  view	  of	  a	  world	  beyond	  their	  daily	  lives.	  Meanwhile	  
control	  over	  television	  was	  highly	  concentrated	  among	  the	  three	  dominant	  
networks.	  This	  created	  a	  public	  sphere	  highly	  vulnerable	  to	  mass	  deception.	  The	  
CIA’s	  failed	  invasion	  of	  Cuba	  at	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs,	  for	  example,	  was	  only	  one	  instance	  
where	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  television	  industry	  facilitated	  the	  mass	  deception	  of	  the	  
American	  people.	  The	  CIA	  had	  planned	  the	  invasion	  in	  secret	  but	  rumors	  had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  After	  his	  own	  narrow	  win	  in	  the	  1960	  presidential	  election	  Kennedy	  commented	  that	  he	  
“wouldn’t	  have	  had	  a	  prayer	  without	  that	  gadget”	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  227).	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circulated	  about	  clandestine	  CIA-­‐run	  training	  camps	  in	  Mexico	  and	  Guatemala.	  
Television	  networks,	  which	  were	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  news	  for	  a	  majority	  of	  
Americans,	  depended	  heavily	  on	  wire	  services	  such	  as	  the	  Associated	  Press	  
especially	  for	  international	  coverage.	  When	  the	  AP’s	  stringer	  in	  Guatemala	  was	  
asked	  to	  investigate	  the	  rumors	  he	  simply	  relayed	  denials	  from	  the	  Guatemalan	  
government.	  These	  denials	  were	  then	  broadcast	  to	  the	  television-­‐watching	  public	  in	  
the	  United	  States	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  290).	  Had	  television	  news	  been	  more	  competitive	  
and	  had	  there	  been	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  television	  news	  outlets	  then	  enterprising	  
reporters	  might	  have	  offered	  Americans	  a	  deeper	  story.	  Such	  deeper	  and	  more	  
critical	  reporting	  had	  characterized	  the	  more	  competitive	  print	  news	  industry	  of	  
turn	  of	  the	  century	  where	  muckraking	  papers	  and	  magazines	  investigated	  corporate	  
misconduct,	  but	  as	  television	  dominated	  the	  public	  sphere	  Americans’	  view	  of	  the	  
world	  became	  narrower,	  more	  homogeneous,	  and	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  manipulation.	  
	   The	  structure	  of	  the	  television	  industry	  also	  facilitated	  more	  indirect,	  and	  
perhaps	  more	  powerful,	  acceptance	  of	  government	  rhetoric	  by	  the	  American	  public.	  
As	  the	  Cold	  War	  intensified	  in	  the	  mid	  1960s	  a	  series	  of	  new	  television	  comedies,	  
dramas,	  and	  adventures	  turned	  to	  international	  affairs	  and	  favorably	  portrayed	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  United	  States	  on	  the	  world	  stage.	  A	  wave	  of	  shows	  about	  espionage	  
emerged,	  including	  The	  Man	  from	  U.N.C.L.E.,	  The	  Girl	  from	  U.N.C.L.E.,	  Get	  Smart,	  I	  Spy,	  
and	  Mission	  Impossible,	  delighting	  children	  and	  adults	  across	  the	  country	  with	  
heroes	  battling	  an	  often-­‐invisible	  communist	  threat	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  366–377).	  
Meanwhile	  shows	  about	  World	  War	  II	  and	  other	  American	  military	  victories	  
celebrated	  the	  heroism	  of	  American	  military	  life.	  As	  American	  casualties	  in	  Vietnam	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mounted	  moral	  plummeted	  and	  desertion	  rates	  grew,	  but	  President	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  
tried	  to	  bolster	  support	  for	  the	  war	  by	  framing	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  America’s	  tradition	  of	  
struggling	  against	  tyranny.135	  Even	  if	  television	  producers	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  support	  
Johnson’s	  agenda,	  the	  convergence	  on	  television	  of	  an	  omnipresent	  communist	  
threat	  and	  stories	  of	  American	  heroism	  probably	  did	  just	  that	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  
375).136	  
	   Television	  had	  a	  become	  a	  national	  phenomenon,	  and	  concentration	  among	  
the	  three	  dominant	  broadcast	  networks	  meant	  that	  more	  than	  ever	  before	  large	  
portions	  of	  the	  American	  public	  were	  watching	  the	  same	  thing	  at	  the	  same	  time	  –	  in	  
other	  words,	  the	  mid-­‐century	  mass	  public	  shared	  an	  increasingly	  homogenous	  and	  
simultaneous	  public	  sphere.137	  And	  as	  the	  institution	  developed,	  television	  
continued	  to	  provide	  increasingly	  more	  impressive	  national	  spectacles	  that	  riveted	  
the	  mass	  audience.	  The	  1969	  moon	  landing,	  for	  instance,	  was	  watched	  by	  96	  percent	  
of	  the	  adult	  population	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (Kellner	  2003,	  123).	  Television	  historian	  
Erik	  Barnouw	  wrote	  of	  the	  moon	  landings:	  “If	  an	  empire	  needed	  bread	  and	  circuses,	  
here	  was	  the	  greatest	  circus	  in	  history”	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  428).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  “Our	  purpose	  in	  Vietnam	  is	  to	  prevent	  the	  success	  of	  aggression”	  (L.	  B.	  Johnson	  1966).	  
	  
136	  Johnson	  also	  sought	  to	  manage	  the	  televised	  image	  of	  the	  war	  more	  directly.	  The	  
president	  appeared	  on	  national	  television	  with	  soldiers	  in	  South	  Vietnam	  and	  called	  
television	  news	  anchors	  and	  producers	  after	  broadcasts	  to	  harangue	  them	  about	  their	  
reporting	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  388).	  
	  
137	  On	  January	  19,	  1953,	  for	  instance,	  68.8	  percent	  of	  televisions	  in	  the	  country	  were	  tuned	  
to	  I	  Love	  Lucy.	  The	  episode	  featured	  the	  show’s	  heroine	  giving	  birth	  to	  a	  son	  and	  was	  
broadcast	  on	  the	  same	  day	  that	  actress	  Lucille	  Ball	  gave	  birth	  to	  her	  own	  son	  (Barnouw	  
1990,	  148).	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   Television’s	  reach	  was	  further	  broadened	  in	  July	  of	  1962	  with	  the	  launch	  of	  
Telstar	  I,	  the	  first	  communications	  satellite	  capably	  of	  relaying	  television	  signals	  
around	  the	  globe.	  The	  satellite	  had	  been	  launched	  by	  NASA	  but	  the	  operation	  had	  
been	  paid	  for	  by	  AT&T.	  Since	  the	  early	  days	  of	  network	  radio	  AT&T	  had	  been	  
responsible	  for	  disseminating	  television	  signals	  from	  coast	  to	  coast	  through	  their	  
network	  of	  wires;	  the	  launch	  of	  Telstar	  I	  gave	  them	  an	  international	  reach.	  
Telstar	  I	  made	  live	  television	  broadcasts	  feasible	  from	  almost	  anywhere	  on	  
earth,	  bringing	  more	  of	  the	  world	  into	  the	  American	  televised	  public	  sphere	  while	  
facilitating	  the	  export	  of	  American	  television	  to	  remote	  regions.	  Television	  had	  
facilitated	  the	  homogenization	  of	  the	  American	  public	  sphere	  on	  a	  national	  scale;	  
now	  it	  was	  being	  globalized.	  The	  reach	  of	  live	  broadcasts	  also	  contributed	  to	  an	  
expansion	  in	  network	  news	  schedules,	  which	  increasingly	  brought	  the	  foreign	  and	  
exotic	  into	  American	  living	  rooms.	  In	  1963	  evening	  newscasts	  were	  expanded	  from	  
15	  minutes	  to	  30	  minutes;	  and	  that	  year,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  majority	  of	  Americans	  
said	  that	  television	  was	  their	  main	  source	  of	  news	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  309,	  314).	  
Entertainment	  still	  dominated	  the	  airwaves,	  but	  a	  powerful	  new	  tool	  had	  emerged	  
for	  disseminating	  news	  to	  the	  masses	  –	  and	  this	  tool	  was	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  three	  
powerful	  TV	  networks.	  
The	  1965-­‐66	  television	  season	  represented	  another	  important	  technical	  
development	  for	  the	  medium	  –	  the	  shift	  to	  color	  broadcasting	  by	  the	  major	  
networks.	  Color,	  like	  satellite	  transmission,	  had	  a	  particularly	  strong	  impact	  on	  
news	  broadcasts.	  Images	  from	  around	  the	  world	  seemed	  all	  the	  more	  exotic	  and	  
fascinating	  when	  seen	  in	  color;	  and	  images	  of	  war	  became	  all	  the	  more	  terrible.	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Color	  brought	  greater	  emotional	  resonance	  to	  Americans’	  experience	  of	  the	  TV-­‐
mediated	  public	  sphere.	  This	  had	  far-­‐reaching	  implications.	  
In	  a	  1968	  speech	  to	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Broadcasters,	  for	  instance,	  
President	  Johnson	  blamed	  television	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  Americans	  no	  longer	  
supported	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  summing	  up	  his	  argument	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  
“television	  brings	  the	  war	  into	  the	  American	  home.”	  Americans	  may	  not	  have	  been	  
able	  to	  endure	  past	  wars	  either,	  the	  President	  suggested,	  had	  they	  been	  able	  to	  
watch	  American	  losses	  on	  television	  (Mandelbaum	  1982,	  157).	  The	  specificities	  of	  
television	  as	  a	  medium	  may	  not	  have	  been	  entirely	  responsible	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  
Vietnam	  War;	  but	  color	  television	  certainly	  did	  give	  large	  numbers	  of	  Americans	  a	  
more	  intimate	  sense	  of	  warfare	  than	  they	  had	  ever	  known.	  
	  
Roots	  of	  Fragmentation	  
The	  history	  of	  the	  dominant	  media	  from	  the	  1910s	  through	  the	  1960s	  is	  one	  
of	  aggregation	  and	  massification	  –	  a	  small	  number	  of	  powerful	  interests	  dominated	  
each	  medium	  and	  aggregated	  massive	  American	  audiences	  around	  themselves.	  By	  
the	  late	  1960s	  though	  this	  began	  to	  change	  and	  signs	  of	  fragmentation	  began	  to	  
appear	  as	  these	  media	  began	  to	  accommodate	  the	  diversity	  of	  the	  American	  
experience.	  In	  1960,	  for	  instance,	  black	  Americans	  were	  largely	  excluded	  from	  
appearing	  on	  television	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  made	  up	  10%	  of	  the	  American	  
population.	  As	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  movement	  gained	  momentum	  though,	  several	  groups	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began	  to	  call	  for	  desegregation	  of	  the	  airwaves.138	  Integration	  of	  the	  airwaves	  would	  
be	  a	  gradual	  process,	  but	  eventually	  the	  televised	  public	  sphere	  would	  come	  to	  more	  
accurately	  reflect	  the	  demographics	  of	  its	  constituents.	  
	   By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960s	  the	  United	  States,	  like	  much	  of	  Europe,	  was	  in	  the	  
midst	  of	  social	  upheaval.	  The	  Civil	  Rights	  movement	  and	  the	  fall	  of	  segregation	  had	  
begun	  to	  win	  black	  Americans	  access	  to	  the	  public	  sphere,	  and	  due	  to	  the	  work	  of	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  activist	  groups	  various	  subcultures	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  
visible	  in	  public	  spaces.	  By	  the	  start	  of	  the	  1970s	  television	  began	  to	  reflect	  these	  
changes.139	  While	  television	  of	  the	  post-­‐War	  years	  was	  relatively	  homogenous	  and	  
for	  the	  most	  part	  socially	  and	  politically	  timid,	  the	  television	  of	  the	  1970s	  began	  to	  
reflect	  the	  diversity	  of	  the	  American	  experience.	  Television	  executives	  began	  
speaking	  of	  “relevance”	  as	  a	  means	  of	  appealing	  to	  new	  audiences.	  Relevance	  meant	  
specificity	  and	  this	  meant	  that	  broadcasters	  would	  have	  to	  move	  away	  from	  their	  
strategy	  of	  simultaneously	  reaching	  and	  satisfying	  the	  largest	  possible	  number	  of	  
consumers,	  a	  strategy	  that	  had	  defined	  television	  as	  a	  mass	  medium.	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  In	  1964,	  for	  instance,	  the	  communication	  division	  of	  the	  progressive	  United	  Church	  of	  
Christ	  requested	  that	  the	  FCC	  decline	  to	  renew	  the	  licenses	  of	  two	  southern	  television	  
broadcasters	  that	  excluded	  blacks	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  45	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  in	  their	  
viewing	  area	  was	  black.	  The	  consequence	  of	  this	  discrimination,	  wrote	  the	  Church,	  was	  that	  
the	  entire	  population,	  “negro	  and	  white,	  receives	  a	  distorted	  picture	  of	  vital	  issues”	  (Racial	  
Justice	  in	  Broadcasting:	  A	  Report	  of	  a	  Program	  to	  Combat	  Discrimination	  Practiced	  by	  
Broadcast	  Licensees	  Against	  Blacks	  and	  Other	  Minorities	  by	  Means	  of	  Programming	  and	  
Employment	  Practices	  1970;	  Barnouw	  1990,	  344).	  This	  highlights	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
imbalances	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  can	  distort	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  in	  
such	  a	  way	  that	  certain	  groups	  are	  largely	  excluded	  from	  the	  aggregate	  experience	  of	  
publicity.	  The	  FCC	  refused	  the	  Church’s	  initial	  request,	  but	  its	  decision	  was	  eventually	  
overturned	  by	  an	  appeals	  court	  and	  one	  of	  the	  two	  stations	  in	  the	  Church’s	  initial	  complaint	  
lost	  its	  license	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  345).	  
	  
139	  None	  of	  the	  top	  ten	  television	  series	  of	  1973-­‐74	  had	  been	  leaders	  in	  1968-­‐69	  (Barnouw	  
1990,	  430).	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By	  the	  1970s	  a	  broad	  set	  of	  changes	  began	  sweeping	  the	  airwaves	  (Lentz	  
2000).	  These	  years	  brought	  with	  them	  a	  new	  permissiveness	  in	  the	  use	  of	  language.	  
The	  popular	  TV	  show	  All	  in	  the	  Family	  (1971-­‐1979),	  for	  instance,	  featured	  a	  
belligerent	  father	  character,	  Archie	  Bunker,	  who	  commonly	  used	  racial	  slurs	  that	  
had	  been	  taboo	  in	  the	  earlier	  days	  of	  network	  television.	  With	  its	  frank	  portrayal	  of	  
everyday	  speech	  the	  show	  revealed	  that	  despite	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  
movement	  racism	  remained	  an	  almost	  mundane	  issue	  in	  many	  American	  families	  
(Barnouw	  1990,	  432–433).	  Shows	  also	  began	  deviating	  from	  the	  norms	  of	  white,	  
male-­‐dominated,	  middle-­‐class	  suburbia.	  New	  shows	  like	  The	  Mary	  Tyler	  Moore	  Show	  
and	  Maude,	  which	  were	  both	  in	  the	  top	  10	  for	  the	  1973-­‐74	  season,	  brought	  working	  
and	  politically	  active	  women	  into	  prime	  time.	  Other	  shows	  like	  Sanford	  &	  Son,	  The	  
Jeffersons,	  and	  Good	  Times	  brought	  black	  and	  working	  class	  families	  into	  the	  
limelight.	  And	  Sesame	  Street,	  one	  of	  public	  television’s	  most	  enduring	  offerings,	  was	  
explicitly	  aimed	  at	  underprivileged	  children.	  The	  broadening	  of	  television’s	  horizons	  
continued	  throughout	  the	  1970s.	  In	  1977,	  for	  instance,	  ABC-­‐TV	  broadcast	  Roots,	  an	  
8-­‐part	  series	  about	  slavery.	  Audiences	  responded	  well	  to	  the	  more	  encompassing	  
landscape	  of	  prime-­‐time	  television	  and	  the	  final	  episode	  of	  Roots	  reached	  the	  largest	  
audience	  of	  any	  sponsored	  telecast	  to	  date	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  466).140	  Through	  
decades	  of	  struggle	  previously-­‐marginalized	  Americans	  had	  won	  a	  place	  in	  public	  
life	  –	  and	  that	  meant	  a	  place	  on	  TV.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140	  The	  following	  year	  NBC-­‐TV	  broadcast	  Holocaust,	  chronicling	  the	  Jewish	  experience	  of	  
Nazis’	  efforts	  to	  exterminate	  European	  Jewry.	  It	  was	  the	  most-­‐watched	  broadcast	  of	  1978	  
(Barnouw	  1990,	  466).	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   The	  broadening	  of	  TV’s	  horizons	  also	  both	  reflected	  and	  promoted	  a	  new	  
cultural	  openness,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  sex.	  Suggestive	  disco	  dancing	  on	  The	  
Love	  Boat	  (1977-­‐1986)	  or	  a	  frustrated	  housewife	  borrowing	  Orgasm	  and	  You	  from	  
the	  library	  on	  Mary	  Hartman,	  Mary	  Hartman	  (1976-­‐1977)	  played	  small	  but	  real	  
roles	  in	  reshaping	  what	  was	  fit	  for	  public	  discussion	  (Levine	  2007,	  2).141	  
	  
VI.	  Rupture	  
By	  mid-­‐century	  American	  society	  had	  become,	  in	  the	  view	  of	  many	  observers,	  a	  
mass	  society;	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  dominant	  media,	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  simultaneously	  
accessible	  to	  millions	  of	  people,	  was,	  to	  these	  observers,	  an	  obvious	  part	  of	  the	  new	  
social	  order.142	  The	  exact	  meaning	  of	  mass	  society	  was	  debated	  but	  it	  had	  become	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141	  As	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  and	  the	  Vietnam	  war	  became	  important	  forces	  in	  American	  
social	  and	  political	  life	  it	  was	  increasingly	  apparent	  that	  advertiser-­‐sponsored	  commercial	  
television	  offered	  Americans	  a	  limited	  view	  of	  the	  world.	  Prominent	  figures	  in	  the	  world	  of	  
commercial	  broadcasting,	  including	  CBS	  president	  Pat	  Weaver	  and	  former	  CBS	  News	  
president	  Fred	  Friendly,	  began	  calling	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  non-­‐commercial	  television	  to	  
supplement	  the	  networks’	  offerings.	  Eager	  to	  maintain	  consensus	  about	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam	  
President	  Johnson	  decided	  to	  support	  the	  rising	  tide	  of	  calls	  for	  a	  non-­‐commercial	  television	  
system.	  On	  November	  7,	  1967	  the	  Corporation	  for	  Public	  Broadcasting	  was	  established	  
under	  law.	  If	  it	  initially	  seemed	  that	  Johnson	  was	  creating	  space	  for	  his	  critics	  on	  the	  
airwaves	  the	  reality	  quickly	  became	  apparent.	  The	  Corporation	  for	  Public	  Broadcasting	  was	  
given	  a	  first-­‐year	  appropriation	  of	  only	  $4.5	  million,	  and	  Johnson	  chose	  as	  its	  head	  a	  former	  
Secretary	  of	  the	  Army	  who	  had	  been	  working	  as	  the	  CEO	  of	  military	  contractor	  General	  
Dynamics.	  The	  new	  chairman’s	  views	  on	  using	  noncommercial	  television	  as	  a	  venue	  for	  
dissenting	  voices	  was	  also	  immediately	  clear	  –	  one	  of	  his	  first	  actions	  was	  commissioning	  an	  
inquiry	  into	  how	  public	  television	  could	  be	  used	  for	  riot	  control	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  399).	  
Despite	  these	  initial	  hurdles,	  and	  despite	  being	  dwarfed	  by	  the	  power	  of	  commercial	  
television	  networks,	  public	  television	  would	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  American	  
television	  landscape,	  with	  several	  long-­‐running	  award-­‐winning	  programs	  including	  the	  
children’s	  program	  Sesame	  Street	  (1969-­‐present),	  the	  investigative	  news	  program	  Frontline	  
(1983-­‐present),	  the	  science	  program	  Nova	  (1974-­‐present),	  and	  anthology	  programs	  like	  
Masterpiece	  (1971-­‐present).	  
	  
142	  By	  the	  1970s	  Americans	  watched	  3	  hours	  of	  TV	  and	  listened	  to	  3	  hours	  of	  radio	  per	  day,	  
watched	  4	  or	  5	  movies	  per	  year,	  and	  %80	  percent	  of	  them	  read	  daily	  newspapers.	  Radio,	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clear	  that	  this	  signaled	  something	  about	  the	  unique	  character	  of	  American	  life	  in	  the	  
post-­‐war	  decades.	  For	  the	  millennial	  American	  this	  mid-­‐century	  world	  with	  its	  mass	  
media,	  its	  social	  imaginary,	  and	  its	  national	  ideology	  is	  the	  background	  against	  
which	  changes	  in	  technology,	  in	  society,	  and	  in	  the	  status	  of	  the	  United	  States	  on	  the	  
world	  stage	  are	  experienced.	  And	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  describing	  these	  changes	  
has	  been	  one	  of	  fragmentation.	  
In	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  radically	  new	  communication	  technologies	  entered	  
the	  home	  and	  American	  ideological	  cohesion	  began	  to	  fragment	  amidst	  so-­‐called	  
culture	  wars.143	  The	  American	  social	  order	  was	  undeniably	  changing	  and	  these	  
changes	  were	  widely	  imagined	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  decline	  of	  older	  forms	  –	  the	  decline	  of	  
mass	  society	  and	  the	  mass	  media	  that	  had	  been	  the	  most	  visible	  markers	  of	  mid-­‐
century	  American	  life.	  If	  mid-­‐century	  was	  the	  era	  of	  the	  mass	  man,	  working	  in	  the	  
Fordist	  workplace,	  living	  in	  the	  suburbs,	  and	  sharing	  in	  a	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  
homogeneous	  American	  way	  of	  life,	  the	  millennial	  United	  States	  is	  often	  imagined	  as	  
a	  world	  of	  isolated	  individuals	  alienated	  from	  any	  kind	  of	  coherent	  American	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
television,	  and	  newspaper	  data	  are	  from	  GSS.	  Variables	  are	  tvhours	  (3.05	  hours	  per	  day	  in	  
1975),	  radiohrs	  (3.23	  hours	  per	  day	  in	  1978),	  news	  (1346	  of	  1611	  respondents	  read	  
newspaper	  at	  least	  a	  few	  times	  per	  week	  in	  1972	  survey)	  (T.	  W.	  Smith	  et	  al.	  2013).	  Movie	  
data	  from	  Historical	  Statistics	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (Weiss	  2006).	  
	  
143	  The	  booming	  American	  post-­‐war	  industrial	  economy	  faced	  its	  first	  major	  challenge	  
beginning	  in	  the	  early	  1970s	  when	  domestic	  oil	  production	  peaked.	  In	  October	  1973	  the	  
members	  of	  the	  Organization	  of	  Arab	  Petroleum	  Exporting	  Countries	  (OAPEC)	  proclaimed	  
an	  embargo	  on	  the	  United	  States	  in	  retaliation	  for	  American	  support	  of	  Israel,	  causing	  the	  
price	  of	  oil	  to	  skyrocket	  and	  compounding	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  January	  1973	  stock	  market	  
collapse.	  These	  events,	  together	  with	  broader	  changes	  in	  the	  world	  economy	  set	  off	  a	  
decade	  of	  high	  inflation	  and	  unemployment	  in	  the	  United	  States.143	  This	  was	  the	  context	  in	  
which	  Ronald	  Reagan	  won	  the	  presidency	  in	  1980;	  and	  his	  presidency	  was	  largely	  defined	  
by	  a	  sweeping	  agenda	  of	  reforms	  that	  reshaped	  the	  American	  economy.	  Deregulation	  and	  
privatization	  became	  the	  watchwords	  of	  “Reaganomics.”	  They	  returned	  the	  country	  to	  a	  
market-­‐oriented	  mode	  of	  social	  coordination	  and	  had	  important	  consequences	  for	  the	  
structure	  of	  both	  the	  dominant	  media	  and	  the	  public	  sphere.	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experience.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  what	  I	  call	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  media	  narrative	  has	  
emerged	  as	  a	  dominant	  account	  of	  the	  new	  order	  of	  American	  communications.	  
Underlying	  this	  narrative	  is	  a	  rupture	  in	  the	  historic	  logic	  of	  mass	  media	  institutions.	  
While	  these	  institutions	  had	  formerly	  been	  guided	  by	  the	  logic	  of	  audience	  
aggregation,	  in	  the	  last	  decades	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  they	  adopted	  a	  new	  guiding	  
principle	  –	  audience	  segmentation.	  
	  
	   Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  advertisers	  had	  become	  increasingly	  
interested	  in	  the	  prospect	  of	  more	  effectively	  targeting	  their	  sales	  pitches.	  In	  print	  
this	  had	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  publications	  that	  were	  increasingly	  tailored	  to	  
particular	  segments	  of	  the	  population.	  In	  television	  though,	  audience	  segmentation	  
posed	  a	  bigger	  problem.	  Television	  was	  still	  dominated	  by	  the	  big-­‐three	  networks,	  
NBC,	  CBS,	  and	  ABC,	  whose	  dominance	  was	  secured	  by	  the	  enormous	  initial	  
investment	  needed	  to	  launch	  additional	  national	  broadcast	  networks.	  In	  1976	  
though,	  Ted	  Turner	  began	  to	  transmit	  broadcasts	  from	  his	  Atlanta-­‐based	  TV	  station	  
to	  cable-­‐television	  providers	  around	  the	  country.	  This	  constituted	  a	  technical	  and	  
organizational	  breakthrough.	  Cable	  television	  had	  previously	  served	  as	  an	  
alternative	  to	  antenna-­‐based	  reception,	  primarily	  in	  areas	  that	  were	  underserved	  or	  
where	  geographic	  features	  interfered	  with	  broadcast	  signals.	  By	  the	  1980s	  though	  
many	  stations	  followed	  Turner’s	  lead	  and	  cable	  television	  brought	  dozens	  of	  
channels	  into	  American	  homes,	  inaugurating	  a	  wave	  of	  audience	  segmentation	  in	  
the	  nation’s	  most	  popular	  medium.	  By	  the	  early	  1990s	  the	  mass	  audiences	  that	  had	  
dominated	  the	  1950s,	  1960s,	  and	  1970s,	  had	  become	  divided	  among	  a	  broad	  range	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of	  TV	  channels	  and	  special-­‐interest	  publications.	  The	  mass	  character	  of	  the	  
dominant	  media	  seemed	  to	  be	  declining.	  These	  are	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐
media	  narrative.	  
By	  the	  1990s	  there	  were	  two	  dominant	  accounts	  of	  the	  fragmentation	  in	  the	  
media	  that	  had	  taken	  place	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  preceding	  decades.	  One	  
emphasized	  a	  technological	  revolution	  that	  had	  made	  segmentation	  possible,	  the	  
other	  emphasized	  the	  role	  of	  marketers,	  for	  whom	  segmentation	  was	  a	  profit-­‐
maximizing	  strategy.	  In	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  for	  instance,	  Nicholas	  Negroponte,	  the	  
founder	  of	  MIT’s	  Media	  Lab,	  prominently	  argued	  that	  the	  capabilities	  of	  new	  
technologies	  would	  account	  for	  a	  transformation	  from	  the	  indiscriminate	  
information	  delivery	  that	  characterized	  mass	  media	  to	  a	  new	  form	  of	  hyper-­‐
customization	  suited	  to	  each	  individual’s	  interests	  (Negroponte	  1995).	  Similarly,	  in	  
an	  influential	  book	  on	  marketing,	  The	  One	  to	  One	  Future,	  Don	  Pepper	  and	  Martha	  
Rodgers	  predicted	  that	  patterns	  of	  segmentation	  would	  continue,	  particularly	  as	  
new	  technologies	  would	  increasingly	  enable	  firms	  to	  engage	  with	  consumers	  on	  an	  
individual	  level	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  mass	  (Peppers	  and	  Rogers	  1993).	  The	  alternative	  to	  
the	  technological	  determinism	  of	  these	  accounts	  was	  represented	  by	  observers	  like	  
Joseph	  Turow	  who	  argued	  that	  advertisers	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  constitution	  
of	  the	  media	  and	  that	  their	  interests	  are	  what	  accounted	  for	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  
mass	  media	  and,	  more	  generally,	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  American	  society	  (Turrow	  
1998).144	  Although,	  Turow’s	  analysis	  emphasizes	  transformations	  in	  the	  media	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  Turow	  described	  the	  fragmentation	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  late	  decades	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  
as	  a	  shift	  from	  what	  he	  called	  society-­‐making	  media	  towards	  segment-­‐making	  media.	  
Segment-­‐making	  media,	  in	  Turow’s	  account,	  are	  those	  media	  that	  isolate	  segments	  of	  the	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have	  taken	  place	  since	  the	  1970s,	  he	  finds	  the	  roots	  of	  segmentation	  earlier	  in	  the	  
20th	  century.	  The	  New	  Yorker,	  for	  instance,	  began	  publication	  in	  1925	  and	  was	  
explicitly	  tailored	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  elites.	  The	  magazine’s	  publishers	  were	  explicit	  
about	  their	  intention	  of	  publishing	  a	  niche	  magazine,	  as	  stated	  in	  their	  prospectus.	  
The	  New	  Yorker	  will	  be	  the	  magazine	  which	  is	  not	  edited	  for	  the	  old	  lady	  in	  
Dubuque.	  It	  will	  not	  be	  concerned	  with	  what	  she	  is	  thinking	  about.	  This	  is	  not	  meant	  
in	  disrespect,	  but	  the	  New	  Yorker	  is	  a	  magazine	  avowedly	  published	  for	  a	  
metropolitan	  audience	  and	  thereby	  will	  escape	  an	  influence	  which	  hampers	  most	  
national	  publications.	  (Tebbel	  and	  Zuckerman	  1991,	  219)	  
This	  foreshadowed	  a	  second	  wave	  of	  magazine-­‐industry	  specialization	  in	  the	  1960s	  
and	  1970s	  (Tebbel	  and	  Zuckerman	  1991,	  239).	  
	   Despite	  early	  moves	  towards	  specialization	  in	  mass	  media	  industries	  (more	  
of	  which	  are	  discussed	  below),	  the	  fact	  that	  segmentation	  only	  took	  off	  on	  a	  large	  
scale	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  mid-­‐
century	  mass	  society	  was	  the	  product	  of	  more	  than	  new	  profit-­‐maximizing	  
strategies	  among	  marketers.	  This	  transformation	  was	  the	  product	  of	  a	  specific	  
historical	  conjuncture,	  which	  included	  the	  influence	  of	  advertiser	  agendas	  and	  new	  
technologies,	  but	  also	  included	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  organization	  of	  society,	  and	  which	  has	  
led	  to	  a	  basic	  reconfiguration	  in	  the	  logic	  by	  which	  media	  firms	  engaged	  with	  
audiences.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
population	  from	  each	  other,	  promoting	  dialogue	  only	  within	  homogenous	  groups.	  Society-­‐
making	  media,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  facilitate	  dialogue	  between	  groups	  (Turow	  1998,	  3).	  
Turow’s	  well-­‐argued	  and	  thoroughly	  researched	  book	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  the	  death-­‐of-­‐
mass-­‐media	  narrative.	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Segmentation	  as	  Strategy	  
Forward-­‐looking	  commentators	  had	  already	  recognized	  the	  potential	  of	  
market	  segmentation	  in	  the	  mid	  1950s.	  In	  a	  landmark	  1956	  article	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  
Marketing	  for	  instance,	  Wendell	  Smith	  proposed	  that	  differentiation	  of	  products	  and	  
segmentation	  of	  markets	  could	  be	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  twin	  specters	  of	  market-­‐
saturation	  and	  inter-­‐firm	  competition.	  Smith	  defined	  the	  strategy	  concisely:	  “In	  its	  
simplest	  terms,	  product	  differentiation	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  bending	  of	  demand	  to	  
the	  will	  of	  supply”	  (W.	  R.	  Smith	  1956,	  5).	  Two	  years	  later	  former-­‐sociologist	  Pierre	  
Martineau	  explained	  the	  factors	  that	  make	  segmentation	  both	  possible	  and	  
profitable.	  The	  limited	  market	  segmentation	  that	  had	  existed	  in	  the	  1950s,	  
Martineau	  noted,	  was	  structured	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  consumer	  income,	  but	  social	  
class,	  which	  included	  status,	  psychology,	  and	  cultural	  differences,	  offered	  a	  deeper	  
basis	  for	  understanding	  the	  differential	  motivations	  that	  drive	  consumer	  choice	  and	  
would	  therefore	  allow	  for	  market	  segmentation	  on	  a	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  scale	  
(Martineau	  1958).	  
	   Interest	  in	  segmentation	  as	  a	  profit-­‐maximizing	  strategy	  gained	  momentum	  
in	  the	  1960s.	  A	  1960	  textbook	  on	  advertising,	  for	  instance,	  cautioned	  its	  readers	  
against	  conceiving	  of	  the	  market	  as	  a	  homogeneous	  mass.	  
‘The	  market'	  is	  not	  a	  single,	  cohesive	  unit;	  it	  is	  a	  seething,	  disparate,	  pullulating,	  
antagonistic,	  infinitely	  varied	  sea	  of	  differing	  human	  beings	  –	  every	  one	  of	  them	  as	  
distinct	  from	  every	  other	  one	  as	  finger-­‐prints;	  every	  one	  of	  them	  living	  in	  
circumstances	  different	  in	  countless	  ways	  from	  those	  in	  which	  every	  other	  one	  of	  
them	  is	  living.	  (Weir	  1960)	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In	  1964	  Daniel	  Yankelovitch	  published	  an	  influential	  article	  on	  market	  segmentation	  
in	  the	  Harvard	  Business	  Review,	  which	  prompted	  a	  wave	  of	  studies	  into	  buyer	  
attitudes.	  In	  his	  article	  Yankelovitch	  analyzed	  the	  meanings	  that	  different	  types	  of	  
consumers	  attribute	  to	  the	  products	  that	  they	  purchase,	  arguing	  that	  marketers	  
should	  tailor	  their	  products	  to	  satisfy	  the	  attitudes	  of	  each	  segment	  of	  consumers	  
(Yankelovich	  1964).	  Large	  firms	  increasingly	  implemented	  the	  segmentation	  
strategies	  that	  Yankelovitch	  advocated,	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  mimicking	  the	  successes	  he	  
described.	  
The	  benefits	  of	  segmentation	  had	  become	  clear	  by	  the	  1960s,	  but	  these	  could	  
only	  be	  realized	  if	  marketers	  had	  an	  effective	  way	  of	  reaching	  specific	  segments	  of	  
the	  market	  without	  wasting	  ad-­‐dollars	  on	  mass-­‐market	  appeals.	  During	  the	  heyday	  
of	  mass	  media	  advertisers	  had	  a	  limited	  degree	  of	  control	  in	  targeting	  their	  
advertisements.	  For	  instance	  ads	  broadcast	  on	  daytime	  television	  generally	  targeted	  
women,	  who	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  at	  home	  during	  those	  hours.	  Nonetheless	  most	  
of	  the	  television	  landscape	  of	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  was	  intended	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  
broadest	  possible	  audience	  and	  opportunities	  for	  reaching	  a	  specific	  category	  of	  
viewers	  were	  limited.	  By	  the	  1970s	  though,	  audience	  segmentation	  took	  center	  
stage	  in	  the	  strategies	  of	  advertisers	  and	  media	  executives	  began	  to	  design	  offerings	  
that	  targeted	  increasingly	  specific	  demographic	  groups.	  
For	  TV	  networks,	  capitalizing	  on	  advertiser	  interest	  in	  market	  segmentation	  
meant	  demonstrating	  television’s	  ability	  to	  reach	  particular	  types	  of	  viewers.	  In	  the	  
early	  1970s,	  for	  instance,	  CBS	  sent	  its	  sponsors	  a	  promotional	  pamphlet	  titled	  
Where	  the	  Girls	  Are,	  which	  provided	  information	  about	  the	  ages	  of	  women	  most	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likely	  to	  buy	  certain	  products	  and	  showed	  advertisers	  how	  they	  could	  use	  Nielsen	  
ratings	  data	  to	  most	  accurately	  reach	  their	  target	  audience.145	  These	  were	  still	  early	  
days	  for	  segmentation	  though,	  and	  both	  networks	  and	  advertisers	  would	  soon	  
become	  far	  more	  sophisticated	  in	  their	  ad-­‐targeting	  strategies.	  
More	  effective	  demographic	  targeting	  meant	  that	  advertisements	  would	  
become	  more	  effective	  –	  and	  more	  valuable.	  By	  1970	  total	  US	  ad	  spending	  had	  
reached	  nearly	  $20	  billion	  annually,	  with	  TV	  advertising	  accounting	  for	  more	  than	  
$3.5	  billion.	  By	  1979	  these	  numbers	  had	  risen	  to	  $48	  billion	  and	  $10	  billion	  
respectively	  (Raff	  2006).	  This	  increase	  in	  ad	  spending	  was	  largely	  the	  result	  of	  
increasingly	  effective	  strategies	  of	  reaching	  specific	  types	  of	  viewers,	  which	  
increased	  the	  value	  of	  these	  ads	  –	  the	  value	  of	  TV	  advertisements	  had	  nearly	  tripled	  
over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  decade,	  while	  the	  number	  of	  households	  with	  TV	  sets	  
increased	  by	  only	  25%	  (Field	  2006).	  
The	  rising	  importance	  of	  demographics	  began	  to	  transform	  the	  content	  of	  
television	  broadcasts,	  and	  even	  popular	  shows	  could	  be	  canceled	  if	  they	  failed	  to	  
reach	  the	  specific	  audiences	  that	  advertisers	  coveted.	  In	  the	  fall	  of	  1975	  for	  instance,	  
the	  popular	  CBS	  show	  Gunsmoke,	  still	  in	  the	  top	  30,	  was	  cancelled	  to	  make	  room	  for	  
Rhoda	  and	  Phyllis,	  two	  female-­‐oriented	  spinoffs	  of	  the	  Mary	  Tyler	  Moore	  Show,	  
which	  appealed	  to	  younger	  audiences	  (Laurent	  1975).	  
	   The	  rising	  effectiveness	  of	  ad	  targeting	  was	  met	  with	  some	  resistance,	  
particularly	  when	  ads	  targeted	  children.	  By	  the	  late	  1970s,	  for	  instance,	  a	  national	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  The	  pamphlet	  was	  addressed	  to	  CBS’s	  sponsors:	  “What	  can	  you	  learn	  from	  a	  woman’s	  
age?	  More	  today	  than	  you	  might	  suppose.	  Such	  as	  what	  she	  buys.	  What	  television	  shows	  she	  
watches.	  And	  what	  a	  knowing	  advertiser	  can	  do	  about	  it”	  (Barnouw	  1990,	  471).	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debate	  had	  emerged	  over	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission’s	  proposed	  ban	  on	  TV	  
advertisements	  aimed	  at	  children.	  In	  an	  article	  about	  the	  proposed	  ban,	  the	  
Washington	  Post	  informed	  readers	  that	  the	  average	  child	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  2	  and	  
11	  sees	  20,000	  TV	  commercials	  a	  year,	  the	  equivalent	  of	  three	  house	  of	  
advertisements	  per	  week,	  and	  spends	  more	  time	  watching	  TV	  than	  in	  the	  classroom	  
(Shifrin	  1978).	  Another	  article	  on	  the	  proposed	  ban	  informed	  readers	  that	  more	  
than	  half	  of	  the	  students	  in	  a	  Connecticut	  third-­‐grade	  class,	  when	  asked	  to	  spell	  the	  
word	  “relief”	  on	  a	  spelling	  quiz,	  wrote	  R-­‐O-­‐L-­‐A-­‐I-­‐D-­‐S.	  A	  popular	  TV	  commercial	  for	  
the	  ant-­‐acid	  Rolaids,	  showed	  man-­‐on-­‐the-­‐street	  style	  clips	  of	  people	  saying	  that	  R-­‐O-­‐
L-­‐A-­‐I-­‐D-­‐S	  spells	  relief	  (Kramer	  1979a).	  
Before	  a	  decision	  on	  the	  ban	  had	  been	  reached	  TV	  networks	  took	  steps	  to	  
address	  concerns	  themselves	  rather	  than	  submit	  to	  federal	  regulation	  and	  risk	  
losing	  the	  $600	  million	  spent	  annually	  on	  ads	  placed	  alongside	  children’s	  
programming	  (Hinds	  1981).	  In	  January	  of	  1979,	  for	  instance,	  ABC	  announced	  a	  plan	  
to	  reduce	  ads	  directed	  at	  children	  by	  20%	  (Kramer	  1979b).	  By	  October	  1981	  
though,	  the	  proposed	  ban	  was	  abandoned	  on	  the	  same	  day	  that	  Reagan-­‐
administration	  economist	  James	  C.	  Miller	  III	  was	  appointed	  as	  the	  new	  chairman	  of	  
the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  (Brown	  1981).	  Reaganomics	  meant	  that	  for	  better	  or	  
worse	  corporate	  interests	  trumped	  government	  intervention.	  
	  
By	  the	  start	  of	  the	  1980s	  it	  had	  become	  clear	  that	  new	  media	  technologies,	  
able	  to	  offer	  audiences	  more	  choices,	  would	  become	  central	  to	  the	  advertising	  
strategies	  of	  major	  firms.	  In	  October	  of	  1981	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Ford	  Motor	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Company	  described	  this	  as	  a	  shift	  from	  a	  “shotgun”	  approach	  to	  consumers	  –	  which	  
was	  the	  strategy	  of	  older	  mass	  media	  such	  as	  network	  TV	  and	  wide-­‐circulation	  
newspapers	  –	  to	  “rifles”	  that	  could	  more	  effectively	  target	  specific	  groups	  of	  
consumers	  (“Net	  TV	  Won’t	  Dominate:	  Ford	  Boss	  Outlines	  Shift	  to	  ‘Rifle’	  Media”	  
1981,	  1).	  Cable	  TV	  was	  at	  the	  vanguard	  of	  these	  new	  media	  “rifles.”	  By	  1981	  cable	  
television	  had	  18.3	  million	  subscribers,	  or	  one	  for	  every	  five	  TV	  households.	  By	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  decade	  that	  number	  would	  more	  than	  double	  to	  50	  million	  subscribers,	  or	  
over	  50%	  of	  TV	  households	  (Field	  2006).	  The	  growth	  in	  cable	  ad	  revenues	  was	  even	  
more	  impressive.	  In	  1981	  advertisers	  spent	  $72	  million	  on	  cable	  ads;	  by	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  decade	  that	  number	  had	  risen	  to	  over	  $2	  billion	  (Raff	  2006).	  
Major	  media	  firms	  rapidly	  entered	  the	  new	  cable-­‐TV	  market,	  launching	  new	  
ad-­‐supported	  channels	  to	  reach	  specific	  types	  of	  viewers.	  In	  1981	  Advertising	  Age	  
summarized	  the	  rapidly-­‐evolving	  landscape	  of	  targeted	  cable	  channels:	  the	  Health	  
Channel	  and	  Hearst-­‐ABC	  Daytime	  targeted	  women,	  Warner’s	  Music	  Television	  
targeted	  teens	  and	  young	  adults,	  ABC’s	  ARTS	  targeted	  culture-­‐lovers,	  ESPN	  targeted	  
men,	  Ted	  Turner’s	  CNN	  and	  Westinghouse’s	  Satellite	  NewsChannels	  targeted	  news	  
buffs,	  BET	  targeted	  blacks,	  Spanish	  International	  Network	  targeted	  Hispanics,	  
Christian	  Broadcasting	  Network	  targeted	  Christians,	  the	  Weather	  Channel	  targeted	  
travelers,	  and	  UTV	  targeted	  game-­‐show	  fans	  (Christopher	  1981;	  Turow	  1998).	  This	  
rise	  of	  targeted	  media	  “rifles”	  meant	  the	  decline	  of	  older	  mass-­‐media	  “shotguns”	  like	  
network	  television.	  By	  undermining	  the	  mass	  media	  these	  new	  media	  seemed	  to	  be	  
undermining	  the	  lynchpin	  of	  mass	  society.	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   Network	  ad	  spending	  still	  far	  outweighed	  spending	  on	  cable	  ads,	  but	  cable	  
was	  gaining	  ground	  in	  the	  ratings.	  Between	  1976	  and	  1981,	  Advertising	  Age	  
reported,	  the	  Big	  3	  broadcast	  networks	  had	  lost	  5	  percent	  of	  prime-­‐time	  viewing	  
households	  to	  cable	  (Reiss	  1983).	  More	  significantly	  though,	  cable	  was	  increasingly	  
seen	  as	  the	  way	  to	  reach	  affluent	  suburban	  viewers.	  Cable	  was	  disproportionately	  
present	  in	  higher	  income	  households,	  which	  meant	  that	  broadcast	  networks	  
increasingly	  delivered	  a	  lower-­‐income	  audience	  to	  advertisers.146	  
While	  effective	  segmentation	  of	  audiences	  called	  for	  the	  development	  of	  new	  
media	  technologies	  geared	  towards	  targeted	  delivery	  it	  also	  meant	  that	  new	  
techniques	  would	  be	  needed	  for	  monitoring	  audience	  behavior	  and	  for	  identifying	  
the	  segments	  that	  advertisers	  increasingly	  coveted.	  An	  important	  step	  in	  that	  
direction	  would	  come	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  when	  the	  leading	  TV	  ratings	  agency,	  
Nielsen,	  began	  offering	  ratings	  on	  an	  individual	  level	  rather	  than	  by	  household.	  This	  
allowed	  a	  new	  degree	  of	  specificity	  in	  both	  the	  tailoring	  of	  media	  content	  to	  
particular	  slices	  of	  the	  audience	  and	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  marketers	  to	  target	  particular	  
consumers.147	  The	  fact	  that	  new	  technologies	  for	  monitoring	  audience	  behavior	  
increased	  the	  power	  of	  both	  advertisers	  and	  media	  firms	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  
American	  public,	  which	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  concerned	  about	  its	  loss	  of	  
privacy.	  1984	  was	  the	  year	  in	  which	  George	  Orwell	  had	  set	  his	  story	  of	  a	  dystopian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  In	  1983	  the	  head	  of	  the	  USA	  cable	  network,	  co-­‐owned	  by	  Time,	  Paramount,	  and	  MCA,	  
described	  the	  worlds	  of	  cable	  and	  broadcast	  as	  two	  different	  “universes,”	  one	  of	  affluent	  
suburban	  viewers,	  the	  other	  composed	  of	  everyone	  else	  (Spillman	  1983).	  
	  
147	  In	  December	  of	  1984	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Advertising	  Research	  Foundation	  called	  this	  
new	  ratings	  strategy	  “the	  No.	  1	  issue	  in	  TV	  today”	  (Mandese	  1984).	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surveillance	  state,	  and	  observers	  of	  the	  increased	  power	  of	  media	  firms	  noted	  the	  
similarities	  between	  his	  fiction	  and	  their	  reality.148	  
	   As	  the	  power	  of	  marketers	  grew	  viewers	  found	  ways	  to	  push	  back,	  aided	  by	  
new	  customer-­‐oriented	  technologies.	  The	  most	  significant	  of	  these	  was	  the	  Video	  
Cassette	  Recorder	  (VCR),	  which	  allowed	  viewers	  to	  record	  TV-­‐shows	  and	  watch	  
them	  at	  their	  leisure,	  skipping	  over	  commercials.	  By	  1985	  20%	  of	  American	  
television	  homes	  also	  had	  VCRs	  (Field	  2006).	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  framed	  the	  new	  
device	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  struggle	  between	  viewers	  and	  advertisers:	  "after	  years	  of	  
submitting	  passively	  to	  the	  tyranny	  of	  television	  programmers,	  viewers	  are	  taking	  
charge"	  (S.	  B.	  Smith	  1985).	  
	   The	  introduction	  of	  VCRs	  into	  American	  homes	  had	  significance	  beyond	  
offering	  viewers	  commercial-­‐free	  television.	  One	  of	  the	  distinct	  features	  of	  
broadcast	  media	  was	  their	  simultaneity.	  Not	  only	  did	  television	  reach	  large	  
audiences,	  it	  reached	  them	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Simultaneity	  was	  one	  of	  the	  defining	  
characteristics	  of	  mass	  media	  and	  played	  a	  central	  part	  in	  shaping	  the	  public	  sphere.	  
150	  years	  before	  the	  VCR	  was	  introduced	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville	  had	  noted	  the	  
importance	  of	  simultaneity	  in	  shaping	  democratic	  publics:	  “Only	  a	  newspaper	  can	  
put	  the	  same	  thought	  at	  the	  same	  time	  before	  a	  thousand	  readers…	  So	  hardly	  any	  
democratic	  association	  can	  carry	  on	  without	  a	  newspaper”	  (Tocqueville	  1835,	  289).	  
TV	  had	  largely	  taken	  the	  place	  of	  newspapers,	  putting	  the	  same	  sounds	  and	  images	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148	  Commenting	  on	  a	  new	  method	  of	  monitoring	  individual	  purchases	  and	  correlating	  them	  
to	  ad	  exposure,	  one	  Washington	  Post	  commentator,	  for	  instance,	  wrote,	  “just	  when	  you	  
thought	  1984	  was	  about	  to	  slip	  harmlessly	  away,	  along	  comes	  the	  ‘RD-­‐100	  People	  Meter	  
and	  Data	  Scan	  Wand’	  –	  a	  major	  breakthrough	  in	  computerized	  surveillance	  of	  your	  living	  
room	  and	  kitchen"	  (Reid	  1984).	  
	  153	  
before	  millions	  of	  Americans	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  shaping	  mid-­‐century	  mass	  
society.	  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  VCR	  though,	  inaugurated	  an	  era	  of	  “time-­‐shifting,”	  
removing	  simultaneity	  from	  the	  logic	  of	  television.	  As	  marketers	  were	  driving	  
demographic	  segmentation	  of	  audiences,	  audiences	  were	  pushing	  back	  by	  
segmenting	  themselves	  temporally.	  By	  1995	  over	  80%	  of	  TV	  homes	  had	  VCRs	  
making	  time-­‐shifting	  commonplace	  among	  viewers	  (Field	  2006).	  A	  decade	  later	  new	  
Internet-­‐based	  technologies	  would	  remove	  simultaneity	  from	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  
dominant	  media	  almost	  entirely.	  
	  
New	  Segments	  
	   The	  dominance	  of	  audience	  segmentation	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  had	  led	  to	  the	  
development	  of	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  new	  consumer	  identities.	  In	  March	  1986,	  for	  
instance,	  Vogue	  magazine,	  generally	  filled	  with	  images	  of	  svelte	  fashion	  models,	  
introduced	  a	  32-­‐page	  promotional	  insert	  called	  “Fashion	  Plus”	  aimed	  at	  “the	  upscale	  
segment	  of	  the	  large-­‐size	  women’s	  market”	  (Polakov	  1986).	  Similarly,	  in	  April	  of	  
1986,	  the	  78-­‐year	  old	  clothing	  make	  Jantzen	  introduced	  a	  new	  line	  of	  bikini	  swim-­‐
suits	  aimed	  at	  “working	  women	  with	  disposable	  income,”	  an	  older	  group	  than	  the	  
traditional	  bikini-­‐consumer	  (Magiera	  1986).	  Meanwhile	  the	  baking	  goods	  brand	  
Betty	  Crocker	  updated	  the	  image	  of	  their	  mascot	  to	  reflect	  their	  new	  ideal	  
consumer,	  a	  well-­‐dressed	  businesswoman	  in	  her	  30s	  (“Thoroughly	  Modern	  Betty”	  
1986).	  As	  working-­‐women	  found	  their	  identity	  represented	  by	  a	  coherent	  set	  of	  
marketing	  appeals,	  others	  found	  themselves	  described	  as	  “New	  Traditionalists”	  by	  
the	  magazine	  Good	  Housekeeping,	  which	  targeted	  “the	  contemporary	  woman	  who	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has	  made	  a	  new	  commitment	  to	  the	  traditional	  values	  that	  some	  people	  thought	  
were	  ‘old-­‐fashioned’”	  (Sloan	  1988).	  The	  following	  year,	  Good	  Housekeeping	  launched	  
a	  new	  edition,	  “The	  Best	  in	  the	  House,”	  aimed	  at	  further	  segmenting	  their	  audience	  
and	  targeting	  households	  with	  median	  incomes	  of	  $44,000.149	  
In	  the	  1980s	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  “demographic	  editions”	  of	  magazines	  were	  
launched,	  aimed	  at	  targeting	  progressively	  narrower	  segments	  of	  the	  reading	  
public:	  Volume	  was	  a	  general-­‐interest	  magazine	  targeting	  college	  students	  and	  
published	  in	  separate	  male	  and	  female	  editions	  (“Back	  to	  School;	  Freshman	  Class	  of	  
Magazines	  Demonstrate	  Potential”	  1989);	  Fishworld	  magazine	  split	  itself	  into	  
“freshwater”	  and	  “saltwater”	  editions	  (“‘Fishing	  World’	  Splits”	  1986);	  Field	  &	  Stream	  
magazine	  launched	  a	  “Trophy”	  edition	  targeting	  500,000	  subscribers	  in	  the	  most	  
affluent	  zip	  codes	  (“Information	  on	  New	  Publication	  Launches”	  1986).	  At	  the	  
extreme,	  certain	  publications	  took	  advantage	  of	  new	  computer	  and	  inkjet	  printing	  
technologies	  to	  publish	  highly-­‐customized	  versions	  of	  their	  magazines,	  tailored	  to	  
an	  almost	  reader-­‐specific	  degree.	  The	  agricultural	  business	  magazine	  Farm	  Journal,	  
for	  instance,	  used	  a	  database	  of	  telephone	  surveys	  of	  its	  readers	  to	  publish	  between	  
two-­‐	  and	  three	  thousand	  distinct	  editions	  of	  each	  issue	  by	  the	  early	  1990s	  (Rapp	  
and	  Collins	  1990,	  97).	  
Other	  media	  began	  focusing	  on	  particular	  segments	  of	  the	  population	  as	  well,	  
inaugurating	  new	  consumer	  identities	  in	  the	  process.	  Radio	  stations	  increasingly	  
focused	  on	  specific	  groups	  of	  people	  with	  shared	  tastes.	  By	  the	  1990s	  listeners	  could	  
tune	  into	  as	  many	  as	  30	  stations	  in	  large	  cities,	  each	  offering	  a	  selection	  of	  music	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149	  Roughly	  $82,000	  in	  2013	  dollars.	  Adjusted	  using	  CPI.	  
	  155	  
commentary	  tailored	  to	  a	  particular	  demographic	  group	  –	  black,	  white,	  Hispanic,	  
young,	  old,	  country	  music	  fans,	  sport	  fans,	  etc.	  (Turow	  1998,	  98).	  New	  offerings	  also	  
emerged	  in	  the	  motion	  picture	  industry,	  designed	  to	  appeal	  to	  newly-­‐identified	  sub-­‐
segments	  of	  the	  population,	  such	  as	  Generation	  X,	  the	  generation	  that	  followed	  the	  
post-­‐war	  baby	  boomers.	  Stephen	  Soderberg’s	  award-­‐winning	  film	  Sex,	  Lies,	  and	  
Videotape	  (1989),	  for	  instance,	  appealed	  directly	  to	  Gen-­‐Xers	  disaffected	  with	  
yuppie	  culture	  and	  the	  materialism	  of	  the	  1980s.	  Soderberg’s	  film	  kicked	  off	  an	  
independent	  film	  movement	  that	  defined	  much	  of	  the	  1990s,	  as	  low-­‐budget	  films	  
offered	  idiosyncratic	  alternatives	  to	  large	  studio	  movies	  designed	  to	  appeal	  to	  broad	  
audiences	  (Biskind	  2013).	  
Segmentation	  of	  markets	  and	  audiences	  was	  about	  more	  than	  satisfying	  
idiosyncratic	  tastes	  –	  it	  was	  also	  about	  generating	  new	  forms	  of	  demand	  by	  
producing	  new	  identities.	  In	  their	  popular	  marketing	  guide,	  The	  One	  to	  One	  Future,	  
which	  was	  published	  in	  1993,	  Don	  Pepper	  and	  Martha	  Rodgers	  suggested	  that	  many	  
brands	  were	  purchased	  not	  for	  the	  immediate	  satisfaction	  that	  they	  provide	  to	  their	  
users,	  but	  for	  their	  “badge”	  value	  –	  their	  ability	  to	  demonstrate	  belonging	  to	  a	  
certain	  group.	  
Sometimes	  a	  person	  simply	  wants	  to	  belong	  to	  a	  group	  of	  other,	  like-­‐minded	  
people…	  If	  you	  drive	  a	  new	  Jaguar,	  you	  might	  do	  so	  because	  you	  want	  to	  be	  seen	  to	  
be	  different	  from	  your	  neighbors,	  but	  you	  probably	  also	  want	  to	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  
similar	  to	  some	  other	  people	  you	  know	  who	  drive	  Jaguars.	  The	  same	  exact	  argument	  
applies	  if	  you	  drive	  a	  beat-­‐up	  old	  Pontiac	  Sunbird.	  (Peppers	  and	  Rogers	  1993,	  255)	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Beyond	  merely	  offering	  ways	  for	  consumers	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  membership	  in	  
certain	  identity	  groups,	  the	  efforts	  of	  marketers	  and	  media	  executives	  in	  the	  1980s	  
and	  1990s	  produced	  those	  identities	  as	  coherent,	  exclusive,	  and	  purchasable.	  
	   Identity-­‐construction	  had	  a	  broad	  impact	  on	  advertising	  because	  it	  required	  
both	  segmentation	  and,	  at	  times,	  broad-­‐based	  campaigns.	  It	  was	  not	  enough	  for	  
members	  of	  a	  group	  to	  identify	  themselves	  with	  a	  certain	  product	  –	  others	  needed	  
to	  recognize	  the	  association	  between	  particular	  products	  and	  identities	  as	  well.	  The	  
“badge”	  value	  of	  products	  was	  therefore	  often	  produced	  by	  advertising	  to	  broad	  
audiences	  even	  though	  the	  actual	  market	  for	  those	  products	  might	  remain	  narrow.	  
The	  Lamborghini	  car	  company,	  for	  instance,	  advertised	  its	  vehicles	  in	  large	  
circulation	  magazines,	  even	  though	  its	  cars	  were	  unaffordable	  to	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  
readers.	  The	  reason	  the	  company	  chose	  a	  broad	  advertising	  strategy	  was	  to	  inform	  
the	  masses	  of	  the	  car’s	  exclusivity,	  which	  made	  it	  more	  valuable	  to	  the	  small	  number	  
of	  people	  who	  could	  afford	  it	  (Turow	  1998,	  182).	  
	  
	   During	  the	  heyday	  of	  mass	  media,	  high	  barriers	  to	  entry	  kept	  many	  
marginalized	  groups	  from	  accessing	  the	  airwaves.	  The	  high	  cost	  of	  launching	  a	  radio	  
or	  television	  broadcast	  station	  for	  instance,	  meant	  that	  groups	  that	  were	  
marginalized	  by	  the	  mainstream	  national	  broadcasters	  often	  had	  no	  way	  of	  
accessing	  the	  airwaves.	  The	  rising	  possibilities	  for	  audience	  segmentation	  though,	  
meant	  that	  large	  firms	  could	  profit	  from	  both	  the	  mainstream	  and	  from	  previously-­‐
untapped	  minority	  markets	  –	  they	  could	  target	  minority	  groups	  through	  new	  
channels	  without	  offending	  their	  mainstream	  audiences.	  Meanwhile	  the	  broad	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changes	  in	  American	  culture	  that	  took	  place	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  meant	  that	  
various	  stigmas	  had	  begun	  to	  wane.	  In	  this	  context,	  many	  minority	  groups	  began,	  
paradoxically,	  to	  see	  their	  targeting	  by	  marketers	  as	  a	  signal	  of	  acceptance.	  This	  
trend	  is	  clear	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  gay	  market	  segment,	  which	  many	  marketers	  
had	  avoided	  throughout	  much	  of	  the	  1980s,	  despite	  acknowledging	  its	  spending-­‐
power.150	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  marketers	  began	  taking	  advantage	  of	  more	  precise	  
targeting	  methods	  to	  appeal	  to	  this	  market	  without	  offending	  their	  mainstream	  
customers.	  Gay	  rights	  activists	  were	  generally	  supportive	  of	  this	  development,	  and	  
some	  saw	  targeting	  by	  marketers	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  legitimate	  standing	  in	  American	  
society	  (Turow	  1998,	  81).	  
	   Not	  all	  commentators	  were	  so	  optimistic	  about	  the	  social	  consequences	  of	  
marketers’	  efforts	  to	  target	  formerly	  marginalized	  groups.	  Liz	  Cohen,	  for	  instance,	  
has	  observed	  that	  oftentimes	  this	  also	  represented	  the	  cooptation	  of	  counter-­‐culture	  
movements	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  profitability.	  
After	  all,	  when	  marketers	  recognized	  –	  and	  catered	  to	  –	  diversity	  in	  the	  cultural	  
values	  of	  consumers…	  existing	  power	  relations	  were	  rarely	  altered.	  Most	  
fundamentally,	  ownership	  usually	  remained	  concentrated	  in	  large	  corporate	  
merchandisers...	  What	  resulted	  was	  a	  new	  commercial	  culture	  that	  reified	  –	  at	  times	  
even	  exaggerated	  –	  social	  difference	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  profits,	  often	  reincorporating	  
disaffected	  groups	  into	  the	  commercial	  marketplace.	  (L.	  Cohen	  2008b,	  309)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150	  In	  1980,	  for	  instance,	  Advertising	  Age	  cautioned	  its	  readers	  against	  overtly	  catering	  to	  
gay	  consumers.	  “Other	  than	  book	  and	  record	  companies	  and	  a	  few	  liquor	  accounts	  shy	  away	  
from	  being	  identified	  with	  homosexuals”	  (Rozen	  1980;	  quoted	  in	  Turow	  1998,	  215).	  From	  
1978	  to	  1993	  Advertising	  Age	  carried	  only	  45	  ads	  and	  articles	  about	  homosexuals,	  mostly	  
about	  the	  AIDS	  epidemic	  and	  public	  scandals	  (Turow	  1998,	  215).	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Market	  and	  audience	  segmentation	  also	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  artificially	  rewriting	  the	  
lines	  dividing	  social	  groups.	  Market	  research	  agencies	  were	  particularly	  powerful	  in	  
this	  regard.	  For	  instance	  Nielsen	  Audience	  Measurement	  launched	  a	  separate	  
viewer	  index	  in	  1992,	  the	  Nielsen	  Hispanic	  Index.	  The	  company’s	  surveys	  ignored	  
the	  respondents’	  countries-­‐of-­‐origin,	  collapsing	  the	  diversity	  of	  Spanish	  speaking	  
peoples	  into	  a	  simple	  question	  of	  language.	  This	  suited	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Index’s	  
sponsors,	  the	  Spanish-­‐language	  networks	  Univision	  and	  Telemundo	  (Fisher	  1994;	  
Turow	  1998,	  86).	  Rather	  than	  catering	  to	  pre-­‐existing	  social	  groups	  major	  media	  
firms	  were,	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  creating	  them.	  
	  
Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  the	  homogenous	  mass	  public	  sphere	  
of	  mid-­‐century	  crumbled.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  an	  ad	  agency	  executive	  at	  Ogilvy	  and	  
Mather,	  “Thirty	  years	  ago,	  we	  knew	  what	  men	  wanted	  because	  they	  all	  wanted	  the	  
same	  things	  –	  a	  Chevy,	  apple	  pie,	  and	  to	  send	  their	  kids	  to	  college.	  But	  the	  changes	  in	  
society	  have	  fragmented	  that,	  and	  we’re	  not	  making	  many	  generalizations	  anymore”	  
(Turow	  1998,	  61;	  Simons	  1984).	  As	  segmentation	  became	  the	  watchword	  of	  late	  
20th	  century	  business	  strategies	  the	  older	  mass	  media	  –	  including	  radio,	  broadcast	  
television,	  large-­‐circulation	  newspapers,	  and	  motion	  pictures	  –	  seemed	  to	  be	  at	  risk.	  
Many	  commentators	  prophesied	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  media.	  
The	  actual	  reconfigurations	  that	  took	  place	  in	  media	  industries	  were,	  in	  
reality,	  more	  complex	  than	  a	  simple	  shift	  away	  from	  mass	  engagement.	  I	  address	  
this	  in	  chapter	  6,	  which	  aims	  to	  empirically	  adjudicate	  between	  the	  life-­‐	  and	  death-­‐
of-­‐mass-­‐media	  narratives.	  One	  of	  the	  important	  shifts	  unambiguously	  represented	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by	  the	  technological,	  organizational	  and	  economic	  developments	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  
1980s	  though,	  is	  what	  I	  understand	  as	  the	  cheapening	  of	  publicity.	  As	  the	  number	  of	  
channels	  through	  which	  audiences	  could	  be	  reached	  multiplied	  the	  financial	  
barriers	  to	  accessing	  audiences	  gradually	  declined.	  Publicity	  was	  cheapened	  in	  
another	  sense	  as	  well	  though.	  Appearance	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  whether	  in	  print,	  on	  
television,	  or	  in	  a	  movie,	  no	  longer	  necessarily	  implied	  access	  to	  a	  large	  mass	  
audience.	  By	  the	  dawn	  of	  the	  Internet	  revolution	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  our	  current	  
phase	  in	  the	  history	  of	  mass	  media,	  the	  days	  when	  68%	  of	  American	  households	  
would	  simultaneously	  tune	  in	  to	  watch	  a	  sitcom	  like	  I	  Love	  Lucy	  were	  long	  gone.	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CHAPTER	  5	  
THE	  MASS	  MEDIA	  TODAY:	  EMPIRICS	  
	  
The	  preceding	  chapter	  outlined	  the	  key	  historical	  rupture	  in	  the	  mass	  media	  that	  
has	  distinguished	  the	  millennial	  United	  States	  from	  the	  post-­‐war	  years	  –	  a	  rupture	  
in	  the	  technical	  and	  institutional	  logic	  of	  mass	  media	  firms.	  Many	  observers	  have	  
interpreted	  this	  rupture	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  media.	  The	  central	  question	  of	  
this	  dissertation	  though,	  is	  whether	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  institutional	  and	  technical	  logic	  
of	  dominant	  media	  firms	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  media	  technologies	  and	  organizational	  
strategies	  geared	  towards	  segmenting	  audiences	  actually	  represent	  the	  terminal	  
decline	  of	  mass	  media	  as	  a	  social	  form.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  review	  evidence	  from	  the	  
past	  two	  decades	  and	  show	  that	  while	  the	  trend	  towards	  audience	  segmentation	  
has,	  in	  many	  respects,	  become	  dramatically	  more	  acute	  it	  has	  also,	  paradoxically,	  
been	  accompanied	  by	  increasingly	  powerful	  consumption	  patterns	  that	  fit	  the	  
definition	  of	  mass	  media.	  I	  describe	  these	  two	  accounts	  as	  the	  life-­‐	  and	  death-­‐of-­‐
mass-­‐media	  narratives.	  There	  is	  compelling	  evidence	  to	  support	  both	  of	  these	  
contradictory	  scenarios.	  This	  paradox	  is	  what	  I	  have	  aimed	  to	  unravel	  in	  this	  
dissertation	  and	  I	  do	  so	  in	  chapter	  6.	  
	  
The	  Death	  of	  Mass	  Media	  
	  
“Our	  most	  important	  ad	  medium,	  television,	  is	  about	  to	  change	  big-­‐time.”	  Ed	  Artzt	  
President,	  CEO	  of	  Procter	  and	  Gamble	  1994	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From	  a	  revenue	  perspective	  the	  traditional	  mass	  media	  industries	  appeared	  to	  be	  on	  
the	  decline	  by	  the	  last	  decades	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  Industry-­‐leader	  fears	  in	  the	  
1990s	  were	  realized	  throughout	  the	  2000s	  in	  the	  form	  of	  falling	  profits.	  Today,	  the	  
fourteen	  industrial	  sectors	  most	  strongly	  associated	  with	  traditional	  mass	  media	  
account	  for	  roughly	  $24	  billion	  per	  year	  in	  profits	  or	  roughly	  1.6%	  of	  US	  GDP;	  this	  
includes	  newspapers,	  magazines,	  broadcast	  radio	  and	  television,	  and	  the	  production	  
of	  content	  for	  all	  these	  media.	  Over	  the	  past	  five	  years	  these	  industries	  have	  been	  
contracting	  –	  i.e.	  their	  revenues	  have	  been	  falling	  –	  at	  a	  rate	  of	  roughly	  2.2%	  per	  
year	  (IBISWorld).151	  Over	  the	  same	  5-­‐year	  period	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole	  grew	  at	  a	  
rate	  of	  roughly	  0.8%	  per	  year	  (BEA).	  The	  downward	  trend	  for	  certain	  mass	  media	  
industries	  is	  even	  more	  dramatic.	  Over	  the	  past	  five	  years	  newspaper	  publishing,	  
magazine	  and	  periodical	  publishing,	  radio	  broadcasting,	  and	  television	  broadcasting	  
have	  contracted	  at	  an	  average	  annual	  rate	  of	  4.6%.	  Meanwhile	  revenues	  for	  new	  
media	  industries	  such	  as	  cable	  and	  satellite	  TV	  and	  internet-­‐based	  media	  have	  
grown	  rapidly.	  For	  instance,	  over	  the	  same	  5-­‐year	  period	  annual	  revenues	  of	  online	  
publishers,	  online	  broadcasters,	  internet	  service	  providers,	  and	  internet	  search	  
engines	  have	  grown	  4.5%	  per	  year	  or	  5.7	  times	  as	  fast	  as	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.	  
Cable	  networks	  and	  satellite	  TV	  providers	  grew	  at	  an	  even	  faster	  rate	  of	  5.4%	  per	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  Industry	  data	  aggregated	  from	  IBISWorld	  Reports	  for	  the	  following	  industries	  (by	  NAICS	  
classification):	  Newspaper	  Publishing	  (51111),	  Magazine	  and	  Periodical	  Publishing	  
(51112),	  Major	  Label	  Music	  Production	  (51222),	  Audio	  Production	  Studios	  (51224),	  Radio	  
Broadcasting	  (51311),	  Movie	  and	  Video	  Distribution	  (51212),	  Book	  Publishing	  (51113),	  
Movie	  and	  Video	  Production	  (51211a),	  Music	  Publishing	  (51223),	  Television	  Broadcasting	  
(51312),	  Video	  Postproduction	  Services	  (51219),	  Movie	  Theaters	  (51213),	  News	  Syndicates	  
(51411)*,	  Television	  Production	  (51211b).	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year.152	  From	  a	  revenue	  perspective,	  new	  media	  technologies	  seem	  to	  be	  
responsible	  for	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  media.	  
	  
The	  single	  industry	  hardest-­‐hit	  by	  these	  changes	  has	  been	  newspaper	  
publishing.	  Over	  the	  past	  5	  years,	  newspaper-­‐publishing	  profits	  have	  declined	  at	  a	  
dizzying	  rate	  of	  8.1%	  per	  year.	  This	  decline	  prompted	  The	  Economist	  to	  publish	  a	  
five-­‐part	  special	  report	  on	  the	  news	  industry.	  The	  report’s	  concluding	  article	  was	  
titled	  “The	  End	  of	  Mass	  Media”	  and	  proclaimed	  the	  death	  of	  mass-­‐media	  news	  at	  the	  
hands	  of	  new	  technologies	  (Economist	  2011).	  
The	  [news]	  industry	  is	  being	  reshaped	  by	  technology…	  By	  undermining	  the	  mass	  
media’s	  business	  models,	  that	  technology	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  returning	  the	  industry	  to	  
the	  more	  vibrant,	  freewheeling	  and	  discursive	  ways	  of	  the	  pre-­‐industrial	  era…	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152	  I	  include	  Cable	  and	  Satellite	  TV	  with	  New	  Media	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  these	  emerged	  in	  
the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s,	  well	  after	  the	  term	  mass	  media	  had	  reached	  its	  peak	  
popularity.	  Second,	  these	  media	  offer	  audiences	  an	  unprecedented	  degree	  of	  choice.	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mass-­‐media	  era	  now	  looks	  like	  a	  relatively	  brief	  and	  anomalous	  period	  that	  is	  
coming	  to	  an	  end.	  (Economist,	  2011)	  
The	  article	  predicted	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  media	  in	  no	  ambiguous	  terms.	  Even	  the	  term	  
“mass	  media”	  has	  been	  declining	  in	  popularity,	  falling	  by	  40%	  from	  its	  peak	  in	  1975	  
to	  2008	  (Michel	  et	  al.	  2011).	  
Consternation	  about	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  media	  had	  become	  prevalent	  by	  the	  
mid-­‐1990s,	  largely	  among	  media	  industry	  executives	  worried	  about	  future	  profits.	  
An	  influential	  early	  warning	  came	  from	  Procter	  &	  Gamble’s	  chairman	  and	  CEO	  Ed	  
Artzt,	  who,	  in	  May	  of	  1994,	  delivered	  a	  keynote	  speech	  to	  an	  annual	  conference	  of	  
the	  American	  Association	  of	  Advertising	  Agencies.153	  The	  assembled	  ad-­‐men	  and	  ad-­‐
women	  had	  good	  reason	  to	  pay	  attention	  –	  as	  chairman	  and	  CEO	  of	  Procter	  &	  
Gamble	  Artzt	  was	  head	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  advertiser,	  with	  $3	  billion	  a	  year	  in	  ad	  
spending.154	  Artzt’s	  called	  his	  speech	  “The	  Future	  of	  Advertising”	  and	  in	  it	  he	  
predicted	  an	  imminent	  and	  radical	  reconfiguration	  in	  the	  mass	  media.	  This	  
reconfiguration,	  he	  warned,	  would	  be	  driven	  by	  new	  technologies	  that	  offered	  
consumers	  an	  unprecedented	  degree	  of	  choice,	  extending	  the	  logic	  of	  audience	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  The	  conference	  was	  held	  at	  West	  Virginia’s	  luxurious	  Greenbrier	  Resort,	  a	  710-­‐room	  
compound	  built	  in	  the	  same	  Classical	  Revival	  style	  as	  the	  White	  House.	  The	  resort	  boasts	  
three	  golf	  courses,	  ten	  lobbies,	  forty	  meeting	  rooms,	  ninety-­‐six	  estate	  houses,	  and	  a	  massive	  
underground	  bunker,	  kept	  secret	  until	  1992,	  that	  was	  meant	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  emergency	  
shelter	  for	  the	  US	  Congress	  in	  the	  event	  of	  nuclear	  war.	  
	  
154	  In	  Advertising	  Age’s	  account,	  the	  keynote	  address	  he	  delivered	  “dropped	  a	  bomb	  on	  ad	  
agency	  leaders…”	  (Yahn	  1994).	  Headlines	  soon	  followed:	  “Ad	  industry	  awaits	  fallout	  after	  
new-­‐media	  alarm”,	  “TV	  advertising	  in	  danger”,	  “P&G	  chief’s	  alarm	  still	  ringing	  in	  the	  ears	  of	  
ad	  industry”	  (Yahn	  1994;	  Wells	  and	  Mandese;	  Ad	  Age	  1994).	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segmentation	  that	  began	  gaining	  momentum	  in	  the	  1970s.155	  Increasing	  the	  number	  
of	  options	  available	  to	  audiences	  reduces	  the	  number	  of	  people	  that	  any	  one	  
broadcaster	  is	  likely	  to	  reach;	  and	  this	  segmentation	  of	  audiences	  into	  smaller	  slices	  
threatened	  the	  thing	  that	  large	  advertisers	  valued	  most	  about	  mass	  media	  –	  its	  
ability	  to	  reach	  massive	  audiences.	  Segmentation	  had	  initially	  been	  valued	  by	  
advertisers	  as	  a	  way	  of	  more	  effectively	  targeting	  their	  sales	  pitches	  –	  now,	  as	  
consumers	  extended	  the	  logic	  of	  segmentation	  in	  order	  to	  cherry	  pick	  content,	  it	  
seemed	  that	  national	  advertisers	  were	  at	  risk	  of	  losing	  their	  ability	  to	  cheaply	  and	  
simultaneously	  reach	  the	  masses.	  
The	  television	  industry	  was	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  reconfiguration	  that	  Artzt	  
described	  and	  in	  1994	  it	  accounted	  for	  ninety	  percent	  of	  P&G’s	  ad	  spending,	  or	  $2.7	  
billion.	  Despite	  this	  massive	  spending,	  Artzt	  warned,	  the	  uncertain	  future	  of	  broad-­‐
reach	  television	  represented	  a	  major	  threat	  to	  firms	  like	  P&G.156	  
Frequency	  and	  depth	  of	  sale	  in	  advertising	  are	  critical	  to	  preserving	  loyalty	  to	  
frequently	  purchased	  brands	  like	  ours.	  For	  example,	  in	  any	  given	  month,	  P&G	  
brands	  like	  Tide	  and	  Crest	  and	  Pantene	  will	  reach	  more	  than	  90	  percent	  of	  their	  
target	  audience	  six	  or	  seven	  times.	  The	  only	  way	  you	  can	  achieve	  that	  kind	  of	  impact	  
is	  with	  broad	  reach	  television…	  which	  is	  why	  we	  must	  preserve	  our	  ability	  to	  use	  
television	  as	  our	  principal	  advertising	  medium.	  (Artzt	  1994,	  2)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155	  “Consumers	  will	  be	  choosing	  among	  hundreds	  of	  shows	  and	  pay-­‐per-­‐view	  movies.	  
They'll	  have	  dozens	  of	  home	  shopping	  channels.	  They'll	  play	  hours	  of	  interactive	  video	  
games”	  (Artzt	  1994).	  
	  
156	  “Television	  advertising	  is	  the	  lifeblood	  of	  our	  business,”	  he	  warned,	  “and	  we	  simply	  must	  
protect	  our	  access	  to	  it”	  (Artzt	  1994).	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But	  as	  audiences	  were	  becoming	  more	  segmented	  the	  economics	  of	  TV	  advertising	  
were	  changing.	  
In	  1980	  around	  15.2	  million	  households	  –	  roughly	  19%	  of	  the	  American	  
people157	  –	  watched	  primetime	  network	  television	  on	  any	  given	  night.	  With	  top-­‐
rated	  shows	  like	  Dallas,	  60	  Minutes,	  and	  The	  Love	  Boat,	  it	  cost	  advertisers	  $10.35	  to	  
reach	  1,000	  households.	  But	  by	  the	  time	  of	  Artzt’s	  1994	  speech	  primetime	  network	  
viewership	  had	  fallen	  by	  2.5	  million	  households	  and	  it	  cost	  an	  additional	  12%,	  to	  
reach	  the	  same	  1,000	  households.	  Artzt	  predicted	  that	  these	  trends	  were	  still	  just	  
beginning	  –	  and	  he	  was	  right.	  By	  2012	  primetime	  viewership	  had	  lost	  another	  8.1	  
million	  homes	  and	  had	  fallen	  to	  only	  30%	  of	  the	  1980	  level.	  Meanwhile	  the	  cost	  for	  
an	  advertiser	  to	  reach	  1,000	  homes	  had	  risen	  by	  232%	  to	  $24.08.158	  
	  
In	  Artzt’s	  view,	  continued	  segmentation	  and	  the	  development	  of	  new	  media	  
technologies	  offering	  viewers	  more	  choices	  spelled	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  media.	  
Whether	  or	  not	  Artzt	  accurately	  interpreted	  these	  changes	  –	  i.e.,	  whether	  they	  
support	  the	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media	  narrative,	  as	  Artzt	  feared	  they	  might	  –	  it	  was	  clear	  
that	  these	  changes	  have	  not	  been	  limited	  to	  the	  television	  industry.	  Movies,	  for	  
instance,	  have	  faced	  declining	  revenues	  over	  the	  past	  five	  years,	  both	  in	  motion	  
picture	  distribution	  and	  in	  production	  (Kaczanowska	  2012a;	  Kaczanowska	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  In	  1980	  there	  were	  roughly	  80.39	  million	  households	  in	  the	  US.	  
	  
158	  Prices	  are	  reported	  here	  as	  inflation-­‐adjusted	  2012	  dollars.	  Calculations	  based	  on	  data	  
from	  TVB,	  a	  non-­‐profit	  television	  industry	  trade	  association	  (TV	  Cost	  &	  CPM	  Trends	  -­‐	  
Network	  TV	  Primetime	  2013).	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2012b).159	  Movie	  ticket	  sales	  have	  generally	  fallen	  since	  reaching	  a	  peak	  of	  1.576	  
billion	  in	  2002.	  This	  decline	  coincides	  with	  the	  rising	  popularity	  of	  broadband	  
Internet	  access,	  which	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  watch	  streaming	  videos,	  movies,	  and	  
television	  shows	  online.	  
	  
It	  is	  not	  just	  the	  newest	  technologies,	  like	  broadband	  Internet	  access,	  that	  
have	  offered	  viewers	  more	  options,	  threatening	  the	  future	  of	  mass	  media	  –	  when	  
Artzt	  warned	  about	  segmentation	  affordable	  high-­‐speed	  internet	  access	  was	  still	  a	  
decade	  away.	  But	  already	  in	  the	  1980s	  the	  popularization	  of	  cable	  television	  and	  
VCRs	  introduced	  a	  new	  world	  of	  at-­‐home	  viewing	  options,	  which	  coincided	  with	  a	  
decline	  in	  top	  box-­‐office	  grosses.	  For	  instance,	  among	  the	  top	  200	  highest-­‐grossing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159	  Revenues	  in	  Movie/Video	  Distribution	  and	  Movie/Video	  production	  have	  declined	  at	  an	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movies	  of	  all	  time,	  each	  passing	  year	  since	  1965	  is	  correlated	  with	  $4.5	  million	  less	  
at	  the	  box	  office,	  on	  average.160	  
	  
While	  evidence	  from	  the	  film	  industry	  demonstrates	  an	  association	  between	  
declining	  revenues	  and	  the	  spread	  of	  new	  media	  technologies	  this	  link	  appears	  even	  
more	  dramatically	  in	  the	  music	  industry,	  where	  online	  music	  piracy	  became	  a	  highly	  
publicized	  issue.	  The	  story	  of	  the	  online	  file-­‐sharing	  service	  Napster	  is	  highly	  
illustrative,	  and	  represents	  an	  important	  milestone	  in	  the	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media	  
narrative.	  
	  
Free	  Music,	  Napster	  and	  the	  RIAA	  
The	  popularization	  of	  the	  MP3	  file	  format	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  and	  the	  launch	  of	  
Napster	  in	  1999	  represented	  a	  major	  disruption	  in	  the	  music	  industry.	  MP3	  is	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160	  CPI	  Adjusted	  First	  Run	  Gross	  (millions)	  =	  9401.0229	  -­‐	  4.5188	  *	  Year;	  (P	  =	  6.71E-­‐07).	  
This	  decline	  is	  even	  more	  striking	  considering	  that	  it	  took	  place	  over	  a	  period	  in	  which	  the	  
US	  population	  grew	  by	  62%	  (“World	  Development	  Indicators”	  2013).	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compressed	  file	  format	  for	  storing	  digital	  audio,	  which	  uses	  1/11th	  as	  much	  digital	  
storage	  space	  as	  an	  audio	  compact	  disc,	  the	  previously-­‐dominant	  format.	  The	  
development	  of	  MP3	  greatly	  increased	  the	  popularity	  of	  computer-­‐based	  music	  
because	  users	  could	  both	  store	  much	  larger	  music	  libraries	  on	  their	  computers	  and	  
easily	  transfer	  files	  to	  each	  other.	  Digital	  audio	  files	  could	  be	  copied	  with	  no	  loss	  of	  
quality,	  so	  unlike	  the	  “home-­‐taping	  crisis”	  of	  the	  1980s,	  in	  which	  audio	  and	  video	  
cassette	  tapes	  were	  duplicated	  by	  consumers,	  the	  digital	  copies	  of	  MP3s	  were	  
indistinguishable	  from	  the	  originals.	  By	  the	  late	  1990s	  digital	  storage	  of	  music	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  compact	  MP3	  files	  had	  become	  widespread	  and	  Internet-­‐based	  music	  
sharing	  had	  become	  especially	  popular	  on	  college	  campuses,	  where	  students	  could	  
take	  advantage	  of	  high-­‐speed	  Internet	  connections	  to	  download	  hundreds	  of	  songs	  
per	  hour.	  
The	  popular	  explosion	  in	  file	  sharing	  began	  in	  1999	  with	  the	  launch	  of	  
Napster,	  the	  first	  widely	  used	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  service	  for	  exchanging	  music.	  By	  the	  
summer	  of	  2000	  11	  million	  users	  were	  making	  1.5	  billion	  songs	  available	  to	  each	  
other	  using	  the	  service	  (Steve	  Jones	  and	  Lenhart	  2004).	  Rather	  than	  actually	  hosting	  
or	  transferring	  files	  Napster	  simply	  offered	  a	  central	  database	  of	  Internet	  addresses	  
so	  that	  users	  searching	  for	  a	  certain	  song	  could	  connect	  with	  other	  users	  who	  had	  
that	  song.161,162	  The	  original	  incarnation	  of	  Napster	  was	  eventually	  shut	  down,	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161	  Because	  the	  system	  was	  based	  on	  a	  centralized	  server	  Napster	  was	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  
copyright	  infringement	  suits	  than	  other	  less-­‐popular	  services	  such	  as	  Gnutella,	  which	  
operated	  without	  the	  centralized	  database	  of	  addresses.	  
	  
162	  The	  August	  14,	  2000	  issue	  of	  Bloomberg	  Business	  Week	  described	  the	  rise	  and	  
imminent	  fall	  of	  Napster	  in	  its	  cover	  story.	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the	  broad	  availability	  of	  free,	  downloadable,	  high-­‐quality	  music	  had	  a	  major	  
destabilizing	  effect	  on	  the	  record	  industry.	  
While	  Napster	  and	  MP3	  had	  made	  the	  Internet	  a	  “candy	  store”	  for	  music	  fans	  
these	  innovations	  were	  received	  very	  differently	  by	  music	  publishers,	  which	  
struggled	  to	  prevent	  new	  technologies	  from	  destabilizing	  their	  industry	  (Schubert	  
1999).	  In	  the	  fall	  of	  1998	  the	  Recording	  Industry	  Association	  of	  America	  (RIAA)	  
unsuccessfully	  tried	  to	  block	  the	  release	  of	  the	  Rio,	  a	  $200	  portable	  music	  player	  
that	  could	  play	  MP3	  files	  downloaded	  from	  the	  Internet.163	  By	  April	  of	  2000	  a	  Pew	  
Internet	  Survey	  showed	  that	  21	  percent	  of	  Internet-­‐using	  respondents	  had	  
downloaded	  music,	  and	  by	  the	  following	  year	  that	  number	  had	  jumped	  to	  29	  
percent	  (Schubert	  1999;	  Steve	  Jones	  and	  Lenhart	  2004,	  189).	  According	  to	  RIAA	  
data	  the	  value	  of	  total	  US	  music	  shipments	  peaked	  at	  $19.69	  billion	  in	  1999,	  the	  year	  
that	  Napster	  was	  launched,	  after	  which	  point	  the	  value	  of	  music	  shipments	  began	  a	  
downward	  tumble,	  dropping	  by	  64%	  to	  $7	  billion	  in	  2011	  (“Year	  End	  Shipment	  
Database”	  2012).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  brainstorm	  of	  a	  17-­‐year-­‐old	  college	  freshman	  became	  the	  hottest	  phenomenon	  on	  the	  
Net	  in	  less	  than	  a	  year.	  Now	  under	  legal	  assault,	  its	  very	  existence	  is	  in	  doubt.	  Whatever	  
happens,	  Napster	  has	  changed	  the	  music	  biz	  forever	  (Businessweek	  2000).	  
	  
163	  In	  response	  to	  the	  rapidly	  growing	  popularity	  of	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  file	  sharing	  the	  RIAA	  
posted	  a	  statement	  on	  its	  website:	  
Unfortunately,	  the	  Internet	  culture	  of	  unlicensed	  use	  means	  that	  theft	  of	  intellectual	  
property	  is	  rampant,	  and	  the	  music	  business	  and	  its	  artists	  are	  the	  biggest	  victims.	  
Unauthorized	  Internet	  music	  archive	  sites	  using	  compression	  technology	  such	  as	  MP3	  




The	  RIAA	  directly	  attributes	  this	  decline	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  online	  file	  sharing	  
technologies,	  citing	  a	  study	  by	  a	  conservative	  think	  tank,	  the	  Institute	  for	  Policy	  
Innovation,	  which	  claims	  that	  illegal	  music	  downloads	  result	  in	  annual	  losses	  of	  $3.7	  
billion	  to	  U.S.	  firms.	  Including	  physical	  piracy,	  such	  as	  the	  sale	  of	  counterfeit	  CDs,	  
and	  downstream	  effects,	  such	  as	  reduced	  revenues	  to	  music	  retailers,	  the	  study	  
estimates	  that	  music	  piracy	  results	  in	  losses	  to	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  of	  $12.5	  billion,	  
including	  71,060	  jobs,	  $2.7	  billion	  in	  earnings,	  and	  $422	  million	  in	  tax	  revenues	  
(Siwek	  2007).164	  From	  a	  revenue	  perspective,	  the	  RIAA	  supports	  the	  central	  death-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164	  The	  RIAA	  maintains	  a	  “piracy”	  section	  on	  its	  website,	  which	  includes	  information	  about	  
copyright	  issues	  and	  a	  mechanism	  for	  reporting	  violations,	  and	  in	  which	  the	  organization	  
explicitly	  draws	  a	  link	  between	  file	  sharing	  and	  declining	  revenues.	  A	  section	  on	  the	  web	  
site	  titled	  Who	  Music	  Theft	  Hurts	  emphasizes	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  problem:	  
It’s	  commonly	  known	  as	  “piracy,”	  but	  that’s	  too	  benign	  of	  a	  term	  to	  adequately	  describe	  the	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of-­‐mass-­‐media	  claim	  –	  new	  media	  technologies	  are	  damaging	  to	  mass	  media	  
industries.	  
	  
Trends	  in	  the	  music	  industry	  also	  provide	  evidence	  for	  the	  more	  particular	  
claim	  that	  the	  damaging	  effect	  of	  new	  media	  technologies	  is,	  in	  part,	  a	  result	  of	  their	  
segmenting	  effect	  on	  the	  mass	  media’s	  audiences.	  For	  instance	  in	  the	  decade-­‐and-­‐a-­‐
half	  since	  the	  popularization	  of	  the	  Internet,	  a	  greater	  variety	  of	  artists	  and	  albums	  
have	  made	  it	  onto	  the	  Billboard	  Top	  200	  charts	  each	  year.	  While	  a	  small	  number	  of	  
stars	  dominated	  music-­‐listening	  in	  the	  days	  of	  mass	  media,	  audiences	  are	  
increasingly	  consuming	  music	  by	  a	  greater	  variety	  of	  artists.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  
when	  the	  cost	  of	  listening	  to	  unfamiliar	  music	  is	  lower	  for	  consumers	  –	  either	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  cheaper	  online	  purchases	  or	  even	  through	  illegal	  file	  sharing	  –	  then	  
consumers	  can	  more	  easily	  become	  aware	  of	  new,	  less-­‐popular	  music	  that	  they	  like,	  
and	  as	  a	  result	  more	  artists	  and	  albums	  become	  popular	  enough	  to	  make	  it	  onto	  the	  
charts.	  The	  effect	  is	  fragmentation	  of	  audiences	  among	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  
artists.165	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
scenes	  to	  bring	  music	  to	  your	  ears.	  That	  cast	  includes	  songwriters,	  recording	  artists,	  audio	  
engineers,	  computer	  technicians,	  talent	  scouts	  and	  marketing	  specialists,	  producers,	  
publishers	  and	  countless	  others…	  While	  downloading	  one	  song	  may	  not	  feel	  that	  serious	  of	  a	  
crime,	  the	  accumulative	  impact	  of	  millions	  of	  songs	  downloaded	  illegally	  –	  and	  without	  any	  
compensation	  to	  all	  the	  people	  who	  helped	  to	  create	  that	  song	  and	  bring	  it	  to	  fans	  –	  is	  
devastating.	  (RIAA	  2012)	  
	  
165	  Gopal,	  et.	  al.	  have	  linked	  this	  trend	  to	  internet	  usage,	  finding	  that	  the	  number	  of	  unique	  
artists	  and	  albums	  appearing	  on	  the	  Billboard	  Top	  200	  chart	  is	  significantly	  correlated	  to	  
the	  number	  of	  internet	  users	  (Gopal,	  Bhattacharjee,	  and	  Sanders	  2006).	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This	  transformation	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  music	  industry	  is	  beneficial	  to	  less	  
well-­‐known	  artists,	  who	  can	  more	  easily	  reach	  a	  prospective	  audience.166	  In	  essence,	  
this	  represents	  the	  effect	  of	  reduced	  barriers	  to	  publicity	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  recorded	  
music.	  A	  related	  benefit	  for	  less	  well-­‐known	  musicians	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  increased	  
revenues	  from	  live	  concerts	  –	  online	  music	  sharing	  can	  help	  consumers	  discover	  
new	  bands	  which	  they	  then	  pay	  to	  see	  perform.	  This	  may	  explain	  why	  after	  the	  
launch	  of	  Napster	  the	  annual	  number	  of	  live	  concerts	  performed	  grew	  while	  album	  
sales	  declined.	  
	  
As	  with	  file	  sharing’s	  effect	  on	  album	  sales,	  the	  effect	  on	  concert	  attendance	  differs	  
for	  more-­‐	  and	  less-­‐famous	  musicians.	  This	  is	  because	  less-­‐famous	  artists	  have	  more	  
to	  gain	  from	  the	  increased	  awareness	  that	  online	  sharing	  of	  their	  music	  can	  bring.	  
Superstar	  musicians,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  already	  well	  known	  and	  have	  little	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166	  Gopal,	  et.	  al.,	  note	  that	  consumers’	  ability	  to	  sample	  music	  online	  leads	  to	  greater	  sales	  
for	  albums	  by	  these	  artists,	  who	  music-­‐buyers	  may	  not	  have	  otherwise	  known	  (Gopal,	  
Bhattacharjee,	  and	  Sanders	  2006).	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gain	  from	  having	  their	  music	  freely	  distributed.167	  Clearly,	  the	  relationship	  between	  
online	  music	  formats	  and	  record	  industry	  revenues	  is	  contingent	  on	  many	  factors.	  
Nonetheless	  a	  few	  things	  are	  clear	  from	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  music	  industry	  over	  the	  
past	  fifteen	  years:	  1)	  the	  internet	  has	  become	  the	  dominant	  venue	  for	  purchasing	  
music,	  2)	  record	  industry	  profits	  are	  declining,	  and	  3)	  music	  is	  one	  part	  of	  a	  complex	  
ecology	  of	  digital	  entertainment	  options.	  
A	  2010	  report	  by	  the	  Nielsen	  ratings	  agency	  summarized	  the	  world	  of	  
contemporary	  music	  listening	  as	  a	  “hyper-­‐fragmented	  world”	  (The	  Hyper-­‐
fragmented	  World	  of	  Music:	  Marketing	  Considerations	  and	  Revenue	  Maximisation	  
2011).	  As	  of	  2011	  there	  were	  roughly	  400	  licensed	  digital	  music	  services	  worldwide	  
providing	  audiences	  with	  a	  cumulative	  13	  million	  songs	  –	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  the	  days	  in	  
which	  local	  NBC,	  CBS	  affiliates	  and	  one	  or	  two	  independent	  radio	  stations	  provided	  
the	  only	  options	  available	  for	  much	  of	  the	  American	  music-­‐listening	  public	  (IFPI	  
Digital	  Music	  Report:	  Music	  at	  the	  Touch	  of	  a	  Button	  2011).	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  Internet	  
and	  new	  media	  technologies	  has	  certainly	  changed	  the	  music	  industry.	  In	  retrospect	  
it	  appears	  that	  Businessweek	  was	  right	  in	  proclaiming	  that	  “whatever	  happens,	  
Napster	  has	  changed	  the	  music	  biz	  forever”	  (“Napster’s	  High	  and	  Low	  Notes”	  2000).	  
	  
Targeted	  Content	  and	  Hyper-­‐Segmentation	  
The	  trends	  outlined	  above	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  changes	  that	  have	  concerned	  
executives	  in	  the	  television,	  film,	  and	  music	  industries	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  2000s,	  and	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  Mortimer	  et	  al.,	  found	  that	  with	  the	  spread	  of	  Napster,	  small	  bands	  tended	  to	  experience	  
a	  greater	  increase	  in	  concert	  revenues	  and	  less	  of	  a	  decline	  in	  album	  sales	  than	  highly	  
popular	  bands	  (Mortimer,	  Nosko,	  and	  Sorensen	  2012;	  Dewenter,	  Haucap,	  and	  Wenzel	  
2012).	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which	  have	  been	  interpreted	  as	  signals	  pointing	  to	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  media.	  In	  
recent	  years	  these	  concerns	  have	  been	  further	  stoked	  by	  optimistic	  forecasting	  from	  
new-­‐media	  executives	  and	  entrepreneurs	  touting	  the	  benefits	  of	  their	  technologies	  –	  
technologies	  that	  facilitate	  fragmentation	  of	  audiences	  on	  an	  unprecedented	  scale.	  
In	  	  2006,	  for	  instance,	  the	  social	  media	  platform	  Facebook	  introduced	  a	  new	  
feature	  that	  took	  the	  notion	  of	  audience-­‐segmentation	  far	  beyond	  anything	  Artzt	  
had	  predicted.	  Facebook’s	  founder	  and	  CEO	  Mark	  Zuckerberg	  explained	  the	  benefits	  
of	  the	  new	  feature	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  “a	  squirrel	  dying	  in	  front	  of	  your	  house	  
may	  be	  more	  relevant	  to	  your	  interests	  right	  now	  than	  people	  dying	  in	  Africa”	  
(Kirkpatrick	  2011,	  181).	  Zuckerberg’s	  idea	  was	  that	  users	  were	  more	  interested	  in	  
their	  immediate	  surroundings	  than	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  people	  they	  had	  never	  met;	  and	  
this	  is	  exactly	  what	  Facebook’s	  “news	  feed”	  offered.	  The	  “news	  feed”	  generated	  a	  
custom-­‐tailored	  stream	  of	  alerts	  based	  on	  the	  activities	  of	  each	  user’s	  friends.	  This	  
would	  enable	  users	  to	  get	  the	  news	  they	  cared	  about	  while	  ignoring	  the	  plight	  of	  
“people	  dying	  in	  Africa.”	  In	  terms	  of	  audience	  segmentation	  this	  is	  a	  giant	  step	  
beyond	  the	  technologies	  that	  had	  concerned	  Artzt	  in	  1994.	  Today,	  for	  instance,	  the	  
average	  American	  household	  receives	  roughly	  119	  television	  channels,	  so,	  
theoretically,	  cable	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  segment	  the	  TV-­‐watching	  audience	  into	  
roughly	  119	  slices	  (Average	  U.S.	  Home	  Now	  Receives	  a	  Record	  118.6	  TV	  Channels,	  
According	  to	  Nielsen	  2008).	  Meanwhile	  Facebook	  has	  over	  584	  million	  active	  daily	  
users,	  so	  the	  newsfeed	  feature	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  segment	  the	  audience	  into	  584	  
million	  slices	  –	  one	  slice	  per	  person	  (“Number	  of	  Active	  Users	  at	  Facebook	  over	  the	  
Years”	  2011).	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The	  question,	  though,	  is	  whether	  this	  signals	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  media.	  Does	  
the	  technology	  that	  makes	  hyper-­‐segmentation	  possible	  imply	  that	  hyper	  
segmentation	  will	  occur?	  In	  recent	  decades	  traditional	  broadcast	  media	  have	  
certainly	  struggled.	  And	  during	  the	  same	  decades	  the	  media	  that	  have	  grown	  most	  
rapidly	  are	  those	  that	  provide	  users	  with	  a	  large	  number	  of	  choices	  that	  can	  be	  
accessed	  anytime,	  rather	  than	  offering	  a	  single	  message	  to	  a	  large	  number	  of	  people	  
more-­‐or-­‐less	  simultaneously.	  Does	  this	  signal	  the	  immanent	  death	  of	  mass	  media?	  
According	  to	  the	  dominant	  popular	  narrative	  the	  answer	  is	  yes.	  
	  
A	  Splintering	  Nation?	  
The	  economic	  significance	  of	  these	  changes	  is	  reason	  enough	  to	  study	  the	  
shifting	  media	  landscape,	  but	  the	  decline	  of	  mass	  media	  is	  more	  than	  simply	  an	  
economic	  concern.	  Mass	  media	  provide	  shared	  experiences	  to	  large	  numbers	  of	  
people.	  These	  shared	  experiences	  help	  people	  to	  imagine	  themselves	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
community	  –	  an	  imagined	  community.	  Adjudicating	  between	  the	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐
media	  and	  the	  life-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media	  narratives	  is	  therefore	  more	  than	  a	  question	  of	  
about	  alternate	  media-­‐futures	  –	  it	  becomes	  a	  question	  about	  the	  future	  of	  
community	  formation	  in	  general.	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  then	  that	  the	  death-­‐of-­‐mass	  
media	  narrative	  has	  been	  accompanied	  by	  another	  popular	  narrative	  about	  the	  
decline	  in	  the	  coherence	  of	  American	  society.	  This	  narrative	  came	  into	  the	  limelight	  
during	  Pat	  Buchanan’s	  “culture	  war”	  speech	  delivered	  to	  the	  1992	  Republican	  
National	  Convention.	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There	  is	  a	  religious	  war	  going	  on	  in	  our	  country	  for	  the	  soul	  of	  America.	  It	  is	  a	  
cultural	  war,	  as	  critical	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  nation	  we	  will	  one	  day	  be	  as	  was	  the	  Cold	  War	  
itself.	  
Buchanan	  went	  on	  to	  rail	  against	  “environmental	  extremists	  who	  put	  insects,	  rats	  
and	  birds	  ahead	  of	  families,	  workers	  and	  jobs,”	  and	  against	  the	  “radical	  feminism”	  
espoused	  by	  Bill	  and	  Hillary	  Clinton.	  The	  term	  “culture	  war”	  had	  been	  re-­‐introduced	  
into	  popular	  political	  discourse	  in	  1991	  by	  James	  Davidson	  Hunter’s	  Culture	  Wars:	  
The	  Struggle	  to	  Define	  America	  and	  the	  term	  has	  since	  become	  a	  catchall	  to	  describe	  
social	  fragmentation	  on	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  issues	  (Hunter	  1992).	  For	  instance,	  in	  2010	  
the	  publisher	  M.E.	  Sharpe	  released	  Culture	  Wars:	  An	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Issues,	  
Viewpoints,	  and	  Voices,	  which	  included	  592	  headings	  from	  “abortion”	  to	  “Zinn,	  
Howard”;	  and,	  The	  New	  Yorker’s	  Hendrik	  Herzberg	  declared	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  
2012	  elections	  a	  “culture-­‐war	  Waterloo”	  –	  Barack	  Obama	  had	  been	  reelected,	  
marijuana	  was	  legalized	  in	  two	  states	  and	  gay	  marriage	  was	  legalized	  in	  two	  more	  
(Chapman	  2010;	  Herzberg	  2012).	  
Since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  dozens	  of	  books,	  countless	  articles,	  and	  hours	  of	  
punditry	  have	  been	  devoted	  to	  analyzing	  the	  apparent	  fragmentation	  of	  American	  
society.	  For	  instance,	  Arthur	  Schlesinger’s	  The	  Disuniting	  of	  America	  is	  a	  polemic	  
against	  ethnic	  balkanization	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  warning	  against	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  
common	  American	  identity	  (Schlesinger	  1998);	  Diane	  Ravitch,	  formerly	  U.S.	  
Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  Education,	  has	  written	  extensively	  about	  ethnic	  
fragmentation	  in	  American	  public	  school	  curriculums,	  which,	  she	  claimed,	  had	  been	  
“spreading	  like	  wildfire”	  	  (Ravitch	  1990,	  343);	  Todd	  Gitlin’s	  The	  Twilight	  of	  Common	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Dreams	  explores	  how	  the	  rise	  of	  identity	  politics	  created	  ideological	  fragmentation	  
within	  the	  Left	  (Gitlin	  1996);	  in	  The	  Age	  of	  Fracture	  intellectual	  historian	  Daniel	  T.	  
Rodgers	  attributes	  ideological	  fragmentation	  during	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  free-­‐market	  thinking	  (Rodgers	  2011);	  Robert	  
Putnam’s	  Bowling	  Alone	  traces	  a	  general	  decline	  in	  civic	  participation	  by	  Americans	  
over	  the	  past	  century	  (Putnam	  2001,	  228);	  in	  Polarized	  America,	  McCarty,	  Poole,	  and	  
Rosenthal	  offer	  quantitative	  evidence	  that	  the	  country	  is	  more	  politically	  polarized	  
than	  ever	  before,	  at	  least	  as	  reflected	  in	  Congressional	  voting	  patterns	  (McCarty,	  
Poole,	  and	  Rosenthal	  2008;	  Whitehouse	  2011);	  and	  in	  Breaking	  Up	  America	  Joseph	  
Turow	  draws	  a	  link	  between	  social	  fragmentation	  and	  segmentation	  in	  the	  media	  
(Turow	  1998).	  If	  counter-­‐narratives	  have	  emerged	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  country	  may	  be	  
less	  fragmented	  than	  the	  pundits	  imagined	  this	  is	  only	  because	  fragmentation	  had	  
become	  such	  a	  dominant	  concern	  –	  c.f.	  The	  Myth	  of	  a	  Polarized	  America	  (Fiorina,	  
Abrams,	  and	  Pope	  2011).	  
The	  issue	  of	  national	  segmentation	  occupies	  such	  a	  place	  in	  the	  American	  
psyche	  that	  overcoming	  it	  was	  the	  climactic	  rallying	  cry	  of	  President	  Obama’s	  2012	  
election-­‐night	  victory	  speech.	  
It	  doesn’t	  matter	  whether	  you’re	  black	  or	  white	  or	  Hispanic	  or	  Asian	  or	  Native	  
American	  or	  young	  or	  old	  or	  rich	  or	  poor,	  abled,	  disabled,	  gay	  or	  straight.	  (Cheers,	  
applause.)	  I	  believe	  we	  can	  seize	  this	  future	  together	  because	  we	  are	  not	  as	  divided	  
as	  our	  politics	  suggests.	  We’re	  not	  as	  cynical	  as	  the	  pundits	  believe.	  We	  are	  greater	  
than	  the	  sum	  of	  our	  individual	  ambitions	  and	  we	  remain	  more	  than	  a	  collection	  of	  
red	  states	  and	  blue	  states.	  We	  are,	  and	  forever	  will	  be,	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  
(Cheers,	  applause.)	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But	  with	  the	  apparent	  decline	  of	  mass	  media	  have	  we	  lost	  one	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  
tools	  that	  could	  have	  continued	  to	  make	  us	  “less	  divided	  than	  our	  politics	  suggests”	  
and	  “more	  than	  a	  collection	  of	  red	  states	  and	  blue	  states”?	  
	  
The	  Life	  of	  Mass	  Media	  
There	  is	  an	  alternate	  narrative	  about	  the	  future	  of	  mass	  media,	  but	  it	  is	  both	  
less	  popular	  and	  less	  dramatic	  than	  the	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media.	  This	  narrative	  
acknowledges	  that	  new	  technologies	  are	  changing	  the	  ways	  that	  people	  consume	  
media,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  accept	  the	  notion	  that	  these	  changes	  spell	  the	  end	  of	  mass	  
media.	  This	  account	  may	  be	  less	  popular,	  in	  part,	  because	  finding	  evidence	  for	  this	  
narrative	  requires	  a	  slightly	  more	  nuanced	  reading	  of	  empirical	  trends	  –	  but	  the	  
evidence	  is	  there.	  
Media	  industry	  revenues	  have	  indeed	  declined,	  as	  outlined	  above,	  but	  this	  is	  
due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  higher	  costs	  of	  reaching	  the	  same	  audience	  –	  both	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
spiraling	  marketing	  costs	  and	  production	  budgets.	  Stability	  in	  certain	  aspects	  of	  
media	  consumption	  –	  such	  as	  the	  relative	  popularity	  of	  #1	  movies,	  or	  the	  opening-­‐
weekend	  ticket	  sales	  of	  Hollywood	  blockbusters	  –	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  something	  
about	  mass	  media	  that	  is	  withstanding	  the	  fragmenting	  pressure	  of	  new	  
technologies.	  
For	  instance,	  today’s	  movie-­‐going	  public	  does	  face	  a	  more	  fragmented	  pool	  of	  
options	  –	  on	  average	  since	  1980	  seven	  more	  movies	  have	  been	  released	  each	  year	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than	  in	  the	  previous	  year.168	  And	  as	  a	  result	  the	  most	  successful	  movie	  of	  each	  year	  
commands	  a	  smaller	  and	  smaller	  slice	  of	  total	  box	  office	  revenues.169	  
	  
From	  this	  perspective	  the	  data	  seems	  to	  support	  the	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media	  narrative.	  
While	  viewing	  options	  have	  increased	  though,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  no	  change	  in	  
people’s	  tendency	  to	  watch	  certain	  movies	  en	  masse	  –	  since	  1980	  the	  top	  movie	  of	  
each	  year	  consistently	  sells	  about	  twenty-­‐five	  times	  as	  many	  tickets	  as	  the	  average	  
movie	  in	  the	  same	  year.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  #	  of	  movies	  =	  -­‐13416.5051	  +	  6.9646	  *	  Year.	  
P	  =	  0.00004.	  Based	  on	  Box	  Office	  Mojo	  data.	  
169	  #1	  film	  as	  %	  of	  Domestic	  Box	  Office	  =	  1.9624	  –	  0.0010	  *	  Year	  
P	  =	  0.00741	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By	  some	  measures,	  mass	  media	  has	  done	  more	  than	  hold	  the	  line.	  The	  
Avengers,	  for	  instance,	  was	  the	  highest	  grossing	  movie	  of	  2012	  and	  enjoyed	  the	  
largest	  opening	  weekend	  ever	  recorded	  at	  the	  box	  office.170	  Not	  only	  were	  opening-­‐
weekend	  attendance	  records	  broken	  two	  years	  in	  a	  row,	  first	  by	  a	  teen-­‐aged	  wizard	  
(Harry	  Potter)	  and	  then	  by	  a	  team	  of	  comic	  book	  heroes	  (The	  Avengers)	  –	  opening	  
weekend	  attendance	  for	  the	  most	  successful	  movie	  of	  each	  year	  has	  grown	  
consistently	  for	  at	  least	  the	  past	  three	  decades,	  suggesting	  that	  from	  the	  perspective	  
of	  opening	  weekends	  the	  motion	  picture	  industry	  has	  resisted	  the	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐
media	  narrative.	  In	  1980	  The	  Empire	  Strikes	  Back	  –	  the	  biggest	  opener	  of	  that	  year	  –	  
sold	  just	  over	  4	  million	  tickets	  during	  its	  first	  72	  hours;	  in	  2012	  The	  Avengers	  sold	  
roughly	  25	  million	  tickets	  in	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  time.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  According	  to	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  the	  movie	  had	  “vanquished”	  its	  Box-­‐Office	  Rivals	  by	  
Monday	  morning.	  
In a strong start to Hollywood's summer movie season the superhero team in ''Marvel's 
The Avengers'' took in about $200.3 million at North American theaters over the weekend, 
according to Walt Disney Studios, which released the film. That No. 1 result easily smashed what 
the movie industry considers the record, set last summer by ''Harry Potter and the Deathly 
Hallows: Part 2,'' for the biggest opening weekend of all time. (Barnes 2012).	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On	  average,	  since	  1980,	  top	  openings	  have	  been	  getting	  bigger	  by	  about	  600,000	  
tickets	  each	  year.171	  From	  an	  earnings	  perspective,	  although	  revenues	  for	  movie	  
producers	  and	  distributors	  have	  been	  declining	  in	  recent	  years,	  revenues	  for	  theater	  
owners	  have	  grown	  at	  roughly	  the	  same	  rate	  as	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole	  
(MacFarland	  2012).172	  This	  conflicts	  with	  the	  dominant	  notion	  of	  an	  industry	  in	  
decline;	  and	  this	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  the	  film	  industry.	  For	  instance,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  
primetime	  network	  TV	  audiences	  have	  been	  shrinking	  since	  1980	  the	  most	  watched	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  Tickets	  Sold	  =-­‐	  1184976939.1237	  +	  599896.3808	  *	  Year	  (p=0.00).	  This	  effect	  remains	  
strong	  when	  considered	  on	  a	  per	  capita	  basis.	  Over	  this	  period	  top	  opening	  weekend	  ticket	  
sales	  grew	  more	  than	  six-­‐fold,	  while	  the	  US	  population	  grew	  by	  only	  38%	  (US	  Census	  
Bureau	  2013).	  
	  
172	  Movie	  theater	  revenues	  have	  grown	  at	  approximately	  0.7%	  per	  year	  over	  this	  period.	  US	  
GDP	  has	  grown	  at	  approximately	  0.8%	  per	  year	  over	  the	  same	  period.	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American	  TV	  program	  in	  history	  was	  the	  2011	  Super	  Bowl	  –	  the	  broadcast	  drew	  an	  
average	  audience	  of	  111	  million	  people.	  
	  
Mass	  Media	  Tendencies	  in	  New	  Media	  
	   Not	  only	  have	  older	  mass	  media	  shown	  signs	  of	  resisting	  segmentation	  –	  new	  
media	  have	  also	  exhibited	  mass-­‐media	  tendencies.	  For	  instance,	  although	  
Facebook’s	  CEO	  assumed	  that	  people	  would	  use	  online	  filtering	  and	  social	  
networking	  technologies	  to	  ignore	  “people	  dying	  in	  Africa”	  and	  instead	  seek	  out	  
media	  tailored	  to	  fit	  their	  idiosyncratic	  interests,	  one	  of	  the	  fastest	  spreading	  
YouTube	  videos	  of	  all	  time	  was	  Kony	  2012,	  an	  earnest	  plea	  for	  help	  by	  an	  aid	  
organization	  called	  Invisible	  Children.	  The	  video	  is	  a	  30-­‐minute	  documentary	  that	  
aims	  to	  raise	  awareness	  about	  the	  crimes	  committed	  by	  Ugandan	  warlord	  Joseph	  
Kony	  –	  it	  was	  watched	  55	  million	  times	  in	  its	  first	  36	  hours	  and	  within	  8	  days	  had	  
been	  watched	  75	  million	  times	  (Quilty-­‐Harper	  2012).	  Invisible	  Children’s	  Facebook	  
page	  has	  been	  “liked”	  by	  over	  3	  million	  Facebook	  users.	  
Online	  new	  media	  technologies	  –	  like	  Facebook	  and	  YouTube	  –	  generally	  
have	  two	  of	  the	  four	  attributes	  of	  a	  mass	  medium	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter:	  
they	  are	  subject	  to	  economies	  of	  scale,	  and	  transmit	  messages	  to	  many	  recipients.	  
But	  in	  cases	  like	  the	  Kony	  2012	  video	  these	  media	  also	  exhibit	  the	  other	  two	  
requirements	  –	  people	  consume	  the	  same	  message,	  and	  they	  do	  so	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  
simultaneously.	  Online	  technologies	  may	  have	  been	  designed	  with	  segmentation	  in	  
mind	  but	  they	  have	  also	  facilitated	  the	  formation	  of	  broad-­‐based	  audiences	  that	  look	  
much	  like	  the	  mass-­‐media	  audiences	  of	  past	  decades.	  
	  183	  
Recognizing	  the	  endurance	  of	  mass-­‐media	  tendencies	  in	  new	  media	  is	  an	  
important	  part	  of	  new	  business	  models	  among	  mass-­‐media	  content	  providers.	  The	  
video-­‐on-­‐demand	  website	  Hulu.com,	  for	  instance,	  was	  built	  by	  a	  consortium	  of	  TV	  
networks	  to	  deliver	  –	  through	  the	  Internet	  –	  content	  that	  had	  originally	  been	  
produced	  for	  traditional	  mass-­‐media	  television	  broadcasting.	  Similarly,	  the	  Internet-­‐
based	  video-­‐on-­‐demand	  service	  Netflix.com	  spent	  $100	  million	  to	  produce	  House	  of	  
Cards,	  a	  26-­‐episode	  original	  series	  starring	  Academy	  Award	  winner	  Kevin	  Spacey	  
and	  directed	  by	  blockbuster	  film	  director	  David	  Fincher	  (Masters	  2012).	  Netflix	  is	  a	  
video-­‐on-­‐demand	  service	  which	  facilitates	  non-­‐simultaneous	  viewing,	  but	  this	  high-­‐
profile	  production	  likely	  created	  a	  large	  eager-­‐to-­‐watch	  audience	  that	  tuned	  in	  
simultaneously.173	  Netflix	  does	  not	  release	  viewership	  data	  (the	  company	  has	  no	  
need	  to	  do	  so	  because	  it	  does	  not	  sell	  advertisements)	  but	  widely-­‐cited	  estimates	  
put	  the	  number	  of	  House	  of	  Cards	  viewers	  at	  between	  1.5	  million	  and	  2.7	  million	  
within	  a	  day	  of	  the	  series’	  release	  (Molloy	  2013).	  Netflix.com	  was	  a	  poster-­‐child	  of	  
the	  web	  2.0	  boom,	  but	  the	  company’s	  investment	  in	  “House	  of	  Cards”	  follows	  a	  mass	  
media	  model.	  
Failing	  to	  recognize	  that	  new	  media	  technologies	  can	  also	  fill	  the	  roll	  of	  mass	  
media	  –	  and	  choosing	  to	  analyze	  only	  patently	  mass	  media	  technologies	  when	  
evaluating	  industry	  health	  –	  can	  lead	  to	  accounts	  that	  mistake	  a	  shift	  in	  technologies	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  summarized	  the	  sense	  of	  anticipation:	  “Netflix	  did	  not	  immediately	  
say	  what	  time	  of	  day	  on	  Feb.	  1	  it	  will	  release	  ‘House	  of	  Cards,’	  but	  keep	  your	  finger	  near	  the	  
refresh	  button”	  (Itzkoff	  2012).	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for	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  mass	  media	  more	  generally.174	  For	  instance,	  according	  to	  a	  
report	  by	  the	  recording	  industry	  advocacy	  group	  IFPI	  the	  most	  popular	  form	  of	  
online	  music	  consumption	  in	  2011	  was	  watching	  music	  videos	  on	  a	  computer,	  which	  
57%	  of	  survey	  respondents	  had	  done	  in	  the	  past	  3	  months	  (IFPI	  Digital	  Music	  
Report:	  Music	  at	  the	  Touch	  of	  a	  Button	  2011).	  Slightly	  less	  than	  50%	  of	  respondents	  
had	  downloaded	  a	  song	  without	  paying,	  and	  between	  20%	  and	  25%	  of	  respondents	  
had,	  in	  the	  past	  3	  months	  streamed	  music	  on	  a	  computer,	  watched	  music	  videos	  on	  a	  
mobile	  phone,	  and/or	  streamed	  music	  on	  a	  mobile	  phone	  (IFPI	  2011).	  	  Each	  of	  these	  
represents	  a	  different	  medium	  for	  music	  consumption	  and	  on	  the	  surface	  might	  
seem	  to	  indicate	  fragmentation	  of	  audiences,	  but	  much	  of	  the	  same	  music	  is	  
consumed	  across	  these	  platforms.	  For	  instance	  the	  #2	  most	  watched	  YouTube	  video	  
of	  all	  time	  is	  the	  music	  video	  for	  the	  song	  “Baby”	  by	  teen	  pop	  star	  Justin	  Bieber.	  And	  
while	  the	  YouTube	  video	  has	  been	  watched	  over	  800	  million	  times,	  the	  song	  was	  
also	  purchased	  as	  a	  digital	  download	  over	  3.7	  million	  times	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  
came	  from	  an	  album	  that	  was	  the	  #1	  most	  downloaded	  album	  during	  its	  debut	  week	  
(Grein	  2012;	  “Digital	  Albums	  |	  Billboard”	  2010).	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  new	  
technologies	  have	  made	  more	  options	  available	  the	  most	  popular	  content	  has	  a	  
persistent	  ability	  to	  attract	  mass	  audiences,	  both	  among	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174	  Sassen	  has	  described	  a	  similar	  trap	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  globalization,	  where	  analyses	  
that	  study	  patently	  global	  processes	  miss	  important	  national,	  subnational,	  and	  local	  
articulations	  of	  global	  processes.	  Sassen	  describes	  this	  as	  “a	  kind	  of	  endogeneity	  trap”	  and	  
avoids	  it	  by	  analyzing	  instead	  assemblages	  of	  transhistorical	  concepts	  –	  territory,	  authority,	  
and	  rights	  (“World	  Development	  Indicators”	  2013).	  The	  definition	  of	  mass	  media	  that	  I	  
offered	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  does	  something	  similar.	  Rather	  than	  analyze	  media	  that	  
appear	  to	  be	  “mass	  media”	  prima	  facie,	  I	  have	  defined	  the	  object	  of	  analysis	  (mass	  media)	  in	  
terms	  of	  four	  transhistorical	  characteristics	  of	  communication	  that	  deal	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  message	  and	  the	  audience.	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competing	  options	  and	  across	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  media	  platforms.	  From	  this	  
perspective	  these	  changes	  do	  not	  represent	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  media	  but	  the	  
emergence	  of	  a	  new	  spectrum	  of	  technologies	  capable	  of	  delivering	  the	  same	  
content;	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  do	  so	  by	  design,	  these	  new	  technologies	  often	  
operate	  according	  to	  the	  four	  criteria	  that	  define	  a	  mass	  medium.	  The	  challenge	  to	  
mass	  media	  industries	  is	  one	  of	  monetization,	  as	  media	  firms	  seek	  to	  develop	  
business	  models	  that	  make	  new	  modes	  of	  content	  distribution	  profitable;	  mass	  
media	  may	  look	  different	  but	  it	  has	  not	  vanished.175	  
	   	  
Prognostications	  about	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  media	  often	  assume	  that	  new	  
media	  will	  act	  as	  simple	  substitutes	  for	  older	  media.	  But	  in	  fact,	  the	  interaction	  
between	  new	  media	  and	  older	  mass	  media	  has	  been	  very	  different	  from	  the	  
innovation,	  substitution,	  obsolescence	  pattern	  that	  characterized	  the	  death	  of	  the	  8-­‐
Track	  cassette	  or	  the	  VHS	  tape.176	  This	  became	  evident	  in	  NBC’s	  “$1	  billion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175	  The	  main	  challenge	  in	  this	  complex	  ecosystem	  –	  where	  mass	  media	  still	  dominates,	  even	  
though	  it	  is	  delivered	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  new	  technologies	  –	  is	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  bring	  
fragmented	  digital	  revenues	  up	  to	  the	  level	  of	  physical	  sales.	  In	  2010	  an	  estimated	  29%	  of	  
record	  company	  revenues	  –	  $4.6	  billion	  –	  came	  from	  digital	  channels,	  while	  the	  remainder	  
came	  mainly	  from	  physical	  sales	  (Nielsen	  2011;	  IFPI	  2011).	  
	  
176	  The	  relationship	  between	  new	  and	  old	  media	  can	  follow	  various	  patterns,	  which	  are	  
discussed	  in	  the	  appendix	  titled	  “The	  Succession	  of	  Media.”	  These	  patterns	  include	  
substitution,	  as	  in	  the	  move	  from	  8-­‐Track	  audio	  cassettes	  to	  cassette	  tapes;	  redefinition	  of	  
roles	  among	  new	  and	  old	  media,	  as	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  painting	  and	  photography;	  
and	  industry-­‐wide	  complex	  disruption	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  online	  music	  downloads.	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laboratory”	  for	  examining	  the	  interactions	  between	  new	  and	  old	  media	  –	  the	  2008	  
Beijing	  Olympics	  (Zucker	  2008).177	  
Using	  a	  new	  audience	  measurement	  system	  called	  the	  Total	  Audience	  
Measurement	  Index,	  or	  TAMi,	  NBC	  was	  able	  to	  monitor	  audience	  engagement	  across	  
different	  media	  platforms	  during	  the	  Beijing	  Summer	  Games.	  The	  system	  tracked	  
the	  daily	  media	  consumption	  of	  panelists	  across	  all	  media	  devices	  from	  the	  time	  
they	  woke	  up	  until	  they	  went	  to	  sleep.	  The	  results	  revealed	  that	  unlike	  the	  cassette	  
tape	  and	  the	  8-­‐Track,	  online	  video	  and	  TV	  broadcasts	  are	  not,	  generally	  speaking,	  
substitutes	  for	  one	  another.	  In	  fact,	  users	  who	  engaged	  with	  new	  media	  actually	  
watched	  more	  traditional	  television	  broadcasts,	  not	  less.	  According	  to	  former	  
NBCUniversal	  CEO	  Jeff	  Zucker,	  people	  who	  watched	  the	  Olympics	  on	  both	  television	  
and	  the	  Internet	  ended	  up	  watching	  twice	  as	  much	  TV.	  This	  led	  Zucker	  to	  echo	  Bill	  
Gates’s	  1996	  proclamation	  that	  “content	  is	  king”.	  
In	  other	  words,	  for	  people	  who	  are	  enthusiastic	  about	  the	  content	  –	  be	  it	  the	  
Olympics	  or	  Heroes	  or	  30	  Rock	  –	  making	  content	  available	  on	  all	  platforms	  leads	  to	  
more	  –	  not	  less	  –	  viewing	  on	  TV.	  (Zucker	  2008)	  
Zucker	  gave	  an	  example	  of	  typical	  media	  consumption	  behavior	  from	  one	  of	  the	  
TAMi	  panelists.	  The	  panelist	  was	  a	  23-­‐year-­‐old	  woman	  living	  in	  Miami	  and	  this	  
excerpt	  describes	  her	  media	  consumption	  during	  primetime	  on	  Monday,	  August	  11th	  
2008.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177	  NBC	  paid	  $894	  million	  to	  broadcast	  the	  2008	  Beijing	  Olympic	  Games	  in	  the	  United	  
States,	  producing	  3,600	  hours	  of	  televised	  and	  online	  coverage.	  In	  2012	  the	  network	  paid	  
$1.18	  billion	  to	  broadcast	  the	  2012	  London	  Olympic	  Games,	  producing	  5,535	  hours	  of	  
coverage.	  The	  network	  also	  won	  a	  bid	  to	  cover	  the	  next	  four	  games	  (including	  Winter	  
games)	  for	  which	  it	  will	  pay	  a	  combined	  $4.38	  billion	  (“What	  NBC	  Paid	  for	  US	  Olympic	  
Rights	  over	  the	  Years”	  2012).	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She	  began	  the	  night	  at	  8	  p.m.	  both	  at	  NBCOlympics.com	  and	  on	  NBC	  –	  using	  both	  at	  
once.	  She	  stayed	  on	  the	  site	  until	  8:45	  and	  watched	  TV	  until	  9:03.	  She	  came	  back	  to	  
NBC	  again	  twice	  in	  the	  next	  hour.	  Then,	  at	  10:24	  she	  came	  back	  again,	  and	  a	  minute	  
later	  she	  visited	  NBCOlympics.com	  from	  her	  mobile	  phone	  for	  16	  minutes	  while	  she	  
continued	  to	  watch	  TV.	  Then	  she	  watched	  TV	  from	  10:57	  until	  12:38	  a.m.,	  and	  
visited	  NBCOlympics.com	  three	  times	  while	  she	  watched.	  (Zucker	  2008)	  
Not	  only	  were	  new	  media	  complementing	  older	  mass	  media	  –	  they	  were	  being	  used	  
simultaneously.	  “The	  surprising	  fact,”	  Zucker	  told	  the	  audience	  at	  a	  Royal	  Television	  
Society	  conference	  in	  London,	  is	  that	  “consumers	  in	  the	  U.S.	  spend	  an	  average	  of	  12	  
hours	  daily	  with	  media	  –	  but	  they	  do	  it	  in	  nine	  hours”	  (Zucker	  2008).	  The	  symbiotic	  
relationship	  between	  new	  and	  old	  media	  that	  NBC	  observed	  during	  its	  coverage	  of	  
the	  2008	  Olympics	  conflicts	  with	  assumptions	  about	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  media.	  
This	  type	  of	  relationship	  happens	  in	  other	  contexts	  as	  well.	  For	  instance	  in	  
Hollywood	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  new	  and	  old	  media	  has	  
been	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  marketing	  strategies.	  Walt	  Disney	  Studios,	  which	  
distributed	  The	  Avengers,	  achieved	  that	  movie’s	  opening	  weekend	  success,	  in	  part,	  
through	  the	  use	  of	  a	  social	  media	  marketing	  campaign.	  The	  highly	  anticipated	  first	  
trailer	  for	  The	  Avengers	  debuted	  not	  on	  television	  but	  on	  Facebook.	  This	  
represented	  a	  novel	  trailer-­‐release	  strategy.	  By	  way	  of	  comparison:	  in	  2011	  
Paramount	  Pictures	  had	  spent	  $3.1	  million	  to	  debut	  an	  ad	  for	  Transformers	  III:	  Dark	  
of	  the	  Moon	  during	  the	  Super	  Bowl.	  One	  measure	  of	  the	  ad’s	  effectiveness	  was	  the	  
response	  on	  the	  social	  networking/microblogging	  site	  Twitter.	  The	  $3.1	  million	  ad	  
resulted	  in	  37,000	  tweets	  (N.	  Davis	  2011).	  Rather	  than	  premiering	  the	  trailer	  for	  
The	  Avengers	  during	  the	  Super	  Bowl,	  as	  is	  common	  for	  would-­‐be	  summer	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blockbusters,	  Disney	  released	  their	  trailer	  to	  2.3	  million	  Facebook	  fans	  three	  
months	  earlier;	  and	  instead	  of	  spending	  $3.1	  million	  to	  release	  the	  trailer,	  like	  
Paramount,	  the	  cost	  for	  Disney	  to	  distribute	  the	  ad	  was	  $0.	  The	  effect	  of	  Disney’s	  
strategy:	  61,000	  tweets,	  or	  about	  two	  thirds	  more	  than	  Paramount’s	  (N.	  Davis	  
2011).	  Disney	  also	  released	  the	  trailer	  on	  iTunes	  Movie	  Trailers	  where	  it	  was	  
downloaded	  10	  million	  times	  in	  its	  first	  24	  hours,	  breaking	  the	  record	  for	  the	  most-­‐
viewed	  trailer	  on	  the	  site	  (Marvel	  2011).	  The	  trailer	  was	  also	  posted	  to	  YouTube,	  
where	  it	  has	  been	  viewed	  over	  18	  million	  times.	  Disney	  eventually	  did	  pay	  for	  a	  30	  
second	  Super	  Bowl	  ad	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  $4	  million,	  but	  this	  came	  months	  after	  the	  
distributor’s	  social	  media	  efforts	  began	  (Fritz	  2012).	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  
online	  media	  may	  have	  been	  designed	  with	  segmentation	  in	  mind,	  the	  case	  of	  The	  
Avengers	  shows	  these	  media	  being	  used	  to	  help	  drive	  over	  26	  million	  people	  to	  
watch	  the	  same	  movie	  in	  a	  72-­‐hour	  period,	  promoting,	  not	  diminishing,	  
simultaneous	  mass	  engagement.178	  
The	  2008	  Olympics	  and	  The	  Avengers	  show	  how	  new	  media	  can	  be	  used	  by	  
established	  mass	  media	  corporations	  to	  promote	  their	  content	  among	  viewers,	  but	  
new	  media	  can	  also	  support	  traditional	  mass	  media	  in	  other	  unexpected	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178	  There	  is	  an	  analogy	  to	  studies	  of	  globalization	  here.	  The	  emergence	  of	  novel	  information	  
and	  communication	  technologies	  (ICTs)	  in	  the	  1980s	  was	  presumed	  by	  many	  to	  signal	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  city.	  The	  notion	  was	  that	  ICTs	  would	  enable	  companies	  to	  re-­‐locate	  outside	  of	  
expensive	  overcrowded	  cities.	  While	  this	  did	  happen	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  dominant	  trend	  was	  
precisely	  the	  opposite.	  In	  combination	  with	  neoliberal	  trade	  policies	  these	  ICTs	  enabled	  
companies	  to	  disperse	  their	  activities	  around	  the	  world.	  This	  increased	  the	  need	  for	  high-­‐
level	  management	  functions	  and	  complex	  forms	  of	  information.	  Many	  of	  these	  functions	  
were	  fulfilled	  by	  specialized	  producer	  service	  firms,	  which	  agglomerated	  into	  urban	  cores.	  
Eventually,	  the	  technical	  innovations	  that	  many	  engineers	  and	  pundits	  imagined	  would	  
make	  the	  city	  irrelevant	  made	  certain	  cities	  more	  important	  than	  ever	  (c.f.	  Sassen	  2001;	  
Sassen	  2011).	  The	  analogy	  here	  is	  that	  the	  new	  media	  technologies	  that	  many	  assumed	  
would	  spell	  the	  end	  of	  mass	  media	  may	  actually	  be	  bolstering	  older	  mass	  media	  industries.	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sometimes	  counterintuitive	  ways.	  For	  instance,	  in	  October	  2004,	  the	  British	  satellite	  
broadcaster	  SkyOne	  aired	  the	  premiere	  episode	  of	  a	  new	  science	  fiction	  show,	  
Battlestar	  Galactica,	  which	  had	  been	  co-­‐produced	  by	  the	  American	  SciFi	  Channel.	  
The	  program	  premiered	  in	  the	  US	  three	  months	  after	  the	  UK	  premier	  and	  in	  the	  
interim	  was	  widely	  downloaded	  on	  bitTorrent,	  a	  popular	  unlicensed	  file-­‐sharing	  
service.	  Rather	  than	  dampening	  the	  TV	  audience	  for	  Battlestar	  Galactica’s	  premier	  
though,	  unauthorized	  file-­‐sharing	  on	  bitTorrent	  had	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  ratings,	  
according	  to	  media	  analyst	  Mark	  Pesce.179	  Battlestar	  Galactica	  was	  the	  most	  highly	  
watched	  series	  on	  the	  SciFi	  Channel	  from	  its	  premier	  onwards.	  Pesce	  suggests	  that	  
something	  similar	  occurred	  when	  an	  “unfinished”	  new	  episode	  of	  the	  BBC’s	  reboot	  
of	  the	  cult	  TV	  show	  Dr.	  Who	  was	  leaked	  to	  the	  Internet.	  The	  episode	  was	  illegally	  
downloaded	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  times.	  The	  result:	  on	  broadcast	  the	  episode	  
attracted	  10.81	  million	  viewers,	  among	  the	  show’s	  top	  ratings	  (Pesce	  2005).	  
The	  positive	  effect	  of	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  file	  sharing	  on	  mass	  media	  has	  been	  
studied	  in	  other	  contexts	  as	  well,	  especially	  in	  the	  music	  industry.	  For	  instance	  while	  
the	  RIAA	  publishes	  findings	  that	  online	  piracy	  does	  damage	  to	  the	  music	  industry,	  
other	  studies	  have	  come	  to	  different	  conclusions.	  A	  2007	  study	  used	  the	  increase	  in	  
file-­‐sharing	  during	  German	  school	  holidays	  as	  a	  natural	  experiment	  to	  investigate	  
the	  effects	  of	  file	  sharing	  on	  legal	  music	  purchases.	  The	  study,	  which	  covered	  a	  17-­‐
week	  period	  during	  2002,	  found	  no	  statistically	  significant	  correlation	  between	  file-­‐
sharing	  and	  a	  reduction	  in	  legal	  purchases	  (Oberholzer-­‐Gee	  and	  Strumpf	  2007).	  And	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179	  “The	  series	  is	  so	  good,”	  said	  Pesce,	  “that	  the	  few	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  people	  who	  
watched	  downloaded	  versions	  told	  their	  friends	  to	  tune	  in	  on	  January	  14th,	  and	  see	  for	  
themselves”	  (Pesce	  2005).	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an	  earlier	  investigation	  from	  2004	  found	  that	  while	  file-­‐sharing	  could	  have	  resulted	  
in	  a	  10%	  decrease	  in	  CD	  sales	  in	  2001,	  online	  sharing	  could	  not	  account	  for	  the	  drop	  
observed	  in	  2002	  (Martin	  Peitz	  and	  Waelbroeck	  2006;	  M.	  Peitz	  and	  Waelbroeck	  
2004).	  
Although	  the	  decline	  in	  record	  sales	  is	  undeniable	  some	  analysts	  have	  
questioned	  the	  causal	  link	  to	  file	  sharing	  by	  offering	  alternative	  explanations.	  One	  of	  
the	  factors	  that	  could	  account	  for	  falling	  record	  industry	  revenues	  is	  the	  broader	  
shift	  in	  entertainment	  spending.	  Between	  1999	  and	  2003	  sale	  of	  DVDs	  and	  VHS	  
tapes	  increased	  by	  over	  $5	  billion,	  consumers	  spent	  40%	  more	  on	  videogames,	  and	  
teen	  cell	  phone	  use	  tripled	  (Oberholzer-­‐Gee	  and	  Strumpf	  2007).	  This	  could	  all	  
amount	  to	  less	  money	  spent	  on	  music	  since	  paychecks	  and	  pocket	  money	  are,	  after	  
all,	  limited.	  Another	  factor	  accounting	  for	  declining	  revenues	  may	  be	  apathy	  to	  
music	  industry	  offerings.	  A	  January	  2006	  survey	  of	  1,000	  US	  adults	  found	  that	  58%	  
of	  respondents	  said	  that	  music	  is	  getting	  worse,	  while	  only	  24%	  said	  it	  was	  getting	  
better,	  74%	  of	  respondents	  said	  music	  CDs	  were	  expensive,	  and	  while	  33%	  said	  that	  
music	  sales	  were	  declining	  because	  of	  piracy,	  73%	  said	  that	  the	  cause	  was	  either	  
that	  CDs	  are	  too	  expensive,	  that	  the	  quality	  of	  music	  is	  getting	  worse,	  or	  that	  the	  
decline	  was	  the	  result	  of	  competition	  from	  other	  forms	  of	  entertainment	  (The	  
Associated	  Press	  Rolling	  Stone	  Study	  2006).	  The	  fragmenting	  effect	  of	  new	  media	  
may	  not	  be	  an	  adequate	  explanation	  for	  changes	  in	  the	  music	  industry,	  and	  so	  the	  
further	  spread	  of	  new	  media	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  a	  further	  decline	  in	  music	  
industry	  revenues.	  The	  significance	  of	  this	  is	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  old	  and	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new	  media	  is	  much	  more	  complicated	  than	  a	  procession	  of	  latest-­‐and-­‐greatest	  
technologies	  sending	  older	  media	  to	  the	  junk-­‐heap.	  
	  
Making	  sense	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  contemporary	  publicity	  requires	  dealing	  
with	  the	  two	  accounts	  outlined	  above,	  which	  describe	  the	  apparently	  contradictory	  
situation	  of	  the	  contemporary	  media.	  If	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  dominant	  media	  firms	  has	  
shifted	  from	  away	  mass	  audience	  engagement	  –	  as	  described	  in	  chapter	  four	  –	  and	  if	  
audiences	  are	  consuming	  a	  radically	  expanded	  menu	  of	  offerings	  designed	  with	  
segmentation	  in	  mind,	  then	  how	  can	  it	  be	  that	  by	  some	  measures	  mass	  media	  is	  
thriving?	  In	  the	  following	  chapter	  I	  propose	  an	  answer.	  Namely,	  that	  the	  locus	  of	  
mass	  media	  in	  society	  has	  shifted	  away	  from	  the	  institutional	  logic	  of	  mass	  media	  
firms	  and	  has	  become	  situated	  in	  the	  interaction	  of	  two	  principles	  that	  govern	  media	  
today.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  is	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency,	  which	  was	  introduced	  in	  
chapter	  2.	  The	  second	  is	  the	  principle	  of	  cheap	  publicity,	  which	  briefly	  mentioned	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  chapter	  four	  and	  which	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  depth	  in	  chapter	  seven.	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CHAPTER	  6	  
THE	  STRUCTURE	  OF	  THE	  MEDIA	  TODAY	  
	  
In	  the	  preceding	  chapters	  I	  outlined	  the	  apparent	  contradiction	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  media	  today.	  Since	  the	  rupture	  of	  the	  1970s	  in	  which	  media	  institutions	  began	  to	  
adopt	  a	  strategy	  of	  audience	  segmentation	  there	  has	  been	  a	  proliferation	  of	  new	  
technologies	  and	  media	  institutions	  geared	  at	  fragmenting	  audiences;	  nonetheless	  
media	  consumption	  continues	  to	  exhibit	  mass	  tendencies,	  which	  don’t	  appear	  to	  be	  
vanishing.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  offer	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  this	  is	  possible,	  based	  on	  two	  
key	  principles	  developed	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapters:	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency	  
(chapter	  2)	  and	  the	  cheapening	  of	  publicity	  (chapters	  4	  and	  5).	  
	   While these two principles were the product of my engagement with theoretical 
literature on publicity and media their validity is also implicitly supported by some of the 
prior research on cultural markets. Most relevant here is work by Salganik, Dodds, and 
Watts, who constructed an artificial cultural market for music. In their experiment 14,341 
human participants downloaded previously unknown songs with or without knowledge of 
other participants’ choices. The authors found that when participants were aware of each 
others’ choices they tended to choose already-popular songs at a significantly higher rate 
(Salganik, Dodds, and Watts 2006). While the authors’ goal was to identify sources of 
inequality and unpredictability in market outcomes, this intermediate finding provides 
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strong empirical evidence for the existence of what I have described as a mass media 
tendency.180	  	  
	   It	  was	  not	  immediately	  obvious	  to	  me	  that	  these	  two	  principles	  would	  be	  
enough	  to	  account	  for	  the	  paradoxical	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  today.	  In	  order	  to	  
understand	  their	  ramifications	  though,	  I	  constructed	  a	  computer	  simulation	  of	  
media	  consumption.181	  The	  unexpected	  result	  of	  this	  simulation	  is	  that	  these	  two	  
principles	  provide	  a	  parsimonious	  explanation	  of	  the	  patterns	  we	  are	  seeing	  in	  the	  
media	  today,	  namely	  the	  simultaneous	  appearance	  of	  fragmentation	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180	  While	  I	  do	  not	  devote	  space	  to	  an	  in-­‐depth	  engagement	  with	  this	  literature	  here	  there	  
have	  been	  several	  projects	  in	  economics	  and	  business	  that	  have	  examined	  these	  trends	  
from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  market	  dynamics,	  consumer	  choice,	  and	  marketing.	  Markets	  that	  
exhibit	  mass	  tendencies	  have	  also	  been	  described	  as	  winner-­‐take-­‐all	  markets	  and	  superstar	  
markets	  (c.f.	  Rosen	  1981;	  Frank	  and	  Cook	  1996;	  De	  Vany	  2011).	  Related	  issues	  have	  also	  
been	  studied	  in	  the	  context	  of	  social	  influence,	  compliance	  and	  conformity,	  though	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  distinguish	  these	  (c.f.	  Bond	  and	  Smith	  1996;	  Cialdini	  and	  Goldstein	  2004).	  The	  
mass	  media	  tendency	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  conformity	  –	  it	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  
consumers	  will	  like	  or	  explicitly	  endorse	  the	  media	  that	  they	  consume,	  only	  that	  they	  will	  
consume	  it.	  An	  easy	  example	  here	  would	  be	  highly-­‐contentious	  products,	  which	  large	  parts	  
of	  the	  audience	  may	  dislike,	  notwithstanding	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  consumed	  it.	  In	  fact	  in	  
the	  simulation	  below	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency	  is	  simulated	  as	  orthogonal	  to	  audience-­‐
member	  tastes	  and	  preferences.	  
	  
181	  Hollywood	  executives	  distinguish	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  movies	  –	  high	  concept	  and	  low	  
concept.	  Low	  concept	  movies	  are	  generally	  considered	  higher	  “quality”	  –	  they	  are	  the	  
character	  studies	  or	  languorous	  art	  films.	  High	  concept	  movies	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  rely	  
heavily	  on	  a	  single	  premise,	  often	  framed	  as	  a	  “what	  if…”	  statement.	  What	  if	  it	  was	  possible	  
to	  clone	  dinosaurs?	  What	  if	  a	  shark	  started	  terrorizing	  a	  New	  Jersey	  beach	  during	  summer	  
vacation?	  What	  if	  the	  world	  we	  live	  in	  is	  actually	  a	  computer	  simulation?	  These	  were	  the	  
high-­‐concept	  hooks	  behind	  the	  blockbusters	  Jurassic	  Park,	  Jaws,	  and	  The	  Matrix.	  A	  strong	  
premise	  sets	  in	  motion	  all	  the	  events	  of	  the	  narrative	  and	  audience	  comes	  to	  watch	  what	  
happens.	  A	  computer	  simulation	  is	  very	  similar.	  The	  simulation	  usually	  begins	  with	  a	  “what	  
if…”	  question.	  For	  instance	  a	  bird	  flocking	  simulation	  might	  begin	  with	  the	  question,	  what	  if	  
birds	  only	  paid	  attention	  to	  the	  birds	  flying	  immediately	  next	  to	  them	  (c.f.	  Reynolds	  1987)?	  
A	  structural	  engineering	  simulation	  might	  begin	  with	  the	  question,	  what	  if	  a	  building	  was	  
constructed	  with	  wooden	  trusses	  instead	  of	  steel?	  Just	  as	  the	  audience	  watching	  Jurassic	  
Park,	  Jaws,	  or	  The	  Matrix,	  is	  intrigued	  by	  the	  movie’s	  main	  question	  and	  watches	  to	  find	  out	  
how	  that	  question	  is	  answered,	  someone	  running	  a	  computer	  simulation	  implements	  their	  
question	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  variable	  and	  watches	  to	  see	  what	  happens	  when	  they	  manipulate	  
it.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  implement	  a	  simulation	  that	  includes	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency	  and	  the	  
cheapening	  of	  publicity	  as	  variables.	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enduring	  mass	  consumption	  of	  certain	  media.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  main	  finding	  of	  this	  
dissertation:	  mass	  media	  is	  no	  longer	  rooted	  in	  the	  institutional	  logic	  of	  dominant	  
media	  firms,	  it	  has	  become	  the	  emergent	  effect	  of	  the	  organization	  of	  contemporary	  
society,	  namely	  the	  cheapening	  of	  publicity,	  which	  has	  been	  taking	  place	  since	  the	  
1970s,	  and	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency,	  which	  describes	  a	  basic	  human	  trait.	  In	  the	  
remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  simulation	  and	  its	  results.	  In	  the	  
following	  chapter	  I	  will	  discuss	  their	  meaning.	  
	  
The	  Simulation	  
My	  simulation	  of	  media	  consumption	  is	  a	  synchronous,	  stochastic,	  turn-­‐based,	  
agent-­‐based	  simulation	  that	  includes	  two	  entities	  –	  people	  and	  messages.	  The	  
messages	  can	  be	  movies,	  television	  shows,	  newspaper	  articles	  –	  any	  content	  that	  is	  
transmitted	  via	  communications	  media.	  
In	  brief,	  the	  simulation	  is	  a	  Monte-­‐Carlo	  simulation.	  Each	  decision	  in	  the	  
simulation	  is	  made	  based	  on	  the	  result	  of	  a	  random-­‐number	  generator.	  The	  
significance	  of	  this	  is	  that	  each	  time	  the	  simulation	  is	  run	  the	  outcome	  will	  be	  
slightly	  different,	  even	  when	  the	  same	  variables	  are	  used.	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  
simulation	  is	  repeated	  100	  times	  for	  each	  set	  of	  variables	  and	  the	  results	  are	  
averaged.	  This	  method	  has	  been	  widely	  adopted	  in	  computational	  physics,	  biology,	  
and	  economics.182	  
When	  the	  simulation	  is	  initialized	  each	  person	  is	  randomly	  connected	  to	  a	  
certain	  number	  of	  other	  people	  –	  their	  friends	  –	  and	  each	  person	  is	  also	  randomly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  See	  Carsey	  and	  Harden	  2013;	  McLeish	  2011;	  Binder	  and	  Heermann	  2010.	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assigned	  a	  number	  that	  indicates	  their	  taste	  or	  preference	  for	  certain	  kinds	  of	  
messages	  (e.g.	  their	  preference	  for	  certain	  kinds	  of	  movies).	  During	  initialization	  a	  
certain	  number	  of	  messages	  are	  randomly	  distributed	  throughout	  the	  population	  –	  
one	  per	  person	  –	  with	  the	  requirement	  that	  each	  message	  appears	  in	  the	  population	  
at	  least	  once,	  though	  it	  can	  appear	  in	  the	  population	  multiple	  times	  (e.g.	  multiple	  
people	  might	  watch	  the	  same	  movie	  at	  the	  same	  time).	  The	  cheapening	  of	  publicity	  
discussed	  in	  earlier	  chapters	  has	  led	  to	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  media	  
content	  available	  in	  society,	  and	  this	  is	  modeled	  in	  the	  simulation	  by	  increasing	  the	  
number	  of	  unique	  messages	  in	  the	  population.	  During	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  there	  
were	  only	  three	  major	  television	  networks	  and	  audiences	  had	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  
choices	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  shows	  they	  could	  watch.	  Today	  viewers	  can	  chose	  from	  an	  
almost	  limitless	  number	  of	  options	  by	  watching	  online	  videos-­‐on-­‐demand.	  The	  
limiting	  factor	  is	  audience-­‐member	  awareness	  of	  the	  available	  content.	  This	  has	  also	  
increased	  dramatically	  in	  recent	  years	  both	  as	  a	  result	  of	  increasingly	  sophisticated	  
filtering	  and	  recommendation	  systems,	  the	  increased	  prevalence	  of	  advertising,	  and	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  audience	  members	  are	  connected	  to	  a	  vastly	  greater	  
number	  of	  other	  people	  via	  communication	  technologies	  such	  as	  Facebook.	  These	  
are	  all	  channels	  through	  which	  audience	  members	  receive	  recommendations	  and	  
information	  about	  available	  media	  content.	  In	  the	  simulation	  this	  is	  modeled	  by	  
increasing	  the	  number	  of	  friends	  that	  each	  user	  has	  –	  friends	  are	  essentially	  content	  
recommenders.	  
With	  every	  cycle	  of	  the	  simulation,	  each	  person	  choses	  a	  new	  message	  from	  
among	  the	  messages	  that	  their	  friends	  consumed	  in	  the	  last	  cycle.	  This	  choice	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depends	  on	  the	  balance	  between	  two	  variables	  –	  the	  similarity	  in	  ‘taste’	  between	  the	  
consumer	  and	  each	  friend,	  and	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  messages	  on	  offer	  among	  the	  
person’s	  friends.	  This	  second	  factor	  models	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency	  –	  persons	  will	  
have	  a	  tendency	  to	  choose	  already	  popular	  messages,	  sometimes	  over	  
recommendations	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  friends	  with	  similar	  taste.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  
requirement	  that	  individuals	  do	  not	  consume	  the	  same	  message	  more	  than	  once	  (for	  
the	  most	  part,	  we	  do	  not	  tend	  to	  re-­‐watch	  the	  same	  movies	  again	  and	  again).	  
The	  difference	  in	  tastes	  is	  calculated	  as,	  
tastedifference(!, !, !"#$) = min  ( ! − ! , !"#$ −max !, ! +min !, ! )	  
	  
This	  is	  equivalent	  to	  distance	  along	  a	  ring.	  This	  is	  preferable	  to	  linear	  Euclidean	  
distance	  because	  in	  the	  formula	  above	  all	  people	  are,	  on	  average,	  equidistant	  from	  
all	  others.	  In	  the	  simulation	  a	  base	  of	  18	  is	  used,	  so	  the	  maximum	  difference	  in	  taste	  
between	  any	  two	  people	  in	  the	  simulation	  is	  9	  and	  the	  minimum	  distance	  for	  people	  
with	  identical	  taste	  is	  0.	  	  
In	  each	  generation	  a	  person	  chooses	  the	  message	  from	  among	  her	  friends	  
that	  has	  the	  highest	  score	  according	  to	  the	  formula,	  




When	  homophilypreference	  is	  1,	  it	  takes	  ten	  of	  the	  most	  weakly-­‐matched	  people	  in	  
terms	  of	  taste	  to	  equal	  the	  recommending	  power	  of	  one	  perfectly	  matched	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person.183	  When	  homophilypreference	  is	  0	  all	  recommendations	  contribute	  1	  to	  the	  
score	  so	  all	  that	  matters	  is	  how	  many	  friends	  recommend	  each	  message.	  When	  
homophilypreference	  becomes	  very	  large	  all	  that	  matters	  is	  the	  taste	  of	  the	  most	  
well-­‐matched	  recommender	  –	  for	  instance	  when	  homophilypreference	  is	  44	  it	  takes	  
103	  recommendations	  by	  second-­‐best	  matched	  friends	  to	  equal	  the	  score	  of	  a	  single	  
recommendation	  by	  a	  perfectly	  matched	  friend.	  
	   In	  summary,	  the	  simulation	  allows	  manipulation	  of	  the	  following	  variables:	  
• Population	  –	  the	  number	  of	  people	  in	  the	  simulation.	  
• Nfriends	  –	  the	  number	  of	  friends	  per	  person.	  
• Nmessages	  –	  the	  number	  of	  unique	  messages	  in	  the	  model.	  
• Generations	  –	  the	  number	  of	  cycles	  in	  each	  simulation.	  
• Simulations	  –	  the	  number	  of	  times	  to	  repeat	  the	  simulation.	  
• HomophilyPreference	  –	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  a	  message’s	  popularity	  versus	  
the	  similarity	  between	  a	  friend’s	  taste	  and	  the	  taste	  of	  the	  person	  choosing	  the	  
message.	  A	  larger	  value	  for	  HomophilyPreference	  indicates	  a	  stronger	  tendency	  
to	  prefer	  recommendations	  from	  friends	  with	  similar	  taste.	  A	  smaller	  value	  
indicates	  a	  preference	  for	  popular	  messages.	  This	  variable	  is	  where	  the	  mass	  
media	  tendency	  is	  implemented.	  
Unless	  otherwise	  noted	  in	  the	  simulations	  below	  the	  population	  size	  is	  set	  to	  1,000	  
people,	  the	  number	  of	  simulations	  is	  set	  to	  100,	  and	  the	  simulations	  are	  run	  for	  50	  
cycles.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183	  Note	  that	  the	  maximum	  difference	  in	  tastes,	  or	  tastediff	  in	  the	  formula,	  is	  9.	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The	  purpose	  of	  this	  simulation	  is	  explore	  how	  changes	  in	  technology	  and	  
individual	  behavior	  affect	  overall	  media	  consumption	  patterns.	  Certain	  changes	  will	  
have	  the	  tendency	  to	  reduce	  mass	  consumption,	  supporting	  the	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐
media	  scenario;	  other	  change	  will	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  increase	  mass	  consumption,	  
supporting	  the	  life-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media	  scenario.	  A	  key	  indicator	  here	  is	  the	  histogram	  of	  
message	  popularity	  –	  I	  interpret	  changes	  that	  increase	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  most	  
popular	  messages	  as	  changes	  that	  have	  promoted	  mass-­‐media-­‐type	  consumption,	  
whereas	  changes	  that	  tend	  to	  create	  a	  more	  even	  distribution	  have	  promoted	  more	  




The	  “homophily	  preference”	  
The	  first	  variable	  tested	  in	  the	  simulation	  models	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency	  –	  
i.e.	  that	  a	  preference	  for	  consuming	  already-­‐popular	  messages	  can	  provide	  an	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explanation	  for	  overall	  mass	  media	  consumption	  patterns.	  In	  the	  simulation	  this	  is	  
implemented	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  single	  variable	  that	  controls	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  
recommender	  similarity	  over	  message	  popularity	  as	  described	  above	  –	  i.e.	  
homophilypreference.	  	  
The	  figure	  below	  illustrates	  the	  effect	  of	  increasing	  the	  variable	  
homophilypreference	  from	  0,	  where	  all	  that	  matters	  is	  message	  popularity,	  to	  44,	  
where	  all	  that	  matters	  is	  the	  similarity	  of	  the	  best-­‐matched	  recommender’s	  taste.	  
	  
	  
As	  expected,	  adding	  a	  preference	  for	  already-­‐popular	  messages	  causes	  messages	  
that	  are	  slightly	  more	  popular	  than	  others	  –	  based	  on	  the	  random	  initial	  distribution	  
–	  to	  become	  significantly	  more	  popular.	  As	  the	  preference	  for	  already-­‐popular	  
messages	  increases,	  the	  most	  popular	  messages	  account	  for	  a	  greater	  and	  greater	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share	  of	  total	  messages.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  the	  initial	  distribution	  of	  
messages	  is	  the	  same	  across	  all	  six	  panels	  in	  the	  figure	  above.	  The	  mass-­‐media	  
character	  of	  the	  bottom	  right	  histogram	  is	  not	  a	  property	  of	  the	  initial	  selection	  of	  
messages,	  but	  an	  emergent	  property	  of	  the	  community	  of	  people	  in	  the	  simulation.	  
This	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency	  can	  act	  as	  a	  parsimonious	  
explanation	  for	  mass	  media	  consumption	  patterns	  showing	  that	  mass	  media	  is	  not	  
necessarily	  a	  feature	  of	  our	  technologies,	  but	  may	  instead	  be	  a	  feature	  of	  our	  selves.	  
	  
Number	  of	  messages	  
	   One	  of	  the	  contentions	  of	  the	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media	  narrative	  is	  that	  increasing	  
the	  number	  of	  choices	  available	  to	  consumers	  will	  increase	  audience	  fragmentation	  
and	  undermine	  mass	  media.	  Audience	  choice	  in	  the	  simulation	  is	  affected	  by	  two	  
variables	  –	  the	  number	  of	  messages	  available	  to	  the	  population	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  the	  
number	  of	  connections	  to	  each	  person.	  
The	  number	  of	  messages	  represents	  the	  total	  media	  output	  of	  the	  world.	  By	  
analogy	  to	  the	  real	  world	  this	  would	  be,	  for	  example,	  all	  of	  the	  movies	  produced	  in	  a	  
given	  period	  of	  time.	  A	  single	  individual	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  all	  of	  these,	  but	  
they	  are	  available	  to	  the	  population	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  variable	  tests	  the	  assertion	  that,	  
simply	  put,	  more	  media	  means	  more	  fragmentation.	  Video-­‐on-­‐demand	  services,	  for	  
instance,	  have	  made	  a	  greater	  number	  options	  available,	  as	  have	  user-­‐generated	  
content	  services	  like	  YouTube,	  an	  increased	  number	  of	  TV	  channels,	  and	  the	  annual	  
increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  movies	  produced	  in	  Hollywood.	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   The	  figure	  below	  illustrates	  the	  effect	  of	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  messages	  
in	  the	  model.	  In	  this	  scenario	  there	  are	  1,000	  people,	  and	  the	  homophily	  preference	  
is	  set	  to	  1	  so	  there	  is	  a	  balance	  between	  people’s	  preference	  for	  already-­‐popular	  
content	  and	  their	  preference	  for	  recommendations	  from	  well-­‐matched	  friends.	  
	  
The	  result	  of	  this	  simulation	  is	  striking	  –	  increasing	  the	  amount	  of	  content	  available	  
to	  the	  population	  as	  a	  whole	  actually	  increases	  the	  mass-­‐media	  character	  of	  the	  
outcome.	  This	  is	  the	  opposite	  of	  what	  the	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media	  narrative	  assumes.	  
	   The	  tendency	  of	  increased	  content-­‐production	  to	  promote	  mass-­‐media-­‐like	  
behavior	  results	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  when	  there	  is	  more	  competition	  among	  messages	  
fewer	  of	  those	  messages	  are	  able	  to	  gain	  an	  advantage.	  Those	  that	  do	  gain	  even	  a	  
small	  advantage	  though	  can	  quickly	  outcompete	  the	  large	  number	  of	  unpopular	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messages.	  This	  is	  a	  strong	  finding,	  and	  even	  appears	  when	  there	  is	  a	  very	  weak	  
tendency	  for	  people	  to	  consume	  already-­‐popular	  content,	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  figure	  
below.	  
	  
Number	  of	  friends	  
	   The	  other	  important	  variable	  that	  determines	  the	  number	  of	  choices	  
available	  to	  audience	  members	  is	  nfriends.	  This	  determines	  the	  number	  of	  
connections	  between	  people	  in	  the	  model.	  Since	  people	  in	  the	  model	  can	  only	  
choose	  a	  message	  from	  among	  the	  people	  connected	  to	  them	  this	  dictates	  the	  
number	  of	  options	  available	  to	  each	  person	  at	  every	  generation.	  This	  models	  several	  
real-­‐world	  phenomena.	  Obviously	  this	  includes	  the	  number	  of	  people	  with	  whom	  a	  
person	  discusses	  mass	  media	  –	  for	  instance	  if	  TV	  is	  a	  popular	  topic	  of	  conversation	  
around	  the	  water-­‐cooler	  an	  individual	  is	  likely	  to	  hear	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  opinions	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and	  recommendations.	  This	  variable	  also	  models	  the	  effect	  of	  online	  social	  
networking	  tools	  such	  as	  Facebook,	  which	  vastly	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  people	  
whose	  preferences	  and	  recommendations	  a	  given	  individual	  can	  see.	  In	  general	  
terms	  nfriends	  models	  the	  number	  of	  channels	  through	  which	  an	  individual	  can	  
learn	  about	  a	  message.	  Surprisingly,	  when	  there	  is	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  tendency	  
to	  choose	  messages	  based	  on	  popularity	  and	  the	  tendency	  to	  choose	  messages	  based	  
on	  recommender-­‐similarity	  –	  i.e.,	  when	  homophily	  preference	  =	  1	  –	  increasing	  the	  
number	  of	  connections	  between	  people	  also	  increases	  the	  mass-­‐media	  character	  of	  
the	  outcome,	  as	  in	  the	  figure	  below.	  
	  
Interestingly	  though,	  this	  effect	  does	  not	  appear	  when	  people	  have	  no	  preference	  for	  
already-­‐popular	  messages	  –	  when	  all	  that	  matters	  is	  the	  recommender’s	  taste,	  
increasing	  the	  number	  of	  channels	  through	  which	  a	  person	  can	  learn	  about	  movies,	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for	  instance,	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  affect	  the	  mass-­‐media	  character	  of	  the	  outcome	  one	  
way	  or	  the	  other.	  
	  
In	  reality,	  of	  course,	  people	  do	  have	  some	  tendency	  to	  prefer	  already-­‐popular	  
content,	  which	  I	  have	  described	  as	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  
entirely	  changes	  the	  effect	  of	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  connections	  between	  people,	  
which	  is	  a	  major	  effect	  of	  new	  media	  technologies,	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  
accounting	  for	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency	  in	  predicting	  the	  future	  of	  mass	  media.	  
	  
These	  simulations,	  particularly	  those	  that	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  increasing	  the	  
amount	  of	  content	  (i.e.	  messages)	  in	  the	  media	  ecosystem,	  account	  for	  the	  apparent	  
paradox	  in	  the	  mass	  media	  today.	  New	  technologies	  have	  dramatically	  increased	  the	  
number	  of	  movies,	  television	  shows,	  newspaper	  articles,	  online	  videos,	  etc.,	  that	  are	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available	  to	  consumers	  at	  any	  given	  moment.	  While	  normative	  accounts	  predict	  that	  
this	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  massive	  fragmentation	  of	  audiences	  and	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  media	  
as	  a	  social	  form,	  the	  simulations	  above	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  two	  concepts	  
introduced	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  namely	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency	  and	  the	  
cheapening	  of	  publicity,	  imply	  that	  precisely	  the	  opposite	  will	  occur.	  While	  
expanding	  the	  range	  of	  options	  available	  to	  consumers	  may	  lead	  to	  fragmentation	  at	  
the	  low	  end	  –	  i.e.	  among	  the	  least	  popular	  content	  –	  this	  is	  also	  ensures	  that	  the	  
most	  popular	  media	  will	  attract	  massive	  audiences.	  This	  may	  seem	  paradoxical	  but	  
it	  is	  the	  core	  dynamic	  in	  the	  Western	  media	  today.	  The	  dominant	  media	  institutions	  
may	  have	  shifted	  away	  from	  massification	  as	  their	  guiding	  principle,	  but	  the	  
cheapening	  of	  publicity	  and	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency	  mean	  that	  mass	  media	  as	  a	  
social	  form	  no	  longer	  needs	  these	  institutions	  in	  order	  to	  survive.	  The	  current	  
situation	  is	  not	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  end	  of	  mass	  media;	  it	  is	  a	  new	  communications	  
regime,	  in	  which	  mass	  media	  has	  a	  new,	  though	  no	  less	  important	  place.	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CHAPTER	  7	  
THE	  CONTEMPORARY	  PUBLIC	  SPHERE	  
	  
The	  previous	  chapter	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  cheap	  publicity	  and	  the	  
mass	  media	  tendency	  offer	  a	  parsimonious	  explanation	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
dominant	  media	  today.	  This	  suggests	  that	  these	  two	  principles	  are	  stable	  aspects	  of	  
our	  media	  regime	  and	  that	  neither	  the	  life-­‐	  or	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media	  scenarios	  is	  
entirely	  correct.	  Here	  I	  discuss	  the	  ramifications	  of	  these	  findings,	  both	  for	  
audiences	  and	  for	  media	  firms.	  
	  
The	  Mass	  Media	  Tendency	  
The	  mass	  media	  tendency	  explains	  the	  persistence	  of	  mass	  audience	  engagement	  in	  
a	  world	  where	  mass	  engagement	  is	  no	  longer	  embedded	  in	  the	  technical	  logic	  of	  the	  
dominant	  media.	  This	  explains	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  contradictory	  tendencies	  of	  the	  
dominant	  media	  have	  not	  resolved	  themselves	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other.	  In	  essence	  this	  
suggests	  that	  the	  transformation	  that	  has	  taken	  place	  since	  the	  1980s	  is	  not	  the	  
decline	  of	  mass	  media	  per	  se,	  but	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  logic	  of	  mass	  media	  from	  technologies	  
to	  people.	  
	   In	  the	  years	  of	  mass	  media’s	  heyday,	  the	  1920s	  through	  the	  1960s,	  broadcast	  
media	  transmitted	  the	  same	  messages	  to	  large	  parts	  of	  the	  American	  public.	  Media	  
corporations	  organized	  themselves	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  economies	  of	  scale	  that	  
came	  from	  consolidation	  and	  expansion,	  largely	  by	  promoting	  networking,	  both	  in	  
radio	  and	  television	  and	  by	  forming	  an	  oligopoly	  in	  the	  motion	  picture	  industry.	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Because	  of	  the	  mass	  character	  of	  these	  industries,	  it	  seemed	  obvious	  to	  many	  
observers	  that	  their	  mass	  character	  was	  a	  feature	  of	  media	  technologies,	  and	  the	  
shift	  to	  new	  technologies	  seemed	  to	  herald	  the	  decline	  of	  mass	  media.	  But	  this	  
supply-­‐side	  view	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  the	  persistence	  of	  mass	  media	  patterns	  in	  new	  
Internet-­‐based	  media,	  which,	  from	  a	  technical	  perspective,	  should	  promote	  hyper-­‐
segmentation	  rather	  than	  massification.	  The	  fact	  that	  hyper-­‐segmentation	  has	  only	  
partially	  taken	  place	  signals	  a	  basic	  oversight	  in	  this	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media	  
perspective.	  Namely,	  this	  perspective	  overlooks	  the	  fact	  that	  “mass	  media”	  also	  
characterizes	  a	  demand-­‐side	  tendency	  among	  audiences	  –	  a	  tendency	  to	  seek-­‐out	  
already-­‐popular	  content.	  	  
In	  chapter	  4	  I	  described	  a	  mass	  medium	  as	  any	  medium	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  
economies	  of	  scale	  and	  where	  one	  message	  is	  communicated	  to	  many	  people	  more-­‐or-­‐
less	  simultaneously.	  This	  describes	  the	  technologies	  and	  institutions	  that	  supply	  
mass	  media;	  but	  this	  supply-­‐side	  account	  can	  be	  reframed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  need	  or	  
demand	  among	  consumers.	  Rephrased	  in	  terms	  of	  need,	  the	  definition	  of	  mass	  
media	  refers	  to	  the	  need	  to	  consume	  the	  same	  message	  that	  other	  people	  are	  
consuming,	  more	  or	  less	  simultaneously,	  and	  more	  so	  as	  more	  people	  consume	  that	  
message.	  This	  is	  the	  inverse	  of	  the	  supply-­‐oriented	  definition	  offered	  above	  and	  
points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  although	  mass	  media	  technologies	  may	  be	  superseded	  by	  new	  
forms	  of	  communication,	  mass	  media	  also	  describes	  a	  form	  of	  demand	  that	  
transcends	  technological	  change.	  
Our	  demand	  for	  mass	  media	  is	  rooted	  in	  three	  basic	  needs:	  a	  need	  to	  share	  a	  
sense	  of	  reality	  with	  other	  people,	  a	  need	  to	  find	  meaning	  in	  our	  daily	  lives,	  and	  a	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need	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  community	  –	  reality-­‐making,	  meaning-­‐making,	  and	  community-­‐
making.	  I	  have	  reviewed	  each	  of	  these	  in	  chapter	  2.	  Whether	  these	  represent	  
transhistorical	  tendencies,	  or	  whether	  they	  have	  emerged	  as	  the	  result	  of	  national	  
conditioning	  during	  the	  years	  in	  which	  mass	  media	  were	  the	  only	  available	  media,	  
we	  have	  come	  to	  satisfy	  these	  needs	  through	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  engagement	  with	  
the	  media.	  This	  form	  of	  engagement	  seems	  to	  be	  persisting,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
media	  themselves	  have	  changed.	  
	  
The	  mode	  in	  which	  we	  have	  become	  accustomed	  to	  satisfying	  basic	  human	  
impulses	  to	  reality-­‐making,	  meaning-­‐making,	  and	  community-­‐making	  creates	  a	  
demand	  for	  mass	  media.	  This	  demand	  is	  what	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency,	  
and	  it	  explains	  why	  technologies	  are	  not	  necessarily	  being	  used	  according	  to	  the	  
audience-­‐fragmenting	  logic	  of	  their	  engineers	  –	  why	  people	  still	  come	  together	  to	  
watch	  tragedies	  in	  Africa	  rather	  than	  focusing	  only	  on	  their	  own	  back	  yards,	  why	  
111	  million	  people	  watched	  the	  Super	  Bowl	  in	  2010,	  and	  why	  26	  million	  people	  
went	  to	  see	  The	  Avengers	  in	  its	  first	  72	  hours.	  
	  
Cheap	  Publicity	  
The	  mass	  media	  tendency	  is	  a	  demand	  for	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  publicity	  articulated	  
at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual	  –	  an	  individual-­‐scale	  demand	  for	  mass	  publicity.	  	  But	  
this	  demand	  is	  contradictory	  with	  respect	  to	  mass	  publicity	  itself.	  It	  is	  a	  desire	  for	  
large-­‐scale	  publicity,	  which	  is	  impossible	  to	  satisfy	  on	  a	  large-­‐scale	  because	  as	  the	  
scale	  of	  publicity	  increases	  the	  proportion	  of	  audience	  members	  able	  to	  participate	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as	  performers	  necessarily	  decreases.	  I	  have	  discussed	  this	  in	  chapter	  3	  under	  the	  
heading	  The	  Contradictions	  of	  Mass	  Publicity.	  
In	  chapter	  4	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  cheapening	  of	  publicity	  was	  a	  central	  part	  of	  
the	  rupture	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  dominant	  media	  during	  the	  1970s.	  
This	  cheapening	  also	  resolves,	  or	  at	  least	  stabilizes,	  the	  contradictions	  of	  mass	  
publicity.	  It	  is	  media-­‐firms’	  solution	  to	  audiences’	  impossible	  demand	  for	  an	  equal	  
share	  in	  mass	  publicity.	  The	  emergence	  of	  new	  media	  technologies	  have	  created	  a	  
new	  way	  for	  media	  firms	  to	  satisfy	  consumers’	  demand	  for	  mass	  publicity	  by	  
offering	  audience	  members	  an	  inflated	  sense	  of	  their	  own	  publicity.	  These	  new	  
technologies,	  as	  implemented	  by	  dominant	  media	  firms,	  have	  provided	  a	  form	  of	  
publicity	  to	  the	  masses	  and	  they	  have	  done	  so	  while	  preserving	  both	  the	  economies	  
of	  scale	  that	  made	  mass	  media	  industries	  so	  profitable	  and	  the	  mass	  character	  of	  
much	  of	  the	  dominant	  media.	  Whether	  or	  not	  this	  was	  the	  result	  of	  conscious	  efforts	  
by	  media	  firms	  or	  simply	  a	  result	  of	  short-­‐term	  profit	  maximizing	  strategies	  it	  
defines	  the	  contemporary	  relationship	  between	  media	  firms	  and	  consumers.	  
	   A	  key	  factor	  in	  the	  cheapening	  of	  publicity	  has	  been	  the	  dramatic	  lowering	  of	  
barriers	  to	  publicity,	  which	  was	  largely	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  new	  media	  
technologies	  that	  emerged	  since	  the	  late	  1970s.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  reduction	  in	  
barriers	  to	  publicity	  has	  not	  produced	  an	  across-­‐the-­‐board	  decline	  in	  mass	  
engagement	  though,	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  barriers	  have	  come	  down	  in	  a	  
manner	  that	  is	  both	  partial	  and	  highly	  structured.	  Facebook	  is	  a	  paradigmatic	  
example	  of	  this	  reduction	  in	  barriers	  and	  embodies	  the	  principle	  of	  cheap	  publicity.	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   Facebook	  offers	  its	  users	  a	  means	  of	  publicity	  by	  giving	  each	  of	  them	  a	  
homepage	  where	  they	  can	  easily	  post	  text,	  photos	  and	  videos	  of	  themselves	  and	  
provides	  users	  with	  opportunities	  to	  signal	  their	  opinions	  by	  “liking”	  webpages,	  
products,	  or	  people	  throughout	  the	  Internet.	  Users	  can	  limit	  the	  accessibility	  of	  
materials	  that	  they	  publicize	  by	  accepting	  certain	  other	  users	  as	  “friends.”	  Users	  can	  
also	  create	  universally	  accessible	  “pages”	  for	  products,	  interests,	  groups	  or	  various	  
other	  non-­‐user	  entities.	  As	  of	  May	  2013,	  Facebook	  had	  1.11	  billion	  active	  monthly	  
users	  world-­‐wide,	  making	  it	  the	  world’s	  most	  popular	  website	  with	  revenues	  of	  
$1.46	  billion	  (Constine	  2013;	  “Facebook.com	  Site	  Info”	  2013).	  As	  of	  December	  31,	  
2012	  there	  were	  150	  billion	  friend-­‐connections	  on	  Facebook,	  or	  roughly	  141	  friends	  
per	  user,	  and	  there	  were	  over	  50	  million	  Facebook	  pages	  that	  had	  been	  “liked”	  by	  at	  
least	  ten	  users	  (Form	  10-­‐K	  2013).184	  This	  massive	  sphere	  of	  Facebook-­‐based	  
publicity	  is	  built	  around	  a	  free	  medium	  that	  enables	  users	  to	  perform	  and	  observe	  
others’	  performances	  on	  a	  potentially	  enormous	  scale.	  The	  real	  significance	  of	  this	  
new	  medium	  though,	  is	  that	  it	  has	  qualitatively	  transformed	  the	  experience	  of	  
publicity	  for	  its	  users.	  
	   In	  May	  2007	  Facebook	  launched	  Facebook	  Platform,	  an	  open	  framework	  for	  
outside	  software	  developers	  to	  create	  applications	  that	  take	  advantage	  of	  
Facebook’s	  social	  networking	  features,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  over	  9	  
million	  Facebook-­‐linked	  products	  (Facebook	  Inc.	  2012,	  87).	  The	  significance	  of	  this	  
is	  that	  Facebook	  has	  become	  integrated	  into	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  Internet-­‐based	  
services	  and	  applications,	  giving	  users	  the	  opportunity	  to	  make	  many	  of	  their	  day-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184	  At	  the	  time	  there	  were	  1.06bn	  active	  monthly	  users	  on	  the	  site.	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to-­‐day	  actions	  public.	  For	  instance	  users	  of	  the	  popular	  online	  music	  service	  Spotify	  
have	  their	  listening	  behavior	  publicized	  by	  default	  to	  all	  of	  their	  Facebook	  friends,	  
transforming	  music	  listening	  into	  a	  public	  activity.185	  Spotify	  users	  become	  
conscious	  of	  this	  publicity	  because	  they	  also	  receive	  Facebook-­‐based	  alerts	  about	  
their	  friends’	  music-­‐listening	  habits.	  Users	  are	  also	  able	  to	  more	  actively	  seek-­‐out	  
publicity	  by	  creating	  publicly	  viewable	  playlists.	  In	  total,	  users	  have	  created	  over	  1	  
billion	  such	  playlists	  (“Information”	  2013).	  Facebook	  has	  also	  been	  integrated	  into	  
the	  popular	  online	  movie-­‐	  and	  TV-­‐streaming	  service	  Netflix,	  which	  had	  37.6	  million	  
subscribers	  as	  of	  July,	  2013	  (“By	  The	  Numbers:	  Netflix	  Subscribers”	  2013).	  In	  the	  
first	  three	  months	  of	  2013	  Netflix	  users	  watched	  a	  total	  of	  more	  than	  4	  billion	  hours	  
of	  online	  video	  and	  the	  site	  represents	  the	  largest	  user	  of	  internet	  bandwidth	  in	  
North	  America	  (Spangler	  2013).186	  Like	  Spotify,	  Netflix	  allows	  users	  to	  make	  their	  
viewing	  behavior	  publicly	  visible	  to	  other	  Netflix	  and	  Facebook	  users,	  turning	  their	  
at-­‐home	  TV	  and	  movie	  watching	  in	  a	  public	  experience.	  Many	  other	  online	  media	  
similarly	  offer	  users	  the	  opportunity	  to	  make	  their	  activities	  public,	  from	  the	  video-­‐
sharing	  site	  YouTube,	  to	  prestigious	  publications	  like	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  and	  The	  
New	  Yorker.	  
All	  of	  this	  gives	  users	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  publicity,	  even	  when	  their	  publicized	  
activity	  fails	  to	  reach	  a	  meaningful	  audience.	  The	  ability	  to	  easily	  publicize	  mundane	  
behaviors	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  an	  audience	  will	  be	  interested	  in	  those	  activities.	  On	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185	  As	  of	  July	  2013,	  Spotify	  had	  over	  24	  million	  active	  monthly	  users	  across	  28	  countries	  
(“Information”	  2013).	  
	  
186	  Netflix	  accounted	  for	  roughly	  one-­‐third	  (32.3%)	  of	  all	  wired	  downstream	  Internet	  traffic	  
during	  peak	  periods	  during	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2013	  (Spangler	  2013).	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the	  video-­‐sharing	  site	  YouTube,	  for	  instance,	  a	  small	  number	  of	  videos	  account	  for	  
the	  vast	  majority	  of	  traffic,	  while	  a	  large	  number	  of	  unpopular	  videos	  reach	  a	  
negligible	  audience.187	  But	  while	  users	  may	  be	  apathetic	  regarding	  the	  online-­‐
behavior	  of	  most	  of	  their	  fellow	  users,	  their	  own	  ability	  to	  publicize	  their	  most	  
mundane	  online	  activities	  paradoxically	  provides	  them	  an	  inflated	  sense	  of	  their	  
own	  publicity.	  I	  call	  this	  form	  of	  publicity	  cheap	  both	  because	  it	  is	  easily	  obtained	  
and	  because	  it	  has	  little	  intrinsic	  worth	  compared	  to	  earlier	  forms	  of	  mediated	  
publicity.	  The	  publicity	  that	  came	  with	  appearing	  on	  a	  network-­‐television	  broadcast	  
in	  the	  1960s	  implied	  a	  broad	  audience;	  the	  publicity	  that	  comes	  from	  sharing	  music	  
listening	  tastes	  through	  Facebook	  does	  not.	  
	   This	  new	  mode	  of	  cheap	  publicity	  is	  very	  valuable	  to	  the	  media	  firms	  that	  
facilitate	  it.	  Users’	  hunger	  for	  publicity	  causes	  them	  to	  spend	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  time	  on	  
websites	  that	  provide	  them	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  publicity.	  On	  average	  users	  spend	  more	  
time	  on	  Facebook	  than	  on	  any	  other	  website	  in	  the	  world,	  accounting	  for	  10.8%	  of	  
total	  time	  spent	  online	  in	  December	  2012	  (Weigley	  2013).	  Users	  spend	  an	  average	  
of	  over	  34	  minutes	  per	  day	  on	  Facebook	  (“Facebook.com	  Site	  Info”	  2013).	  By	  
comparison,	  the	  average	  visitor	  to	  The	  New	  York	  Times’s	  website	  spends	  only	  four	  
minutes	  per	  day	  on	  that	  site,	  and	  users	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  popular	  search	  engine,	  
Google.com,	  which	  is	  also	  the	  world’s	  second	  most	  visited	  website,	  spend	  an	  average	  
of	  fourteen-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  minutes	  on	  the	  site	  daily	  (“NYTimes.com	  Site	  Info”	  2013;	  
“Google.com	  Site	  Info”	  2013).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187	  Guillemin	  et.	  al.,	  for	  instance	  find	  that	  33%	  of	  videos	  in	  their	  453,345	  download	  sample	  
are	  viewed	  only	  once,	  while	  the	  top	  10	  videos	  account	  for	  23.3%	  of	  all	  traffic	  (Guillemin	  et	  
al.	  2013).	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   Cheap	  publicity’s	  strong	  appeal	  for	  users	  translates	  into	  revenues	  for	  large	  
media-­‐firms.	  The	  more	  time	  a	  user	  spends	  on	  a	  site,	  the	  more	  revenues	  that	  site	  can	  
generate	  from	  advertising.	  This	  is	  the	  same	  logic	  that	  drove	  older	  mass	  medias’	  
efforts	  to	  keep	  users	  engaged.	  The	  value	  of	  cheap	  publicity	  though,	  is	  also	  driven	  by	  
a	  second	  incentive	  among	  media	  firms,	  namely	  the	  value	  to	  advertisers	  of	  the	  
detailed	  demographic	  and	  behavioral	  data	  that	  these	  new	  forms	  of	  engagement	  
generate.	  Advertisers’	  booming	  interest	  in	  market	  segmentation	  creates	  a	  strong	  
demand	  for	  data	  that	  facilitates	  increasingly	  fine-­‐grained	  targeting	  of	  potential	  
customers	  –	  a	  demand	  that	  new	  media	  firms	  are	  increasingly	  able	  to	  satisfy.	  
Data	  about	  users	  has	  become	  the	  lynchpin	  of	  many	  ad-­‐based	  online	  
businesses	  and	  the	  content	  that	  users	  see	  online	  is,	  like	  their	  advertising,	  
increasingly	  targeted.	  Eli	  Pariser	  has	  described	  this	  hyper-­‐targeting	  of	  online	  
content	  as	  the	  “filter	  bubble”	  (Pariser	  2012).	  Like	  Turow	  in	  Breaking	  Up	  America,	  
Pariser	  argues	  that	  advertisers’	  interest	  in	  market	  segmentation	  has	  fractured	  the	  
public	  sphere.	  Online	  though,	  this	  fragmentation	  can	  reach	  levels	  that	  were	  
impossible	  when	  earlier	  forms	  of	  mass	  media	  were	  dominant.	  In	  Pariser’s	  dystopic	  
description	  of	  contemporary	  publicity,	  each	  individual	  sees	  only	  a	  carefully	  filtered	  
segment	  of	  the	  world	  tailored	  to	  that	  individual’s	  personal	  characteristics	  without	  
being	  aware	  that	  filtering	  is	  taking	  place.	  Each	  individual	  becomes	  the	  center	  of	  their	  
own	  universe	  of	  publicity,	  constructed	  for	  him	  or	  her	  by	  various	  new	  media	  firms	  
according	  to	  his	  or	  her	  interests.	  But	  these	  filter	  bubbles	  offer	  a	  no	  less	  distorted	  
view	  of	  the	  world	  for	  their	  being	  based	  on	  users’	  own	  interests	  –	  they	  act	  as	  echo	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chambers,	  putting	  us	  in	  dialogue	  with	  ourselves	  while	  giving	  us	  the	  impression	  of	  
engagement	  with	  a	  broad	  public.188	  
	   Filter	  bubbling	  represents	  the	  end	  game	  of	  cheap	  publicity.	  It	  takes	  the	  
illusion	  of	  publicity	  to	  a	  new	  level	  by	  reshaping	  the	  world	  to	  give	  users	  an	  inflated	  
sense	  of	  the	  value	  of	  their	  own	  interests	  and	  ideas.	  Filter	  bubbling	  is	  therefore	  the	  
antithesis	  of	  mass	  society.	  While	  mass	  society	  is	  based	  on	  homogeneity	  and	  large-­‐
scale	  audiences,	  filter	  bubbling	  is	  based	  on	  heterogeneity	  and	  audiences	  of	  one.	  The	  
crucial	  similarity	  though,	  is	  that	  both	  are	  founded	  on	  a	  basic	  human	  hunger	  for	  mass	  
publicity.	  Filter	  bubbles	  and	  cheap	  publicity	  have	  emerged	  as	  the	  solutions	  to	  media	  
consumers’	  paradoxical	  demand	  for	  mass	  publicity.	  In	  this	  sense	  they	  represent	  the	  
great	  bait-­‐and-­‐switch	  of	  the	  contemporary	  media:	  the	  promise	  of	  mass	  publicity	  is	  
held	  out	  as	  universally	  attainable,	  and	  a	  small	  number	  of	  success	  stories	  are	  offered	  
as	  proof	  that	  a	  new	  egalitarian	  barrier-­‐free	  regime	  has	  arrived,	  but	  for	  the	  vast	  
majority	  of	  users	  mediated	  publicity	  becomes	  micro-­‐scale	  publicity	  dressed	  up	  with	  
the	  promise	  of	  a	  potentially-­‐unlimited	  audience.	  Late	  20th	  century	  audiences	  
clamoring	  for	  greater	  representation	  in	  the	  mid-­‐century	  mass	  public	  sphere	  have	  
instead	  been	  given	  a	  filter	  bubble	  in	  which	  to	  live	  and	  in	  which	  their	  interests	  and	  
personal	  publicity	  appear	  to	  be	  far	  more	  significant	  than	  they	  are.	  Meanwhile,	  since	  
the	  technologies	  of	  filtering	  are	  based	  on	  fixed	  algorithms,	  new	  media	  firms	  
continue	  to	  enjoy	  the	  economies	  of	  scale	  that	  made	  earlier	  forms	  of	  mass	  media	  so	  
profitable.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188	  Pariser	  eloquently	  describes	  this	  as	  a	  world	  of	  “invisible	  autopropaganda,	  indoctrinating	  
us	  with	  our	  own	  ideas”	  (Pariser	  2012).	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   There	  is	  a	  limit	  though.	  Filter	  bubbles	  are	  an	  illusion.	  They	  are	  an	  illusion	  
both	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  provide	  the	  illusion	  of	  greater	  personal	  publicity	  and	  in	  
the	  sense	  that	  they	  create	  among	  analysts	  the	  impression	  of	  a	  terminally-­‐
fragmenting	  public	  sphere.	  If	  Pariser’s	  account	  of	  a	  fragmenting	  world	  represents	  
cause	  for	  concern,	  the	  massive	  box-­‐office	  success	  of	  The	  Avengers	  represents	  cause	  
for	  hope	  and	  signals	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  countervailing	  force.	  And	  as	  the	  simulations	  
in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  demonstrate,	  neither	  of	  these	  phenomena	  undermines	  the	  
other.	  Although	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency	  drives	  the	  rise	  of	  cheap	  publicity	  to	  satisfy	  
audiences’	  demand	  it	  also	  drives	  audiences	  to	  seek	  out	  truly	  popular	  content.	  And	  it	  
also	  drives	  content	  producers	  to	  continue	  striving	  to	  produce	  movies,	  music,	  and	  
stories	  with	  broad	  appeal.	  Audiences	  driven	  by	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency	  will	  
continue	  to	  flock	  to	  massively	  popular	  content,	  sewing	  together	  the	  public	  spheres	  
pulled	  apart	  by	  new	  media	  technologies	  and	  the	  logic	  of	  market	  segmentation.	  
	  
Famous	  Friends	  and	  the	  Class	  Size	  Paradox	  
The	  cheapening	  of	  publicity	  has	  made	  publicity	  itself	  a	  salient	  part	  of	  the	  
contemporary	  American	  experience.	  When	  the	  extent	  of	  each	  individual’s	  publicity	  
is	  on	  public	  display	  –	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  Facebook	  friend-­‐count	  or	  a	  number	  of	  Twitter	  
“followers”	  –	  publicity	  becomes	  a	  badge	  of	  an	  individual’s	  worth	  and	  a	  goal	  to	  be	  
attained.	  But	  how	  much	  publicity	  is	  enough?	  
A	  reasonable	  assumption	  would	  be	  that	  individuals	  compare	  themselves	  to	  
their	  friends	  in	  judging	  whether	  they	  themselves	  have	  enough	  friends,	  contacts,	  or	  
acquaintances	  –	  in	  short	  whether	  they	  have	  a	  sufficiently	  large	  audience	  for	  their	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public	  displays.	  This	  creates	  a	  paradoxical	  situation	  though.	  In	  many	  social	  
networks,	  individuals	  will,	  on	  average,	  have	  fewer	  friends	  than	  their	  friends	  have,	  
creating	  a	  sense	  of	  relative	  inadequacy	  among	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population.	  
	   Scott	  Feld	  identified	  this	  paradox	  in	  a	  1991	  article	  titled	  “Why	  Your	  Friends	  
Have	  More	  Friends	  Than	  You	  Do.”	  Using	  data	  from	  a	  1961	  survey	  of	  high	  school	  
students	  Feld	  found	  that	  among	  146	  girls	  at	  “Marketville”	  high	  school,	  74%	  had	  
fewer	  friends	  than	  the	  average	  number	  of	  friends	  among	  their	  friends	  (Feld	  1991,	  
1469).	  Feld	  demonstrated	  that	  this	  phenomenon	  was	  a	  structural	  tendency	  of	  many	  
social	  networks.189	  This	  paradox	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  tendency	  for	  college	  students	  
to	  experience	  their	  average	  class	  size	  as	  larger	  than	  it	  is	  and	  for	  people	  to	  
experience	  beaches	  and	  parks	  as	  more	  crowded	  than	  they	  usually	  are.	  
	   It	  would	  seem	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  that	  online	  social	  networks	  –	  in	  which	  
the	  extent	  of	  each	  individual’s	  publicity	  is	  so	  prominently	  on	  display	  –	  would	  
likewise	  feature	  this	  paradox.	  Ugander	  et.	  al.	  have	  shown	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case	  using	  a	  
formidable	  data	  set	  of	  721	  million	  Facebook	  users	  or	  roughly	  10%	  of	  the	  world’s	  
population.	  Their	  data	  show	  that	  93%	  of	  users	  have	  fewer	  friends	  than	  the	  average	  
among	  their	  friends,	  and	  that	  while	  users	  had	  an	  average	  of	  190	  friends,	  their	  
friends	  had	  an	  average	  of	  635	  friends	  (Strogatz	  2012;	  Ugander	  et	  al.	  2011).	  
If	  people	  tend	  to	  use	  their	  friends’	  publicity	  as	  a	  yardstick	  for	  evaluating	  
themselves,	  then	  we	  would	  expect	  this	  structural	  feature	  of	  online	  social	  networks	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189	  Feld	  explains	  this	  phenomenon	  concisely:	  “The	  basic	  logic	  can	  be	  described	  simply.	  If	  
there	  are	  some	  people	  with	  many	  friendship	  ties	  and	  others	  with	  few,	  those	  with	  many	  ties	  
show	  up	  disproportionately	  in	  sets	  of	  friends.	  For	  example,	  those	  with	  40	  friends	  show	  up	  
in	  each	  of	  40	  individual	  friendship	  networks	  and	  thus	  can	  make	  40	  people	  feel	  relatively	  
deprived,	  while	  those	  with	  only	  one	  friend	  show	  up	  in	  only	  one	  friendship	  network	  and	  can	  
make	  only	  that	  one	  person	  feel	  relatively	  advantaged”	  (Feld	  1991,	  1465).	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to	  fuel	  audiences’	  hunger	  for	  more	  personal	  publicity.	  And	  this	  would	  drive	  more	  
people	  to	  spend	  more	  time	  engaging	  with	  new	  media	  organized	  around	  the	  
principle	  of	  cheap	  publicity,	  further	  fueling	  the	  growth	  of	  these	  industries.	  At	  the	  
same	  time	  though,	  as	  Feld	  noted,	  “if	  individuals	  make	  this	  type	  of	  comparison,	  it	  is	  
likely	  that	  most	  of	  them	  will	  feel	  relatively	  inadequate”	  (Feld	  1464).	  A	  sense	  of	  
relative	  depravation	  regarding	  the	  extent	  of	  one’s	  personal	  publicity	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  
structural	  feature	  of	  today’s	  public	  sphere,	  further	  driving	  the	  dual	  countervailing	  
tendencies	  towards	  mass	  media	  and	  cheap	  publicity.	  This	  adds	  one	  more	  veridical	  
paradox	  –	  a	  paradox	  whose	  outcome	  is	  true	  despite	  its	  apparent	  absurdity	  –	  to	  the	  
experience	  of	  publicity	  today:	  everyone	  imagines	  that	  they	  have	  more	  publicity	  than	  
they	  do,	  while	  imagining	  that	  they	  have	  less	  publicity	  than	  other	  people.	  
	  
Lost	  Potential	  or	  New	  Hope?	  
Clearly,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  and	  of	  publicity	  have	  changed	  since	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  
century.	  Many	  mid-­‐century	  scholars	  identified	  mass	  society	  with	  social	  pathologies,	  
but	  do	  the	  changes	  that	  have	  led	  us	  to	  the	  present	  moment	  mean	  that	  these	  
pathologies	  have	  been	  resolved?	  Have	  they	  been	  made	  more	  severe?	  	  Was	  there	  
something	  valuable	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  mid-­‐century	  publicity	  that	  has	  been	  lost?	  
In	  short,	  how	  can	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency	  and	  the	  principle	  
of	  cheap	  publicity	  help	  us	  to	  judge	  the	  present	  in	  light	  of	  the	  past?	  
	   In	  chapter	  2	  I	  outlined	  a	  series	  of	  six	  questions	  derived	  from	  mid-­‐century	  
critiques	  of	  mass	  media	  and	  mass	  society.	  Here	  I	  will	  briefly	  address	  each	  in	  turn.	  
The	  answers	  to	  these	  questions	  are	  largely	  speculative,	  but	  they	  should	  illustrate	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that	  understanding	  the	  structure	  of	  contemporary	  media	  and	  publicity	  provides	  a	  
useful	  set	  of	  concepts	  for	  judging	  what	  about	  the	  present	  is	  worth	  encouraging	  and	  
what	  should	  be	  regarded	  with	  suspicion.	  
	  
1)	  How	  do	  changes	  in	  the	  media	  and	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  publicity	  affect	  the	  scale	  
and	  structure	  of	  mass	  organizations,	  and	  how	  does	  this	  affect	  the	  mediation	  
between	  the	  masses	  and	  the	  machinery	  of	  governance?	  
	   According	  to	  Mills’s	  view	  of	  mid-­‐century	  mass	  society,	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  
question	  was,	  negatively.	  The	  formation	  of	  mass	  organizations	  in	  an	  era	  of	  mass	  
media	  meant	  that	  a)	  the	  media	  were	  not	  structured	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  facilitated	  
fine-­‐grained	  dialogue	  among	  an	  organization’s	  members,	  which	  meant	  that	  b)	  mass	  
organizations	  became	  increasingly	  governed	  by	  full-­‐time	  leaders,	  whose	  role	  
became	  c)	  to	  convince	  members	  to	  accept	  certain	  decisions	  rather	  than	  promoting	  
the	  organic	  emergence	  of	  public	  opinion.	  Today	  though,	  the	  situation	  appears	  to	  be	  
different.	  
	   The	  principle	  of	  cheap	  publicity	  means	  that	  contemporary	  technologies	  and	  
institutions	  increasingly	  foster	  individual-­‐scale	  publicity	  both	  within	  organizations	  
and	  outside	  of	  them.	  Many	  large	  organizations	  have,	  for	  instance,	  adopted	  internal	  
wikis,	  online	  knowledge	  bases	  that	  can	  be	  modified	  by	  any	  one	  of	  an	  organization’s	  
members.	  Even	  the	  notoriously	  dysfunctional	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  Community,	  
comprised	  of	  the	  CIA,	  FBI,	  NSA,	  and	  13	  other	  intelligence	  organizations	  adopted	  an	  
internal	  wiki	  known	  as	  Intellipedia	  in	  2006	  (Intellipedia	  Marks	  Second	  Anniversary	  
2008).	  Within	  three	  years	  of	  its	  launch	  Intellipedia	  grew	  to	  include	  900,000	  articles	  
	  219	  
and	  100,000	  users	  making	  5,000	  edits	  daily,	  without	  requiring	  hierarchical	  
management	  or	  approval	  (Calabresi	  2009).	  Meanwhile,	  forward-­‐thinking	  
organizations	  have	  increasingly	  adopted	  a	  form	  of	  management	  that	  David	  Stark	  has	  
described	  as	  “heterarchy”	  in	  which	  managers	  seek	  to	  promote	  diversity	  and	  
dialogue	  within	  organizations,	  rather	  than	  promoting	  pre-­‐defined	  agendas	  to	  
members	  or	  employees	  (Stark	  2009).	  
Other	  organizations,	  most	  notably	  leading	  Internet	  companies	  like	  Amazon	  
and	  Google,	  have	  adopted	  a	  structure	  that	  allows	  all	  employees	  to	  make	  changes	  to	  
the	  companies’	  products	  with	  little	  or	  no	  managerial	  approval.	  The	  system,	  known	  
as	  A/B	  testing,	  allows	  employees	  to	  make	  changes,	  which	  are	  automatically	  
deployed	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  users.	  Automated	  algorithms	  determine	  whether	  the	  
changes	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  and	  automatically	  expand	  the	  deployment	  of	  
successful	  modifications.	  The	  strategy	  has	  moved	  from	  leading	  tech	  companies	  to	  
other	  organizations,	  including	  President	  Obama’s	  20012	  reelection	  campaign	  
(Christian	  2012).	  
Changes	  in	  the	  character	  of	  mass	  organizations	  have	  also	  been	  widely	  
discussed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  social	  movements.	  By	  2009	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  reported	  
that	  the	  phrase	  “twitter	  revolution”	  had	  become	  “something	  of	  a	  cliché,”	  referring	  to	  
the	  role	  attributed	  to	  the	  online	  micro-­‐blogging	  service	  in	  a	  series	  of	  uprisings	  
around	  the	  world	  (Stone	  and	  Cohen	  2009).	  Such	  accounts	  of	  the	  organizing	  power	  of	  
new	  media	  are	  still	  prevalent	  today.	  The	  branding	  consultant	  Simon	  Mainwaring,	  for	  
instance,	  has	  written	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  online	  social	  media	  –	  particularly	  their	  
facilitation	  of	  broad	  horizontal	  connections	  among	  activists	  and	  their	  ability	  to	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reduce	  vertical	  barriers	  to	  attaining	  large-­‐scale	  publicity	  –	  ultimately	  allowed	  the	  
January	  2011	  popular	  uprising	  in	  Egypt	  to	  cause	  the	  resignation	  of	  president	  Hosni	  
Mubarak	  (Mainwaring	  2011).	  A	  central	  idea	  in	  such	  accounts	  is	  that	  new	  media	  have	  
changed	  the	  organizational	  structure	  of	  social	  movements,	  making	  them	  very	  
different	  from	  the	  mass	  organizations	  of	  mid-­‐century.	  
	   Other	  authors	  have	  argued	  that	  these	  accounts	  overstate	  the	  power	  of	  new	  
media.	  Malcolm	  Gladwell,	  for	  instance,	  building	  on	  the	  work	  of	  sociologist	  Doug	  
McAdam,	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  organizational	  structure	  of	  online	  activist	  networks	  
promotes	  weak	  ties	  among	  members	  and	  low	  levels	  of	  commitment,	  which	  are	  
insufficient	  for	  causing	  real	  change.	  Gladwell	  contrasts	  online	  movements	  with	  
McAdam’s	  account	  of	  the	  American	  civil	  rights	  movement	  in	  the	  1960s,	  which	  
involved	  much	  higher	  risks	  and	  was	  possible	  as	  a	  result	  of	  strong	  personal	  
connections	  among	  members	  as	  well	  as	  a	  highly	  organized	  hierarchical	  management	  
structure	  led	  by	  Martin	  Luther	  King	  (Gladwell	  2010;	  McAdam	  1986;	  McAdam	  and	  
Paulsen	  1993).	  In	  this	  view,	  the	  engagement	  of	  a	  mass	  organization’s	  members,	  
when	  coordinated	  through	  new	  media	  offering	  cheap	  publicity,	  lack	  the	  intra-­‐
organizational	  “strong	  ties”	  that	  are	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  creating	  meaningful	  change.	  
	   I	  have	  described	  the	  cheapening	  of	  contemporary	  publicity	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  
its	  low	  barriers	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  low	  inherent	  value.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  social	  
movements,	  and	  in	  light	  of	  arguments	  such	  as	  Gladwell’s,	  this	  suggests	  that	  some	  of	  
the	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  mass	  organizations	  may	  have	  much	  to	  do	  with	  
offering	  members	  an	  easy	  sense	  of	  achievement	  while	  diminishing	  their	  willingness	  
to	  make	  the	  more	  costly	  commitments	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  real	  change.	  Clearly	  the	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character	  of	  contemporary	  publicity	  has	  changed	  the	  structure	  of	  mass	  
organizations,	  and	  there	  exists	  a	  clear	  possibility	  that	  this	  is	  change	  for	  the	  better.	  
Whether	  that	  will	  be	  the	  case	  hinges	  on	  making	  sure	  that	  publicity	  within	  mass	  
organizations	  is	  cheap	  only	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  cost,	  not	  quality.	  
	  
2)	  Do	  these	  changes	  make	  the	  relationship	  between	  power	  and	  authority	  more	  
or	  less	  obvious?	  
	   Here	  also,	  there	  is	  a	  dual	  tendency.	  Mills	  described	  “manipulation”	  as	  the	  
divorce	  between	  power	  and	  legitimate	  authority	  in	  society.	  In	  Mills’s	  account	  of	  
mass	  society,	  powerful	  elites	  without	  authority	  manipulate	  the	  masses	  into	  “willing	  
acceptance	  or	  cheerful	  support	  of	  their	  decision	  or	  opinions”	  (Mills	  1956,	  317).	  In	  
chapter	  3,	  I	  extended	  this	  concept	  to	  account	  for	  unintentional	  manipulation	  
resulting	  from	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  dominant	  media,	  calling	  the	  resulting	  
phenomenon	  structural	  manipulation.	  In	  some	  respects	  the	  structure	  of	  
contemporary	  publicity	  makes	  this	  phenomenon	  more	  severe;	  in	  others	  it	  offers	  an	  
antidote.	  
	   Social	  media	  marketing	  campaigns,	  for	  instance,	  create	  the	  illusion	  of	  popular	  
choice	  among	  consumers.	  When	  a	  Facebook	  “friend”	  appears	  to	  endorse	  a	  product,	  
the	  involvement	  of	  corporate	  marketers	  becomes	  less	  obvious.	  One	  recent	  example	  
is	  the	  social	  media	  campaign	  “Burberry	  Kisses,”	  launched	  by	  the	  Burberry	  clothing	  
company	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2013.	  The	  campaign	  offers	  users	  a	  way	  to	  send	  messages	  
to	  loved	  ones	  around	  the	  world	  marked	  with	  a	  digital	  imprint	  of	  their	  lips	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(“Burberry	  Kisses”	  2013).190	  Each	  message	  sent	  becomes	  an	  implicit	  and	  often	  
unintentional	  endorsement	  of	  the	  Burberry	  brand,	  creating	  an	  aggregate	  sense	  of	  
popular	  approval.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  campaign	  was	  produced	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  
collaboration	  between	  Burberry	  and	  Google,	  two	  corporate	  giants	  with	  market	  
capitalizations	  of	  $6.76	  billion	  and	  $302	  billion	  respectively	  is	  not	  apparent	  in	  the	  
sense	  of	  popular	  acceptance	  of	  the	  brand	  that	  users	  feel	  (“Burberry	  Group	  PLC”	  
2013;	  “Google	  Inc”	  2013).	  
	   The	  flip	  side	  to	  new	  media’s	  power	  to	  hide	  the	  rift	  between	  power	  and	  
authority	  is	  the	  increased	  ease	  of	  access	  to	  information	  and	  low	  barriers	  to	  
publication	  that	  these	  media	  enable.	  This	  makes	  it	  harder	  for	  corporations	  to	  hide	  
their	  exercise	  of	  power.	  The	  Pulitzer	  Prize-­‐winning	  online	  investigative	  news	  
organization	  ProPublica,	  for	  instance,	  has	  compiled	  a	  large	  open-­‐access	  database	  of	  
physicians	  who	  receive	  support	  from	  pharmaceutical	  companies,	  often	  in	  exchange	  
for	  endorsing	  new	  drugs	  to	  patients	  (Merrill	  et	  al.	  2013).	  Endorsement	  of	  a	  drug	  by	  
a	  physician	  carries,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  patients,	  the	  authority	  of	  a	  trusted	  health-­‐care	  
provider,	  while	  concealing	  the	  role	  of	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  who	  have	  obvious	  
conflicts	  of	  interest.	  Online	  tools	  make	  this	  break	  between	  power	  and	  authority	  
more	  difficult	  to	  conceal.	  ProPublica	  has	  also	  launched	  similar	  databases	  with	  
information	  about	  political	  campaign	  contributions	  (Shaw	  and	  Barker	  2013).	  	  
	  
3)	  To	  what	  extent	  do	  media	  confirm	  what	  their	  audiences	  already	  believe?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190	  The	  imprint	  is	  created	  by	  kissing	  the	  touch-­‐screen	  of	  a	  mobile	  phone.	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   In	  Mills’s	  account	  of	  mass	  society	  the	  media	  had	  replaced	  inter-­‐personal	  
dialogue	  and	  had	  promoted	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  “stereotypes”	  among	  audiences,	  which,	  
taking	  on	  the	  appearance	  of	  “common	  sense,”	  were	  then	  reinforced	  by	  the	  mass	  
media’s	  limited	  offerings.	  In	  mass	  society	  the	  media	  tended	  to	  confirm	  audience	  
beliefs	  rather	  than	  offering	  alternative	  perspectives.	  This	  was	  in	  large	  part	  the	  result	  
of	  a	  lack	  of	  competition	  among	  media	  firms.	  
Today’s	  low	  barriers	  to	  publicity	  have	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  large	  and	  
diverse	  range	  of	  media	  outlets,	  which	  would	  seem	  to	  undermine	  the	  tendency	  Mills	  
described.	  Unfortunately	  though,	  filter-­‐bubbling	  means	  that	  users	  are	  increasingly	  
presented	  with	  targeted	  perspectives	  that	  confirm	  their	  “common	  sense”	  beliefs.	  In	  
The	  Filter	  Bubble,	  Pariser	  offered	  several	  examples	  demonstrating	  the	  tendency	  for	  
targeted	  online	  media	  to	  reinforce	  audience	  perspectives	  rather	  than	  challenging	  
them.	  For	  instance	  Pariser	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  two	  women	  searching	  for	  the	  term	  
“BP”	  on	  Google.	  One	  woman	  was	  presented	  with	  investment	  information	  about	  the	  
oil	  company,	  the	  other	  was	  presented	  with	  information	  about	  the	  devastating	  oil	  
spill	  caused	  by	  BP’s	  Deepwater	  Horizon	  offshore	  oil	  rig	  (Pariser	  2012).	  In	  a	  world	  of	  
filter-­‐bubbles	  diversity	  of	  content	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  that	  audience	  
stereotypes	  will	  be	  substantively	  challenged.	  
There	  is	  a	  counter-­‐trend	  here,	  though	  it	  still	  remains	  minor	  compared	  with	  
the	  ubiquity	  of	  filtered	  search	  results.	  Awareness	  of	  the	  filter-­‐bubbling	  phenomenon	  
has	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  products	  that	  aim	  to	  “liberate”	  users	  from	  their	  online	  
echo	  chambers.	  The	  search	  engine	  DuckDuckGo,	  for	  instance,	  promotes	  its	  product	  
with	  a	  promise	  of	  online	  anonymity	  that	  prevents	  marketers	  from	  targeting	  users	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(“Don’t	  Track	  Us”	  2013).	  Even	  the	  search	  giant	  Google,	  which	  developed	  much	  of	  the	  
technology	  that	  has	  led	  to	  filter-­‐bubbling,	  has	  responded	  by	  launching	  a	  feature	  that	  
gives	  customers	  the	  option	  of	  receiving	  user-­‐agnostic	  search	  results	  rather	  than	  
personalized	  and	  targeted	  content	  (Levy	  2012).	  This	  remains	  a	  minor	  
countermovement	  though,	  and	  the	  convenience	  of	  online	  targeting,	  both	  for	  users	  
and	  marketers,	  suggests	  that	  self-­‐reinforcing	  stereotypes	  will	  remain	  a	  dominant	  
feature	  of	  mediated	  publicity,	  although	  there	  may	  be	  more	  of	  them	  available.	  
	  
4)	  To	  what	  extent	  do	  alternative	  media	  substantively	  compete	  with	  each	  other	  
and	  offer	  alternative	  ways	  of	  seeing	  the	  world?	  
	   This	  question	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  question	  above:	  if	  alternative	  media	  
substantively	  compete	  with	  one	  another	  then	  this	  competition	  will	  highlight	  the	  
diversity	  and	  contingency	  of	  their	  perspectives.	  As	  described	  above	  though,	  filter-­‐
bubbling	  suggests	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  increasing	  diversity	  of	  media	  outlets	  
made	  possible	  by	  low	  barriers	  to	  entry	  leads	  to	  specialization	  rather	  than	  
competition.	  Online	  publications	  run	  the	  gamut	  from	  mainstream	  to	  radical,	  but	  
these	  various	  perspectives	  very	  rarely	  compete	  for	  the	  same	  users.	  
The	  mass	  media	  tendency	  represents,	  in	  certain	  respects,	  a	  countervailing	  
force	  here,	  limiting	  the	  tendencies	  towards	  specialization	  and	  for	  audiences	  to	  
disperse	  among	  media	  outlets.	  Consumers’	  tendency	  to	  seek-­‐out	  already-­‐popular	  
content	  will	  tend	  to	  bring	  people	  face	  to	  face	  with	  popular	  views,	  which	  may	  differ	  
from	  their	  own	  previously-­‐held	  stereotypes.	  This	  is	  the	  up-­‐side	  of	  the	  mass	  media	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tendency.	  The	  darker	  implication	  though,	  is	  that	  mass	  attractions	  will	  also	  tend	  to	  
reinforce	  mainstream	  stereotypes.	  
The	  question	  with	  respect	  to	  challenging	  audience	  pre-­‐conceptions	  is	  
whether	  the	  attractions	  that	  snowball	  in	  popularity	  represent	  mainstream	  dogma	  or	  
whether	  they	  represent	  alternative	  perspectives.	  It	  is	  a	  question	  about	  diversity	  in	  
the	  mainstream.	  There	  may	  be	  reason	  for	  hope	  though.	  The	  highest-­‐grossing	  
documentary	  film	  at	  the	  domestic	  box-­‐office	  was	  Michael	  Moore’s	  anti-­‐
establishment	  tirade,	  “Fahrenheit	  9/11”	  (2004),	  which	  railed	  against	  Bush-­‐
administration	  practices.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  fourth	  highest-­‐grossing	  documentary	  film,	  
“2016:	  Obama’s	  America”	  (2012),	  was	  a	  conservative	  attack	  on	  President	  Obama	  
and	  represents	  the	  opposite	  end	  of	  the	  ideological	  spectrum	  (“Documentary	  Chart”	  
2013).	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  both	  films	  merely	  preach	  to	  their	  respective	  choirs,	  but	  
their	  popularity,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  mass-­‐media	  tendency,	  suggests	  that	  diversity	  in	  the	  
mainstream	  may	  represent	  a	  counter-­‐tendency	  to	  the	  hyper-­‐targeting	  of	  specialized	  
content.	  
	  
5)	  To	  what	  extent	  do	  the	  media	  constrain	  individuals’	  freedom	  to	  form	  their	  own	  
specific	  identities?	  
	   Several	  authors	  have	  examined	  the	  identity-­‐shaping	  power	  of	  media	  (see	  
chapter	  2).	  In	  mid-­‐century	  mass	  society	  though,	  Mills	  argued,	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  
identities	  represented	  in	  the	  media	  constrained	  individuals’	  options	  for	  choosing	  
and	  developing	  their	  own	  identities.	  Here,	  the	  contemporary	  reduction	  in	  barriers	  to	  
publicity	  seems	  to	  constitute	  a	  major	  break	  with	  the	  mass	  society	  of	  mid	  century:	  it	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is	  far	  easier	  than	  it	  has	  ever	  been	  to	  connect	  with	  other	  identity	  groups	  and	  to	  
recombine	  styles	  and	  roles	  into	  new	  identities.	  
Transgender	  individuals,	  for	  example,	  were	  offered	  few	  if	  any	  identity-­‐
models	  by	  the	  mid-­‐century	  mass	  media.	  The	  cheapening	  of	  publicity	  though,	  has	  
made	  it	  inestimably	  easier	  for	  these	  individuals	  to	  become	  aware	  of	  alternative	  
modes	  of	  identification.	  A	  2012	  online	  survey	  of	  transgender	  individuals,	  for	  
instance,	  found	  that	  respondents	  identified	  with	  an	  average	  of	  2.5	  current	  gender	  
identities	  and	  1.4	  past	  gender	  identities,	  including	  Female,	  Male,	  Genderqueer,	  
Transgender,	  Transsexual,	  Crossdresser,	  Two	  spirit,	  Bigender,	  Intergender,	  Drag	  
King,	  Androgynous,	  and	  Drag	  Queen	  (Kuper,	  Nussbaum,	  and	  Mustanski	  2012).	  Other	  
studies	  have	  similarly	  described	  the	  emergence	  and	  diffusion	  of	  various	  other	  
Internet-­‐enabled	  identities.	  D’Enbeau,	  for	  instance,	  describes	  the	  emergence	  of	  
transnational	  feminist	  identity	  (D’Enbeau	  2011);	  Keller	  has	  described	  the	  
emergence	  of	  teenage	  feminist	  identity	  through	  online	  blog-­‐based	  discourse	  (Keller	  
2012);	  Gray	  has	  described	  the	  importance	  of	  Internet	  access	  for	  young	  people	  living	  
in	  rural	  areas	  who	  form	  non-­‐normative	  gender	  identities	  without	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  
physically	  proximal	  LGBTQ	  others	  (Gray	  2009);	  several	  authors	  have	  explored	  the	  
flexibility	  that	  online	  media	  give	  to	  young	  people	  experimenting	  with	  different	  
performances	  of	  identity	  (Thomas	  2007;	  Subrahmanyam	  and	  Šmahel	  2011);	  from	  
the	  perspective	  of	  marketers,	  Zackariasson	  et.	  al.	  have	  examined	  the	  implications	  of	  
massively	  multiplayer	  online	  games	  for	  experimenting	  with	  identity,	  suggesting	  that	  
these	  online	  identities	  should	  be	  taken	  seriously	  by	  marketers	  because	  they	  
represent	  potential	  customers	  not	  necessarily	  as	  they	  are	  but	  “as	  they	  might	  like	  to	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be”	  (Zackariasson,	  Wåhlin,	  and	  Wilson	  2010);	  and	  at	  the	  opposite	  extreme	  Sassen	  
has	  described	  Buenos	  Aires	  garbage	  pickers	  self-­‐identification	  as	  “ecological	  
entrepreneurs”	  (Sassen	  2011a).	  
This	  is	  a	  small	  sampling	  of	  the	  large	  and	  rapidly-­‐expanding	  body	  of	  
scholarship	  that	  deals	  with	  the	  implications	  of	  new	  media	  for	  identity	  formation,	  but	  
the	  diversity	  of	  identities	  represented	  here	  reflects	  a	  breakdown	  in	  the	  hegemony	  of	  
mid-­‐century	  mainstream	  identity	  –	  a	  breakdown	  that	  was	  largely	  made	  possible	  by	  
increasingly	  low	  barriers	  to	  publicity.	  Even	  when	  access	  to	  new	  media	  may	  be	  
limited,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Sassen’s	  slum-­‐dwelling	  “ecological	  entrepreneurs,”	  low	  
barriers	  to	  publicity	  facilitate	  the	  circulation	  of	  diverse	  identities	  both	  online	  and	  
off-­‐.	  
	  
6)	  To	  what	  extent	  does	  the	  world	  represented	  by	  the	  media	  reflect	  the	  
complexity	  and	  diversity	  of	  the	  real	  world?	  
	   In	  Mills	  account,	  the	  overwhelming	  complexity	  of	  mass	  society	  leads	  people	  
to	  retreat	  into	  homogenous	  “pseudo-­‐worlds”	  in	  which	  their	  own	  perspectives	  are	  
dominant	  and	  in	  which	  others	  are	  reduced	  to	  simplified	  stereotypes.	  These	  well-­‐
ordered	  fictitious	  worlds	  are	  mechanisms	  for	  coping	  with	  the	  complexity	  of	  mass	  
society	  and	  they	  are	  popularized	  through	  mass	  media.	  The	  question	  is	  whether	  
today’s	  media,	  with	  their	  low	  barriers	  and	  easy	  publicity,	  mean	  that	  people	  are	  more	  
likely	  to	  experience	  the	  complexity	  and	  diversity	  of	  the	  world.	  
From	  a	  technical	  perspective,	  new	  media	  have	  vastly	  expanded	  the	  number	  
of	  perspectives	  represented	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  the	  aggregate	  sphere	  of	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mediated	  publicity	  has	  come	  far	  closer	  to	  representing	  the	  diversity	  of	  American	  
society.	  The	  problem	  of	  Mills’s	  pseudo-­‐worlds	  though,	  is	  a	  human	  one.	  While	  the	  
mass	  media	  constrained	  the	  experience	  of	  diversity	  and	  promoted	  homogenous	  
imaginings	  of	  American	  society	  this	  tendency	  emerged	  from	  people’s	  desire	  for	  
clarity	  and	  simplicity	  in	  an	  increasingly	  complex	  society.	  Several	  scholars	  have	  
analyzed	  mediating	  imaginaries	  that	  serve	  a	  similar	  purpose.	  Louis	  Althusser,	  for	  
example,	  defined	  ideology	  as	  a	  “representation	  of	  the	  imaginary	  relationship	  of	  
individuals	  to	  their	  real	  conditions	  of	  existence,”	  which	  conditions	  were	  too	  complex	  
to	  be	  represented	  directly.	  In	  Althusser’s	  view	  ideology	  is	  a	  necessary	  aspect	  of	  
social	  life	  and	  its	  distorting	  simplifications	  are	  unavoidable	  (Althusser	  2006).	  
Similarly,	  the	  urbanist	  Kevin	  Lynch	  described	  “cognitive	  maps,”	  mental	  images	  of	  
cities	  that	  reduce	  the	  overwhelming	  complexity	  of	  urban	  space	  into	  navigable	  
simplifications	  (Lynch	  1960).	  A	  generation	  of	  scholars	  has	  deepened	  and	  extended	  
these	  perspectives,	  but	  the	  underlying	  assumption	  of	  these	  theories	  is	  that	  well-­‐
ordered,	  imagined	  representations	  of	  a	  complex	  world	  are	  basic	  human	  necessities.	  
It	  is	  this	  human	  tendency	  towards	  simplifying	  complexity	  that	  filter-­‐bubbling	  
addresses.	  In	  introducing	  their	  system	  of	  user-­‐specific	  search	  results	  Google	  
launched	  an	  ad	  campaign	  promoting	  the	  convenience	  of	  this	  innovation	  in	  helping	  
users	  to	  navigate	  the	  overwhelming	  amounts	  of	  information	  available	  on	  the	  
Internet.	  One	  ad	  showed	  a	  Volkswagen	  Beetle	  alongside	  an	  insect.	  
Were	  you	  looking	  for	  a	  beetle	  that	  beeps	  or	  a	  beetle	  that	  buzzes?	  When	  you	  type	  in	  
beetle	  we	  can	  guess	  you	  mean	  the	  car	  and	  not	  the	  insect	  if	  you’ve	  searched	  for	  cars	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recently.	  It	  makes	  things	  a	  little	  bit	  quicker	  and	  a	  whole	  lot	  easier	  for	  you.	  (Delo	  
2012)	  
While	  low	  barriers	  to	  publicity	  make	  it	  possible	  for	  today’s	  media	  to	  represent	  the	  
complexity	  and	  diversity	  of	  American	  society,	  there	  are	  basic	  human	  tendencies	  that	  
work	  against	  this	  possibility.	  These	  tendencies	  shape	  people’s	  use	  of	  the	  media	  and	  
promote	  the	  development	  of	  new	  technologies	  like	  personalized	  search	  filtering.	  
They	  transcend	  the	  technical	  logic	  of	  cheap	  publicity	  and	  have	  likely	  endured	  the	  
transformation	  of	  the	  American	  public	  sphere	  that	  has	  taken	  place	  over	  the	  past	  
half-­‐century.	  
New	  media	  and	  cheap	  publicity	  have	  radically	  increased	  the	  technical	  
possibility	  of	  representing	  the	  social	  world	  in	  all	  its	  complexity	  rather	  than	  reducing	  
this	  complexity	  to	  the	  well-­‐ordered	  simplifications	  of	  mass-­‐media	  hits	  like	  TV’s	  
Father	  Knows	  Best	  (1954-­‐1960);	  but	  the	  decisive	  question	  is	  whether	  consumers	  
will	  choose	  to	  step	  outside	  of	  their	  comfortable	  imaginaries.	  Consumers	  may	  not	  do	  
so	  until	  the	  costs	  of	  social	  fragmentation	  and	  isolation	  are	  too	  high	  and	  too	  obvious	  
to	  be	  ignored.	  In	  a	  world	  increasingly	  fragmented	  by	  social	  and	  economic	  inequality	  
and	  political	  and	  religious	  extremism	  this	  is	  rapidly	  becoming	  the	  case.	  Whether	  we	  
confront	  these	  challenges	  head-­‐on	  instead	  of	  hiding	  from	  them	  in	  homogeneous	  
fantasy-­‐worlds	  will	  be	  a	  test	  of	  our	  character,	  not	  our	  technologies.	  
	  
The	  “answers”	  I	  have	  offered	  to	  the	  questions	  above	  do	  not	  provide	  a	  simple	  
resolution	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  we	  are	  better	  off	  than	  we	  were	  a	  half-­‐century	  
ago.	  They	  do	  suggest	  though,	  that	  the	  new	  public	  sphere	  has	  brought	  with	  it	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unprecedented	  potential	  for	  positive	  social	  change	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  creating	  
powerful	  tools	  for	  segmenting	  and	  exploiting	  the	  masses.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  
which	  of	  these	  two	  outcomes	  will	  win-­‐out.	  But	  by	  clarifying	  the	  structure	  of	  
contemporary	  publicity	  I	  hope	  that	  I	  have	  helped	  to	  reveal	  the	  dimensions	  along	  
which	  the	  struggle	  will	  play	  out.	  The	  mass	  media	  tendency	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  
cheap	  publicity	  define	  the	  battlefield;	  and	  the	  stakes	  have	  never	  been	  higher.	  
	  
A	  Personal	  Note:	  The	  Progressive	  Blockbuster	  or	  Why	  I	  Am	  Optimistic	  
My	  interest	  in	  the	  mass	  media	  comes	  from	  a	  lifetime	  passion	  for	  movies.	  Over	  
the	  course	  of	  my	  life	  I	  have	  seen	  major	  transformations	  in	  the	  American	  film	  
industry	  –	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  independent	  film	  movement,	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  VHS	  
market,	  the	  rise	  of	  video-­‐on-­‐demand	  services,	  the	  rising	  dominance	  of	  computer	  
generated	  imagery,	  and	  the	  hyper-­‐inflation	  of	  movie	  budgets.	  All	  the	  while,	  
commentaries	  about	  these	  changes	  were	  often	  accompanied	  by	  a	  mix	  of	  nostalgia	  
for	  a	  better	  past	  and	  doomsday	  predictions	  about	  the	  impending	  death	  of	  mass	  
media.	  The	  idea	  for	  this	  project	  largely	  emerged	  from	  my	  own	  curiosity	  about	  the	  
future	  of	  the	  film	  industry,	  and	  so	  I	  conclude	  here	  with	  a	  brief	  and	  somewhat	  
personal	  note	  about	  why	  I	  continue	  to	  find	  hope	  in	  this	  industry,	  even	  in	  the	  
summer	  blockbusters	  that	  many	  other	  observers	  deride.	  
In	  chapter	  3	  I	  discussed	  the	  progressive	  potential	  of	  mass	  publicity.	  By	  
bringing	  together	  diverse	  people	  mass	  publicity	  makes	  social	  problems	  visible	  
across	  boundaries	  of	  class,	  race,	  and	  gender.	  Narratives	  about	  the	  death	  of	  mass	  
media	  suggest	  that	  opportunities	  for	  mass	  publicity	  are	  vanishing,	  but	  with	  the	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concept	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  tendency	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  this	  will	  never	  be	  the	  case.	  
Media	  industries	  will	  certainly	  change,	  but	  just	  as	  blockbusters	  in	  various	  media	  
have	  been	  with	  us	  since	  Homer	  was	  worshiped	  as	  a	  hero	  for	  his	  epic	  poems	  and	  
since	  Luther	  became	  print	  capitalism’s	  first	  best	  seller,	  they	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  
feature	  of	  mediated	  publicity	  for	  the	  imaginable	  future.	  Blockbusters	  are	  a	  feature	  of	  
our	  selves,	  not	  our	  media.	  
	   There	  is	  certainly	  merit	  to	  Frankfurt-­‐school	  concerns	  about	  the	  power	  of	  
mass	  media	  to	  act	  as	  homogenizing	  selling-­‐machines	  that	  lull	  audiences	  into	  
acceptance	  of	  the	  status	  quo.	  But	  today	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  hope	  that	  new	  media	  and	  
the	  cheapening	  of	  publicity	  may,	  in	  some	  ways,	  diminish	  these	  effects.	  More	  
importantly	  though,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  like	  many	  social	  formations	  
mass	  media	  also	  have	  redeeming	  qualities.	  Today’s	  seemingly-­‐inane	  summer	  
blockbusters	  may	  lack	  the	  aesthetic	  refinement	  or	  subtlety	  of	  movies	  from	  earlier	  
decades,	  but	  by	  bringing	  the	  whole	  gamut	  of	  American	  society	  into	  the	  same	  sphere,	  
by	  creating	  a	  platform	  for	  dialogue	  between	  otherwise	  isolated	  segments	  of	  the	  
public,	  these	  mass	  market	  products	  serve	  a	  valuable	  purpose.	  
Perhaps	  I	  am	  concluding	  with	  an	  unconscious	  apologia	  for	  a	  pathology	  that	  I	  
have	  come	  to	  love.	  But	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  promote	  national	  and	  even	  international	  
cohesion,	  however	  flawed	  and	  however	  partial,	  I	  see	  something	  valuable	  in	  today’s	  
blockbuster	  movies.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  very	  possible	  that	  James	  Cameron’s	  superficial	  
engagement	  with	  environmentalism	  in	  the	  mega-­‐hit	  Avatar	  had	  a	  real	  impact	  on	  
raising	  environmental	  awareness	  on	  a	  global	  scale,	  and	  that	  the	  use	  of	  actress	  Judi	  
Dench	  in	  the	  role	  of	  spy-­‐master	  M	  in	  the	  James	  Bond	  action	  movie	  franchise	  had	  a	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real	  impact	  in	  redefining	  gender	  roles.	  These	  effects	  may	  be	  miniscule	  on	  an	  
individual	  level,	  but	  in	  their	  cumulative	  effects	  they	  play	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  
shaping	  the	  dialogues	  in	  which	  we	  all	  participate.	  And	  this	  matters	  more	  and	  more	  
in	  a	  world	  where	  increasingly,	  and	  without	  knowing	  it,	  we	  are	  living	  in	  isolated	  
spheres	  of	  our	  own	  and	  where	  we	  often	  trade	  the	  illusion	  of	  false	  publicity	  on	  a	  
grand	  scale	  for	  real	  publicity	  on	  a	  lesser	  one.	  I	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  seek	  out	  mass	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APPENDIX	  1	  
PERSONALITY,	  PUBLICITY,	  AND	  THE	  CITY	  
	  
In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  have	  emphasized	  structural	  transformations	  in	  the	  public	  
sphere	  constituted	  by	  media.	  These	  aggregate-­‐scale	  transformations	  though,	  are	  
necessarily	  accompanied	  by	  changes	  on	  an	  individual/psychological	  scale.	  While	  the	  
mass	  media	  tendency	  remains	  unchanged	  there	  are	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  personal	  
transformations	  that	  are	  both	  a	  cause	  and	  consequence	  of	  the	  contemporary	  media	  
regime.191	  Here	  I	  examine	  some	  of	  these	  transformations	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  
changing	  character	  of	  personality	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  using	  as	  a	  model	  Richard	  
Sennett’s	  formidable	  Fall	  of	  Public	  Man.	  
In	  a	  sweeping	  account	  of	  the	  shifting	  character	  of	  Western	  public	  life	  Sennett	  
has	  argued	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  gradual	  shift,	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  ancien	  régime,	  
from	  a	  society	  grounded	  in	  values	  of	  civility	  and	  customary	  interactions	  to	  a	  society	  
in	  which	  individual	  personality	  and	  intimacy	  have	  become	  the	  highest	  values.	  The	  
elevation	  of	  intimacy	  over	  civility	  caused	  people	  to	  gradually	  abandon	  the	  social	  
masks,	  customs,	  and	  rituals	  that	  had	  kept	  them	  at	  a	  distance	  from	  one	  another.	  
Abandoning	  these	  barriers	  to	  intimacy	  in	  public	  had	  an	  ironic	  consequence	  though	  –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191	  My	  mode	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  individual-­‐social	  relationship	  here	  is	  largely	  based	  on	  
Georg	  Simmel’s	  approach	  in	  essays	  such	  as	  “How	  is	  Society	  Possible?”	  Simmel	  concluded	  
that	  the	  conditions	  of	  society’s	  possibility	  “reside	  a	  priori	  in	  the	  elements	  themselves,	  
through	  which	  they	  combine,	  in	  reality,	  into	  the	  synthesis,	  society”	  (Simmel	  1910,	  376).	  In	  
other	  words	  in	  order	  for	  society	  to	  emerge,	  Simmel	  believed,	  all	  that	  was	  needed	  was	  a	  large	  
number	  of	  interacting	  individuals	  each	  possessing	  rules	  to	  govern	  his	  or	  her	  own	  behavior.	  
This	  is	  also	  the	  basis	  of	  complex	  systems	  theory	  and	  the	  twin	  concepts	  of	  emergence	  and	  
complexity	  describe	  the	  dynamics	  modeled	  in	  the	  simulations	  of	  chapter	  6	  (c.f.	  Wolfram	  
2002).	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without	  these	  boundaries	  sociability	  became	  too	  painful	  or	  stressful	  for	  many	  
people.	  When	  public	  life	  was	  dominated	  by	  civility,	  Sennett	  argued,	  public	  
interactions	  were	  characterized	  by	  controlled	  expressions;	  when	  personality	  and	  
intimacy	  became	  dominant,	  social	  interactions	  became	  increasingly	  characterized	  
by	  emotionally	  burdensome	  personal	  revelations.	  Sennett	  articulates	  this	  elegantly	  
as	  the	  distinction	  between	  incivility	  and	  civility:	  incivility	  is	  the	  “burdening	  of	  others	  
with	  oneself,”	  while	  civility	  “is	  the	  activity	  which	  protects	  people	  from	  each	  other	  
and	  yet	  allows	  them	  to	  enjoy	  each	  other’s	  company”	  (Sennett	  1992,	  264–265).	  In	  
Sennett’s	  account,	  public	  life	  under	  a	  regime	  of	  intimacy	  had	  become	  narcissistic	  in	  
the	  sense	  that	  all	  encounters	  were	  measured	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  self	  rather	  than	  in	  
terms	  of	  propriety	  or	  civility.	  
	   Public	  life	  dominated	  by	  personality	  and	  intimacy	  had	  become	  stressful,	  
Sennett	  explained,	  because	  it	  had	  become	  a	  constant	  game	  of	  seeking	  to	  discover	  the	  
“true”	  character	  of	  those	  around	  you	  while	  struggling	  to	  prevent	  accidental	  
revelations	  about	  yourself.	  When	  personality	  mattered	  above	  all	  else,	  and	  when	  
personality	  was	  imagined	  to	  be	  rooted	  deep	  within	  the	  individual’s	  psyche,	  people’s	  
actions	  and	  beliefs	  were	  no	  longer	  the	  markers	  of	  their	  worth;	  instead	  every	  aspect	  
of	  their	  public	  appearance	  became	  clues	  to	  a	  “true”	  inner	  character.	  This	  new	  regime	  
of	  public	  intimacy	  caused	  people	  to	  withdraw	  from	  public	  life.192	  
Not	  all	  people	  withdrew	  from	  public	  life,	  in	  Sennett’s	  account;	  in	  fact	  the	  
valorization	  of	  personality	  created	  new	  scale	  on	  which	  public	  figures	  were	  
evaluated,	  and	  some	  public	  careers	  flourished	  under	  this	  new	  regime.	  Successful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192	  “When	  everyone	  has	  each	  other	  under	  surveillance,	  sociability	  decreases,	  silence	  being	  
the	  only	  form	  of	  protection”	  (Sennett	  15).	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public	  figures	  were	  still	  described	  as	  charismatic,	  but	  the	  meaning	  of	  charisma	  had	  
changed.	  Before	  the	  ascendance	  of	  personality	  charisma	  had	  been	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  
truth	  spoken	  by	  public	  figures	  –	  priests	  were	  described	  as	  charismatic	  when	  they	  
conveyed	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  truth	  they	  spoke	  had	  been	  granted	  by	  God.	  In	  the	  intimate	  
public	  sphere	  though	  charisma	  had	  become	  something	  different	  –	  it	  had	  become	  a	  
matter	  of	  making	  increasingly	  intense	  personal	  revelations.193	  
In	  the	  public	  imagination	  of	  early	  modern	  Europe	  the	  figure	  that	  most	  fully	  
enacted	  this	  “psychic	  striptease”	  was	  the	  artist,	  a	  figure	  whose	  art	  was	  imagined	  to	  
be	  a	  representation	  of	  his	  personal	  suffering.	  This	  created	  “a	  new	  standard	  of	  
heroism,”	  one	  that	  quickly	  made	  its	  way	  into	  politics.	  By	  the	  early	  to	  mid	  19th	  
century,	  Sennett	  writes,	  politicians	  had	  begun	  to	  model	  their	  public	  behavior	  and	  
self-­‐presentation	  on	  artists	  of	  the	  stage,	  i.e.	  theater	  actors	  (Sennett	  1992,	  236).	  With	  
the	  rise	  of	  personality	  in	  public	  life	  politicians	  were	  increasingly	  judged	  by	  how	  
effectively	  they	  conveyed	  a	  sense	  of	  personal	  feeling	  and	  thus	  was	  born	  the	  politics	  
of	  personality.	  But,	  in	  Sennett’s	  account,	  this	  personalization	  of	  politics	  had	  dire	  
consequences	  –	  it	  created	  a	  politically	  impotent	  society.	  “The	  structures	  of	  
domination	  especially	  remain	  unchallenged	  when	  people	  are	  led	  into	  electing	  
politicians	  who	  sound	  angry,	  as	  if	  ready	  to	  change	  things;	  these	  politicians	  are,	  by	  
the	  alchemy	  of	  personality,	  freed	  from	  translating	  angry	  impulses	  into	  action”	  
(Sennett	  165).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193	  “The	  sheer	  revelation	  of	  someone’s	  inner	  impulses	  became	  exciting;	  if	  a	  person	  could	  
reveal	  himself	  in	  public	  and	  yet	  control	  the	  process	  of	  self-­‐disclosure,	  he	  was	  exciting.	  You	  
felt	  he	  was	  powerful	  but	  couldn’t	  explain	  why.	  This	  is	  secular	  charisma:	  a	  psychic	  
striptease.”	  (Sennett	  269)	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   The	  shifting	  values	  that	  Sennett	  describes	  have	  a	  special	  meaning	  for	  the	  
relationship	  between	  media	  and	  the	  public	  sphere.	  He	  illustrates	  how	  the	  rise	  of	  
personality	  broadly	  influenced	  the	  experience	  of	  public	  life	  and	  the	  possibilities	  for	  
collective	  action.	  The	  particular	  structures	  through	  which	  personality	  is	  articulated	  
into	  public	  life	  though,	  are	  in	  large	  part	  shaped	  by	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media.	  
Sennett	  wrote	  The	  Fall	  of	  Public	  Man	  before	  the	  emergence	  of	  “new	  media”	  and	  so	  
his	  brief	  discussion	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  media	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  some	  characteristics	  that	  
are	  particular	  to	  the	  mass	  media	  that	  dominated	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  
Nonetheless	  his	  analysis	  illustrates	  many	  of	  the	  non-­‐trivial	  links	  between	  
personality,	  publicity,	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  media.	  
Sennett	  highlights	  four	  aspects	  of	  the	  media	  in	  particular:	  1)	  it	  has	  a	  
structure	  of	  passivity,	  2)	  it	  intensifies	  a	  focus	  on	  personality,	  3)	  it	  hides	  diversity,	  
and	  4)	  it	  encourages	  the	  conflation	  of	  public	  and	  private.	  These	  effects	  are	  linked.	  
First,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  habituates	  people	  to	  a	  passive	  form	  of	  
engagement	  with	  public	  life.194	  In	  turn,	  this	  induced	  passivity	  intensifies	  the	  
audience’s	  preoccupation	  with	  personality;	  because	  the	  audience	  is	  denied	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  express	  their	  personality	  in	  their	  engagement	  with	  mass	  media	  they	  
become	  increasingly	  interested	  in	  those	  personalities	  that	  are	  expressed	  (Sennett	  
284).	  This	  is	  the	  second	  characteristic	  of	  mass	  media	  that	  Sennett	  highlights.	  
This	  tendency	  of	  certain	  forms	  of	  media	  to	  emphasize	  personality	  has	  
important	  implications	  for	  the	  structure	  and	  dynamics	  of	  political	  life.	  These	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194	  “For	  the	  spectator,	  the	  radio	  and	  the	  tube	  do	  not	  permit	  audience	  interruption;	  if	  you	  
start	  reacting	  while	  the	  politician	  is	  on	  the	  air	  you	  miss	  part	  of	  what	  he	  or	  she	  says	  next.	  
You’ve	  got	  to	  be	  silent	  to	  be	  spoken	  to…	  Passivity	  is	  the	  “logic”	  of	  this	  technology”	  (Sennett	  
283).	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implications	  were	  revealed	  in	  some	  of	  the	  20th	  century’s	  major	  political	  dramas.	  For	  
instance	  when	  politics	  are	  governed	  by	  displays	  of	  personality	  every	  aspect	  of	  
character	  becomes	  potentially	  symbolic	  of	  politicians’	  true	  natures.	  An	  important	  
consequence	  is	  that	  “an	  act	  of	  weakness,	  or	  a	  crime,	  or	  a	  moral	  failure	  in	  any	  one	  
realm	  makes	  every	  other	  aspect	  of	  the	  politician’s	  life	  suspect”	  (Sennett	  286).	  An	  
iconic	  example	  is	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  President	  Richard	  Nixon,	  who	  had	  built	  his	  
career	  on	  personal	  revelations.	  One	  of	  Nixon’s	  most	  famous	  speeches	  was	  a	  
televised	  and	  breathtakingly	  intimate	  revelation	  of	  his	  personal	  finances,	  a	  
revelation	  that	  was	  meant	  to	  convey	  his	  true	  character	  as	  an	  honest	  middle-­‐class	  
Quaker.	  He	  began	  the	  account	  of	  his	  own	  past	  as	  follows.	  
And	  so	  now,	  what	  I	  am	  going	  to	  do	  –	  and	  incidentally	  this	  is	  unprecedented	  in	  the	  
history	  of	  American	  politics	  –	  I	  am	  going	  at	  this	  time	  to	  give	  to	  this	  television	  and	  
radio	  audience,	  a	  complete	  financial	  history,	  everything	  I	  have	  earned,	  everything	  I	  
have	  spent	  and	  everything	  I	  own,	  and	  I	  want	  you	  to	  know	  the	  facts.	  (Nixon	  1952)	  
But	  Nixon	  continued	  not	  by	  disclosing	  his	  finances	  but	  by	  talking	  about	  his	  earliest	  
childhood,	  a	  symbol	  through	  which	  the	  audience	  might	  read	  his	  personality	  but	  
hardly	  an	  indicator	  of	  his	  competence	  as	  a	  President.	  
I	  will	  have	  to	  start	  early,	  I	  was	  born	  in	  1913.	  Our	  family	  was	  one	  of	  modest	  
circumstances,	  and	  most	  of	  my	  early	  life	  was	  spent	  in	  a	  store	  out	  in	  East	  Whittier.	  It	  
was	  a	  grocery	  store,	  one	  of	  those	  family	  enterprises.	  (Nixon	  1952)	  
The	  speech	  became	  known	  as	  the	  “Checkers”	  speech	  –	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  speech	  
Nixon	  disclosed	  that	  he	  had	  accepted	  a	  gift	  while	  in	  office.	  
A	  man	  down	  in	  Texas	  heard	  Pat	  on	  the	  radio	  mention	  that	  our	  two	  youngsters	  
would	  like	  to	  have	  a	  dog,	  and,	  believe	  it	  or	  not,	  the	  day	  we	  left	  before	  this	  campaign	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trip	  we	  got	  a	  message	  from	  Union	  Station	  in	  Baltimore,	  saying	  they	  had	  a	  package	  
for	  us.	  We	  went	  down	  to	  get	  it.	  You	  know	  what	  it	  was?	  It	  was	  a	  little	  cocker	  spaniel	  
dog,	  in	  a	  crate	  that	  he	  had	  sent	  all	  the	  way	  from	  Texas,	  black	  and	  white,	  spotted,	  and	  
our	  little	  girl	  Tricia,	  the	  six	  year	  old,	  named	  it	  Checkers.	  And	  you	  know,	  the	  kids,	  like	  
all	  kids,	  loved	  the	  dog,	  and	  I	  just	  want	  to	  say	  this,	  right	  now,	  that	  regardless	  of	  what	  
they	  say	  about	  it,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  keep	  it.	  (Nixon	  1952)	  
Nixon	  had	  so	  completely	  conflated	  his	  personal	  life	  with	  his	  public	  self	  that	  his	  
eventual	  downfall	  was	  read	  as	  an	  indictment	  of	  his	  whole	  character.	  And	  it	  is	  in	  
keeping	  with	  the	  emphasis	  on	  personality	  that	  Nixon’s	  most	  famous	  words	  of	  self-­‐
defense	  –	  “I	  am	  not	  a	  crook	  –	  were	  a	  defense	  of	  his	  character,	  not	  his	  actions	  
(“Operation	  Candor’”	  1973).	  
	   The	  third	  aspect	  of	  the	  media	  that	  Sennett	  highlights	  is	  its	  tendency	  to	  hide	  
diversity.	  Engaging	  with	  diversity	  is	  a	  central	  aspect	  of	  publicity,	  but	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  mass	  media	  during	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  century	  had	  a	  homogenizing	  tendency.	  As	  
discussed	  in	  the	  chapters	  above	  this	  monolithic	  representation	  of	  American	  culture	  
became	  a	  source	  of	  the	  discontent	  –	  which	  became	  increasingly	  visible	  beginning	  
with	  the	  civil	  rights	  era	  –	  and	  this	  discontent	  played	  a	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  new	  media	  
that	  emerged	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century.	  
	   Finally	  Sennett	  emphasizes	  role	  of	  the	  media	  in	  encouraging	  a	  conflation	  of	  
private	  and	  public	  space.	  Television,	  radio,	  and	  newspapers	  delivered	  to	  your	  front	  
door	  each	  morning	  collapse	  the	  distance	  between	  public	  and	  private	  spaces	  –	  these	  
media	  portray	  the	  public	  world	  but	  are	  generally	  consumed	  in	  the	  intimate	  spaces	  of	  
the	  home.	  This	  elimination	  of	  the	  distance	  between	  public	  and	  private	  has	  far-­‐
reaching	  consequences.	  One	  consequence	  is	  the	  penetration	  of	  social	  class	  into	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private	  psychic	  life.	  As	  the	  distance	  between	  public	  and	  private	  collapses,	  Sennett	  
suggests,	  individuals	  increasingly	  accept	  definitions	  of	  themselves	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
roles	  they	  occupy	  in	  public,	  especially	  their	  role	  in	  the	  workplace.	  
The	  penetration	  of	  workplace	  identity	  into	  personal	  life	  is	  endemic	  to	  
contemporary	  capitalism.	  Sennett	  proposes	  that	  this	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  white-­‐collar	  technical	  workers	  such	  as	  computer	  programmers	  or	  low-­‐level	  
stockbrokers.	  These	  employees	  constitute	  a	  new	  class	  and	  have	  no	  group	  identity	  or	  
class	  culture.	  Therefore	  they	  are	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  accepting	  institutional	  
definitions	  of	  their	  work	  as	  definitions	  of	  their	  personalities.	  Sennett	  describes	  this	  
as	  the	  “mobilization	  of	  narcissism”	  in	  the	  workforce.	  Adequacy	  on	  the	  job	  becomes	  a	  
question	  of	  self-­‐adequacy	  –	  it	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  “narcissism	  is	  the	  protestant	  ethic	  
of	  modern	  times”	  (Sennett	  333).	  While	  this	  may	  be	  particularly	  evident	  for	  mid-­‐level	  
technical	  workers	  the	  conflation	  of	  personality	  with	  position	  in	  the	  workforce	  
applies	  at	  all	  levels.	  This	  has	  ramifications	  on	  people’s	  experiences	  and	  their	  
behavior	  in	  their	  professional	  lives	  and	  also	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  class	  system	  as	  a	  
whole.	  
On	  an	  individual	  level,	  the	  conflation	  of	  workplace	  performance	  with	  self-­‐
worth	  becomes	  a	  source	  of	  anxiety.	  As	  a	  result	  individuals	  attempt	  to	  
psychologically	  shield	  themselves	  by	  imagining	  their	  work	  selves	  as	  passive,	  
reacting	  to	  events	  in	  the	  workplace	  rather	  than	  taking	  initiative	  and	  ownership	  of	  
their	  actions.	  On	  a	  broader	  social	  level	  the	  conflation	  of	  workplace	  position	  with	  
self-­‐worth	  inhibits	  the	  potential	  for	  social	  change.	  The	  result	  of	  mobilizing	  
narcissism	  in	  support	  of	  class	  is	  that	  class	  becomes,	  for	  the	  workers,	  	  “too	  much	  a	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part	  of	  themselves	  to	  be	  played	  with”	  (Sennett	  328).	  Sennett	  is	  building	  here	  on	  C.	  
Wright	  Mills’s	  claim	  that	  the	  more	  people	  connect	  their	  class	  position	  to	  their	  
personalities	  the	  less	  angry	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  about	  the	  injustices	  of	  class	  inequality	  
(Mills	  1946).	  In	  addition	  to	  repressing	  individual	  objections	  to	  the	  reigning	  class	  
structure	  this	  mobilization	  of	  narcissism	  –	  which	  is	  facilitated	  by	  the	  conflation	  of	  
public	  and	  private	  space,	  and	  which	  is	  itself,	  Sennett	  suggests,	  partly	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  media	  –	  inhibits	  tendencies	  towards	  class	  solidarity.	  If	  class	  reflects	  
personal	  ability	  then	  occupying	  a	  low	  class	  is	  a	  source	  of	  shame,	  and	  “the	  logic	  of	  
self-­‐respect	  is	  upward	  mobility”	  (Sennett	  332).	  This	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  identify	  
with	  others	  that	  share	  your	  class	  position	  –	  although	  you	  may	  share	  common	  
interests	  you	  imagine	  yourself	  as	  upwardly	  mobile,	  only	  temporarily	  occupying	  a	  
class	  in	  which	  your	  true	  personal	  abilities	  are	  not	  fully	  expressed.	  Acting	  on	  those	  
shared	  interests	  implies	  that	  your	  class	  accurately	  reflects	  your	  personal	  ability.	  
Finally,	  the	  conflation	  of	  the	  personal	  and	  the	  public	  limits	  the	  potential	  for	  
social	  change	  by	  limiting	  people’s	  ability	  to	  imagine	  a	  world	  different	  from	  their	  
own.	  This,	  Sennett	  claims,	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  opportunities	  for	  
expressive	  play.	  In	  a	  narcissistic	  society	  where	  personality	  and	  intimacy	  dominate	  
all	  else	  the	  dominant	  principle	  of	  expression	  becomes	  direct	  representation	  of	  an	  
inner	  state	  –	  e.g.,	  how	  I	  feel,	  what	  I	  want	  –	  rather	  than	  controlled	  civil	  expressions	  
that	  make	  use	  of	  conventional	  cultural	  tools	  to	  express	  meaning.	  Such	  tools	  could	  be	  
shuffled	  and	  recombined	  in	  a	  form	  of	  expressive	  play;	  their	  loss	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  
the	  distance	  between	  public	  and	  private	  have	  deprived	  us	  of	  the	  opportunity	  for	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such	  play,	  depriving	  us	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  imagine	  alternatives	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  
the	  present.	  
A	  person	  cannot	  imagine	  playing	  with	  his	  environment,	  playing	  with	  the	  facts	  of	  his	  
position	  in	  society,	  playing	  with	  his	  appearances	  to	  others,	  because	  these	  conditions	  
are	  now	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  himself…	  To	  lose	  the	  ability	  to	  play	  is	  to	  lose	  the	  sense	  
that	  worldly	  conditions	  are	  plastic.	  This	  ability	  to	  play	  with	  social	  life	  depends	  on	  
the	  existence	  of	  a	  dimension	  of	  society	  which	  stands	  apart	  from,	  at	  a	  distance	  from,	  
intimate	  desire,	  need,	  and	  identity…	  The	  ability	  to	  be	  expressive	  is	  at	  a	  fundamental	  
level	  cut,	  because	  one	  tries	  to	  make	  one’s	  appearances	  represent	  who	  one	  is,	  to	  join	  
the	  question	  of	  effective	  expression	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  authenticity	  of	  expression.	  Under	  
these	  conditions,	  everything	  returns	  to	  motive:	  Is	  this	  what	  I	  really	  feel?	  Do	  I	  really	  
mean	  it?	  Am	  I	  being	  genuine?	  The	  self	  of	  motivations	  intervenes	  in	  an	  intimate	  
society	  to	  block	  people	  from	  feeling	  free	  to	  play	  with	  the	  presentation	  of	  feelings	  as	  
objective,	  formed	  signs.	  (Sennett	  267)	  
By	  collapsing	  the	  distance	  between	  public	  and	  private	  and	  by	  intensifying	  the	  
fixation	  on	  personality,	  the	  mass	  media,	  in	  Sennett’s	  account,	  rob	  society	  of	  its	  
flexibility.	  
	   By	  articulating	  personality	  into	  public	  life	  in	  particular	  ways	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  mass	  media	  shapes	  the	  character	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Sennett’s	  account	  of	  four	  
aspects	  of	  mid-­‐20th	  century	  mass	  media	  –	  its	  structure	  of	  passivity,	  its	  
intensification	  of	  the	  focus	  on	  personality,	  its	  concealment	  of	  diversity,	  and	  its	  
collapse	  of	  public	  and	  private	  –	  illustrate	  these	  complex	  articulations	  at	  a	  particular	  
moment	  in	  Western	  history.	  The	  question	  is	  whether	  these	  still	  apply	  in	  today’s	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transformed	  media	  landscape.	  How	  does	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  today	  interact	  
with	  personality	  and	  narcissism	  to	  shape	  the	  character	  of	  public	  life?	  
	  
	   In	  some	  respects	  the	  articulations	  that	  Sennett	  described	  between	  media,	  
personality,	  and	  public	  life	  have	  become	  amplified	  in	  the	  latest	  media	  regime.	  The	  
penetration	  of	  media	  into	  intimate	  life,	  for	  example,	  has	  become	  exponentially	  
greater	  in	  recent	  decades	  –	  the	  locus	  of	  media	  has	  moved	  from	  the	  living	  room,	  to	  
the	  bedroom,	  to	  the	  body	  itself	  with	  ubiquitous	  internet-­‐enabled	  smart	  phones	  
delivering	  news	  feeds,	  streaming	  videos,	  and	  instant	  access	  to	  the	  Internet.	  The	  rise	  
of	  “transmedia”	  entertainment	  further	  enhances	  this	  penetration	  –	  branded	  objects	  
of	  all	  kinds,	  from	  bed	  sheets	  to	  drinking	  glasses,	  extend	  public	  sphere	  
representations	  into	  every	  aspect	  of	  private	  life.	  These	  developments	  further	  
collapse	  the	  distance	  between	  private	  and	  public	  worlds,	  which	  encourages	  the	  
conflation	  of	  public	  and	  private	  identity.	  
Sennett’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  conflation	  in	  the	  workplace	  also	  
seems	  prescient,	  particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  mid-­‐level	  white-­‐collar	  technicians	  –	  the	  
Silicon	  Valley	  computer-­‐programmer	  has	  become	  an	  iconic	  figure,	  and	  his	  scruffy	  
beard	  and	  informal	  clothes	  have	  become	  symbols	  of	  both	  his	  job	  and	  his	  lifestyle.	  
This	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  proliferation	  of	  contemporary	  workplace	  TV	  shows	  in	  
which	  each	  character’s	  personality	  is	  expressed	  through	  their	  workplace	  identity.	  
The	  logic	  of	  these	  shows	  is	  that	  we	  come	  to	  know	  the	  characters	  personalities	  
through	  their	  behavior	  in	  the	  workplace.	  For	  instance,	  NBC’s	  “The	  Office”	  (2005-­‐
2013),	  explores	  a	  common	  workplace	  experience	  in	  a	  faux-­‐documentary	  style	  by	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following	  employees	  at	  the	  Dunder	  Mifflin	  Paper	  Company.	  Many	  of	  these	  shows	  
also	  include	  their	  own	  transmedia	  components	  –	  you	  can	  drink	  coffee	  out	  of	  a	  mug	  
featuring	  the	  logo	  of	  the	  fictional	  Dunder	  Mifflin	  paper	  company	  while	  driving	  to	  
your	  own	  mundane	  office	  job,	  emulating	  a	  world	  in	  which	  workplace	  and	  personal	  
identities	  are	  one	  in	  this	  same.	  	  
	   In	  other	  important	  respects	  though	  the	  structure	  of	  media	  today	  has	  
fundamentally	  reconfigured	  some	  of	  the	  articulations	  between	  personality	  and	  
publicity.	  For	  instance	  the	  structure	  of	  passivity	  that	  characterized	  mass	  media	  no	  
longer	  holds.	  Sennett	  proposed	  that	  “passivity”	  is	  the	  logic	  of	  mass	  media	  because	  
on	  the	  one	  hand	  mass	  media	  communication	  was	  one-­‐directional	  and	  on	  other,	  since	  
it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  arbitrarily	  start	  and	  stop	  a	  broadcast,	  interrupting	  with	  your	  
own	  opinion	  meant	  missing	  part	  of	  the	  broadcast	  itself.	  Today	  though	  the	  vast	  
majority	  of	  broadcasters	  offer	  viewers	  the	  ability	  to	  react	  to	  broadcasts	  in	  real	  time	  
by	  posting	  comments	  to	  their	  websites.	  Audience	  members	  can	  also	  react	  by	  
broadcasting	  their	  reactions	  through	  free	  services	  like	  Twitter	  or	  Facebook.	  
Furthermore	  ubiquitous	  Digital	  Video	  Recorders	  make	  it	  easy	  to	  stop,	  replay,	  and	  
even	  fast-­‐forward	  televised	  broadcasts.	  
A	  more	  complex	  case	  in	  which	  the	  articulation	  between	  personality	  and	  
publicity	  has	  been	  restructured	  by	  the	  shifting	  media	  landscape	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  
opportunities	  for	  expressive	  play	  and	  the	  consequent	  facility	  with	  which	  people	  can	  
imagine	  alternatives	  to	  the	  status	  quo.	  The	  collapse	  of	  personality	  and	  publicity	  
caused	  by	  the	  entry	  of	  new	  media	  into	  intimate	  life	  might	  bring	  with	  it	  the	  kinds	  of	  
political	  impotence	  that	  Sennett	  described;	  but	  new	  forms	  of	  media	  also	  brings	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powerful	  new	  forms	  of	  political	  imagination.	  For	  instance	  the	  hollowing	  out	  of	  
opportunities	  for	  play	  that	  comes	  from	  the	  conflation	  of	  personality	  with	  public	  life	  
is	  counteracted	  by	  the	  hyper-­‐malleability	  of	  the	  media	  themselves.	  Free	  web-­‐based	  
publishing	  of	  text,	  images,	  and	  video	  has	  become	  accessible	  to	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  
population.	  Artificial	  worlds	  have	  become	  commonplace	  and	  the	  wildest	  flights	  of	  
fancy	  can	  be	  realized	  in	  various	  forms.	  This	  opens	  room	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  for	  a	  
powerful	  new	  form	  expressive	  play.	  
On	  a	  personal	  level	  too	  new	  media	  seem	  to	  offer	  countermeasures	  to	  the	  
anxieties	  created	  by	  the	  collapse	  of	  personality	  and	  publicity.	  In	  Sennett’s	  account	  
part	  of	  the	  anxiety	  that	  results	  from	  the	  domination	  of	  personality	  over	  public	  life	  
comes	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  public	  all	  outward	  appearances	  become	  clues	  to	  
personality.	  “When	  everyone	  has	  each	  other	  under	  surveillance,	  sociability	  
decreases,	  silence	  being	  the	  only	  form	  of	  protection”	  (Sennett	  15).	  This	  is	  based	  on	  
the	  assumption	  that	  personality	  expresses	  itself	  involuntarily	  through	  bodily	  actions	  
and	  choices,	  which	  can	  be	  decoded.	  Furthermore,	  in	  public,	  the	  involuntary	  
appearance	  of	  economic,	  social,	  and	  political	  cues	  can	  color	  perceptions	  of	  an	  
individual’s	  personality.	  In	  the	  contemporary	  sphere	  of	  mediated	  communications	  
though	  this	  logic	  is	  inverted	  –	  because	  of	  the	  complete	  malleability	  of	  one’s	  self-­‐
presentation	  via	  electronic	  media	  the	  direct	  link	  between	  presentation	  and	  
personality	  has	  been	  broken	  and	  the	  logic	  of	  self-­‐presentation	  has	  become	  inverted.	  
In	  the	  real	  world	  personality	  is	  constrained	  wherever	  it	  is	  expressed,	  both	  because	  
of	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  expressed	  and	  because	  of	  the	  anxiety	  produced	  by	  others’	  
assumptions	  that	  that	  personality	  will	  indeed	  be	  expressed.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  in	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electronic	  media	  there	  is	  neither	  assumption	  nor	  context.	  Electronic	  media	  offer	  a	  
space	  in	  which	  personality	  can	  be	  expressed	  –	  and	  made	  –	  with	  complete	  freedom.	  
Mediated	  personality	  can	  be	  more	  real	  than	  real-­‐world	  personality.	  
The	  delinking	  of	  personality	  and	  appearance	  quickly	  became	  a	  salient	  feature	  
of	  new	  media	  and	  by	  the	  1990s	  had	  become	  a	  pop-­‐culture	  trope.	  For	  instance	  “The	  
Parlor,”	  a	  popular	  short	  film	  published	  online	  in	  2001,	  depicts	  a	  group	  of	  people	  
sitting	  in	  a	  waiting	  room	  having	  a	  conversation.	  Each	  wears	  a	  name-­‐tag	  –	  a	  heavy-­‐
set	  mustached	  man	  wears	  a	  nametag	  that	  says	  “beth”,	  another	  wears	  a	  nametag	  that	  
says	  “schizo.”	  As	  they	  talk	  with	  each	  other	  we	  begin	  to	  notice	  that	  their	  descriptions	  
of	  themselves	  differ	  from	  their	  physical	  appearance.	  A	  bald	  man	  wearing	  a	  tie	  tells	  
the	  group	  that	  he	  is	  fifteen	  years	  old,	  nobody	  objects.	  Eventually	  it	  becomes	  clear	  
that	  the	  film	  is	  a	  live-­‐action	  depiction	  of	  an	  online	  chat-­‐room	  in	  which	  participants	  
have	  total	  freedom	  to	  describe	  themselves	  however	  they	  like	  without	  being	  
challenged.	  The	  films	  ironic	  tension	  comes	  from	  the	  contrast	  between	  the	  
individuals’	  physical	  selves	  and	  their	  avatars,	  their	  constructed	  self-­‐representations.	  
The	  term	  avatar,	  now	  ubiquitous,	  comes	  from	  the	  Sanskrit	  word	  for	  descent,	  which,	  
in	  Hindu	  mythology,	  describes	  the	  descent	  of	  a	  deity	  to	  earth	  in	  incarnate	  form	  –	  a	  
fitting	  term	  for	  the	  godlike	  control	  over	  self-­‐presentation	  that	  new	  media	  offer.	  
	  
As	  the	  examples	  above	  indicate,	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  call	  for	  
a	  reevaluation	  of	  the	  articulations	  between	  publicity	  and	  personality.	  In	  order	  to	  
understand	  these	  articulations	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
media	  today	  and	  this	  has	  been	  my	  goal	  in	  the	  chapters	  above.	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Sennett	  concludes	  The	  Fall	  of	  Public	  Man	  with	  a	  hope	  that	  the	  city	  could	  act	  as	  
a	  platform	  for	  teaching	  the	  kind	  of	  impersonal	  sociability	  that	  had	  been	  the	  basis	  for	  
rich	  public	  life	  and	  political	  action	  in	  the	  past.	  After	  all,	  the	  city	  is	  the	  site	  where	  
individuals	  come	  together	  to	  pursue	  their	  interests	  in	  the	  company	  of	  dissimilar	  
strangers.	  Castells	  had	  similarly	  hoped	  that	  by	  acting	  as	  a	  platform	  for	  collective	  
consumption	  the	  city	  could	  serve	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  cross-­‐class	  solidarity	  and	  social	  
action.	  But	  the	  city	  of	  the	  present	  has	  failed	  to	  serve	  these	  functions.	  Proponents	  of	  
an	  inclusive	  urbanism	  have	  often	  fought	  an	  uphill	  battle	  against	  the	  polarizing	  logics	  
of	  global	  capital,	  and	  the	  modern	  city	  has	  been	  characterized	  by	  fragmentation	  and	  
segregation.195	  
For	  Castells,	  Sennett	  and	  many	  others	  the	  progressive	  potential	  of	  the	  city	  
emerged	  from	  its	  mass	  aspects.	  The	  mass	  implies	  a	  kernel	  of	  sociability,	  and	  the	  
mass	  aspects	  of	  the	  city	  brought	  a	  mass	  aspect	  to	  public	  life.	  But	  the	  mass	  public	  life	  
of	  mid-­‐century	  was	  also	  shaped	  by	  the	  mass	  aspects	  of	  the	  media.	  And	  so	  in	  
searching	  for	  a	  platform	  for	  a	  richer	  public	  life	  perhaps	  the	  media	  can	  also	  offer	  
some	  hope.	  In	  a	  fragmenting	  world	  the	  paradox	  of	  the	  contemporary	  media	  is	  that	  it	  
appears	  to	  maintain	  a	  mass	  aspect	  even	  amidst	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  its	  own	  
audiences.	  Despite	  the	  atomization	  caused	  by	  new	  technologies	  audiences	  continue	  
to	  swarm	  to	  certain	  pieces	  of	  content	  –	  to	  films	  like	  2009’s	  Avatar,	  which	  boasted	  
the	  highest	  box	  office	  returns	  in	  history,	  or	  2012’s	  The	  Avengers	  which	  drew	  a	  
record	  number	  of	  people	  during	  its	  opening	  weekend,	  or	  to	  online	  videos	  like	  “Kony	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195	  See	  Neil	  Smith	  regarding	  gentrification	  (N.	  Smith	  2012);	  Sassen	  regarding	  global	  
capitalism	  and	  urban	  polarization	  (Sassen	  2001;	  Sassen	  2011b);	  Graham	  and	  Marvin’s	  
Splintering	  Urbanism	  regarding	  urban	  fragmentation	  (Graham	  and	  Marvin	  2002).	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2012”	  which	  attracted	  nearly	  100	  million	  views	  to	  its	  humanitarian	  message	  about	  
plight	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  The	  mass,	  with	  its	  progressive	  potential,	  may	  be	  a	  
latent	  feature	  of	  the	  new	  media	  regime	  even	  though	  it	  maintains	  the	  appearance	  of	  
hyper-­‐individualism;	  and	  so	  it	  may	  be	  the	  media	  that	  will	  become	  the	  platform	  for	  
facilitating	  a	  rich	  public	  life,	  for	  resolving	  social	  conflicts,	  and	  for	  organizing	  
cooperative	  projects	  among	  strangers.	  The	  media	  may	  be	  the	  new	  city.196	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196	  This	  analogy	  is	  more	  than	  merely	  rhetorical.	  Henri	  Lefebvre	  provided	  a	  model	  for	  
analyzing	  the	  city	  –	  or	  more	  precisely	  the	  urban,	  which	  is	  a	  characteristic	  of	  the	  city	  –	  as	  a	  
meso-­‐level	  that	  mediates	  between	  the	  personal	  and	  global	  levels	  of	  social	  reality	  (Lefebvre	  
2003;	  Brenner	  2000).	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  urban	  is	  a	  “mediate”	  level.	  The	  media	  similarly	  
mediates	  between	  personal	  and	  global	  and	  much	  of	  the	  theoretical	  apparatus	  that	  describes	  
the	  mediating	  role	  of	  the	  urban	  can	  be	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  media.	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APPENDIX	  2	  
Complexity,	  Contradictions,	  and	  the	  Dominant	  Mode	  of	  Social	  Coordination	  
	  
Accounting	  for	  historical	  transformations	  in	  the	  media-­‐publicity	  complex	  requires	  
some	  sort	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  change	  and	  stability	  that	  
characterizes	  the	  movement	  from	  one	  historical	  period	  to	  the	  next.	  In	  this	  appendix	  
I	  sketch	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  motive	  force	  behind	  the	  changes	  described	  in	  this	  
dissertation	  –	  a	  combination	  of	  complexity	  and	  contradiction.	  This	  requires	  
introducing	  an	  additional	  concept,	  the	  dominant	  mode	  of	  social	  coordination.	  I	  
conclude	  with	  a	  brief	  example	  of	  how	  these	  concepts	  work	  together	  to	  explain	  the	  
linked	  transformations	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Western	  media	  and	  society	  during	  the	  
1970s	  and	  1980s.	  
Accepting	  complexity	  as	  a	  guiding	  principle	  precludes	  monocausal	  
explanations	  of	  historical	  change.	  Nonetheless,	  at	  each	  historical	  stage	  the	  structure	  
of	  the	  media	  and	  the	  public	  sphere	  reflect,	  in	  part,	  the	  ways	  that	  dominant	  social	  
contradictions	  –	  between	  classes,	  between	  genders,	  between	  ethnic	  groups	  –	  have	  
been	  stabilized.	  These	  contradictions	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  drive	  change	  only	  insofar	  
as	  they	  are	  visible	  to	  a	  public,	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  controls	  that	  
visibility.197	  Therefore	  understanding	  change	  in	  the	  media	  and	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197	  I	  would	  preempt	  accusations	  of	  functionalism	  by	  noting	  that	  the	  implication	  here	  is	  not	  
that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  always	  works	  to	  hide	  social	  contradictions.	  Indeed	  if	  
that	  were	  the	  case	  there	  would	  not	  be	  revolutionary	  conflict	  or	  social	  change.	  Roger	  Gould’s	  
wonderful	  Insurgent	  Identities	  showed	  how	  the	  structure	  of	  public	  life	  among	  workers	  in	  
pre-­‐1971	  Paris,	  organized	  around	  neighborhood	  clubs	  and	  popular	  meeting	  places,	  
structured	  the	  1971	  uprising	  (Gould	  1995).	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  public	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with	  respect	  to	  contradictions	  in	  society	  provides	  clues	  as	  to	  how	  these	  come	  
together	  to	  form	  a	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  stable	  public	  sphere.	  
	   Using	  social	  contradictions	  to	  account	  for	  transformations	  in	  the	  media,	  and	  
publicity	  requires	  accounting	  for	  a	  third	  factor,	  which	  Habermas	  described	  as	  the	  
dominant	  mode	  of	  social	  coordination.	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  overarching	  logic	  that	  
organizes	  social	  life	  at	  a	  particular	  place	  and	  time.	  Through	  our	  articulation	  into	  the	  
public	  sphere	  we	  learn	  to	  act,	  think,	  and	  feel	  according	  to	  that	  logic;	  and	  changes	  in	  
that	  logic	  imply	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  both	  the	  media	  and	  in	  the	  character	  of	  
publicity.	  
In	  practice	  the	  dominant	  mode	  of	  social	  coordination	  accounts	  for	  a	  broad	  
range	  of	  real-­‐world	  processes.	  In	  appendix	  3,	  for	  instance,	  I	  review	  the	  importance	  
of	  culture,	  economic	  policy,	  and	  political	  ideology.	  In	  chapter	  1	  I	  also	  discuss	  the	  
concept	  of	  complexity	  and	  its	  implication	  that	  complex	  social	  processes	  cannot	  be	  
simply	  disaggregated	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  analytical	  convenience.	  Nonetheless,	  
thoroughly	  accounting	  for	  the	  character	  of	  all	  social	  processes	  at	  a	  given	  moment	  in	  
history	  is	  impossible.	  The	  concept	  of	  dominant	  mode	  of	  social	  coordination	  
addresses	  this	  problem	  by	  serving	  as	  a	  master	  category	  that	  describes	  
commonalities	  among	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  processes.	  As	  such	  it	  is	  a	  useful	  instrument	  
for	  registering	  large-­‐scale	  social	  transformations	  without	  flattening	  them.	  
Modern	  Western	  history	  has	  generally	  known	  three	  ideal-­‐typical	  modes	  of	  
social	  coordination	  –	  hierarchy/oligarchy,	  state	  power,	  and	  market	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sphere	  can	  either	  highlight	  or	  hide	  social	  contradictions,	  which	  provide	  a	  useful	  
hermeneutic	  tool	  for	  interrogating	  the	  structure	  of	  public	  life.	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coordination198,199	  –	  and	  as	  each	  of	  these	  has	  dominated	  in	  turn,	  both	  the	  structure	  
of	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  dominant	  media	  have	  changed.	  The	  
structure	  of	  public	  sphere,	  the	  dominant	  media,	  and	  the	  mode	  of	  social	  coordination	  
therefore	  constitute	  a	  three-­‐part	  equation	  that	  lends	  itself	  to	  a	  rough	  periodization	  
into	  four	  historical	  stages	  in	  the	  American	  case:	  1)	  Beginning	  with	  the	  American	  
Revolution	  and	  lasting	  until	  the	  rise	  of	  industrial	  capitalism	  after	  the	  American	  Civil	  
War	  publicity	  and	  the	  media	  were	  oriented	  according	  to	  the	  ideals	  of	  the	  new	  
republic;	  2)	  From	  the	  rise	  of	  large-­‐scale	  industrial	  capitalism	  until	  the	  Great	  
Depression	  publicity	  and	  the	  media	  were	  organized	  according	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  
market;	  3)	  From	  the	  rise	  of	  FDR’s	  New	  Deal	  through	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198	  For	  Habermas	  the	  three	  dominant	  modes	  of	  social	  coordination	  were	  rational-­‐critical	  
debate,	  state	  power,	  and	  the	  market.	  I	  have	  replaced	  Habermas’s	  rational-­‐critical	  debate	  
with	  hierarchy/oligarchy,	  which	  is,	  I	  think,	  more	  appropriate	  insofar	  as	  it	  describes	  a	  
structural	  mode	  of	  social	  coordination	  in	  line	  with	  the	  other	  two,	  since	  Habermas’s	  rational-­‐
critical	  debate	  describes	  a	  process	  of	  coordination,	  not	  its	  structure.	  When	  rational-­‐critical	  
debate	  was	  the	  dominant	  mode	  of	  social	  coordination,	  according	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  Habermas’s	  
own	  argument,	  it	  took	  the	  form	  of	  rational-­‐critical	  debate	  among	  an	  elite	  group	  of	  
individuals.	  Habermas’s	  claim	  is	  that	  rational-­‐critical	  debate	  fails	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  masses	  are	  
involved.	  So	  whether	  rational-­‐critical	  debate	  is	  imagined	  to	  have	  dominated	  among	  an	  
intellectual	  bourgeoisie	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  or	  among	  Roman	  senators	  it	  would	  have	  
been	  an	  aspect	  of	  a	  hierarchical	  society	  ruled	  by	  an	  oligarchy.	  In	  other	  words,	  rational-­‐
critical	  debate	  would	  not,	  in	  fact,	  have	  been	  the	  dominant	  mode	  of	  social	  coordination.	  It	  
would	  simply	  have	  been	  the	  mode	  through	  which	  members	  of	  the	  oligarchy	  reached	  
decisions,	  which	  would	  then	  be	  imposed	  on	  society	  at	  large.	  
	  
199	  The	  existence	  of	  a	  bourgeois	  public	  sphere	  dominated	  by	  rational-­‐critical	  debate	  has	  
been	  widely	  discredited	  (see	  note	  203).	  Furthermore,	  rational-­‐critical	  debate	  seems	  out	  of	  
place	  even	  within	  Habermas’s	  own	  typology	  of	  modes	  of	  social	  coordination.	  The	  two	  other	  
components	  of	  Habermas’s	  typology	  –	  state	  power	  and	  the	  market	  –	  can	  be	  realized	  as	  
institutional	  loci	  of	  coordination	  and	  require	  no	  assumptions	  about	  effectiveness.	  
Meanwhile	  rational-­‐critical	  debate	  refers	  to	  an	  ideal	  process,	  which,	  if	  it	  ever	  dominated	  
social	  coordination,	  would	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  vagaries	  of	  what	  Althusser	  described	  as	  
“society	  effects”	  –	  the	  innumerable	  pressures,	  conflicts,	  and	  compromises	  that	  come	  from	  
transforming	  ideal	  modes	  of	  social	  coordination	  as	  real-­‐world	  institutions.	  The	  ideal	  of	  
rational-­‐critical	  debate	  seems	  likely	  to	  evaporate	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  hits	  the	  real	  world,	  whereas	  
even	  though	  their	  real-­‐world	  manifestations	  may	  be	  perverted	  the	  state	  and	  the	  market	  can	  
be	  institutionalized	  as	  such.	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Fordist/Keynesian	  years	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  social	  coordination	  reverted	  to	  a	  
form	  of	  state-­‐orientation;	  4)	  Beginning	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  Reaganomics	  in	  the	  1980s	  
social	  coordination	  has	  shifted	  back	  towards	  an	  overwhelmingly	  market-­‐oriented	  
mode.	  Hierarchy/oligarchy	  has	  generally	  been	  absent	  from	  American	  history	  as	  a	  
mode	  of	  social	  coordination,	  but	  this	  constitutes	  the	  ancien	  régime	  backdrop	  against	  
which	  the	  American	  republic	  developed.	  
	   Periodizing	  history	  according	  to	  the	  dominant	  mode	  of	  social	  coordination	  
simplifies	  the	  use	  of	  social	  contradiction	  as	  tool	  for	  explaining	  social	  change	  without	  
flattening	  the	  complexity	  and	  diversity	  of	  relevant	  social	  processes.200	  An	  illustrative	  
example	  of	  what	  I	  mean	  here	  is	  the	  transition	  from	  the	  Fordist/Keynesian	  post-­‐war	  
period	  to	  the	  era	  of	  Reaganomics	  and	  neoliberalism.	  In	  the	  former	  period	  a	  cohesive	  
social	  order	  was	  effectively	  maintained	  under	  the	  frameworks	  of	  mass-­‐consumption	  
and	  suburbanization.	  These	  were	  organized	  by	  mass	  media	  and	  state	  action,	  which	  
together	  structured	  the	  experience	  of	  publicity	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  mass	  public	  sphere.	  
The	  mass	  media	  promoted	  mass	  consumption	  through	  depictions	  of	  ideal	  suburban	  
lifestyles	  and	  advertiser-­‐guided	  consumer	  ideals.	  Meanwhile	  state	  coordination	  was	  
crucial	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  infrastructure	  that	  made	  suburbanization	  possible	  
while	  the	  conflicting	  interests	  of	  different	  groups	  were	  largely	  tempered	  into	  claims	  
made	  on	  the	  welfare	  state	  rather	  than	  erupting	  into	  fractured	  conflicts	  among	  
opposing	  segments	  of	  society.	  This	  combination	  of	  mass	  media	  and	  state	  
coordination	  produced	  a	  relatively	  stable	  experience	  of	  public	  life	  for	  much	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200	  A	  methodological	  analogy	  here	  is	  Althusser’s	  concept	  of	  overdetermination.	  See	  
“Contradiction	  and	  Overdetermination”	  in	  For	  Marx	  (Althusser	  2005).	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20th	  century,	  a	  public	  life	  dominated	  by	  a	  monolithic	  image	  of	  the	  ideal	  American	  
family	  and	  a	  monolithic	  image	  of	  the	  American	  public.201	  
It	  was	  only	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  that	  shifts	  in	  the	  world	  economy	  
and	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  prompted	  reconfigurations	  in	  the	  dominant	  
mode	  of	  social	  coordination	  and	  in	  the	  media.202	  These	  reconfigurations	  had	  to	  
accommodate	  more	  than	  a	  changed	  world	  economy	  and	  a	  new	  domestic	  political	  
landscape	  –	  a	  new	  order	  of	  social	  conflicts	  had	  begun	  to	  emerge	  during	  the	  social	  
and	  economic	  upheavals	  of	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  during	  which	  exclusion	  from	  
the	  monolith	  of	  mid-­‐century	  American	  public	  life	  had	  become	  a	  point	  of	  contention	  
for	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  self-­‐identified	  social	  groups.	  This	  new	  order	  of	  social	  
contradictions	  became	  particularly	  visible	  in	  the	  form	  of	  identity	  politics,	  which	  
loomed	  large	  during	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s.	  The	  new	  media	  regime	  and	  the	  
new	  mode	  of	  social	  coordination	  that	  emerged	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century	  would	  have	  
to	  accommodate	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  groups	  for	  whom	  economic	  or	  legal	  equality	  
was	  no	  longer	  the	  only	  goal;	  rather	  these	  groups	  were	  now	  also	  fighting	  for	  their	  
right	  to	  remake	  American	  public	  life	  in	  their	  image.	  The	  lily-­‐white	  world	  of	  
broadcasts	  like	  “Father	  Knows	  Best”	  (1954-­‐1960)	  was	  no	  longer	  fit	  to	  dominate	  
public	  life.	  After	  five	  decades	  of	  mass	  public	  life,	  the	  shared	  experience	  of	  publicity	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  life	  itself	  was	  stable	  –	  this	  was	  a	  time	  of	  great	  social	  upheavals	  
from	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  to	  debates	  over	  abortion.	  Rather,	  the	  structure	  of	  public	  life	  
was	  stable	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  people	  accessed	  and	  experienced	  public	  life.	  
	  
202	  The	  shift	  to	  market	  coordination	  was	  in	  part	  a	  response	  to	  oil	  shocks	  and	  a	  world	  
economic	  downturn,	  which	  caused	  a	  series	  of	  regulatory	  changes	  that	  were	  themselves	  part	  
of	  what	  caused	  the	  reorganization	  of	  media	  –	  e.g.	  legislative	  changes	  that	  made	  cable	  
networks	  possible,	  the	  FCC’s	  fin-­‐syn	  regulations,	  etc.	  This	  reaction	  to	  external	  changes	  is	  
analogous	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  policies	  geared	  towards	  maintaining	  high	  levels	  of	  consumer	  
spending	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.	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had	  revealed	  iniquities	  in	  public	  life	  itself	  and	  discontent	  over	  these	  iniquities	  
shaped	  the	  emerging	  regime.	  
	  
A	  Note	  on	  Habermas	  
Habermas’s	  path-­‐breaking	  examination	  of	  public	  life	  in	  structural	  terms	  provides	  
the	  basis	  for	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  above.	  It	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  though,	  that	  my	  
theorization	  of	  change	  in	  the	  media	  and	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  differs	  
from	  Habermas’s	  mode	  of	  analysis	  in	  two	  fundamental	  ways.	  
First,	  Habermas’s	  definition	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  much	  narrower	  than	  the	  
one	  I	  use	  here.	  For	  Habermas,	  as	  for	  Arendt,	  the	  public	  sphere	  was	  theorized	  as	  a	  
platform	  for	  political	  action.	  From	  a	  sociological	  perspective	  the	  public	  sphere	  has	  a	  
much	  broader	  relevance,	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  chapter	  2.	  In	  addition,	  for	  Habermas	  
“public	  sphere”	  refers	  to	  what	  I	  understand	  as	  a	  historically	  specific	  configuration	  of	  
the	  more	  general	  sociological	  concept	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Habermas’s	  public	  
sphere	  was	  specifically	  the	  sphere	  of	  rational-­‐critical	  debate;	  and	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  
the	  rational-­‐critical	  public	  sphere,	  as	  he	  imagined	  it,	  ever,	  in	  fact,	  existed.203	  It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203	  Several	  scholars	  have	  made	  this	  observation.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  for	  
instance,	  Michael	  Schudson	  writes,	  “when	  we	  examine	  descriptions	  of	  what	  public	  life	  was	  
actually	  like,	  there	  is	  not	  much	  to	  suggest	  the	  rational-­‐critical	  discussion	  Jürgen	  Habermas	  
posits	  as	  central	  to	  the	  public	  sphere”	  (Schudson	  1992,	  146).	  Keith	  Michael	  Baker	  has	  
discussed	  the	  slippage	  between	  Habermas’s	  idealized	  public	  sphere	  and	  the	  reality	  of	  18th	  
century	  France	  (K.	  M.	  Baker	  1992).	  And	  Joan	  Landes	  has	  argued	  more	  pointedly	  that	  the	  
gendered	  reality	  of	  the	  18th	  century	  French	  public	  sphere	  –	  it	  was	  “essentially,	  not	  just	  
contingently,	  masculinist”	  –	  conflicts	  with	  Habermas’s	  assumptions	  about	  the	  universal	  
conception	  of	  humanity	  in	  a	  rational	  public	  sphere	  and	  is	  important	  for	  explaining	  its	  
structural	  transformations	  (Landes	  1988,	  7).	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should	  be	  clear	  that	  the	  concept	  as	  I	  apply	  it	  here	  makes	  no	  such	  assumptions	  about	  
the	  character	  of	  public	  discourse.204	  
Second,	  Habermas	  understood	  the	  structural	  transformation	  of	  the	  public	  
sphere	  that	  took	  place	  during	  the	  19th	  century	  as	  a	  result	  of	  internal	  tensions	  within	  
the	  rational-­‐critical	  logic	  of	  bourgeois	  discourse.	  The	  dominance	  of	  rational-­‐critical	  
debate	  was	  premised	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  general	  good	  –	  when	  the	  interests	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204	  Various	  scholars	  have	  similarly	  attempted	  to	  broaden	  the	  concept	  of	  public	  sphere	  in	  a	  
specifically	  Habermasian	  context	  and	  have	  identified	  its	  limitations	  in	  analyzing	  modern	  
social	  formations,	  but	  I	  differ	  from	  them	  insofar	  as	  they	  center	  their	  analyses	  of	  the	  public	  
sphere	  on	  rationality	  and	  political	  action.	  Nicholas	  Garnham,	  for	  example,	  notes	  that	  in	  
large-­‐scale	  societies	  the	  concept	  must	  necessarily	  be	  broadened	  because	  “both	  social	  and	  
communicative	  relations	  are	  inevitably	  mediated	  through	  both	  time	  and	  space,”	  whereas	  
“Habermas’s	  original	  model	  rested	  on	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  communication	  in	  a	  single	  physical	  
space”	  (Garnham	  1992,	  365).	  Mediation	  by	  communication	  technologies	  creates	  inequalities	  
in	  accessibility	  and	  raises	  the	  significance	  of	  “manipulative	  skills”	  (Garnham	  1992,	  365).	  
Nonetheless,	  Garnham	  argues,	  Habermas’s	  approach	  serves	  as	  a	  valuable	  model	  for	  moving	  
beyond	  analyses	  that	  frame	  the	  political	  functions	  and	  effects	  of	  public	  communication	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  dichotomy	  of	  state	  versus	  civil	  society	  (Garnham	  1992,	  363).	  In	  this	  regard,	  
Habermas’s	  model	  continues	  to	  be	  valuable	  for	  evaluating	  the	  “pluralist	  decentered	  politics”	  
of	  the	  millennial	  West	  (Garnham	  1992,	  370).	  Within	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  pseudo-­‐
Habermasian	  public	  sphere	  defined	  as	  a	  space	  for	  communicative	  action	  with	  political	  
potential	  Granham	  valuably	  examines	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  media’s	  structures	  in	  the	  
following	  terms:	  
In	  short,	  the	  problem	  is	  to	  construct	  systems	  of	  democratic	  accountability	  integrated	  with	  
media	  systems	  of	  matching	  scale	  that	  occupy	  the	  same	  social	  space	  as	  that	  over	  which	  
economic	  or	  political	  decisions	  will	  impact.	  If	  the	  impact	  is	  universal,	  then	  both	  the	  political	  
and	  media	  systems	  must	  be	  universal.	  In	  this	  sense,	  a	  series	  of	  autonomous	  public	  spheres	  is	  
not	  sufficient.	  (Garnham	  1992,	  371)	  
Unfortunately	  Garnham	  takes	  for	  granted	  that	  rational-­‐critical	  debate	  invariably	  leads	  to	  
the	  best	  course	  of	  action,	  which	  assumption,	  for	  reasons	  discussed	  below	  –	  class,	  power,	  etc.	  
–	  is	  untenable.	  
There	  must	  be	  a	  single	  public	  sphere,	  even	  if	  we	  might	  want	  to	  conceive	  of	  this	  single	  public	  
sphere	  as	  made	  up	  of	  a	  series	  of	  subsidiary	  public	  spheres,	  each	  organized	  around	  its	  own	  
political	  structure,	  media	  system,	  and	  set	  of	  norms	  and	  interests.	  Thus	  even	  if	  we	  accept	  that	  
debate	  within	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  riven	  with	  controversy	  and	  in	  many	  instances	  may	  be	  
directed	  at	  agreeing	  to	  disagree	  rather	  than	  toward	  consensus,	  we	  are	  still	  faced	  with	  the	  
unavoidable	  problem	  of	  translating	  debate	  into	  action.	  If,	  whether	  we	  like	  it	  or	  not,	  the	  
problem	  faced	  has	  a	  general	  impact	  upon	  us	  all,	  then	  there	  can	  only	  be	  one	  rationally	  
determined	  course	  of	  interventionist	  political	  action.	  [Italics	  mine]	  (Garnham	  1992,	  371).	  
I	  make	  no	  such	  assumptions	  –	  which	  are	  oriented	  towards	  strategies	  for	  political	  action	  –	  
and	  instead	  start	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  a	  more	  broadly-­‐conceived	  public	  sphere.	  Nonetheless,	  
Garnham	  is	  correct	  in	  stating	  that	  “our	  attitude	  to	  this	  pluralist	  political	  project	  is	  crucial	  to	  
our	  discussion	  of	  the	  media	  and	  the	  public	  sphere,”	  but	  this	  is	  the	  case	  only	  insofar	  as	  our	  
interest	  in	  both	  is	  confined	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  political	  action	  (Garnham	  1992,	  372).	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members	  of	  a	  discursive	  space	  were	  in	  natural	  harmony	  rational-­‐critical	  debate	  
would	  inevitably	  lead	  to	  consensus	  on	  what	  was	  best	  for	  all.	  When	  the	  public	  sphere	  
was	  expanded	  to	  include	  groups	  with	  contradictory	  interests	  though,	  the	  notion	  of	  
inevitable	  consensus	  based	  in	  rational-­‐critical	  discourse	  became	  untenable.	  Its	  
openness	  is	  thus	  what	  caused	  the	  undoing	  of	  the	  rational-­‐critical	  public	  sphere,	  but	  
in	  Habermas’s	  account,	  this	  openness	  was	  fundamental	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  public	  
sphere	  itself.205	  This	  dialectical-­‐historical	  reasoning,	  which	  emphasized	  internal	  
contradictions	  in	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  highlights	  Habermas’s	  Marxist	  roots.	  
While	  this	  type	  of	  dialectical	  thinking	  is	  certainly	  powerful,	  my	  own	  account	  also	  
emphasizes	  the	  embeddedness	  of	  publicity	  in	  a	  complex	  of	  institutions.	  As	  such	  I	  
account	  for	  the	  structural	  changes	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  in	  terms	  of	  shifts	  in	  the	  
complex	  of	  media/mode	  of	  social	  coordination/public	  sphere,	  which	  is	  itself	  
embedded	  in	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  institutions.	  Within	  this	  type	  of	  account,	  contradictions	  
can	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  explaining	  change,	  but	  I	  am	  equally	  indebted	  to	  
theorists	  of	  embeddedness	  and	  assemblage,	  from	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  (c.f.	  
Thousand	  Plateaus)	  and	  Sassen	  (c.f.	  Territory,	  Authority,	  Rights:	  From	  medieval	  to	  
modern	  assemblages)	  to	  Latour	  (c.f.	  Reassembling	  the	  Social)	  and	  Grannovetter	  (c.f.	  
“Economic	  Action	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Embeddedness”	  AJS	  1985).	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205	  Habermas	  traces	  this	  openness	  to	  the	  sphere	  of	  literary	  criticism,	  the	  idea	  being	  that	  the	  
sphere	  of	  literary	  criticism	  was	  the	  first	  discursive	  sphere	  in	  which	  the	  quality	  of	  ideas	  
alone	  was	  the	  measure	  of	  their	  worth.	  This	  was	  a	  rejection	  of	  earlier	  norms	  elevating	  the	  
opinions	  of	  the	  elites,	  and	  created	  an	  openness	  of	  the	  discursive	  space.	  This	  openness	  is	  
what	  allowed	  for	  massification	  and	  eventual	  fragmentation	  of	  both	  the	  sphere	  of	  literary	  
criticism	  and	  Habermas’s	  public	  sphere.	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APPENDIX	  3	  
VARIETIES	  OF	  STRUCTURAL	  INFLUENCE	  ON	  THE	  MEDIA	  	  
	  
In	  the	  introduction	  I	  briefly	  discussed	  the	  importance	  of	  complexity	  in	  my	  
understanding	  of	  social	  change.	  This	  implies	  that	  in	  each	  historical	  moment	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  media	  and	  of	  publicity	  are	  shaped	  by	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  social	  
process,	  which	  they	  in	  turn	  shape.	  While	  I	  have	  not	  explicitly	  emphasized	  the	  variety	  
of	  social	  influences	  on	  the	  media	  I	  hope	  that	  these	  have	  been	  evident	  in	  the	  subtext	  
to	  this	  dissertation,	  particularly	  in	  chapter	  4.	  The	  following	  examples	  are	  intended	  
to	  clarify	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  effects.	  Below	  I	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  three	  social	  
processes	  in	  shaping	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  dominant	  media	  in	  a	  given	  time	  and	  place.	  
These	  examples	  are	  intended	  to	  illustrate	  the	  importance	  of	  broadly	  inclusive	  
historical	  accounts	  implied	  by	  discussion	  of	  complexity,	  and	  they	  also	  point	  to	  the	  
historical	  and	  national	  specificity	  of	  forces	  shaping	  publicity,	  which,	  in	  part,	  
motivates	  my	  decision	  to	  concentrate	  on	  the	  American	  media	  in	  this	  project.206	  
	  
1)	  Culture:	  Culture	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  structure	  of	  media	  
by	  constituting	  historically-­‐specific	  hierarchies	  of	  value.	  A	  clear	  example	  is	  the	  
differences	  between	  French	  and	  Anglo-­‐American	  print	  media	  during	  the	  19th	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  while	  these	  three	  processes	  –	  culture,	  politics,	  and	  
economic	  ideologies	  –	  are	  presented	  here	  in	  light	  of	  their	  influence	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  
media,	  this	  influence	  is	  not	  unidirectional.	  Just	  as	  culture	  shapes	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
dominant	  media	  in	  a	  given	  historical	  moment,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  shapes	  culture.	  
This	  is	  why	  I	  refer	  to	  these	  as	  processes,	  rather	  than	  using	  the	  more	  static	  term	  social	  
structures.	  Bourdieu’s	  habitus	  is	  a	  useful	  model	  for	  thinking	  about	  this	  kind	  of	  reflexive	  
influence	  –	  culture,	  politics	  and	  economics	  are	  both	  “structured	  products”	  and	  “structuring	  
structures”	  (Bourdieu	  1984,	  172).	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early	  20th	  centuries.	  In	  France,	  literary	  values	  occupied	  an	  important	  role	  in	  public	  
life	  and	  literary	  celebrities	  were	  often	  involved	  in	  journalistic	  endeavors.	  Honoré	  de	  
Balzac,	  Victor	  Hugo,	  and	  Alexandre	  Dumas	  owned	  and	  edited	  newspapers	  during	  
their	  careers;	  Emile	  Zola	  was	  influential	  as	  both	  a	  novelist	  and	  a	  journalist;	  the	  
popular	  Paris-­‐Soir,	  with	  a	  circulation	  of	  1.8	  million	  in	  1938,	  employed	  literary	  
celebrities	  including	  Jean	  Cocteau,	  Albert	  Camus,	  and	  George	  Simenon.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand	  in	  the	  US	  and	  England	  literary	  figures	  did	  not	  enjoy	  such	  a	  strong	  influence	  in	  
the	  press.	  Charles	  Dickens	  was	  the	  only	  major	  literary	  figure	  who	  flirted	  with	  a	  
career	  in	  journalism	  but	  quit	  his	  post	  as	  editor	  of	  the	  Daily	  News	  after	  three	  weeks	  
(Chalaby	  1996,	  314).	  
According	  to	  Jean	  K.	  Chalaby	  the	  influence	  of	  literary	  celebrities	  in	  French	  
sphere	  of	  print	  reflects	  the	  cultural	  hierarchy	  of	  values	  according	  to	  which	  
discursive	  practices	  were	  judged.	  In	  France,	  poetry	  and	  novels	  occupied	  the	  top	  of	  
this	  hierarchy	  while	  journalism	  was	  at	  the	  bottom,	  below	  even	  vaudeville,	  the	  
lowest	  literary	  genre.	  This	  hierarchy	  was	  replicated	  within	  journalism	  itself.	  
Journalistic	  practices	  with	  a	  more	  literary	  character	  were	  considered	  more	  
prestigious	  –	  at	  the	  top	  were	  chronicles	  and	  polemics,	  at	  the	  bottom	  was	  simple	  
reportage.	  
This	  system	  of	  values	  shaped	  the	  ranks	  of	  popular	  newspapers,	  which	  
recruited	  literary	  celebrities,	  but	  it	  also	  shaped	  the	  content	  of	  the	  newspapers	  
themselves.	  Workaday	  journalists	  were	  influenced	  by	  their	  more	  literary	  heroes,	  
and	  in	  emulating	  the	  work	  of	  popular	  figures	  like	  Hugo	  and	  Zola	  they	  took	  up	  misery	  
as	  the	  subject	  of	  their	  articles.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  fictional	  worlds	  of	  tragedy	  and	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melodrama	  that	  dominated	  literature	  imprinted	  themselves	  onto	  reports	  appearing	  
in	  the	  French	  press.	  
Prostitutes,	  criminals	  and	  convicts	  sent	  to	  overseas	  prisons	  became	  the	  major	  
figures	  of	  this	  caricatured	  world.	  Each	  figure	  was	  constructed	  according	  to	  certain	  
invariable	  criteria.	  The	  prostitute	  was	  working	  towards	  redemption,	  the	  criminal	  
was	  feeling	  remorse	  for	  their	  act,	  and	  the	  convict	  was	  always	  innocent…	  On	  the	  one	  
hand,	  misery	  became	  a	  spectacle;	  on	  the	  other,	  it	  became	  a	  gold	  mine	  for	  the	  
journalists	  and	  reporters	  who	  knew	  how	  to	  exploit	  this	  vein.	  (Chalaby	  1996,	  316)	  	  
In	  this	  way	  the	  values	  that	  characterized	  French	  culture	  shaped	  the	  character	  of	  the	  
French	  media.	  And	  in	  turn	  by	  offering	  the	  French	  public	  a	  particular	  representation	  
of	  their	  world	  the	  character	  of	  the	  French	  media	  shaped	  the	  experience	  of	  French	  
public	  life.	  Making	  sense	  of	  the	  French	  public	  sphere	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  last	  century	  
therefore	  requires	  accounting	  for	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media,	  which	  requires,	  among	  
other	  things,	  accounting	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  culture.	  
	   The	  influence	  of	  culture	  is	  also	  apparent	  in	  the	  contrasting	  Anglo-­‐American	  
case.	  Paul	  Starr	  notes	  that	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  England	  there	  was	  a	  cultural	  
emphasis	  on	  facts	  rather	  than	  on	  interpretation	  or	  literary	  flourish.	  Nineteenth	  
century	  American	  culture	  valorized	  the	  use	  of	  statistical	  data	  in	  both	  governmental	  
and	  private	  decision	  making.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  these	  cultural	  priorities	  American	  
newspapers	  pioneered	  both	  number-­‐heavy	  financial	  and	  sports	  reporting	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  journalistic	  interview,	  which	  stood	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  dominance	  of	  essays	  in	  the	  
French	  press	  (Starr	  2005,	  18).	  The	  Anglo-­‐American	  emphasis	  on	  data	  and	  facts	  also	  
meant	  that	  English	  and	  American	  newspapers	  devoted	  more	  resources	  to	  
developing	  international	  networks	  of	  correspondents.	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   2)	  Political	  Ideology:	  Political	  ideology	  also	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  shaping	  
the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  at	  particular	  moments	  in	  history.	  This	  was	  particularly	  
evident	  in	  the	  early	  Soviet	  decision	  to	  invest	  in	  loudspeakers	  rather	  than	  telephone	  
infrastructure	  after	  the	  revolution	  of	  1917,	  a	  choice	  that	  reflects	  the	  paternalistic	  
Soviet	  state	  ideology	  –	  loudspeakers	  allow	  the	  state	  to	  communicate	  to	  the	  people,	  
but	  they	  did	  not	  allow	  the	  people	  to	  respond.	  This	  case	  also	  highlights	  the	  
importance	  of	  path	  dependence	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  –	  until	  its	  
collapse	  in	  1991	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  fewer	  telephones	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  
Western	  Europe	  (Starr	  2005,	  9).	  Understanding	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Soviet	  (and	  
Russian)	  media	  requires	  understanding	  this	  early	  decision	  to	  invest	  in	  
loudspeakers,	  and	  understanding	  this	  investment	  in	  loudspeakers	  requires	  
understanding	  the	  particular	  impact	  of	  Soviet	  political	  ideology.	  
	  
	   3)	  Economic	  Policy:	  Finally,	  economic	  policy	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  
shaping	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media,	  and,	  like	  culture	  and	  political	  ideology,	  economic	  
policy	  varies	  from	  place	  to	  place	  and	  across	  time.	  The	  specific	  influence	  of	  economic	  
policy	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  media	  is	  often	  not	  apparent,	  particularly	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
“free	  market”	  policies.	  The	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  free	  market	  offers	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  
“free”	  market	  is	  created	  by	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  state	  intervention.	  In	  reality	  various	  
state	  interventions	  are	  needed	  to	  facilitate	  the	  formation	  of	  market-­‐dominated	  
economies,	  interventions	  that	  often	  take	  the	  form	  of	  complex	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  
frameworks	  (c.f.	  Sassen	  2008).	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Anti-­‐trust	  law	  is	  a	  basic	  example	  of	  such	  an	  intervention.	  A	  high-­‐profile	  
intervention	  that	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  was	  
the	  FCC’s	  Financial	  Interest	  and	  Syndication	  Rules,	  widely	  known	  as	  fin-­‐syn,	  which	  
were	  passed	  in	  1970.	  
The	  fin-­‐syn	  regulations	  addressed	  the	  relationship	  between	  television	  
broadcasters	  and	  the	  studios	  that	  produced	  television	  shows.	  In	  the	  pre-­‐fin-­‐syn	  
years	  fin-­‐syn	  programs	  were	  typically	  produced	  under	  a	  model	  known	  as	  “deficit	  
financing.”	  Under	  this	  model	  broadcast	  networks	  would	  pay	  producers	  less	  than	  
what	  it	  cost	  to	  produce	  a	  program	  –	  the	  producer	  would	  license	  the	  program	  to	  
broadcasters	  at	  a	  deficit,	  hence	  the	  name.	  These	  deficits	  could	  add	  up	  to	  millions	  of	  
dollars	  per	  season.	  Once	  enough	  episodes	  had	  been	  produced	  though,	  the	  producers,	  
who	  still	  retained	  ownership	  of	  their	  shows,	  could	  license	  episodes	  to	  other	  outlets	  
such	  as	  local	  television	  stations	  and	  international	  markets.	  This	  re-­‐licensing	  is	  
known	  as	  syndication.	  
Producers	  relied	  on	  potentially-­‐lucrative	  syndication	  deals	  to	  make	  up	  the	  
deficits	  incurred	  during	  production.	  By	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  though,	  the	  Big-­‐three	  
TV	  networks	  –	  ABC,	  NBC,	  and	  CBS	  –	  used	  their	  dominance	  in	  the	  marketplace	  to	  
demand	  a	  share	  of	  producers’	  syndication	  profits,	  which	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  
independent	  producers	  to	  survive.	  Furthermore,	  networks	  that	  held	  a	  stake	  in	  a	  
program	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  air	  that	  program,	  a	  practice	  that	  seemed	  monopolistic	  
and	  therefore	  contrary	  to	  the	  ideology	  of	  a	  free	  market.	  
The	  FCC’s	  fin-­‐syn	  regulations	  were	  intended	  to	  remedy	  this	  situation	  and	  to	  
open	  the	  broadcast	  landscape	  to	  greater	  competition	  among	  producers.	  Many	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regard	  the	  fin-­‐syn	  years	  as	  a	  golden	  era	  of	  independent	  television	  production	  (Lotz	  
2007,	  86).	  These	  years	  saw	  the	  success	  of	  MTM	  Enterprises,	  which	  produced	  hits	  
such	  as	  The	  Mary	  Tyler	  Moore	  Show,	  Lou	  Grant,	  Bob	  Newhart,	  and	  Hill	  Street	  Blues,	  as	  
well	  as	  Tandem	  Productions,	  which	  produced	  hits	  like	  All	  in	  the	  Family,	  Good	  Times,	  
and	  The	  Jeffersons.	  Understanding	  the	  unique	  character	  of	  American	  television	  in	  
1970s	  and	  1980s	  requires	  understanding	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  fin-­‐syn	  regulations,	  
which	  in	  turn	  requires	  understanding	  the	  impact	  of	  specific	  economic	  policies,	  
which	  were	  themselves	  rooted	  in	  the	  dominant	  economic	  ideology	  of	  free	  
markets.207	  	  
	  
These	  three	  examples	  illustrate	  the	  variety	  of	  social	  processes	  that	  can	  play	  a	  role	  in	  
shaping	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  that	  dominate	  particular	  moments	  in	  history;	  but	  
they	  also	  illustrate	  the	  historical	  and	  national	  specificity	  of	  both	  the	  structure	  of	  
media	  and	  the	  processes	  that	  shape	  them.	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207	  The	  fin-­‐syn	  regulations	  were	  eventually	  eliminated	  in	  1995,	  inaugurating	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  
corporate	  conglomeration	  as	  broadcasters	  sought	  control	  and	  financial	  interests	  in	  




METHODOLOGICAL	  DIFFERENCES	  IN	  ANALYZING	  HISTORY	  
	  
The	  emphasis	  on	  complexity	  and	  emergence	  outlined	  in	  the	  introduction	  
mean	  that	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  history	  of	  Western	  media	  differs	  from	  that	  of	  several	  
influential	  scholars,	  to	  whom	  I	  am	  nonetheless	  indebted.	  
Paul	  Starr	  has	  written	  a	  thorough	  and	  insightful	  history	  of	  the	  Western	  
media,	  which	  anchors	  the	  history	  of	  the	  media	  that	  I	  trace	  in	  chapter	  4	  (Starr	  2005).	  
His	  agenda	  in	  that	  project	  was	  to	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  political	  decisions	  in	  
constituting	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  dominant	  media	  throughout	  modern	  history.	  There	  
is	  a	  compelling	  reason	  to	  pay	  special	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  politics.	  The	  basic	  
premise	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  media	  shapes	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  public	  sphere.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  direct	  ways	  that	  this	  occurs	  is	  through	  the	  
structured	  limitation	  of	  access	  to	  the	  means	  of	  publicity	  –	  limiting	  access	  to	  the	  
media	  means	  limiting	  access	  to	  the	  public	  sphere.208	  Limitations	  on	  access	  to	  the	  
media	  –	  which	  in	  general	  terms	  constitute	  barriers	  to	  publicity	  –	  take	  various	  forms:	  
from	  official	  government	  proscriptions,	  such	  as	  the	  requirement	  that	  printers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208	  Starr	  himself	  eloquently	  articulated	  this	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  
political	  revolutions	  and	  revolutions	  in	  the	  media.	  
The	  great	  political	  revolutions	  of	  the	  modern	  world,	  including	  the	  American,	  the	  French,	  and	  
both	  Russian	  revolutions	  (1917	  and	  1991),	  all	  raised	  the	  most	  fundamental	  questions	  about	  
communications	  and	  knowledge,	  as	  they	  did	  about	  politics:	  Who	  will	  have	  the	  rights	  to	  speak	  
and	  to	  publish?	  Who	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  surveillance?	  What	  access	  will	  ordinary	  people	  have	  
to	  information	  and	  debate	  about	  public	  issues?	  What	  incentives	  will	  they	  have	  to	  invest	  in	  
creating	  and	  disseminating	  knowledge?	  In	  each	  case,	  revolutionary	  changes	  in	  politics	  
brought	  about	  revolutionary	  changes	  in	  communications.	  (Starr	  2005,	  5)	  
Politics	  is	  about	  power	  differences	  in	  society	  –	  and	  insofar	  as	  limitations	  on	  access	  to	  the	  
media	  create	  power	  differences	  among	  members	  of	  society	  these	  limitations	  can	  be	  read	  as	  
political	  outcomes.	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receive	  a	  royal	  privilège	  in	  order	  to	  publish	  in	  pre-­‐revolutionary	  France,	  to	  
institutional	  or	  economic	  constraints	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  human	  capital	  needed	  to	  
access	  the	  media,	  such	  as	  literacy	  or	  the	  technical	  competence	  needed	  to	  access	  the	  
Internet.	  209	  Insofar	  as	  these	  limitations	  on	  access	  to	  the	  media	  create	  power	  
differentials	  they	  can	  be	  examined	  under	  the	  framework	  of	  politics;	  but	  these	  
limitations	  are	  also	  clearly	  the	  product	  of	  many	  social	  processes,	  including	  culture,	  
economics,	  and	  technical	  capabilities,	  and	  as	  such	  they	  are	  about	  much	  more	  than	  
politics	  per	  se.	  It	  is	  here	  that	  I	  deviate	  from	  Starr	  –	  political	  decisions	  can	  be	  read	  as	  
outcomes	  of	  various	  social	  processes,	  including	  the	  media	  themselves,	  rather	  than	  
as	  independent	  determining	  factors.	  Nonetheless	  the	  historiographic	  aspect	  of	  
Starr’s	  work	  anchors	  the	  history	  of	  the	  media	  that	  I	  trace	  in	  chapter	  4.	  
Starr’s	  emphasis	  on	  political	  decisions	  also	  leads	  him	  to	  conclusions	  with	  
which	  I	  disagree.	  Starr	  uses	  the	  language	  of	  choice	  –	  i.e.,	  “constitutive	  choice”	  –	  in	  
analyzing	  important	  developments	  in	  the	  media,	  and	  in	  motivating	  his	  project	  he	  
claims	  that	  the	  future	  character	  of	  society	  will	  likewise	  be	  a	  choice.	  “The	  question	  is	  
no	  longer	  whether	  a	  post-­‐industrial,	  information	  society	  is	  coming;	  it	  has	  come.	  But	  
what	  kind	  of	  society	  it	  proves	  to	  be	  will	  ultimately	  be	  a	  political	  choice”	  (Starr	  2005,	  
19).	  This	  view	  overestimates	  our	  ability	  to	  control	  social	  outcomes,	  particularly	  in	  
light	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  social	  systems.	  
Political	  choices	  certainly	  matter;	  and	  those	  choices	  should	  be	  made	  as	  
sincere	  efforts	  to	  improve	  the	  future.	  But	  an	  important	  lesson	  of	  complexity	  science	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209	  In	  pre-­‐revolutionary	  France	  royal	  permission	  was	  required	  for	  all	  publishers.	  In	  the	  
years	  between	  1659	  and	  1789	  seventeen	  percent	  of	  prisoners	  in	  the	  Bastille	  were	  
incarcerated	  for	  offenses	  related	  to	  publishing	  (Starr	  2005,	  42;	  Darnton	  and	  Roche	  1989,	  
23).	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has	  been	  that	  outcomes	  of	  complex	  systems	  can	  often	  be	  difficult	  if	  not	  impossible	  to	  
predict.	  A	  large	  number	  of	  interacting	  elements,	  Starr’s	  “constitutive	  choices”	  among	  
them,	  can	  produce	  complex	  results	  even	  if	  the	  components	  themselves	  operate	  
according	  to	  simple	  rules.	  A	  well-­‐studied	  example	  is	  the	  case	  of	  economic	  bubbles	  
and	  crashes,	  which	  are	  the	  result	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  individual	  decisions.	  The	  
generally-­‐unforeseen	  collapse	  of	  the	  US	  housing	  market	  in	  2008	  was	  one	  example,	  
which	  had	  consequences	  for	  various	  spheres	  of	  social	  life.	  The	  dot-­‐com	  bubble	  of	  the	  
1990s	  was	  another	  –	  this	  bubble	  had	  an	  important	  impact	  on	  the	  kinds	  of	  Internet	  
ventures	  that	  developed	  and	  consequently	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  emerging	  media.	  
In	  recent	  years	  even	  use	  of	  the	  media	  itself	  exhibits	  complex	  dynamics,	  which	  are	  a	  
hallmark	  of	  widely-­‐discussed	  “viral”	  media.	  
To	  presume	  that	  all	  of	  this	  can	  be	  controlled	  and	  intentionally	  guided	  misses	  
the	  underlying	  complexity	  of	  the	  factors	  structuring	  the	  media	  and	  consequently	  the	  
public	  sphere.	  We	  can	  try	  to	  understand	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  the	  
forces	  that	  shape	  it;	  but	  changing	  the	  character	  of	  the	  “information	  society,”	  as	  Starr	  
proposes,	  is	  more	  than	  a	  matter	  of	  making	  a	  few	  constitutive	  choices.	  Explaining	  the	  
character	  of	  the	  media	  and	  their	  effects	  on	  contemporary	  public	  life	  requires	  that	  we	  
pay	  attention	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  social	  processes.	  If	  we	  ignore	  these	  in	  favor	  of	  more	  
readily-­‐legible	  “constitutive	  choices”	  we	  risk	  flattening	  the	  fundamental	  complexity	  
of	  both	  the	  media,	  the	  public	  sphere,	  and	  even	  these	  choices	  themselves.	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APPENDIX	  5	  
THE	  SUCCESSION	  OF	  MEDIA	  
	  
In	  this	  project	  I	  have	  often	  referred	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  various	  new	  media	  
technologies	  and	  their	  effects	  on	  older	  media.	  Here	  I	  briefly	  elaborate	  on	  this	  topic,	  
describing	  various	  patterns	  in	  which	  successive	  media	  can	  affect	  one	  another.	  
	  
The	  Succession	  of	  Media	  
An	  important	  characteristic	  of	  all	  media	  –	  including	  mass	  media	  –	  is	  the	  constant	  
introduction	  of	  new	  technologies	  and	  innovations.	  A	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that	  
most	  media	  have	  some	  sort	  of	  relationship	  with	  their	  predecessors	  and/or	  their	  
successors.	  In	  general,	  the	  relationship	  between	  successive	  media	  can	  usually	  be	  
classified	  according	  to	  three	  patterns	  –	  substitution,	  complementarity	  and	  
redefinition	  of	  roles,	  and	  complex	  disruption.	  Understanding	  these	  patterns	  is	  
important	  in	  adjudicating	  between	  the	  life-­‐	  and	  death-­‐of-­‐mass-­‐media,	  because	  the	  
relationship	  between	  new	  media	  and	  older	  mass	  media	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  both	  
narratives.	  
Historically,	  when	  a	  new	  medium	  becomes	  popular	  it	  is	  often	  at	  the	  expense	  
of	  the	  medium	  or	  media	  that	  was	  previously	  dominant.	  For	  instance	  when	  the	  
cassette	  tape	  became	  popular	  in	  the	  1980s	  it	  largely	  replaced	  the	  8-­‐Track	  tape,	  
which	  had	  been	  popular	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  –	  in	  1973	  record	  companies	  
shipped	  91	  million	  8-­‐Track	  tapes	  and	  15	  million	  cassette	  tapes,	  but	  by	  1990210	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210	  1990	  was	  the	  year	  in	  which	  the	  greatest	  number	  of	  cassette	  tapes	  were	  sold.	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relationship	  was	  reversed,	  with	  592.6	  million	  cassettes	  going	  out	  to	  retailers	  
compared	  with	  under	  1	  million	  8-­‐Tracks	  (RIAA	  2012).	  The	  newer	  cassette	  tapes	  did	  
the	  same	  job	  as	  the	  8-­‐Tracks	  only	  better,	  and	  by	  the	  early	  1990s	  8-­‐Tracks	  were	  
obsolete.	  This	  pattern	  of	  innovation,	  substitution,	  and	  obsolescence	  was	  repeated	  
during	  the	  1990s,	  this	  time	  with	  compact	  discs	  replacing	  cassettes.	  In	  1999	  there	  
were	  994.8	  million	  CDs	  shipped	  compared	  with	  only	  137.8	  million	  cassette	  tapes	  
(RIAA,	  2012).211	  These	  audio	  formats	  were	  effectively	  substitutes	  for	  one	  another.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211	  "Shipments"	  refers	  to	  recorded	  music	  products	  sold	  by	  the	  music	  companies	  net	  of	  
returns	  (including	  digital	  products).	  This	  does	  not	  indicate	  the	  exact	  amount	  of	  product	  sold	  
to	  final	  consumers,	  as	  changes	  in	  retailer	  inventory	  levels	  can	  affect	  shipments.	  
www.riaa.com	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The	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  medium	  does	  not	  always	  lead	  to	  the	  substitution	  of	  
its	  predecessors	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  audio	  recordings.	  New	  mediums	  can	  also	  change	  
the	  way	  that	  older	  mediums	  are	  used.	  Photography,	  for	  instance,	  did	  not	  bring	  about	  
the	  end	  of	  painting.	  Instead	  photography	  opened	  the	  way	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  
styles	  of	  painting.	  Rather	  than	  compete	  with	  photography	  in	  trying	  to	  objectively	  
represent	  the	  world	  in	  front	  of	  them	  painters	  began	  to	  emphasize	  the	  unique	  
strengths	  of	  their	  medium	  –	  particularly	  its	  flexibility.	  Whereas	  photography	  
produced	  an	  “objective”	  representation	  of	  the	  world,	  painters	  could	  control	  the	  
image	  on	  their	  canvases	  to	  convey	  subjective	  impressions	  (i.e.,	  impressionism);	  
express	  their	  inner	  feelings	  (i.e.,	  expressionism);	  or	  simultaneously	  show	  multiple	  
perspectives	  (i.e.,	  cubism),	  perspectives	  that	  were	  impossible	  to	  capture	  all	  at	  once	  
with	  a	  human	  eye	  or	  camera	  lens.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  the	  French	  film	  critic	  André	  Bazin,	  
photography	  liberated	  painting	  from	  its	  “resemblance	  complex”	  (Bazin	  and	  Gray	  
1960,	  7).	  See	  Box	  1.	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BOX	  1:	  Painting	  and	  Photography	  
	  
Parallel	  developments	  in	  photography	  and	  painting	  point	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  as	  
photographers	  have	  become	  more	  adept	  at	  accurately	  capturing	  the	  outside	  world,	  
painters	  have	  increasingly	  emphasized	  the	  flexibility	  of	  their	  medium.	  In	  other	  words,	  
realism	  in	  photography	  relieved	  the	  burden	  of	  realism	  in	  painting.1:	  
	  
In	  1838-­‐39	  Louis	  Daguerre	  took	  the	  first	  photograph	  of	  people;	  in	  1873	  Monet,	  
Renoir,	  Pissarro	  and	  Sisley	  organized	  an	  independent	  exhibit	  of	  impressionist	  
paintings,	  an	  early	  break	  with	  realism.	  
	  
In	  1907	  the	  Lumière	  brothers	  introduced	  Autochrome,	  the	  first	  commercially	  viable	  
color	  photography	  process;	  during	  the	  same	  period	  Picasso	  subtracted	  colors	  from	  
his	  palette	  in	  his	  “blue	  period”.	  
	  
By	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  period	  TV	  broadcasts	  began	  entering	  homes	  around	  the	  United	  
States,	  especially	  the	  wildly	  popular	  Texaco	  Star	  Theater	  featuring	  Milton	  Bearle;	  
during	  this	  same	  period	  abstract	  expressionists	  like	  Jackson	  Pollock	  and	  Mark	  
Rothko	  completely	  abandoned	  representation	  of	  the	  outside	  world.1	  
	  
The	  relationship	  between	  painting	  and	  photography	  shows	  how	  the	  succession	  of	  media	  
does	  not	  always	  follow	  the	  pattern	  of	  innovation,	  substitution,	  and	  obsolescence.	  In	  
2012	  an	  anonymous	  bidder	  paid	  $34.2	  million	  for	  a	  painting	  by	  Gerhard	  Richter,	  the	  
most	  ever	  paid	  for	  a	  work	  by	  a	  living	  painter.	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  some	  people	  at	  least,	  





The	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  medium	  can	  also	  lead	  to	  another,	  more	  challenging	  
type	  of	  interaction	  with	  its	  predecessors	  –	  complex	  industry-­‐wide	  disruption.	  This	  
Joseph Nicéphore Niépce
View From the Window at Le Gras
Earliest Surviving Photograph - 1826
Louis Daguerre
Boulevard du Temple
First photo of people - 1838
Arnold Genthe
Percy MacKaye
Autochrome Photo - 1913







La liberté Guidant le people
French Romanticism - 1830
Pablo Picasso
La Vie
Picasso’s Blue Period - 1903
Jackson Pollock 
Autumn Rhythm
Abstract Expressionism - 1950
Pierre-Auguste Renoir
Bal du moulin de la Galette
French Impressionism - 1876
Box 1 Cont’d
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concept	  is	  somewhat	  ambiguous	  and	  has	  been	  used	  in	  various	  ways.	  Because	  the	  
term	  is	  often	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  newest	  online	  media	  it	  is	  worth	  
exploring	  here	  in	  some	  depth.	  
For	  example,	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  the	  succession	  of	  media	  in	  the	  
music	  industry	  followed	  a	  relatively	  stable	  trajectory	  of	  innovation,	  substitution,	  
and	  obsolescence.	  The	  most	  significant	  disruption	  in	  the	  pre-­‐file-­‐sharing	  era	  was	  the	  
“home-­‐taping	  crisis”	  of	  the	  late	  1980s	  –	  the	  proliferation	  of	  cassette	  tape	  decks	  
made	  it	  cheap	  and	  easy	  to	  copy	  music	  at	  home.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  combat	  this	  “crisis”	  the	  
Recording	  Industry	  Association	  of	  America	  (RIAA)	  moved	  its	  offices	  to	  Washington,	  
DC,	  where	  they	  could	  more	  effectively	  lobby	  Congress	  for	  strict	  copyright	  protection	  
laws	  (S.	  Jones	  1993;	  Harrington	  1986).	  Nonetheless	  the	  late	  20th	  century	  was	  a	  
period	  of	  relative	  stability	  compared	  to	  the	  massive	  disruption	  that	  became	  visible	  
in	  1999	  with	  the	  launch	  of	  Napster.	  These	  changes	  in	  the	  music	  industry	  are	  an	  
example	  of	  what	  engineers,	  entrepreneurs,	  and	  venture	  capitalists	  often	  describe	  as	  
disruptions.	  
For	  aspiring	  innovators	  disrupting	  an	  industry	  is	  the	  ultimate	  goal,	  a	  goal	  
that	  can	  be	  reached	  by	  introducing	  a	  game-­‐changing	  innovation.	  The	  significance	  of	  
“disruption”	  in	  today’s	  entrepreneurial	  psyche	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  title	  of	  Disrupt,	  an	  
annual	  technology	  conference	  hosted	  by	  TechCruch,	  the	  startup	  industry’s	  leading	  
blog.	  Disrupt	  is	  geared	  towards	  engineers,	  entrepreneurs,	  and	  venture	  capitalists.	  
The	  conference	  opens	  with	  a	  24-­‐hour	  non-­‐stop	  “hackathon”	  –	  an	  all-­‐night	  even	  in	  
which	  a	  warehouse	  full	  of	  mostly	  male	  participants	  have	  24	  hours	  to	  develop,	  
implement,	  and	  demonstrate	  a	  new	  product.	  The	  conference	  continues	  with	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presentations	  by	  startups	  seeking	  to	  attract	  capital.	  The	  entire	  event	  is	  geared	  
towards	  identifying	  new	  technologies	  with	  game-­‐changing	  potential.	  
The	  term	  disruptive	  technology	  was	  coined	  in	  Bower	  and	  Christensen’s	  1995	  
article	  “Disruptive	  Technologies:	  Catching	  the	  Wave”	  and	  later	  elaborated	  in	  
Christensen’s	  The	  Innovator’s	  Dilemma	  (Bower	  and	  Christensen	  1995;	  Christensen	  
1997).	  In	  Christensen’s	  model	  most	  technologies	  proceed	  along	  specific	  
“performance	  trajectories”	  –	  i.e.	  their	  performance	  improves	  at	  a	  given	  rate	  over	  
time.	  For	  instance	  in	  the	  market	  for	  photocopiers	  the	  relevant	  performance	  
trajectory	  is	  the	  number	  of	  copies	  produced	  per	  minute.	  Most	  new	  technologies,	  
Christensen	  argues,	  are	  sustaining	  technologies	  –	  they	  are	  incremental	  steps	  along	  a	  
performance	  trajectory	  that	  offer	  small	  improvements	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  
familiar	  product.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  disruptive	  technologies	  introduce	  a	  new	  
combination	  of	  features	  to	  the	  market	  and	  their	  performance	  improves	  more	  
rapidly	  than	  older	  technologies	  –	  i.e.	  they	  have	  steeper	  performance	  trajectories.	  As	  
a	  result	  of	  their	  steeper	  performance	  trajectories	  these	  disruptive	  innovations	  




But,	  Christensen	  says,	  disruptive	  technologies	  initially	  offer	  both	  worse	  
performance	  than	  older	  technologies	  and	  new	  combinations	  of	  features.	  As	  a	  result	  
these	  disruptive	  technologies	  are	  only	  adopted,	  at	  first,	  by	  a	  small	  subset	  of	  
consumers.	  Because	  of	  their	  small	  initial	  appeal,	  Christensen	  claims,	  these	  
disruptive	  technologies	  are	  often	  ignored	  by	  the	  large	  corporations	  that	  dominate	  
the	  market.	  While	  these	  large	  corporations	  focus	  their	  development	  efforts	  on	  
sustaining	  technologies	  that	  cater	  to	  an	  existing	  client	  base,	  upstart	  companies	  
develop	  expertise	  with	  a	  disruptive	  technology	  that	  eventually	  overtakes	  the	  older	  
products	  and	  slow-­‐moving	  corporations.	  This,	  suggests	  Christensen,	  explains	  “the	  
failure	  of	  leading	  companies	  to	  stay	  at	  the	  top	  of	  their	  industries,”	  which	  he	  
describes	  as	  “one	  of	  the	  most	  consistent	  patterns	  in	  business”	  (Bower	  and	  
Christensen	  1995).	  So	  is	  this	  a	  good	  way	  to	  describe	  the	  innovations	  that	  have	  been	  
shaking	  up	  the	  mass	  media	  industries?	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A	  central	  problem	  with	  Christensen’s	  initial	  formulation	  was	  that	  it	  assumed	  
a	  significant	  amount	  of	  technological	  determinism	  –	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  disruptive	  
technology	  to	  topple	  powerful	  competitors	  was	  assumed	  to	  be	  a	  property	  of	  the	  
technology	  itself,	  namely	  its	  steeper	  performance	  trajectory.	  In	  2008	  Christensen	  
updated	  his	  model	  to	  include	  non-­‐technical	  aspects	  of	  disruptive	  innovations,	  
including	  innovative	  business	  models.	  A	  prime	  example	  is	  Apple’s	  MP3	  player,	  the	  
iPod,	  and	  its	  online	  music	  store,	  iTunes.	  These	  products	  have	  been	  wildly	  successful.	  
In	  its	  first	  three	  years	  the	  iPod/iTunes	  combination	  generated	  revenues	  of	  close	  to	  
$10	  billion,	  accounting	  for	  nearly	  50%	  of	  Apple’s	  revenues	  (M.	  W.	  Johnson,	  
Christensen,	  and	  Kagermann	  2008).	  In	  the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2012	  the	  iTunes	  store	  
accounted	  for	  64%	  of	  all	  music	  sold	  online	  and	  29%	  of	  all	  music	  sold	  online	  and	  off-­‐,	  
making	  Apple	  the	  world’s	  largest	  music	  retailer	  (Archer	  2012).	  But	  Apple	  was	  not	  
the	  first	  market	  entrant	  with	  an	  effective	  mp3	  player.	  In	  1998	  Diamond	  Multimedia	  
introduced	  the	  Rio	  and	  in	  2000	  Best	  Data	  introduced	  the	  Cabo	  64.	  Johnson	  and	  
Christensen	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  disruptive	  effect	  of	  the	  iPod/iTunes	  
combination	  was	  not	  simply	  the	  result	  of	  a	  technical	  innovation	  –	  they	  were	  part	  of	  
a	  great	  business	  model.	  
Apple	  did	  something	  far	  smarter	  than	  take	  a	  good	  technology	  and	  wrap	  it	  in	  a	  
snazzy	  design.	  It	  took	  a	  good	  technology	  and	  wrapped	  it	  in	  a	  great	  business	  model.	  
Apple’s	  true	  innovation	  was	  to	  make	  downloading	  digital	  music	  easy	  and	  
convenient.	  To	  do	  that,	  the	  company	  built	  a	  groundbreaking	  business	  model	  that	  
combined	  hardware,	  software,	  and	  service.	  This	  approach	  worked	  like	  Gillette’s	  
famous	  blades-­‐and-­‐razor	  model	  in	  reverse:	  Apple	  essentially	  gave	  away	  the	  “blades”	  
(low-­‐margin	  iTunes	  music)	  to	  lock	  in	  purchase	  of	  the	  “razor”	  (the	  high-­‐margin	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iPod).	  That	  model	  defined	  value	  in	  a	  new	  way	  and	  provided	  game-­‐changing	  
convenience	  to	  the	  consumer.	  (Johnson	  2008,	  59)	  
Apple’s	  music	  offerings	  triggered	  a	  global	  shift	  in	  the	  way	  music	  was	  sold	  and	  
consumed.	  The	  iPod/iTunes	  combination	  disrupted	  the	  music	  industry.	  
	  
Novel	  technologies	  and	  business	  models	  clearly	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  upend	  
established	  ways	  of	  doing	  business.	  The	  distinguishing	  feature	  of	  disruptive	  
innovations	  is,	  then,	  not	  their	  steeper	  performance	  trajectories,	  as	  Christensen’s	  
initial	  formulation	  suggested,	  but	  their	  ability	  to	  reorganize	  industries.	  This	  
phenomenon	  of	  industrial	  reorganization	  has	  a	  deeper	  history	  than	  Christensen’s	  
1995	  description	  of	  disruptive	  technologies.	  In	  1942	  Joseph	  Schumpeter	  described	  
these	  reorganizations	  as	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  capitalism.	  
Schumpeter	  was	  a	  well-­‐known	  Austrian	  economist,	  who	  argued	  that	  
capitalism	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  description	  of	  how	  the	  economy	  is	  organized	  but	  a	  
model	  of	  non-­‐stop	  economic	  change	  (Schumpeter	  1962,	  82).	  According	  to	  
Schumpeter	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  this	  incessant	  change	  is	  capitalist	  enterprise	  –	  
i.e.,	  entrepreneurial	  attempts	  to	  make	  a	  buck	  in	  a	  competitive	  marketplace.	  This	  
striving	  results	  in	  the	  constant	  production	  of	  innovations	  –	  new	  goods,	  new	  
methods	  of	  production,	  new	  markets,	  and	  new	  business	  models.	  Each	  of	  these	  
innovations	  is	  an	  “industrial	  mutation,”	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  way	  an	  industry	  operates,	  and	  
the	  most	  significant	  innovations	  result	  in	  the	  visible	  reorganization	  of	  industries.	  A	  
key	  part	  of	  Schumpeter’s	  theory	  was	  that	  these	  industrial	  reorganizations	  involve	  
not	  just	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  institutions,	  but	  the	  non-­‐stop	  destruction	  of	  old	  ones.	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Schumpeter	  called	  this	  non-­‐stop	  process	  of	  economic	  change	  “Creative	  Destruction”	  
(Schumpeter	  1962,	  83).	  
Schumpeter’s	  model	  is	  more	  far-­‐reaching	  than	  Christensen’s.	  While	  
Christensen’s	  disruptive	  innovations	  out-­‐compete	  old	  organizations	  and	  products	  
by	  virtue	  of	  their	  steeper	  performance	  trajectories,	  Creative	  Destruction	  describes	  
the	  role	  of	  innovations	  in	  fundamentally	  reorganizing	  the	  status	  quo.	  Firms	  that	  
continue	  to	  operate	  according	  to	  the	  old	  way	  of	  doing	  things	  are	  trying	  to	  stand	  “on	  
ground	  that	  is	  slipping	  away	  from	  under	  them”	  (Schumpeter	  1962,	  84).	  This	  is	  a	  
good	  description	  of	  newspaper	  publishers	  who	  have	  watched	  their	  industry	  
contract	  at	  8%	  per	  year	  over	  the	  first	  half-­‐decade	  of	  the	  new	  millennium.	  A	  
description	  of	  economic	  change	  that	  ignores	  Creative	  Destruction,	  says	  Schumpeter,	  
is	  “like	  Hamlet	  without	  the	  Danish	  prince”	  (Schumpeter	  1962,	  86).212	  
The	  important	  point	  here	  is	  that	  while	  certain	  innovations	  can	  be	  described	  
as	  substitutions	  for	  old	  technologies	  –	  e.g.	  the	  cassette	  tape	  replacing	  the	  8-­‐Track	  –	  
other	  innovations	  catalyze	  large-­‐scale	  Creative	  Destruction.	  The	  industries	  in	  which	  
this	  is	  occurring	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  analyzed	  according	  to	  the	  old	  rules	  and	  as	  a	  result	  
common	  metrics	  like	  revenues,	  sales,	  and	  profits	  no	  longer	  work	  as	  indicators	  of	  
industrial	  health.	  If	  the	  mass	  media	  industries	  are	  undergoing	  a	  process	  of	  Creative	  
Destruction	  then	  falling	  profits	  cannot	  simply	  be	  read	  as	  symbols	  of	  mass	  media’s	  
decline;	  and	  we	  must	  be	  careful	  to	  distinguish	  between	  creative	  destruction	  in	  mass	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212	  It	  often	  seems	  that	  “disruptive”	  is	  used	  by	  the	  most	  ambitious	  IT	  entrepreneurs	  with	  a	  
meaning	  much	  closer	  to	  Joseph	  Schumpeter’s	  “destructive”	  –	  though	  of	  course	  “destructive	  
technology”	  is	  a	  hard	  concept	  to	  sell	  when	  praising	  Web	  2.0	  and	  the	  American	  IT	  booms.	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media	  industries	  and	  the	  would-­‐be	  destruction	  of	  mass	  media	  itself	  as	  defined	  in	  
general	  terms	  in	  chapter	  11.213	  
	   With	  respect	  to	  the	  life	  and	  death	  of	  mass	  media	  the	  relevant	  questions	  are	  
not	  about	  profits	  or	  even	  audience	  levels.	  New	  questions	  must	  be	  asked:	  What	  will	  
the	  new	  landscape	  of	  mass	  media	  look	  like?	  What	  aspects	  of	  the	  old	  order	  will	  
survive?	  Will	  anything	  in	  the	  new	  order	  resemble	  the	  electronic	  hearth	  of	  the	  1950s	  
where	  I	  Love	  Lucy	  captured	  the	  attention	  of	  64%	  of	  TV-­‐owning	  American	  
households,	  or	  will	  the	  new	  media	  landscape	  be	  entirely	  organized	  around	  
individualized	  content	  with	  each	  program	  capturing	  1/300,000,000th	  of	  the	  
American	  audience?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213	  I.e.,	  as	  a	  medium	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  where	  one	  message	  is	  



























































































































































































































spaper	  Publishing	  industry	  produces	  and	  distributes	  print	  new
spapers.	  
Com
panies	  that	  solely	  publish	  online	  new
s	  are	  excluded	  from










This	  industry	  produces	  and	  distributes	  m
agazines	  and	  periodicals	  in	  print	  and	  
online.	  How
ever,	  publishers	  that	  exclusively	  sell	  online	  m
agazines	  or	  periodicals	  are	  
excluded	  from









Record	  labels	  are	  responsible	  for	  finding	  m
usical	  talent,	  recording	  their	  w
ork	  and	  
selling	  it	  to	  retail	  outlets.	  The	  capacity	  of	  m
ajor	  labels	  to	  distribute	  the	  physical	  
m
edia	  and	  oversee	  com




een	  independent	  and	  m
ajor	  labels.	  M
ajor	  labels	  also	  have	  deeper	  








s	  in	  this	  industry	  provide	  facilities	  and	  technical	  expertise	  for	  sound	  recording	  
in	  a	  studio.	  Industry	  firm
s	  m
ay	  provide	  audio	  production	  or	  postproduction	  services	  
for	  producing	  m
aster	  recordings,	  and	  m
ay	  provide	  audio	  services	  for	  film
,	  television	  
and	  video	  productions.	  After	  the	  recording	  has	  taken	  place,	  studios	  also	  offer	  








This	  industry	  consists	  of	  broadcasting	  stations,	  netw






	  and	  satellite	  radio	  channels.	  The	  











This	  industry	  includes	  establishm
ents	  that	  are	  prim





orks,	  other	  exhibitors	  and	  stores.	  
The	  industry	  excludes	  m
ovie	  and	  TV	  distributors	  that	  are	  also	  involved	  in	  
audiovisual	  content	  production,	  as	  w
ell	  as	  retailers,	  rental	  stores	  and	  m
erchant	  
w









The	  Book	  Publishing	  industry	  edits	  and	  designs	  books.	  It	  does	  not	  include	  authors	  
(included	  in	  IBISW
orld	  report	  71151,	  Perform
ers	  and	  Creative	  Artists)	  or	  printing	  
(IBISW










This	  industry	  produces	  and	  distributes	  m
otion	  pictures	  and	  videos.	  It	  excludes	  third-­‐
party	  distributors	  and	  disc	  m
anufacturers,	  as	  w
















posers.	  They	  are	  
responsible	  for	  licensing	  the	  intellectual	  property	  of	  their	  clients	  and	  ensuring	  that	  
royalties	  are	  collected.	  Royalties	  are	  earned	  in	  various	  w
ays,	  including	  each	  tim
e	  a	  
song	  is	  dow
nloaded	  on	  iTunes,	  sold	  on	  an	  album
,	  reproduced	  in	  a	  live	  concert	  or	  
played	  on	  the	  radio,	  a	  television	  show
,	  a	  m









Television	  broadcasters	  operate	  studios	  and	  facilities	  that	  program
	  and	  deliver	  
audiovisual	  content	  to	  the	  public	  via	  over-­‐the-­‐air	  transm
ission.	  This	  industry	  








The	  Video	  Postproduction	  Services	  industry	  includes	  businesses	  that	  prepare	  
m
otion	  pictures	  for	  public	  distribution.	  Com
panies	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  m
ovie	  or	  











prises	  businesses	  that	  prim
arily	  exhibit	  m
ovies.	  It	  includes	  
cinem
as,	  drive-­‐in	  and	  outdoor	  m
ovie	  theaters	  and	  film









This	  industry	  includes	  firm
s	  prim
arily	  engaged	  in	  supplying	  content	  like	  new
s	  












panies	  in	  this	  industry	  produce	  television	  program
m
ing	  that	  is	  then	  licensed	  or	  
sold	  to	  broadcast	  or	  cable	  netw
orks,	  w
hich	  are	  not	  included	  in	  this	  industry.	  M
ovie	  
production	  is	  also	  excluded	  from
	  this	  industry,	  w














































This	  industry	  operates	  and	  m
aintains	  sw
itching	  and	  transm
ission	  facilities	  to	  
provide	  direct	  com
m
unication	  through	  radio-­‐based	  cellular	  netw
orks.	  Industry	  
services	  include	  cellular	  m
obile	  phone	  services,	  paging	  services,	  broadband	  
personal	  com
m
unication	  services	  and	  w







This	  industry	  uses	  w
ired	  infrastructure	  to	  provide	  clients	  w
ith	  internet	  access	  and	  
related	  services	  such	  as	  w
eb	  hosting,	  w
eb	  page	  designing	  and	  hardw
are	  or	  softw
are	  





ay	  also	  lease	  out	  capacity	  on	  their	  netw
orks	  to	  support	  the	  netw
ork	  
infrastructure	  of	  other	  com
panies	  (i.e.	  backbone	  services).	  This	  industry	  excludes	  
w









This	  industry	  provides	  local	  and	  long-­‐distance	  voice	  com
m





).	  Industry	  operators	  also	  generate	  
revenue	  by	  w
holesaling	  access	  to	  their	  netw
orks	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  purposes.	  This	  
industry	  excludes	  internet	  service	  providers	  (IBISW
orld	  report	  51711d),	  IP-­‐based	  
voice	  services	  (51711e)	  and	  firm













This	  industry	  includes	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  that	  offer	  nonphysical	  products	  
such	  as	  new
s,	  m
usic	  and	  video	  exclusively	  through	  the	  internet.	  Revenue	  in	  this	  
industry	  is	  derived	  from




ay	  derive	  revenue	  from
	  the	  sale	  of	  user	  inform
ation	  to	  
interested	  third	  parties.	  This	  industry	  does	  not	  include	  search	  engines,	  internet	  







This	  industry	  includes	  enterprises	  that	  operate	  search	  engines	  and	  other	  types	  of	  
search-­‐based	  w
ebsites	  that	  display	  advertisem
ents.	  These	  search	  engines	  typically	  
provide	  search	  services	  for	  free	  and	  earn	  incom
e	  w
hen	  a	  user	  clicks	  on	  an	  
advertising	  link,	  know
n	  as	  a	  "paid	  click."	  W
ebsites	  m
ay	  attract	  users	  to	  their	  search	  














This	  industry	  provides	  telecom
m
unications	  connections	  via	  satellite	  for	  
broadcasters	  and	  other	  telecom
m
unications	  providers.	  This	  industry	  excludes	  
direct-­‐to-­‐hom
e	  satellite	  TV	  services,	  w
hich	  are	  covered	  in	  the	  Satellite	  Television	  
Providers	  industry	  (IBISW





























S	  GDP	  is	  $15.09	  Trillion	  according	  to	  CIA	  W
orld	  Factbook	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